Content

Ridho Al-Hamdi

Indonesian Political Ideology

Political Parties and Local Governance in Yogyakarta Municipality 1998-2015

1. Edition 2017, ISBN print: 978-3-8288-4058-4, ISBN online: 978-3-8288-6884-7, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828868847

Tectum, Baden-Baden
Bibliographic information
Ridho Al Hamdi Indonesian Political Ideology Ridho Al Hamdi Indonesian Political Ideology Political Parties and Local Governance in Yogyakarta Municipality 1998–2015 Ridho Al Hamdi Indonesian Political Ideology. Political Parties and Local Governance in Yogyakarta Municipality 1998–2015 © Tectum – ein Verlag in der Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden 2017 Zugl. Diss. Technische Universität Dortmund, Fakultät Humanwissenschaften und Theologie, Institut für Philosophie und Politikwissenschaft, 2017 eISBN: 978 3 8288 6884 7 (Dieser Titel ist zugleich als gedrucktes Werk unter der ISBN 978-3-8288-4058-4 im Tectum Verlag erschienen.) Umschlagabbildung: Closeup of male hand holding black horse chess piece © fotolia/ Besuchen Sie uns im Internet www.tectum verlag.de Bibliografische Informationen der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Angaben sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar. To the memory of my mother, Sri Relawati ( – ) Acknowledgement This dissertation fulfils the requirements of my doctorate in political science at the Department of Philosophy and Political Science, TU Dortmund University, Germany. Many institutions and people assisted me during my doctoral studies and completing this work. Without their kind assistance, accomplishing this feat would have been unlikely. While I cannot mention all of them by name, I must recognise a few. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Dr. Christoph Schuck as my “Doktorvater” who helped me since the inception of my study in Germany. He also gave me the freedom to pursue my own ideas during the writing of this work. With his valuable guidance, a critical review, patience and encouragement, this dissertation was accomplished. My deepest thanks to Prof. a.D. Dr. Reimund Seidelmann who spent his time to read thoroughly this work and gave his constructive perspectives. My sincere gratitude also goes to Prof Dr. Udo Vorholt who examined this study with his critical questions. My presence in Germany and this work would not have been possible without the role of the Directorate General of Resources for Research, Technology and Higher Education, the Ministry of Research, Technology and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia which granted me a full scholarship. I am also extremely thankful to Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (UMY) for providing me generous funds prior to and during my stay in Germany as well as for my fieldwork research. My colleagues at TU Dortmund University have encouraged and assisted me with their cordial partnership before and during my study in Dortmund, and therefore, I want to express my appreciation to Matthias Heise, Kathrin Ruktäschel, Steve Schlegel, Thalis Weizmann, Julia Dumin, Maria Hemker, Rika Althoff, Adrianus Harsawaskita, Zarifa Mamedova and Christopher Beuter. Special thanks to German’s Familienkasse for its “Kindergeld” during my children living in Dort- VII mund as well as Sonja Wollny who connected me to BILD hilft e.V. which assisted my baby for a certain circumstance. I should not neglect my Indonesian buddies across Europe, especially who have been involving in Muhammadiyah Deutschland, for their brotherhood in social gatherings and helpful assistance during my stay in Germany. Furthermore, I want to mention my colleagues at UMY for their motivation, beneficial cooperation and technical assistance prior to and during my graduate studies: Gunawan Budiyanto, Bambang Cipto, Achmad Nurmandi, Alex Hariyanto, Ali Muhammad, Titin Purwaningsih, Nano Prawoto and Bambang Rahmanto. My grateful thanks to all my colleagues at the Department of Government Affairs and Administration of UMY. Particular thanks to Ahmad-Norma Permata who motivated me prior to my departure for Germany and provided useful ideas. During my fieldwork in Yogyakarta Municipality, I would like to thank the municipal government, including its agencies and technical institutions which provided the necessary data: the town hall, the secretariat of the DPRD, the secretariat of the KPUD, the ARSIPDA office, the KESBANG office, the bureau of statistics and other related institutions. My sincere thanks to all respondents who bestowed their time and shared their experiences and, of course, their valuable information to enrich and sharpen this study. Although they contributed to this study, nonetheless, I am responsible for any misinterpretations and incongruity in this piece of work. The greatest honours and appreciations are bestowed on my family (parents, parents-in-law and siblings) for their support and motivation. My lasting and deepest thankfulness to my beloved wife Chusnul Septina Ari and my children Queena Nabihasophie Al-Hamdi and Aizza Medinareswari Al-Hamdi, for their love, patience and encouragement who accompanied me during my studies in Germany. I dedicate this humble dissertation to them. Dortmund, July Acknowledgement VIII Abstract This study examines the influence of political ideology on Indonesia’s political parties in addressing local governance issues during the democratic era, primarily between and . Three representative parties are investigated: The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS). Selecting these parties is based on a threefold consideration: representing ideological cleavage, representing people’s aspirations and the result of four election cycles. Yogyakarta Municipality is selected as the locus of study due to its good governance and overwhelming achievements nationally in addressing primarily education and health issues. Therefore, this study has three main objectives. First is figuring out the influence of ideology on the party policy and agenda in coping with public service issues. Second is to explore the effectiveness of the party agenda in dealing with those issues. Third is to discern the pattern of relationships between political parties and governance actors. Methodologically, this study adopts qualitative research methodology using a case study approach. Two techniques were used to gather data: first, in-depth elite and specialised interviews and, second, documentary analysis for collecting the necessary data. The data analysis was presented in four steps: reducing data, displaying data, drawing and verification and conclusion. The deductive and inductive analyses were employed together in displaying the data. Four main findings are presented. Firstly, the policies made by PDIP, PAN and PKS in addressing public services have similar roles as defenders of the welfare state. They concur that education and health are basic needs for human life which should be subsidised entirely by the government. Their distinctive ideologies together comprise the ideology of welfarism, or so-called “symbiotic ideology”. The role of the party chairperson and daily boards are more dominant than other positions in deciding policies. There are three determining factors which IX influence those parties in producing policies: the party regulation, internal stimuli and external stimuli. Secondly, the agendas which are performed by PDIP, PAN and PKS occur in two distinctive ways: structural and functional. The former demonstrates the involvement of those parties in five legislative bodies: the parliament board, the social welfare commission, the legislation body, the budgeting body and the special committee. The latter can be known through general statements of the party’s fractions which are delivered in the parliament plenary sessions and through the individual view of the parties’ elites. All parties tend to be defenders of people’s interests indicating that the parties’ agendas are working effectively and, in turn, Yogyakarta Municipality experienced positive growth. Thirdly, the relationship between parties and the state actors reveals that political ideology is waning. The changeable politics in administration or parliament indicates that the ideology is blunt in the power arena. This can be seen in the political contest in the executive arena being marked by three different approaches in three government regimes: ideological, pragmatic and pragmatic-opportunist. In the same vein, in the legislative arena, parties liquefy if they cope with public service and parliamentary affairs; conversely, the circumstances become extreme clashes if they deal with issues linked to religion and ethnicity. Fourthly, the relationship between parties and society reveals the resurgence of ideology when parties approach the grassroots. Each party will cultivate close ties with collateral-mass organisations or alliances. PDIP tends to strengthen the web of Marhaenism devotees, PAN relies on the Muhammadiyah network while PKS maximises the role of liqo’ linkages. To build up their internal forces, each has its own strategy to recruit cadres. PDIP prefers to recruit cadres from Marhaenism-based organisations, PAN tends to recruit cadres from mainly Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah and most of PKS’ cadres originate particularly from the Campus Da’wa Institutes. With economic society, PDIP attempts to struggle for the wong cilik group although it also seems to stand up for the conglomerates’ interests, PAN prefers to build up reciprocal cooperation with business clusters while PKS has little concern with this issue. Given these relationships, Yogyakarta Abstract X Municipality is the root of Marhaen. Nonetheless, pious Muslim activities can also be found in six kampung santris: Kauman, Karangkajen, Kotagede, Suronatan, Warungboto and Nitikan. They are abbreviated into one term: “Trikaswani”. Source: The map of Yogyakarta Municipality was re-sketched by the Author, finished in . . while the map of Indonesia is from d-maps.com at http://dmaps.com/carte.php?num_car= &lang=en Abstract XI Table of Contents List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIX List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXI Glossary and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XXIII Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Why Study Political Ideology in Indonesia? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 1 Scope and Limitations of this Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 3 Objectives of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. 5 Case Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.1. 5 Data-Gathering Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.2. 7 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.3. 10 Structure of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. 12 Chapter I Democratisation and Good Governance in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Democratisation and Decentralisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 15 Understanding Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1. 15 The Democratisation Wave in Indonesia Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2. 20 Decentralisation and its Impacts on Local Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.3. 25 Good Governance and Public Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 29 Governance and Basic Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1. 29 XIII Two Major Public Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2. 34 Education Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2.1. 35 Health Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2.2. 38 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 41 Chapter II Political Ideology and Political Parties in Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Political Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 43 Defining Ideology in the Political Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1. 43 The Variants of Indonesian Society. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2. 50 The Abangan Variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2.1. 51 The Santri Variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2.2. 55 The Jemaah Tarbiyah Variant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2.3. 58 Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 63 Concept of Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1. 63 Model of Party Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2. 68 Change and Goal in a Political Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.3. 73 The Configuration of Political Cleavage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.4. 76 Selected Parties: Formulating the Analytical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 80 The Nationalist-Secular: PDIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.1. 80 The Nationalist-Muslim: PAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.2. 82 The Nationalist-Islamist: PKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.3. 85 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. 88 Chapter III Yogyakarta: The Country’s Leading Municipality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 92 Public Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 97 Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1. 97 Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2. 103 Table of Contents XIV Governance Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 107 Executive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.1. 107 Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.2. 111 Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.3. 125 Economic Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.4. 127 Three Ideological Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. 130 PDIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.1. 133 PAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.2. 135 PKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4.3. 136 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. 138 Chapter IV Towards a Welfare State: Party Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Party Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 141 Education Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1. 142 Health Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2. 145 Party Policy-makers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 148 Policy Determinants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 150 Party Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.1. 150 Internal Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.2. 151 External Stimuli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3.3. 152 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. 153 Chapter V Fighting for People’s Interests: Party Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 156 The Commission of Social Welfare. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1. 158 Legislation Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2. 159 Budgetary Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.3. 163 Special Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.4. 166 Table of Contents XV Party Attitudes towards Raperda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 168 Education System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1. 169 Retribution of Health Services. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2. 171 Health Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.3. 173 Exclusive Breastfeeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.4. 175 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 177 Chapter VI Changeable Politics: Parties and the State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 179 Ideological Approach: 2001–2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1. 181 Pragmatic Approach: 2006–2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2. 186 Pragmatic-Opportunist Approach: 2011–2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.3. 192 Relying on Issues: Parties in the Legislative Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 199 Party and its Fraction: Seemed Solid with a Tiny Clash . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1. 200 Among Fractions: Occasionally Thawing and Freezing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2. 203 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 205 Chapter VII The Resurgence of Ideology: Parties and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 207 PDIP: Strengthening Marhaenism Devotees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.1. 210 PAN: Depending on Muhammadiyah Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.2. 216 PKS: Maximising Liqo’ Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1.3. 220 Having Variant Bonds: Parties and Economic Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 225 PDIP: Attempting to Struggle for Wong Cilik? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1. 225 PAN: Towards a Proportional Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2. 228 PKS: Tending towards Less Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.3. 231 TRIKASWANI: Kampung Santri in the Root of Marhaen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 233 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. 240 Table of Contents XVI Chapter VIII Conclusion: The Waning and Revival of Political Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243 Towards a Symbiotic Ideology: Welfarism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1. 244 Blunt in the Power Arena, Sharp to the Grassroots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2. 247 Waning Ideology: A Contest in the Power Arena . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.1. 247 The Revival of Ideology: Approaching the Grassroots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2.2. 250 Theoretical and Practical Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. 251 Proposal for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4. 255 Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 Appendix 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257 Appendix 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 Appendix 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261 Appendix 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 Appendix 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271 Table of Contents XVII List of Tables Table . The Human Development Index in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Table . Indonesia’s Governance Index in Yogyakarta Municipality, Table . The Number of Schools in Yogyakarta Municipality, Table . The Number of Schools, Classes, Students and Teachers in Yogyakarta Municipality, Table . The Number of Students who Passed their Exam in Yogyakarta Municipality, Table . The Profile of the Regional Government in Yogyakarta Municipality, Table . Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Nine Parties in the Election Table . The Profile of Legislators, – Table . Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Six Parties in the Election Table . The Profile of Legislators, – Table . Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Seven Parties in the Election Table . The Profile of Legislators, – XIX Table . Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Eight Parties in the Election Table . The Profile of Legislators, – Table . The DPRD Board in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Table . Parties’ Involvement in the Commission of Social Welfare, – Table . Parties’ Involvement in the Legislation Body, – Table . The Number of Local Regulations Issued by the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Table . Parties’ Involvement in the Budgetary Body, – Table . The Income and Expenditure Budget in Yogyakarta Municipality Table . Parties’ Involvement in the Special Committee for , – Table . The Comparison of Electoral Votes between Islam-based Parties and Secular Parties in Yogyakarta Municipality, – List of Tables XX List of Figures Figure . Political Ideologies in Contemporary Indonesia Figure . The Invention of Political Ideologies and Their Institutionalisation in Contemporary Indonesia Figure . Yogyakarta Municipality Administrative System Figure . The Electoral Performance of PDIP, PAN and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality ( ) Figure . The Parliamentary Seats of PDIP, PAN and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality ( ) Figure . Determining Factors Influencing the Party Policy Figure . The Effectiveness Process of the Party Agenda Figure . The Creation of Cleavage in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Figure . The Creation of Political Forces XXI Glossary and Abbreviations ABA ‘Aisyiyah Bustanul Athfal, kindergarten under ‘Aisyiyah management abangan nominal Muslim ABY Aliansi Buruh Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta Labour Alliance) AD Anggaran Dasar (Statute) aliran literally stream, denoting various streams in political affairs such as Islamist, nationalist and secularist. Alun-Alun Lor North Field, located in front of the Yogyakarta Kraton Palace Al-Qur’an Muslim Holy book angkringan It denotes a roadside food stall, usually bought by lowerclass people, such as pedicab drivers, students, toilers, street musicians and the like. Most angkringans consist of Javanese local-traditional foods and drinks APBD Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah (Regional Income and Expenditure Budget) APBS Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Sekolah (School Income and Expenditure Budget) ART Anggaran Rumah Tangga (rule) ASKES Asuransi Kesehatan (Health Insurance) ASMI Akademi Sekretari dan Manajemen Marsudirini (Marsudirini Management and Secretary Academy) As-Sunnah The Prophet Muhammad’s way of life Balegda Badan Legislasi Daerah (Legislation Body) Bamus Badan Musyawarah (Consultative Body) Banggar Badan Anggaran (Budgetary Body) Batik Javanese textile dyeing BHP Badan Hukum Pendidikan (Legal Body of Education) BKPM Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Council) BN Basic Needs BOSDA Biaya Operasional Sekolah Daerah (Local School Operational Financial Support) XXIII BPJS Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (Social Insurance Administrative Body) BPK Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (Financial Auditing Agency) BPUPKI Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence) BUMD Badan Usaha Milik Daerah (Local State-owned Enterprises) BUMN Badan Usaha Milik Nasional (National State-owned Enterprises) CSR Corporate Social Responsibility da’wa Islamic proselytising Dagadu a local creative garment industry in Yogyakarta DAK Dana Alokasi Khusus (Special Allocation Fund) Dapil daerah pemilihan (election district) DAU Dana Alokasi Umum (General Allocation Fund) DEPAG Departemen Agama (Indonesia’s Religious Department) desa village level in rural area DIY Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Special Territory of Yogyakarta) DMI Dewan Masjid Indonesia (Indonesian Mosque Council) DPC Dewan Pimpinan Cabang, organisational structure of PAN at the sub-district/sub-municipal levels; or Dewan Pengurus Cabang, organisational structure of PKS at the sub-district/ sub-municipal levels DPC Party Dewan Pimpinan Cabang Partai, organisational structure of PDIP at the district and municipal levels DPD Dewan Pimpinan Daerah, organisational structure of PAN at the district and municipal levels; or Dewan Pengurus Daerah, organisational structure of PKS in executive functions at the district and municipal levels DPD Party Dewan Pimpinan Daerah Partai, organisational structure of PDIP at the provincial level DPLN Party Dewan Perwakilan Luar Negeri Partai (Foreign Representative Board), organisational structure of PDIP in foreign countries DPP Dewan Pimpinan Pusat, organisational structure of PAN at the national level DPP Party Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai, organisational structure of PDIP at the national level DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (People’s Regional Representative Council) Glossary and Abbreviations XXIV DPRt Dewan Pimpinan Ranting, organisational structure of PAN at the levels of village or nagari; or Dewan Pengurus Ranting, organisational structure of PKS at the village level DPT Dana Purna Tugas (Retirement Fund) DPTD Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Daerah, organisational structure of PKS at the district and municipal levels DPTP Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Pusat, organisational structure of PKS at the national level DPTW Dewan Pimpinan Tingkat Wilayah, organisational structure of PKS at the provincial levels DPW Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah, organisational structure of PAN at the provincial level DSD Dewan Syariah Daerah (Municipal Sharia Board) EIU Economist Intelligence Unit EKPPD Evaluasi Kinerja Pemerintah Daerah (Evaluation of the Local Government Performance) FKDK Fraksi Kebangkitan Demokrasi dan Keadilan (Justice and Democracy Awakening Fraction) FKPMY Forum Komunikasi Pelajar Muslim Yogyakarta (Communicating Forum for Yogyakarta’s Muslim Pupils) FORMI Federasi Olahraga Rekreasi Masyarakat Indonesia (Federation of Recreation Sport for Indonesian Society) FPI Fraksi Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union Fraction) fraksi A fraction (faction) in the legislature. It consists of members of a party or some parties. FSLDK Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Forum for Coordinating Campus Predication) FSRMY Forum Silaturahim Remaja Masjid Yogyakarta (Coordinating Forum for Yogyakarta’s Mosque Adolescent) FUI Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic Brotherhood Forum) GAMKI Gerakan Angkatan Muda Kristen Indonesia (Indonesia Christian Youth Movement) Gapeknas Gabungan Pekerja Konstruksi Nasional (National Construction Labour Relations Alliance) GENPRO Global Entrepreneur Professional, an Indonesian Muslim business community Gerindra Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesian Movement) GMNI Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Student Movement) Golkar Golongan Karya (Functional Group) Glossary and Abbreviations XXV GPM Gerakan Pemuda Marhaenis (Marhaenist Youth Movement) GRANAT Gerakan Nasional Anti Narkotika (National Anti-drug Movement) GRM Gerakan Rakyat Marhaen (Marhaen People Movement) GSNI Gerakan Siswa Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist School Pupils’ Movement) halaqah religious circles Hanura Hati Nurani Rakyat (People Pure Heart) HDI Human Development Index HMI Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (Islamic Student Association) IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institutes of Islamic Religion) IDR Indonesian Rupiah, Indonesian currency IGI Indonesia Governance Index ijma acclamation system IKI Indeks Kota Islami (Islamic City Index) Ikhwanul Muslimin Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna in ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund IMM Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Student Association) INKAI Institut Karate-Do Indonesia, one of the martial arts in Indonesia IPKI Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (League of the Upholders of Indonesian Independence) IPM Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah School’s Pupil Association) IUD Intrauterine Device JAMKESDA Jaminan Kesehatan Daerah (Regional Government-financed Health Insurance) JAMKESMAS Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat (Government-financed Health Insurance) JAMSOSTEK Jaminan Sosial Tenagakerja (Employees Social Security System) Jemaah Tarbiyah Education movement JKN Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (National Health Insurance) JMF Jamaah Musholla Fisipol, LDK at the faculty of social and political science UGM Glossary and Abbreviations XXVI Jogja The other well-known name for Yogyakarta Municipality JPD Jaminan Pendidikan Anak (Children Education Insurance) JSIT Jaringan Sekolah Islam Terpadu (Indonesia’s Network of Integrated Islamic Schools) jumatan Friday group-prayer, Friday service kabupaten district KAJASHA Yayasan Keluarga Alumni Jamaah Shalahuddin (Foundation for Jamaah Shalahuddin Alumni) KAMMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union) kampung It does not denote an administrative territory, but it pictures a societal community having a similar culture and practice and usually consisting of some surrounding groups Karang Taruna village-based youth organisation, concentrates itself in social and welfare purposes KB Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning) KBM Keluarga Besar Marhaenis (Great Family of Marhaenist) kecamatan sub-municipality in urban area or sub-district in rural area kelurahan village level in urban area Kesbang Kesatuan Bangsa (National Unity) KIH Koalisi Indonesia Hebat (Outstanding Indonesia Coalition) KJB Koalisi Jogja Bersatu (United Yogyakarta Coalition) KJKS Koperasi Jasa Keuangan Syariah Umbul Sejahtera (Sharia Finance Service Cooperative of Umbul Sejahtera) KKB Klinik Keluarga Berencana (Family Planning Clinics) KLN Koordinator Luar Negeri (Foreign Coordinator), organisational structure of PAN in foreign countries KMP Koalisi Merah Putih (White Red Coalition) KMP Keluarga Muslim Psikologi (Muslim Family of Psychology), LDK in the faculty of psychology UGM KMS Keluarga Menuju Sejahtera (Family towards Prosperity), provided for poor people Konfercab Konferensi Cabang (Branch Conference) Konferda Konferensi Daerah (Regional Conference) KONI Komite Olahraga Nasional Indonesia (National Sports Committee of Indonesia) kos-kosan rented rooms/houses or apartments kota a city or municipality, headed by an elected mayor Glossary and Abbreviations XXVII KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Commission) KPM Koalisi Pelangi Mataram (Mataram Rainbow Coalition) KPU Komisi Pemilihan Umum (Election Commission) KPUD Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah (Regional Election Commission) KRJ Koalisi Rakyat Jogja (Yogyakarta People Coalition) KSPSI Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia (All Indonesian Workers Union Confederation) kyai Muslim elder, cleric lapak seller a person who sells belongings in a tiny place, usually on the floor/ground without any tents or stalls LDK Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (Campus Predication Institute) LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute of Arabic and Islamic Studies of Ibn Saud University) liqo’ meeting LOD Lembaga Ombudsman Daerah (Regional Ombudsman Institution) los seller a person who sells in small aisles madrasah Islamic school masjid mosque MENA Middle East and North Africa Merdeka Indonesian term, freedom MIPI Masyarakat Ilmu Pemerintahan Indonesia (Indonesian Government Scientists’ Association) Malioboro Street Name of a famous street and area located at the heart of Yogyakarta Municipality, as a major shopping centre mainly for tourists MI Madrasah Ibtidaiyah (Islamic primary school) MPD Majelis Pertimbangan Daerah (Municipal Consultative Assembly) MPP Majelis Pertimbangan Partai (Advisory Board) MPR Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People’s Consultative Assembly) MTs Madrasah Tsanawiyah (Islamic junior high school) mubaligh Islamic missionaries muktamar national congress Munas Musyawarah Nasional (National Deliberation) murabbi teacher/senior, mentor Glossary and Abbreviations XXVIII Murba Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak (Deliberation of Common People) Muscab Musyawarah Cabang (Sub-District/Sub-Municipal Deliberation) Musda Musyawarah Daerah (District/Municipal Deliberation) musholla Well-known also as langgar (a place for prayer), smaller than mosque and frequently privately owned Musran Musyawarah Ranting (Village Deliberation) MUSRENBANG Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan (Development Planning Deliberation). Muswil Musyawarah Wilayah (Provincial Deliberation) musyawarah deliberation to build consensus Nasdem Nasional Demokrat (National Democrat) NCC Napza Crisis Centre NGO Non-Government Organisation NII Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) NKRI Negara Kesaturan Republik Indonesia (United State of Republic of Indonesia NU Nahdhatul Ulama (Resurgence of Islamic Scholars) PAC Party Pimpinan Anak Cabang Partai, organisational structure of PDIP at sub-district and sub-municipal levels Pak Literally means Mister. It is a term for respecting other persons PAN Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party) Panggar Panitia Anggaran (Budgetary Committee) Panmus Panitia Musyawarah (Consultative Committee) Pansus Panitia Khusus (Special Committee) Parkindo Partai Kristen Indonesia (Indonesian Christian Party) PAR Party Pengurus Anak Ranting Partai (Sub-Village Board), organisational structure of PDIP under village level PAUD Pendidikan Anak Usia Dini (Early Childhood Education) patungan voluntary dues system PBB Partai Bulan Bintang (Star Crescent Party) PBR Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reformation Star Party) PBSD Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (Socialist Democrat Labour Party) PBVSI Persatuan Bola Voli Seluruh Indonesia (Indonesian Volleyball Association) Glossary and Abbreviations XXIX PCM Pimpinan Cabang Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Sub- Municipal Board) PDA Pimpinan Daerah ‘Aisyiyah (Municipal Board of ‘Aisyiyah) PDAM Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum (Drinking Water Local Company) PDI Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Party) PDIP Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) PDK Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (National Democratic Party) PDKB Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa (National Democracy Party of Devotion) PDM Pimpinan Daerah Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Municipal Board) PDP Partai Demokrasi Pembaharuan (Democratic Renewal Party) PDS Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party) Pelopor Pioneer pengajian Islamic forums and teachings PERBASI Persatuan Bola Basket Seluruh Indonesia (Indonesian Basketball Association) perda peraturan daerah (local regulation) Permai Persatuan Rakyat Marhaen Indonesia (Indonesian Marhaen People’s Union) Perwal peraturan walikota (mayoral regulation) pesantren Islamic boarding school, a place for santri PHBS Perilaku Hidup Bersih dan Sehat (Clean and Health Life Behavior) PIAK Penilaian Inisiatif Anti Korupsi (Anti-Corruption Initiative Assessment) PII Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Pupils) pilkada pemilihan kepala daerah (regional head elections) pilwalkot Pemilihan walikota (mayoral election) PK Partai Keadilan (Justice Party) PKB Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party) PKDI Partai Kasih Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party of Devotion) PKI Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party) PKK Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Movement) Glossary and Abbreviations XXX PKL Pedagang Kaki Lima (Street-based Vendors) PKNU Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama (National Awakening of Islamic Scholars Party) PKPB Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa (Care for the Nation Functional Party) PKPI Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (Indonesian Justice and Unity Party) PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Justice and Prosperous Party) PMKRI Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katholik Republik Indonesia (Indonesian Catholic Student Association) PNBK Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan (Freedom Bull National Party) PNI Partai Nasionalis Indonesia (Indonesian National Party) POLRI Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police) Posyandu Pos Pelayanan Terpadu (Integrated Service Centre) PPD Partai Persatuan Daerah (United Regional Party) PPDB Penerimaan Peserta Didik Baru (New Pupil Registration Online System) PPDI Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democracy Upholder Party) PPKBD Pos Pelayanan Keluarga Berencana Desa (Village Family Planning Post) PPLN Party Pengurus Perwakilan Luar Negeri Partai (Foreign Provincebased Representative Board), organisational structure of PDIP at the federal state or province levels in foreign countries PPP Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party) PPPI Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia (Indonesian Entrepreneurs and Workers Party) PPRN Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional (National People’s Concern Party) PRM Pimpinan Ranting Muhammadiyah, the organisational structure of Muhammadiyah at the levels of kelurahan, desa, RW, RT or certain communities PRP Pengurus Ranting Partai, organisational structure of PDIP at village levels PSI Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) PSI Partai Sarikat Indonesia (Indonesian Union Party) PSIM Persatuan Sepak Bola Indonesia Mataram (Indonesian Mataram Football Club) Glossary and Abbreviations XXXI PTSP Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu (One-stop Integrated Service) Puskesmas Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat (Public Health Centre) PUTM Pendidikan Ulama Tarjih Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah’s Tarjih Ulema Education) PWK Pos Wanita Keadilan (Women’s Justice Station) Rakercabsus Rapat Kerja Cabang Khusus (a special meeting of all PAC PDIPs) raperda rancangan peraturan daerah (local regulation draft) reses a period where legislators conduct activities outside the legislative building, usually three or four times each year RISMA Remaja Masjid, an adolescent predication organisation with activities centred in the mosque ROHIS Rohani Islam (Islamic Spirituality) RSKIA Rumah Sakit Keluarga Ibu dan Anak (Mother and Child Hospital) RSUD Rumah Sakit Umum Daerah (Regional Public Hospital) RT Rukun Tetangga (Neighbouring Group) RTO Real Time Online RW Rukun Warga (Surrounding Group) santri devout Muslim SAW Sallallāhu 'Alaihi waSallam (peace be upon him or PBUH) SD Sekolah Dasar (Primary School) SDI Sarekat Dagang Islam (Muslim Traders Union) Sekda Sekretaris Daerah (Executive Secretariat) Semutlis Sepuluh Menit untuk Lingkungan Sekolah (Ten Minutes for the School’s Environment) sharia Islamic Law SIT Sekolah Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic Schools) SJSN Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional (National Social Security System) SKI Seksi Kerohanian Islam (Islamic Spiritual Section) SKN Sistem Kesehatan Nasional (National Health System) SLB Sekolah Luar Biasa (Extraordinary School) SMA Sekolah Menengah Atas (Senior High School) SMK Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan (Vocational High School) SMP Sekolah Menengah Pertama (Junior High School) STIKES Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Kesehatan (Health Science College) Glossary and Abbreviations XXXII tamanisasi garden(isation), an environment-friendly movement. It denotes the process of greening a garden Taman Pintar Smart Park tarbiyah education or training model of Jemaah Tarbiyah in disseminating its ideas tata tertib standing orders Tim Sukses Success Team tool fitting In Indonesia known as Alkep (Alat Kelengkapan). It denotes the division of parliamentary duties into some bodies such as the board, commissions, the consultative body, the legislation body, the budgetary body and the honorary body. TK Taman Kanak-Kanak (Kindergarten) TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Military) TPS Tempat Pemungutan Suara (polling stations) UAD Universitas Ahmad Dahlan (Ahmad Dahlan University) UGM Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University) UHC Universal Health Coverage UIN Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University) UKDW Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana (Christian University of Duta Wacana) ulama Muslim scholars UMKM Usaha Micro Kecil Menengah (Micro Small and Medium Enterprises) ummah society, community UMR Upah Minimum Regional (Regional Minimum Wage) UMY Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta (Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta) UNDP United Nations Development Programme UST Universitas Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa (Sarjanawiyata Tamansiswa University) ustadz Islamic teachers WHA World Health Assembly WHO World Health Organisation wong cilik common people or small people YAKKUM Yayasan Kristen Untuk Kesehatan Umum (Christian Foundation for Public Health) Glossary and Abbreviations XXXIII Introduction Why Study Political Ideology in Indonesia? Studying political ideology in Indonesia is an appealing subject in scholarly discourse. This country is not only the third largest democratic state of the world after India and the USA, but it is also the world’s largest predominantly Muslim country, with more than million Muslim inhabitants with various beliefs and practices. Indonesia has the largest population in Southeast Asia and is geographically located outside the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries. This study explores how political ideology and democratic governance can grow and develop together in a Muslim country. The history of political ideology in Indonesia can be traced back to the early twentieth century, when Sutomo and Wahidin Sudirohusodo established Boedi Oetomo in as a nationalism-based movement. In , Sarekat Islam, instituted by HOS Tjokroaminoto, emerged on the national stage as a representation of mainly Muslim political forces. Afterwards, representing the ideology of communism and Marxism- Leninism, PKI was established in . More than a decade later, Tjipto Mangunkusumo, Sartono, Iskaq Tjokrohadisuryo, Sunaryo and Soekarno founded PNI in , representing the ideology of nationalism-Marhaenism. All these distinctive ideologies sought to expel colonialism groups and to gain national independence. After achieving independence in , political ideology was manifest in political parties. The s and s were the heydays of political ideology within the country. At the time, hundreds of political parties with their own ideology emerged at the national and local lev- 1. In , Indonesia had , , people (BPS Republik Indonesia, a: p. ). Of them, . percent are Muslims. The rest are divided into . percent Christians, . percent Catholics, . percent Hindu, . percent Buddhists, . percent Confucians and . percent unaffiliated (BPS Republik Indonesia, b). By , this country had . million inhabitants (BPS Republik Indonesia, : p. ). 1 els. Nevertheless, only some political parties led the election. The ideology of nationalism was manifested by PNI. The ideology of communism was embodied in PKI. The ideology of Islam was represented mainly by Masyumi and the NU Party. The ideology of socialism was symbolised by PSI. Meanwhile, the ideology of Christianity and Catholics was manifest by Parkindo and the Catholic Party. During the New Order regime, political ideology eroded and in turn simplified into merely two types: PDI represented the ideology of nationalism while PPP represented the ideology of Islam. There was also a non-ideology group namely Golkar which became the government’s political power. The downfall of Authoritarian Rule in provided a chance for all people to create political ideologies through party politics. Thus, hundreds of political parties with distinctive ideologies appeared on the political stage. Nevertheless, only tens of political parties can participate in the elections due to electoral rules. They fall on the spectrum of ideologies between the secular group on the one hand and the Islamist group on the other. Thus, political ideology has been influencing the development of political parties in Indonesia. Most political scholars argue that as one of the democratic institutions, parties play a vital role as vehicles in articulating distinctive interests among society (Lawson, : p. ; Mainwaring & Scully, : p. ; Pridham, : p.xii; Puhle, : p. ). As central political institutions, parties fulfil major functions between state and civil society (Ufen, : p. ). Therefore, this study examines political parties because they are the main agents of political representation and are virtually the only actors with access to elected positions in democratic politics (Mainwaring & Scully, : p. ). In addition, parties are also the main vehicle for individuals to enter the government. One of the reasons individuals continue to join parties is they can contest elections and gather votes to fill parliamentary seats. Parties’ interests are served when their candidates accumulate adequate votes to be elected into the government, and party support strengthens candidates’ chances of winning (Fionna, : p. ). For nearly two decades, the democratic system has been embedded in Indonesia since . Four cycles of free and fair elections including various regional head elections took place during this time. Indeed, a variety of changes occurred in all aspects of life in different Introduction 2 ways. Indonesia has a noteworthy role in promoting democratic governance while the global trend reveals that a lot of Muslim countries mainly in the MENA regions have been suffering terrible turmoil. One can argue that the political ideology in recent Indonesia is waning such that it is quite difficult for society to differentiate ideologically between one party and other parties. Despite having a party platform, as a matter of fact, such platforms are almost identical to each other. All parties seemingly have similar pragmatic goals: winning elections and gaining parliamentary seats and positions in the government. Thus, it is fascinating to observe the existence of political ideology in Indonesia’s post- New Order regime. As the sole official representative to articulate public interests, political parties are examined in this study. Scope and Limitations of this Study Broadly speaking, this study examines the influence of political ideology in Indonesia’s political parties to address governance issues during the democratic era. To measure if ideology is still alive, vague or submerged within political parties, this study investigates the influence of ideology in three ways. First is the parties’ policy in dealing with two public service issues: education and health. Second is the parties’ agenda in addressing those two public services. Third is the parties’ strategy in interacting and communicating with the so-called “governance actor” in coping with those issues. Yogyakarta Municipality was selected as a representative area for this study. It was chosen first because Muslims comprise a majority at . percent. Although devout Muslims play a vital role in Islamising society, secular groups have an ability to dominate the political stage continuously. The political contest between pious Muslims and nominal Muslims is still continuing. Second, since the establishment of decentralisation and local autonomy in the post-New Order regime, the district and municipal governments are the real executors with high authority to execute public services rather than provincial governments. Third, Yogyakarta Municipality repeatedly achieved outstanding assessments and acknowledgements in the field of governance: the cleanest city from corruption in and , Indonesia’s most live- 2. 2. Scope and Limitations of this Study 3 able city in and , the city with positive development in life expectancy in and and the best city in implementing good governance in . Fourth, the municipality has already earned many international and domestic awards with more than prizes since . By selecting this area, this study seeks to discern whether the well-implemented governance diminishes the influence of ideology or not. Three major political parties were chosen as the main object of the study: PDIP (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional, National Mandate Party) and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Justice and Prosperous Party). There was a threefold consideration in selecting these three parties. Firstly, they represent current types of party ideology in Indonesia. Secondly, they represent major forces of people’s aspirations both at the national and local levels. Thirdly, they have participated in four election cycles and have won seats repeatedly in national and local parliaments. One may argue that examining all parties which participated in four different elections should be carried out to present an excellent account, however such research would require a great amount of effort and is beyond the scope of the current study. Two basic human needs, education and health, were chosen as the main issue of local governance and to assess the influence of political ideology on the parties’ policy and agenda in addressing those two basic needs. Moreover, this study scrutinises the way parties interact and communicate with four key governance actors: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society. Regarding the time frame of the study, it begins in which is the inception of the democratic system after the downfall of Authoritarian Rule and continues to – the end of field research activities carried out in this study. The central question of this study is: To what extent does political ideology influence political parties in addressing local governance issues in Yogyakarta Municipality? More explicitly, this study explores the following three questions: How do the policies and agenda of political parties cope with education and health issues? Do their policies and agenda work effectively? What are their strategies in interacting and communicating with four main actors in the governance arena: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society? Introduction 4 Objectives of the Study The purpose of this study, in general, is explaining the existence of political ideology during the Indonesian democratic era, particularly from to , to discern whether it is still alive, vague or submerged. The seven aims for this study are: . To discern if the well-implemented governance in the regional government is diminishing the role and influence of ideology towards political parties, by examining the parties’ policy and agenda; . To explore if there are any differences in policies and agenda among political parties in addressing public service issues; . To explore the driving factors that could influence political parties when making a policy or policies; . To identify the main policy-makers who play a vital role within political parties; . To explore if the parties’ agenda is working effectively or not in dealing with public service issues; . To identify the relationship pattern between political parties and state actors (government and parliament); and . To identify the relationship pattern between political parties and society, including civil society and economic society. Methodology Case Study This study adopts the qualitative research method which denotes studying things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpreting phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. This research involves studying a broad range of empirical materials which portray routine and problematic moments and meaning in individuals’ lives (Denzin & Lincoln, : pp. – ). Hence, the role of fieldwork through long-term interaction with relevant respondents is very beneficial in qualitative research in order to explore multiple perspectives (Glesne & Peshkin, : p. ). This method is the only way of 3. 4. 4.1. 4. Methodology 5 establishing the validity of findings from field research. It can provide a deeper understanding regarding social phenomena than would be obtained from purely quantitative data (Silverman, : p. ). This study uses qualitative research for three reasons. Firstly, qualitative research is the most appropriate method to explore people’s subjective experiences, embracing their interpretations of those experiences. In this sense, the qualitative method provides a chance for social researchers to investigate further the meaning, process, and context of a unit of analysis. Secondly, the qualitative method facilitates researchers investigating a case in-depth and in detail such that this method typically produces a wealth of detailed information and increases the depth of understanding about cases and real situations. Thirdly, this method has conventionally been applied in political science, especially in the context of micro-level analysis (Devine, : pp. – ; Patton, : p. ). As this study examines the influence of political ideology in political parties, qualitative research is suitable for this study. Furthermore, the qualitative method has five approaches: narrative research, phenomenological research, grounded theory research, ethnographic research and case study research (Creswell, : pp. – ). Among these approaches, the case study is the most appropriate which was employed in this study. Drawing on Creswell ( : p. ), Gerring ( : p. ), Schramm (in Yin, : p. ) and Flyvbjerg ( : pp. – ), this study defines a case study as intensive research which explores one or more cases or a decision or a set of decisions for particular objectives within a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time through detailed and indepth data gathering by involving multiple sources of information. In doing so, the case study is a precise choice and a standard method in social science. In addition, the case study is a proper and preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are utilised for social sciences (Yin, : p. ). The case study is also more beneficial when inferences are descriptive rather than causal, when the study concerns more causal mechanisms than causal effects, when the strategy of a study is exploratory rather than confirmatory and when the study has useful variance which is available for only a single unit or a small number of Introduction 6 units (Gerring, : p. ). Thus, the case study entails systematic gathering of adequate information and data on particular parties to gain insight into the life of the party so that the researcher can deeply investigate a particular case (Berg & Lune, : p. ). Based on these considerations, this study is a case study. Data-Gathering Techniques To produce accurate findings, this study selected two kinds of datagathering techniques: in-depth interview and documentary analysis which are extremely advantageous to collect required and comprehensive information. It is essential, however, that in-depth interviews and documentary analysis serve as the primary data-gathering techniques in this study. In-depth Interview. An interview describes human interaction which takes place between at least two persons, but other useful possibilities include one or more interviewees (Glesne & Peshkin, : p. ). Moreover, an interview has open-ended questions and probes yield in-depth responses about respondents’ experiences, perceptions, opinions, feelings and knowledge. The data consist of verbatim quotations with sufficient context to be interpretable (Patton, : p. ). To carry out in-depth interviews, this study applies elite and specialised interviews. Elite interviewing occurs with persons with high authority representing particular groups within society while specialised interviewing is with persons with broad knowledge and information on a specific topic (Manheim & Rich, : pp. – ). Specialised interviewing enables obtaining an alternative perspective and to validate data collected from the elite interviewing (Silverman, : pp. – ). To conduct the interviews, this study used standardised open-ended interviews, which consist of a set of questions carefully and comprehensively worded before the interview. A set of questions should be arranged in the interview guide to guarantee that the same basic lines of inquiry are pursued with each respondent. The interview guide provides subject areas within which the researcher has freedom to explore, probe and ask as well as to word questions spontaneously which will 4.2. 4. Methodology 7 elucidate and illuminate the specific topic. Furthermore, the benefit in using an interview guide is that the researcher can make decisions to organise the restricted time available during the interview. Besides, the guide will help the interview be more systematic and comprehensive by delimiting in advance the topics to be explored. In conducting focus group interviews, the guide is also crucial to keep the interactions focused when some respondents have other opinions outside the topic (Patton, : pp. – ). When interviewing respondents, the interviews begin with general questions. Afterwards, more complex questions will be posed. At the end of the interview, the respondents will be given a chance to provide important information which was not covered by the interview guide. Moreover, the interviews are cross-referenced with each other so that the information is double-checked. The same technique and procedure are also applied in the interviews with the respondents from other categories. It is important to mention that although the interviews were based on the interview guide, in particular cases, the interviews were not always carried out in exactly the same manner as the interview guide had anticipated to minimise a high degree of standardisation. During the interview, the respondents were also given a chance to provide their own opinions. To ensure accuracy, the interviews were taperecorded to record information and notes were taken as well. The interviews in general were centred in Yogyakarta Municipality with key functionaries of PDIP, PAN and PKS, governance actors and relevant informants. The goal was to discern the policy, agenda and strategy of the three parties as well as to confirm other relevant data. First, a direct interview was conducted with respondents face to face and with direct talking and discussion based on an arranged schedule. The interview occurred twice or more with certain respondents. They took place approximately between June and November . All respondents in this category are mentioned in Appendix I. Second, indirect interviews were conducted with personal communication through social media such as email, telephone and other online social networks. The sources were almost all respondents in the first category and some elected legislators since until mainly from PDIP, PAN and PKS and also other appropriate informants. This sought to reconfirm necessary and missing data which were not covered in the direct inter- Introduction 8 view and in turn to accomplish the study analysis. The communication took place mainly during . Nonetheless, the second category of interviews is not mentioned in the appendix. Documentary Analysis. This study applied documentary analysis as the documents provide important sources of data on organisational rules, regulations, policies, programmes and other preliminary information which cannot be found through interviews. These documents provide many things which cannot be observed. The documents can also reveal goals or decisions which might be otherwise unknown (Patton, : p. ). Moreover, employing this technique has some advantages. Firstly, it is a helpful way in verifying the correct spelling that might have been mentioned in the interviews. Secondly, it can provide other specific details to confirm information from other sources. Thirdly, it can be beneficial in making inferences or new questions for the next interviews (Yin, : p. ). Hence, it was carried out to discern the policy, agenda and strategy of political parties. This technique was conducted before, during and after the field research. Prior to the field research, data and information related to political parties in Indonesia including in Yogyakarta Municipality were collected. In this sense, documentary analysis provides initial information regarding history, platform and general policies of political parties. During the field research, it can support the activities of the in-depth interviews. Moreover, it is also important for understanding patterns and developing interpretations in the data analysis process. After the field research, it accomplished the study analysis. This technique was also applied to gather data and information in the offices of the municipal executive board of the three political parties such as the party’s constitution and platform, the party’s policy and agenda and other relevant meeting reports. Other vital and supporting sources came from the municipal government institutions: the town hall, the related municipal agencies, the secretariat of the parliament office, the bureau of statistics and the election committee. In order to develop interpretations, other scholarly sources suitable for this study were also employed in the data analysis process. 4. Methodology 9 Data Analysis To analyse the data, this study considered reliability and validity issues. Reliability refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to the same category by different observers or by the same observers on different occasions. Meanwhile, validity indicates the extent to which an account accurately represents the social phenomena to which it refers (Hammersley in Silverman, : pp. , ). In order to develop valid interpretations, this study combined several data analysis techniques. The qualitative research should take into account the following procedures: preparing and organising data, reading data, coding and organising themes, representing data, and forming an interpretation (Creswell, : pp. – ). It can be simplified into three steps of analysing data. First is reducing data, which refers to selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data which appear in written field notes or transcriptions. Second is displaying data. The data display commonly is an organised, compressed assembly of information that permits drawing conclusions and action. Third is drawing and verification. Since the beginning, the analyst should decide what things mean – noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows and propositions. Final conclusions may not appear until data gathering is over, although the researcher claims to have been proceeding “inductively”. The conclusion is also verified as the analyst proceeds. Verification may be as brief as a fleeting second thought crossing the analyst’s mind during writing, with a short excursion back to the field notes, or it may be thorough and elaborate, with lengthy argumentation and review among colleagues to develop “intersubjective consensus”, or with extensive efforts to replicate a finding in another data set. The meanings emerging from the data have to be tested for their plausibility, sturdiness, and their confirmability. That is their validity (Miles & Huberman, : pp. – ). Therefore, the collected data from the interviews was transcribed into textual data. Since the data are a primary resource, it was treated carefully by conducting checks and re-checks between the taperecorder, field notes and textual data. After the collected data had been transcribed, they were selected and grouped into three categories: data 4.3. Introduction 10 on the policy of three major political parties in addressing two public services; data on the agenda of three major political parties in coping with two public services; and data on the strategy of three major political parties in interacting and communicating with four governance actors. In addition, the textual data was combined with field notes made during the interviews and the summaries derived from the documentary analysis. In fact, the textual data were read several times to get a comprehensive sense of these data. The validity can be checked by doublechecking all of the data among the respondents. After managing and reading the data were carried out, interpretations and arguments concerning the policy, agenda and strategy of three major political parties were described in as much detailed as possible (Silverman, : pp. – ). In developing the interpretations and arguments, this study combined two sorts of analyses: induction and deduction. The inductive analysis denotes a process of generalisation in which theories are built from empirical proofs while the deductive analysis is an analytical process in which theories are employed to explain real-world events (Manheim & Rich, : pp. – ). This study applied the inductive analysis as arguments and interpretations were mainly based on the empirical data. Additionally, this study employed deductive analysis as it used a set of theoretical frameworks on democracy, good governance, political ideology and political parties to explain the dynamics of political parties at a regular interval and a particular period in Indonesia. Furthermore, pattern-matching logic was applied for deductive analysis while the explanation-building technique was employed for inductive analysis (Yin, : pp. – ). Specifically, in applying the pattern-matching, interpretations and arguments in this study were based on simple patterns in the data. They were also based on rival explanations of the data. Meanwhile, in applying explanation-building, the interpretations and arguments in this study were developed by making initial propositions, revising the initial propositions and then comparing the revision of the theoretical framework. The final step is presenting the findings in the form of narrative texts. Since the interviews were carried out in the Indonesian language, quotations from the interviews were transcribed and displayed in tables and figures. 4. Methodology 11 The data analysis was presented in three steps. First was applying the theoretical and analytical framework. Second was elaboration of the policy, agenda and strategy based on the empirical data. Then, conclusions and theoretical implications were discussed in the last chapter. Structure of the Study This study has five main parts. The first is the introduction. The second is the theoretical and analytical framework consisting of two chapters. The third is a description of the chosen study area. The fourth is the empirical data analysis in four chapters. The last part is a conclusion. Specifically, this study comprises an introduction and eight chapters. The Introduction consists of the background of the study, the scope, limitations and aims of the study, the methodology, data gathering, data analysis and the structure of the study. Chapters I and II describe the theoretical and analytical framework. Chapter I illustrates theories of democratisation and good governance in Indonesia. There are two main sections. First is demonstrating a set of theories on democracy and democratisation in Indonesia consisting of the concept of democracy, the development of democratisation in contemporary Indonesia and decentralisation and its impacts on local politics. Second is portraying good governance and public services. It comprises the concept of governance and basic needs as well as two main public services: education and health affairs. Meanwhile, Chapter II focuses on political ideology and political parties in Indonesia. Three main sections are presented here. First is presenting the concept of political ideology comprising the theories of political ideology and three variants in Indonesian society: abangan, santri and jemaah tarbiyah. Second is explaining political parties containing the concept and model of party classification, the change and goal in a political party and the configuration of political cleavage. Third is presenting three selected political parties: the nationalist-secular PDIP, the nationalist-Muslim PAN and the nationalist-Islamist PKS. Chapter III discusses the area of the study: Yogyakarta Municipality. This chapter explores four interconnected accounts. First is a brief description of Yogyakarta Municipality including demography, popu- 5. Introduction 12 lation, religions, ethnic, history and achievements. Second is depicting two main public services within the municipality: education and health. Third is revealing four key municipal governance actors: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society. Fourth is describing three representative ideological parties in Yogyakarta Municipality: PDIP, PAN and PKS. Chapters IV to VII examine the empirical data. Chapter IV analyses the party policy in three sections. First is describing the policy of the three parties on education and health issues. Second is identifying the policy makers who play a vital role within the party. Third is describing the determining factors which influence the party policy. Chapter V explores the party agenda in two main sections. First is describing the party involvement in the legislative bodies: the commission for social welfare, the legislation, the budgetary and the special committee. Second is describing the attitudes of the three parties towards four issues related to education and health issues: the education system, the retribution of health services, health insurance and exclusive breastfeeding. Chapter VI investigates the relationship between parties and state actors. Two major sections are presented here. First is explaining the contest of parties in the municipal government arena, which starts with the mayoral election and lasts through the end of the regime which is replaced by the new regime and so on and so forth. Second is exploring the relationship between parties and their fractions as well as among fractions within the legislature. Chapter VII explores the relationship between parties and society. There are three key sections. First is analysing the way parties interact and communicate with civil society. Second is investigating the way parties cooperate and communicate with economic communities. Third is revealing the emergence of devout Muslim centres in some corners inside the municipality. Chapter VIII is a conclusion. First an executive summary of the whole study is given. Finally, theoretical and practical implications and proposals for further research are included in this chapter. 5. Structure of the Study 13 Chapter I Democratisation and Good Governance in Indonesia This chapter presents the theoretical framework. First, this chapter explores theories on democracy, democratisation and decentralisation in Indonesia’s post-New Order regime. Second, it describes a set of concepts related to good governance, basic needs and public services. In particular, two selected public services, education and health, are elaborated further. Democratisation and Decentralisation Understanding Democracy In the last quarter of the twentieth century, Huntington ( : pp. , ) described the third wave of democratisation which began in when the dictator regime of Portugal was successfully overthrown by military leaders. Since the tragedy (named “the coup”), a number of countries around the globe transformed from authoritarian to democratic. Democracy has been defined in terms of the source of authority for government, purposes served by government and procedures for constituting the government. As proposed by Huntington ( : pp. – , ), the result was the death of the dictatorship regime replaced by the democratic regime to establish free and fair elections where people could choose political leaders to achieve stability in all aspects of life. At the simplest level, democratisation comprises three stages. First is the end of an authoritarian regime. Second is the installation of a democratic regime. Third is the consolidation of a democratic regime. Regarding the impact of democracy, according to Diamond ( : 1. 1.1. 15 p. ), people should have multiple avenues to express their interests and preferences not merely to influence policies, but also to monitor and check the exercise of state power continuously. Likewise, Dahl ( : p. ) argued that the democratic system will create desirable objectives: avoiding tyranny, protecting essential rights, ensuring general freedom, allowing self-determination, providing moral autonomy, promoting human development, protecting crucial interests, striving for political equality, promoting peace-seeking and creating prosperity. In the first stage of Huntington’s democratisation category, the downfall of the dictator regime and, in turn, a new democratic-oriented regime is the sign of the end of authoritarian rule. Categorising the democratic transition process as the second stage, Henders ( : pp. – ) offered three fundamental processes in this step. First is a continual adjustment of rights and relationships in a political system. Second is the reconstitution of political institutions and collective identities. Third is a shift in pre-existing patrimonial relations with implications for inter-ethnic relations in society. Therefore, Linz and Stepan ( : p. ) posited that the democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreements have been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power as the immediate result of a free and popular vote, when the government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the trias-politica power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure. With respect to the third stage, Rustow ( : pp. – ) argued that democratic consolidation denotes the internalisation of democratic norms, procedures and expectations where actors instinctively conform to the agreed rules even when they compete intensively. According to Diamond ( : p. ), consolidation needs more than a commitment to the idea that democracy is the best form of government; it also requires a shared conviction among elites, political organisations and the public at large that democracy is worth obeying and defending. Hence, Huntington ( : pp. – ) offered a number of driving factors to implement democratic consolidation. First, the transition can be a gradual one. Second, the violence and conflicts amongst social forces are minimised. Third, extreme inequalities in wealth and income are absent with higher levels of economic earnings among soci- Chapter I 16 ety. Fourth, a more market-oriented economy emerges. Fifth, greater social pluralism exists particularly a strong and autonomous bourgeoisie. Sixth, a culture is less monistic and more tolerant of diversity and compromise. In addition, these six factors must be provided and the negative strength of any factor should be removed. The powerful absence of one favourable condition, or, conversely, the presence of a powerful negative condition, that overrides the presence of otherwise favourable conditions, may prevent democratic development. Similarly, extreme poverty, economic inequalities and deeply ingrained Islamic cultural customs could have harmful effects on democratisation in a state. Furthermore, democratic consolidation, as stated by Hadiwinata and Schuck ( b: pp. – ), is desirable because it guarantees popular representation, stability and good governance which developing countries so desperately need. It is like climbing a steep ladder where the chance of falling is as great as the chance of reaching the desired peak. In many cases, the positive development of a consolidated democracy is counterbalanced by conditions which render the new democracies increasingly unstable and defective. Scholars concur that unconsolidated democracy is characterised by weak democratic institutions, the dominance of patrimonialism in social relations, poor law enforcement, the lack of separation of power, the use of violence in political competition, the instrumentalisation of ethnoreligious sentiments by political leaders and so forth. Thus, Schuck ( : p. ) and Hadiwinata and Schuck ( b: p. ) argued that the consequence of the democratic transition process does not merely provide the phase of democratic consolidation named “embedded democracy”, but also presents two other possible alternatives: the decline of democracy (consisting of disintegration and autocratic regime) and the phase of democratic stagnation namely defective democracy. The term “embedded democracy” was initially introduced by Merkel ( : pp. , – ; : pp. – , – ) and Merkel and Croissant ( : pp. – ) to describe democratic consolidation. The concept of embedded democracy was developed in the Research-Project “Defective Democracies”, funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG) and headed by Wolfgang Merkel (Heidelberg/Berlin), Hans-Jürgen Puhle (Frankfurt am Main), Aurel Croissant (Heidelberg) and Peter Thiery (Heidelberg). 1. Democratisation and Decentralisation 17 Stable constitutional democracies are embedded in two ways. Internally, the specific interdependence/independence of the different partial regimes of a democracy secures its normative and functional existence. Externally, these partial regimes are implanted in spheres of enabling conditions for democracy which protect it from outer as well as inner shocks and destabilising tendencies. Conversely, if one of the partial regimes of the embedded democracy is impaired, it tends to be typified as a defective democracy. Therefore, there are several driving factors which cause defective democracy, i.e., the path of modernisation, the level of modernisation, economic trends, social capital and civil society, state and nation building, the type of authoritarian predecessor regime, transitional modus, political institutions and the international context. As explained by Merkel ( : pp. – ; : pp. – ), five partial regimes in embedded democracy demonstrate that the concept of democracy goes beyond the definitions put forth by Downs ( ), Dahl ( ; ), Huntington ( ) and Przeworski ( ). First is the electoral regime characterised by elected officials, inclusive suffrage, the right to candidacy and free and fair organised elections. Second is political liberties with freedom of press and freedom of association. Third is civil rights where the state or private agents have to protect individual liberties from violations of rights and guarantee equality before the law. Fourth is the division of powers and horizontal accountability through separation between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary branches. Fifth is effective power to govern where the elected officials have an ability to rule the government effectively. The first and second partial regimes are part of the dimension of vertical legitimacy and control. The third and fourth partial regimes denote the dimension of liberal constitutionalism and the rule of law. Meanwhile, the last partial regime is the dimension of effective agenda-control. Concerning the prospect of the third wave of democratisation, Merkel and Croissant ( : p. ) argued that although almost one hundred political regimes changed from dictatorship to (electoral) democracy, most of them did not become consolidated as liberal democracies based on the rule of law. At the commencement of the twenty-first century, the prospects for such a ‘second transition’ are not so bright. Many of the new democracies seem to stabilise themselves as diminished subtypes of democracy, that is, as defective democracies. Chapter I 18 Nonetheless, the equilibrium of defective democracies is not the sole trajectory which might explain the future. Merkel and Croissant ( : pp. – ) provided three different scenarios which can be sketched here. First is the regression scenario of being caught in a ‘cycle of political crisis’. Some partial regimes are seriously damaged in this scenario as seen in Belarus, Russia and Chechnya. Second is the stability scenario where we can expect to see neither a trajectory towards a consolidated democracy in the near future nor a regression. The Philippines, Thailand, Ukraine, Russia (a border case) and most central American countries serve as examples. Third is the progression scenario, which is the best scenario where the case of Slovakia can be depicted as transforming from a defective democracy to a consolidated democracy. Other examples can be found in Taiwan and Chile. It is unclear which of the three scenarios will develop in new democracies. However, the experiences of the First and Second Waves are inherently durable in the long run because they underpinned liberal democracies based on the rule of law. The experiences of the Third Wave, in fact, confirm this point of view. If it is true, then ‘electoralists’ will have to give up their minimalist concept of democracy: it is analytically weak and it is misleading in its capacity to predict the future of democracies. In developing countries, Diamond and Morlino ( : p. ) highlighted that the ideal quality of democracy in this region depends on the performance of key institutions and procedures to realise the following: adult suffrage; free, fair, competitive, and recurring elections; more than one political party; alternative sources of information; political and civil freedom, popular sovereignty (control over public policies and the officials who make them), political equality (rights and powers) and broader standards of good governance such as transparency, legality and responsible rule. Kedourie ( : pp. – ) described that democracy in the so-called “Third World countries” is typified by oriental despotism which means the state is stronger than society such as in China, India and the Ottoman Empire around the eighteenth century. The other form of governance for the Third World is a primitive or tribal government where democratic institutions are The World Bank ( : p.xiv) defines developing countries as states having low and middle-income economies and thus may include economies in transition from central planning, as a matter of convenience. 1. Democratisation and Decentralisation 19 controlled by tribal chiefs or elders. Such a government is held together by ties of blood, whether real or presumed. It can also be defined as the kin-group government. By , Freedom House ( : p. – ) released regional trends in world freedom and for Southeast Asia, none of the countries is categorised as democratic. Of these, five were semi-democratic: Indonesia, Philippines, East Timor, Malaysia and Singapore. The rest were not democratic. The Democratisation Wave in Indonesia Today The democratisation waves in Indonesia can be traced back to the era of parliamentary democracy in – (Feith, : p.xi). This period nonetheless is not part of the analysis of this study. The following democratisation started on May st, signalled by the downfall of Soeharto as the second president through a reformation movement led by a number of prominent leaders such as Amien Rais, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Nurcholish Madjid as well as various youth and student movements across the country. It was a historical moment because for more than three decades. Indonesia was led by an authoritarian regime. Schuck ( : p. ) posited that the collapse of autocratic rule occurred for three reasons. First is the high degree of nepotism by Soeharto and his cronies. Second is the vast dissatisfaction among the inhabitants, led by a range of elites both the nationalist and the Islamist groups who had a common target of removing Soeharto. Third is a number of leading elites in Golkar encouraging the reformation movement where the protests emerged from the grassroots-level; instead, it would have been political suicide for them to insist on the continuation of the Soeharto regime. Applying Schumpeter’s ( ) theory that the procedural standard of democracy is “free competition for a free vote” and Dahl’s ( ) criteria of democracy related to contestation and inclusiveness, this study believes that Indonesia passed the first and second stages of democracy as categorised by Huntington ( ) above. Furthermore, Hadiwinata and Schuck ( b: pp. – ) postulated that Indonesia is oscillating between a defective and a consolidated democracy. Some developments indicate signs of positive consolidation, conversely, oth- 1.2. Chapter I 20 ers of democratic stagnation. Specifically, Hadiwinata and Schuck ( a: pp. – ) attempted to assess Indonesian democracy on the basis of eight different fields by rating them on a four-point scale from “stable”, “increasingly stable”, “conditionally unstable”, or “unstable”. . Electoral regime: Increasingly stable . Political liberties: Between increasingly stable and stable . Civil rights: Conditionally unstable . Horizontal accountability: Conditionally unstable . Effective power to rule: Conditionally unstable . Stateness: Between conditionally unstable and unstable . Civil society: Conditionally unstable . Economic-social requisites: Conditionally unstable These data indicate that Indonesia succeeded in the electoral regime while political liberties are still on track towards democracy. Unfortunately, it has yet to overcome the status of defective democracy. Indeed, great effort is needed for Indonesia to move further towards a consolidated democracy and to convince Indonesian people that, as Winston Churchill once stated, democracy is “the worst form of government except all those others that have been tried from time to time”. Most scholars concur that despite many developments in Indonesian democratisation, the weaknesses occur in five arenas: civil society, political society, rule of law, state bureaucratic performance and economic society alike (Abuza, : pp. ; Bünte & Ufen, : pp. – ; Ufen, : p. ; Aspinall, : pp. – ; Hilmy, : p. ; Liddle & Mujani, : pp. – ). The positive developments can be presented here. First is the emergence of various political parties with distinctive types. Second is four free and fair election cycles. Third is the amendment of the Constitution. Fourth is empowering women in public spaces. Fifth is removing police-military representatives in the legislature and state control over societal organisations. Sixth is freedom of association and press. Seventh is the separation of powers into trias politica: legislative, executive and judicial. Meanwhile, the weaknesses are the deprivation of basic human needs in many regions, rampant corruption and bribery of officials, with failure by the government to punish the corrupt officials. Third is patrimonial ties and 1. Democratisation and Decentralisation 21 nepotism encroaching on democratic institutions. Fourth is the lack of religious and tribal tolerance amongst society. Fifth is the fairly stagnant economy. Sixth is the powerlessness of human rights enforcement for marginal people, which indicate that the law is sharp for marginal groups and blunt for people who have power and money. Seventh is the rise of extreme-radical religious groups, separatist movements and terrorist deeds. Hence, Magnis-Suseno ( : pp. – ) put forward that Indonesian democracy will be realised when it goes together with a number of commitments to safeguard human rights, the rule of law, pluralism and religious freedom, social justice and the establishment of stability between centralised and decentralised power. Democracy in Indonesia still copes with five main challenges: anti-pluralism, ongoing impunity of perpetrators of violations of human rights, extreme regionalism or regional separatism, social injustice and rampant corruption embracing bribery. Moreover, Ramage ( : p. ) argued that Indonesia in was “a normal country and quite strong on the politics, security and democracy”. Merkel ( : pp. – ) himself categorised Indonesia as “the domain democracy”. ‘Veto powers’ such as the military, guerrillas, militia, entrepreneurs, landlords, or multi-national corporations take certain political domains outside the elected representatives. Meanwhile, Mietzner ( : pp. – ) labelled Indonesia as “lowquality democracies” and Tan ( : pp. – ) called it between and as “the reign of the parties”. Moreover, due to the increase of oligarchic power and the feeble legal officials in various political aspects, mainly in democratic institutions, Winters ( : pp. – ) predicted that the prospect of democratic consolidation in Indonesia is equally grim. Other scholars are seemingly optimistic that Muslim society in Indonesia will encourage democratic and plural cultures. Hefner ( : pp.xviii, ; a: pp. – ; b: pp. – ) is really confident that sociologically and anthropologically Indonesia still commands significant resources for democratic citizenship, civil decency and pluralist participation, although a number of “uncivil societies” have been emerging in political life. This simple and valuable wish will remain a powerful force in public politics and religion for years to come. Similarly, Mujani ( : pp.ii-iii, – ) found that Islam and Muslims, Chapter I 22 indeed, did not have a negative association with the components of democracy. Almost all components of Islam have a positive relationship with secular civic engagement, political engagement and political participation. Thus, Mujani ( : p.iii) argued that Islam helps Muslim citizens to be active in politics and this activity is congruent with the democratic system. Furthermore, Abdulbaki ( : pp. – ) also stated that neither Islam nor Islamic activism constitute an obstacle to democracy. Therefore, Diamond ( : p. ) put forward that Indonesia between and is a free country and a more vigorous, stable and legitimate democracy. Mujani and Liddle ( : pp. – ) hypothesised the dominance of secular parties in Indonesia is a good sign for short-term democratic stability. Therefore, Liddle ( : p. ) attempted to underline that if Indonesians do increase and distribute political resources more equally, an imagined democracy will be achieved. Moreover, Aspinall ( : pp. – ) examined Indonesian democracy by comparative views on state disintegration and democratic integration. He theorised that Indonesian experiences, primarily in the case of Aceh, East Timor and Papua display that state structures which accommodate ethnic and regional diversity may be a source of state fragility during democratisation, but it can be a source of democratic robustness indicating that Indonesia has obtained democratic progress and state survival. Hence, Mietzner ( : p. ) is optimistic that one and a half decades of Indonesia’s democratic journey have been a surprising success, but there is no guarantee that in the next years the country’s democracy will survive if its parties remain financially unsustainable as reform of party financing is essential. Mietzner ( a: p. ) argued that there are three main reasons Indonesia’s democracy will survive. First, although significant discontents were had in the election, political and economic conditions have been stable. Most people were satisfied with the way in which the government and the democratic system were working. Second, Jokowi is a humble official who did not originate from the country’s conventional elite. His experiences also demonstrate that he embodied the desire of ordinary voters to be ruled by one of their own. Third, there is a common tendency that people prefer to choose the leaders who promised to undertake the hazardous trial of restoring Indonesia’s pre-democratic order. 1. Democratisation and Decentralisation 23 Globally, Mietzner ( b: pp. – ) compared Indonesia’s successful democratic transition to the failed one in Egypt. Some independent organisations have released annual reports related to democracy status in the world. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and the Freedom House both centred in London and America respectively can be representatives here. The EIU ( – ) has published a report on the world democracy index. Methodologically, the democracy index is based on five categories (electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation and political culture) and classified into four types of regimes: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes. Based on this report, Indonesia from to was classified as a flawed democracy. This state still has free and fair elections, despite many problems such as infringements on media freedom. In addition, basic civil liberties are respected. Nonetheless, weaknesses remain significant in some aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation. Despite merely reaching the status of flawed democracy, its development is increasing yearto-year. The EIU ranked Indonesia out of all countries around the globe in , in , in and in and respectively. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia can be categorised as the most consolidated democratic state since until . Likewise, the annual reports released by Freedom House, a nonprofit organisation, demonstrate that from to Indonesia was categorised as “a democratic state” with a rating of for political rights and for civil liberties (with numerical ratings from representing the most free to the least free). Regionally, during this period, Indonesia can be classified as the most consolidated democracy in Southeast Asia. Its position declined to “a semi-democratic state” from to due to the weakening of the rate of civil liberties from to . The latter rate indicates the country’s status as an electoral democracy. Nevertheless, the Freedom House’s ( – ) report confirms that Indonesia is still a leading state for political rights in Southeast Asia from to . It is an overwhelming achievement and, thus, Indonesia can be considered the most democratic Muslim country in the Chapter I 24 world. This evidence also provides a successful benchmark for the compatibility between Islam and democracy. Decentralisation and its Impacts on Local Politics During the New Order regime, the central government had a dominant role in controlling local politics. Governors, district heads and mayors across the country came from military personnel. These local elites had an overriding power in taking over all legislative functions such as policy-making and budgeting. According to Wignjosoebroto ( : pp. – ), the regional parliament during the New Order period was dominated by a majority of legislators originating from Golkar, strongly controlled by President Soeharto. Subsequently, the phrase “in line with the valid regulation” can be understood as “in line with the desire of the ruler in the central government”. As a result, the legislative wing served merely as a rubber stamp for almost all decisions issued by the central government through the executive branches of the regional government. Thus, Wignjosoebroto ( : p. ) posited that the decentralisation and regional autonomy during this period was not significant. Instead, he called this regime “pseudo-decentralisation” or “the elite autonomy of the regional government” mastered by the elite in the central government. After the downfall of the New Order regime, the political situation in Indonesia altered dramatically. The Habibie administration attempted to issue Law No. / in the Regional Government. This Law provided broad authority to the municipal and district governments to rule their own local affairs, primarily in the field of public works, health, education, culture, farming, transportation, industry and trade, investment, environment, defence, cooperative and manpower. Nevertheless, they were banned from particular affairs: foreign policy, security defence, justice, monetary and fiscal, religion and other national and provincial policies. Per this Law, governor, district head and mayor were elected by the legislative wing. Hence, people’s votes were represented in the legislative council in electing a pair of local leaders and the president and vice president. Moreover, the governor is the representative of the central government in its own provincial territory 1.3. 1. Democratisation and Decentralisation 25 mainly in controlling municipal and district governments. In the meantime, the DPRD tool fitting consists of merely the board, commissions and committees. Under the Megawati Soekarnoputri administration, the decentralisation system was revised by Law No. / in the Regional Government. In this Law, some significant rules were revised. The electoral system of mayor and district head transformed from being elected by the legislative to voted by the people, from an indirect election to direct election. Thus, after the realisation of this Law in , all governors, district heads and mayors were elected directly by the people. For the DPRD tool fitting, it contains not merely the board, commission and committees, but also the deliberation committee, the budgetary committee, the honorary body and other necessary tool fittings. The following revision was carried out by the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration with Law No. / on the Regional Government. Some revisions included the DPRD tool fitting consisting of seven parts: the board, the commissions, the consultative body, the legislation body, the budgetary body, the honorary body and other necessary bodies established by the DPRD plenary session. The decentralisation system affected financial distribution between central and regional governments. It was ruled in Law No. / on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Governments and the revised Law No. / on Fiscal Balance between Central and Regional Governments. Both Laws require that all decentralisation functions in district or municipal governments are financed by the APBD. Regarding the sources of revenue, the former Law consists of four parts: local-owned revenue, balancing fund, regional loans and other legal revenues while the latter contains only three sources except the regional loans. More specifically, the sources of local-owned revenue comprise local taxes, local retributions, the outcome of local asset management and other local legal revenues. Moreover, the balance fund encompasses revenue-sharing, DAU and DAK. For the regional loans, the regional government can borrow from other sources inside the country through the central government for local development. Meanwhile, the other legal revenues contain grant and emergency revenues. The grant is based on the memorandum of understanding between the grant provider and the local government. If the grant comes from Chapter I 26 abroad, the local government has to involve the central government. In Law No. / , there are four sources of local finance. First is localowned revenue: local taxes and retributions. Second is the balancing fund between central and regional governments. Third is providing funding for the implementation of special autonomy for a certain regional government decided by the regulation. Fourth is providing loans or grants, emergency funds and incentives (fiscal). Still based on Law No. / , the regional government has been separated into three kinds of levels: province, district and municipality. The provincial government is divided into either districts (kabupaten) in a rural area or municipalities (kota) in an urban area. Both districts and municipalities are partitioned into sub-districts and sub-municipalities (kecamatan). Then, each sub-district and sub-municipality is partitioned into villages with so-called desa in the rural areas and kelurahan in the urban areas. Based on Regulation of Indonesia’s ministry of home affairs No / , up to June , Indonesia had provinces, districts, municipalities, , sub-districts and submunicipalities, , desas and , kelurahans. The realisation of the decentralised system, in fact, has had positive and negative impacts. For positive developments, the local government has a wide authority in controlling and ruling its own administration and local resources. There is no longer strong intervention from the central government. Procedurally, local leaders are directly elected by the people such that political participation has been implemented in society. Moreover, each person has rights to freedom of expression, freedom of press and freedom of organisation. Nevertheless, the negative impacts are the weaknesses in improving social prosperity of the local population. Numerous driving factors contribute to this condition. At the level of bureaucracy, Antlöv ( : pp. – ) argued that it is still dominated by the apparatus trained under the New Order regime and many people who lived comfortably in this regime are still in power. Most scholars believe that a new feudalism and a patronage system are growing in many provinces, districts and municipalities (Vel, : pp. – ; Buehler & Tan, : pp. – ; Choi, : pp. – ; Mietzner, : pp. – ). Local power outside the official elected government emerges in those who have more authority in deciding the 1. Democratisation and Decentralisation 27 precise officials elected in the executive and legislative branches. There is the so-called Jawara network in the Banten Province (Alamsyah, ) and the Blatèr group in Madura Islands, East Java Province (Raditya, ). The emergence of local strongmen and the kinship politics also took place in a number of local areas (Savirani, ; Purwaningsih, ). In particular regions, the role of entrepreneurs is frequently significant in the local elections so that the elected officials are shadowed by this voting power. In addition, the practices of money politics are still rampant in the local elections either executive or legislative (Choi, : pp. – ; Aspinall & Sukmajati, ) and local elites plowed the realisation of the decentralised system to serve their own individual interests (Hadiz, : pp. – ). In the case of corruption, up to February th, , according to Anti-Corruption Clearing House ( ), between and there were corruption cases in the provincial governments, corruption cases in the district and municipal governments and corruption cases in either BUMN or BUMD. In the context of the perpetrator, still referring to Anti-Corruption Clearing House ( ), during this period there were corruption cases conducted by governors, corruption cases carried out by district heads and mayors and vice mayors and corruption cases conducted by legislators either at the national or local levels. Indonesia’s ministry of home affairs ( ) released that since the beginning of pilkada on June st, until January there were out of the regional heads who suffered the corruption. That is why the former vice minister of Indonesia’s Law of Human Rights, Denny Indrayana, estimated approximately percent of regional heads in Indonesia were entangled in corruption cases (Jawa Pos News Network, May ). Even the local leader as the result of the first pilkada, Syaukani Hasan Rais, the district head of the Kutai Kartanegara, was arrested by the KPK due to corruption. Hence, some local corruption cases occasionally involve certain national elites. This includes the bribery case in the Pilkada of the Gunung Mas District, Central Kalimantan, and the Lebak District, Banten, which involved the chairperson of Indonesia’s Constitution Court, Akil Mochtar, in . In addition to rampant corruption, religious tolerance is still feeble in many regions, including the interreligious tragedies between Mus- Chapter I 28 lims and Christians in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and Ambon, Maluku, (ICG Asia Report, , ; Global IDP, : pp. – ; Fuad, : pp. – ). In Bekasi, on March st, , the local officials bowed to the demands of the local Islamic People’s Forum and demolished a church built by the Batak Protestant Christians. The church, in fact, had fulfilled local requirements, but had been denied a building permit for five years running due to pressure from groups opposed to all church construction in the area (Human Right Watch, ). Horizontal conflicts amongst Muslim society took place in various regions. In terms of Ahmadiyah, the refusal started in in Selong City, East Lombok. In the same year, a clash took place in the Manior Lor Village, Kuningan, West Java. By , it was in Parung, Bogor, West Java. Similar conflicts occurred in in West Lombok and in in Cikeusik, Pandeglang, Banten. In the case of Shiite, one of the extraordinary cases took place in Sampang, Madura. The report released by the Human Right Watch indicated that on June th, a mob of more than Sunni militants pressured local authorities to evict hundreds of displaced Shiite villagers from Sampang and attacked their homes, killing one resident. On September th, , a long-simmering dispute between two Muslim communities took place in Puger, Jember, East Java. The peak of the conflict was when a group of machete-wielding militants vandalised the local Darus Sholihin Islamic boarding school. More than a policemen failed to intervene. One of those militants was found dead. All these cases indicate the local government’s inability to address local problems and barriers. Good Governance and Public Services Governance and Basic Needs In the contemporary world, there has been a common consensus that good governance is essential for human resource development in any society or state. The concept of good governance was developed primarily by multilateral development institutions. The World Bank ( : p. ) described good governance, synonymous with sound de- 2. 2.1. 2. Good Governance and Public Services 29 velopment management, as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development. Good governance is central to create and sustain an environment which fosters strong and equitable development, and it is an essential component for sound economic policies. Therefore, the government plays a vital role in the provision of public goods and establishes the rules which make markets work efficiently and corrects for market failure. In order to play this role, the government needs revenues and agents to collect revenues to produce public goods. Likewise, the UNDP ( a) defined good governance as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. Economic governance encompasses the decision-making process which affects the country’s economic activities and its relationships with other economies. Political governance is the process of decision-making to formulate policy. Administrative governance is the system of policy implementation. As a result, the UNDP ( : p. ) assumed that democratic governance should embrace mechanisms, processes and institutions which determine how power is exercised, how decisions are made on public issues, and how citizens articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. Meanwhile, the IMF ( : p. ) argued that good governance is a broad concept covering all aspects of the way a country is governed, embracing its economic policies and regulatory framework as well as adherence to the rule of law. It emphasised promoting good governance when providing policy advice, financial supports and technical assistance to its member countries. In addition, it also has strong measures in place to ensure integrity, impartiality and honesty in the discharge of its own professional obligations. However, the IMF ( : p. ) expressed concerns related to macroeconomic stability, external viability and orderly economic growth in member countries. Its involvement in governance should be restricted to economic aspects of governance. Moreover, a research project organised by Tim Indonesia Governance Index ( : p. ), defined good governance as the process of formulation and implementation of rules, regulations and development priorities through interaction among executive and legislative branches and bureaucracy with participation from civil society Chapter I 30 and economic society. Hence, the UNDP ( a) and Tim Indonesia Governance Index ( ) agreed that there are four key actors in the governance arena: executive wing, legislative wing, civil society and economic society. These institutions should contribute to sustainable human development. For technical reasons, the concepts related to these four governance actors are provided here. . The executive wing refers to the executing body consisting of governor/mayor/district heads and vice governor/mayor/district heads as well as the bureaucracy structure within. A pair of leaders have executorial power to govern and coordinate the development of the government. In the meantime, the bureaucracy comprising government agencies and offices at the provincial/district/municipal level serves as a bridge between the government and the public. . The legislative wing or the DPRD is the policy-making body which has authority in formulating local regulations, controlling the regional government and budgeting the government’s receipts and expenditures. In other words, the local legislature has exclusive rights to scrutinise the executive and bureaucracy and monitors their developments. . It is better to classify civil society as encompassing individuals, formal and non-formal organisations and networks, both religious and secular, in the public and political sphere outside state institutions. Thus, business corporations, government institutions as well as organisations and political parties established by the government are not included in this study (Nyman, : p. ). In this context, civil society can be defined as an organisation with non-profit orientations, usually outside the government structure. It can be represented by religious-based organisations, voluntary associations, foundations, labour unions, professional associations and education or research institutes. . The economic society consists of business entities and associations which aim for profit and the protection of business interests through the conduct of economic exchange and production and advocacy for a better business climate. 2. Good Governance and Public Services 31 Regarding the governance principles, based on the findings of the World Bank ( : pp. – ), the UNDP ( a) and Tim Indonesia Governance Index ( : p. ), the most suitable in terms of the socio-political context of Indonesia is six principles. First is participation or the involvement of the stakeholders in the decision-making processes within each arena and sub-arena. Second is fairness, the condition where policies and programmes are applied fairly to everyone without any discrimination. Third is accountability, the condition where officials, institutions and organisations in each arena are held responsible for their action and inaction. Fourth is transparency, the condition where decisions made by officials in the state, civil institutions and private organisations in each arena and sub-arena are open to the public to observe, scrutinise and evaluate and where public information is available and accessible. Fifth is efficiency, the condition, where policies and programmes implemented have utilised the resources in an optimal manner. Sixth is effectiveness where the output of the programmes has been achieved in line with the intended purpose. Therefore, this study defines good governance as the manner and bridge for people’s basic needs, social justice, stability and freedom by utilising local resources and revenues as well as applying the six principles above. This can be achieved through the legal and elected government (political official) and other legal democratic institutions such as bureaucracy and the legislative body which are incorporated with other non-government actors: civil society and economic society. Furthermore, this study explores the concept of Basic Needs (BN). The concept can be traced back to the discourse on whether poverty is an absolute or a relative phenomenon which is caused by a dispute on the measurement of poverty. The genesis of BN is found in the ILO Employment Missions and in the ILO’s research programme in the s and developed at the World Employment Conference in . The result of these activities was that the concept of BN focuses on ensuring that the poorest group in each country must gain a minimum standard of living within a certain time, at the end of the twentieth century. The BN here includes two main components. First are certain minimum requirements of individual households for private consumption such as adequate food, shelter and clothing. Second are essential services for the community at large such as safe drinking water, sanita- Chapter I 32 tion, public transport, education and health. Hence, to achieve BN, each person should have adequately remunerated employment and participate in the decision making which affects the lives and livelihood of the people and individual freedoms (Weeks & Dore, : p. ; Jolly, : pp. – ). Although there is a conceptual problem in the measurement of the poverty line and levels of human welfare, it is an obvious aspect of poverty: child mortality, life expectancy and access to certain services (education, health, water etc.). Thus, the first step to measure poverty is applying the concept of “primary poverty”, characterised by a family who lacks income to satisfy physical efficiency. It means that their food consumption is below what is necessary to maintain health, normal efficiency and vigour. It is absolute poverty or “material poverty”. It is clear that physical hardship can affect the death. The other alternative to measuring poverty is merely a matter of “convenience”. It correlates with income inequalities in society. In the second concept, alleviating poverty can be solved by reducing the income gap between the rich and the poor (Weeks & Dore, : pp. – ). Therefore, the best solution to meet BN is state intervention in the production and distribution of goods and services which are essential. Indeed, a successful strategy to satisfy BN and eliminate the worst symptoms of poverty requires state intervention. The redistribution of resources by the state would be more equitable than that provided by the market. This strategy will lead directly to the development of human resources which are a prerequisite to economic growth. If an assumption states that the satisfaction of BN is an investment in human capital and essential to increasing the productivity of the working population, it would seem advantageous to satisfy BN as swiftly as possible. Ideological considerations have to be cast aside and non-market measures should be integrated with market mechanisms in the provision of BN. The state has to be encouraged to play an active role in the organisation, production and distribution of those goods and services (Weeks & Dore, : pp. – ). If excellent public services can tackle basic human needs, good and clean governance will be reached soon. Hence, this study selects two main BN as public services: education and health. In this context, the realisation of public services is an indicator of successful local gover- 2. Good Governance and Public Services 33 nance, because, according to the UNDP ( b: p. ), the deprivation in reaching BN is one of the driving factors in the emergence of poverty. Two Major Public Services People who live in modern urban areas, as explained by Michael B. Tietz in Lineberry ( : p. ), are born in a financed hospital, earn their education in supported schools and universities, spend their time travelling on built transportation facilities, communicate through the post office and other electronic devices, drink public drinking water, dispose of their garbage through the public removal system, read public library books, picnic in public parks, are protected by public police, fire and health systems. Then, they eventually die in a hospital and may even be buried in a public cemetery. Their everyday life is bound with government decisions in numerous local services. Thus, Lineberry ( : pp. – ) argued that public services are the grist of urban politics and the principal responsibility of municipal governments. Urban politics is itself a politics of spatial allocation of advantages and disadvantages. According to Indonesia’s Law No. / in Regional Governments, the concept of public service is fulfilling basic services for citizens. It is compulsory for regional governments to ensure the realisation of public services and its management based on these values: public interests, legal certainty, equal rights, balance between rights and obligations, professionalism, participative, non-discriminative, openness, accountability, special treatments for vulnerable groups, punctuality and rapidity, easiness and affordability. The public service management consists of the following elements: the implementation of services, the management of societal complaints, information management, internal control, counselling for society, consultation services and other public services in line with the provision of the Law. More technically, Law No. / obligates regional governments to publish information related to public services to society through accessible places. The information on public services contains, at least, four standards. First is the type of service. Second is condition, procedure, fi- 2.2. Chapter I 34 nance and timeline. Third is right and obligation of the regional government and society. Fourth is the agency or the institution which is responsible for the service. Furthermore, Lineberry ( : p. ) classified some vital services in a municipality. First is the preservation of life, such as police, fire, sanitation and public health. Second is liberty like police, courts and prosecutors. Third is prosperity, for instance, zoning, planning and taxing. Fourth is public enlightenment, for example, schools, colleges and libraries. Moreover, Lineberry ( : p. ) posited that service decisions are the product of municipal policy-making. The process involves lots of stakeholders such as municipal elites, elected officials, interest groups and the delivery bureaucracies of the municipal government. Applying Lineberry’s ( : pp. – ) theory of two types of urban public services, this study will combine these two types. First is immobile facilities and capital intensive, usually found in various points around the community. Schools, universities, hospitals, parks, fire stations and libraries can represent this type. Second is mobile facilities and labour-intensive. Policing and garbage collection are some of the best instances. Currently, schools/universities and hospitals have been providing mobile facilities such as online registration and services, online exams, mobile libraries, mobile healthcare and online method payments meaning these activities can be conducted not merely in a fixed or immobile place, but also in any place. Education Affairs Education is one of the fundamental public services for society. Its resources come from taxation. Educational policies and practices can only be understood as part of an organisation of personal and social services for the public, financed by their taxes, governed by their elected legislators and administered by public servants. Resource allocation, the cost-effectiveness of developments, the rights and responsibilities of the public which provided the money and political sensitivity to public concerns are the context in which educational decisions are made (Shipman, : p. ). Therefore, Dewey ( : p. ) postulated that education has a vital, reciprocal and mutual relationship with 2.2.1. 2. Good Governance and Public Services 35 democracy. In the meantime, democracy itself is an educational principle, an educational measure and policy. The term “education” etymologically is derived from Latin. First is educare, meaning to raise and to bring up. Second is educere: to lead forth or to come out which indicates that education nourishes and develops the good qualities or the inner potentialities of humans and draws out the best in each person. Third is educatum: the act of teaching or training. Hence, education is a life-long process, including all experiences which children receive whether in school, home, community or society through various activities (Uppal, : pp. – ). Moreover, John Dewey frequently said that education is identical with growth and the growth is the education’s aim. Growth is analogous to “life”. What is the purpose of life? The purpose of life is simply more life (Noddings, : p. ). Likewise, Dewantara ( : pp. , ) defined education as an effort to improve the growth of moral and intellectual development within children. It implies that education guides children towards the real human in reaching wished-happiness. As said by Dewantara ( : pp. – ), there are five features in education. First is that the school is a home for leaders where teachers and students live together. Second is that the school teaches how to lend a hand to others and how to live humbly and peacefully. Third is educating children based on their age. Fourth is that the teaching has to be directed to students’ intelligence, and curiosity. Fifth is that physical education is really crucial in order to gain health, good attitudes and so forth. More radically, a Brazilian scientist, Freire ( : pp. – ) defined education as the way for true liberation of humans from oppression, as there is no humanistic dimension in oppression, nor is there dehumanisation in true liberation. Thus, as a humanistic and liberating task, education is not merely a pure act of transference of knowledge, but also an act of knowledge. Still according to Freire ( : p. ), the concept of education for liberation is a social praxis, helping to free people from the oppression which strangles them in their objective reality. This study concurs with the Freire concept. Brighouse ( : pp. – ) proposed five aims of education: personal autonomy, the ability to contribute to social and economic life, personal flourishing, democratic competence and the capacity for cooperation. Simi- Chapter I 36 larly, Feldman ( : p. ) proposed that the central goal of education is to teach students the fundamental reasoning and thinking skills needed to be effective citizens. In organising education affairs, Shipman ( : pp. – ) introduced the concept of “national system locally administered”. It means that education should be decided by the central government as a national system, but managed and administered by the local government: district and municipality. Consequently, in financing education, it should be the responsibility of the government to fulfil this basic human need. However, Shipman ( : pp. – ) argued that there are some difficulties in education affairs related to finance. First is the weakness of economic resources owned by the government. Second is that the finance for education issues compete with other services so that its budget is controlled by the government. Third is that as education is extremely expensive, it is scrutinised closely as a core item of public expenditure. Fourth, the competition in education finance also takes place inside the service itself at different levels. Fifth is the weight of previous commitments largely determines future developments. Sixth is the budget for education is dominated by wages and salaries of labourers. Seventh is the strains at different levels of the service, whether between central and regional government, inside the school or inside the college. In the context of Indonesia, education has made outstanding improvements since the s. The years of schooling increased significantly. In , the government succeeded in building a primary school in each village. A decade later, it made six years of education compulsory in and extended this to nine years in . In the following step, although lots of children were still unable to complete their compulsory junior secondary education, the government plans to extend this to years. In addition, the illiteracy rate decreased gradually and the financing for education improved in budget allocations across the country. Other vital policies included lifting the standard of education encompassing the decentralisation of education to the regions, an emphasis on pro-poor initiatives and the improvement of the teaching force and teacher quality. Indonesia has a surplus of teachers which to some extent leads to shorter working hours (Suharti, : pp. – ). 2. Good Governance and Public Services 37 Nonetheless, some barriers are still apparent. There is a fivefold proof. Firstly, although boys and girls have similar rights of access to education, the children from poor families suffer high discontinuation rates. Secondly, the transition rates from primary to junior secondary school and from junior to senior secondary school are low and require serious attention. It should be addressed if nine and even years of compulsory basic education will be achieved. Thirdly, teacher training providers seem unlikely to fulfil the demand for pre-service and in-service training generated by the new qualification and certification requirements. Fourthly, the increase in budget for education has no positive impact on students’ performance so that it is not merely the size of the government budget for education, but also how the money is used. Fifthly, the financing system requires lots of incentives for efficiency such as the local government and schools have a low incentive to hire the number of teachers they need (Suharti, : pp. – ). Hence, some critics attempt to illustrate the recent reality of education in Indonesia such as Roem Topatimasang in with an aphorism “Sekolah Itu Candu” (school is opium) or Eko Prasetyo in with his proverb “Orang Miskin Dilarang Sekolah” (no school for the poor). Other scholars prefer to build an alternative concept of education like Mansour Fakih with his notion on Pendidikan Kritis (critical pedagogy) in , Munif Chatib with his Sekolahnya Manusia (the school for human) in and Anies Baswedan with his breakthrough and sparkling project, the Gerakan Indonesia Mengajar (Indonesia teaches movement) since . Some activists tried to realise alternative education in the local context such as Ahmad Bahrudin in the Village of Kalibening, Salatiga City, Central Java with his successful programme, the Qaryah Thayyibah, since . Various other concepts and practices on education issues in Indonesia, indeed, have been realised for people to achieve equality in access, quality and governance of education. Health Affairs Health is also considered one of the vital public services in many countries around the globe whether in urban or rural areas. Therefore, discussing health issues is discussing a difficult quality, as it is a biological 2.2.2. Chapter I 38 status, an affair of how well all the body’s parts are working. In a basic definition, health is a vital principle of bliss (Insel & Roth, : p.xiii). The WHO defined health in (in Insel & Roth, : p.xiii) as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. Thus, in the simplest form, the word “health” can be compared with the other opposite term namely “disease”. Moreover, Boorse ( : p. ) defined health as freedom from the entire range of medically abnormal conditions or, in short, freedom from disease. Meanwhile, disease itself is, referring to Goodwin and Guze ( : p. ), any condition related mainly to discomfort, pain, disability, death, or an increased liability to these states. In accordance with this, Allen ( : p. ) argued that health is a right for every human in the world, as health is not only an essential good, but also it should be more highly valued than other non-intrinsic, instrumental goods such as wealth and income. Consequently, health capability should be owned by each person. It entails a body and mind capable of functioning well. Nevertheless, not all healthcare capabilities have the same priority in life. Some will be ‘central’ and others ‘secondary’ (Allen, : pp. – ). Health capability itself is a good for all human beings equally. To realise health equality, we need sincere commitments to distribute resources and, in turn, political mechanisms of legislation and regulation. Therefore, health capability is close to the concept of ‘universal health insurance’ with a ‘universal benefits package’ and, hence, financing health care is extremely vital. It is also related to equal access to health (Ruger, : pp. , , ). Ruger’s concept underlines the vital role played by both public and private institutions to realise universal health for all people. In addition, empirical research carried out by Edwards and Grossman ( : pp. – ) in America postulated that the poor health suffered by children has significant effects on the retardment of their intellectual development primarily on IQ and school achievement. Some specific health indicators such as birth weight, breastfeeding, nutritional status and poor hearing have a contribution and a vital relation with IQ and achievement. The social climate between urban and rural areas is drastically different. Cities have larger populations, a large population density and less space for each person who dwells inside. They have great diversity 2. Good Governance and Public Services 39 in the population, whether in terms of religion or ethnicities. Numerous kinds of people interact and communicate with one another. Thus, most people inside the city have higher rates of cancer, heart disease and psychiatric disorders. Moreover, they are estranged from the social life environment. It causes a lot of internal conflicts related to physical and mental illness. The absence of direct interaction and integration with the surrounding people makes the municipal dwellers “an alienated man” according to Erich Fromm (in Insel & Roth, : pp. – ). According to Chen and Bush ( : pp. – ), there are two indicators to measure the population’s health in a certain area. First are life expectancy and mortality indicators. These indicators cover a single health condition: life (or death). Death indicates the complete dysfunction of a person at present and in the future. Moreover, the mortality index represents the most prominent measure of health status. Therefore, mortality statistics have been developed by biostatistics and related areas, mainly as a measure for population monitoring and for programme evaluation. Even a mortality index is applied by entrepreneurs as a starting point for benefit evaluation. In addition, mortality by causes or by population features are vital yardsticks in health decision making. Second are morbidity indicators, denoting counts of diseases, disability and utilisations. The diseases and disability are beneficial to measure societal health in a particular area. These two indicators are usually used by scientists in their analysis. In particular, the utilisation rates are the number of health care activities such as physician visits and cases treated. It is frequently used as a health status measure. In the case of Indonesia, health issues are part of the major concern of the government. Many developments have been made. The number of health facilities increased since until . According to Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of villages in Indonesia which have public hospitals increased from , in to , in and to , in . Similarly, the quantity of villages which have Puskesmas increased from , in to , in and to , in . In addition, the number of villages which have pharmacies has also been improving significantly from , in to , in and to , in (BPS Republik Indonesia, ). At the level of budgeting, the realisation of the budget in Indonesia’s ministry of health affairs denotes the increase from to . In Chapter I 40 , it was more than trillion IDR. In more than trillion IDR and in more than trillion IDR (Kemenkes Republik Indonesia, : pp. – ). To implement Universal Health Coverage (UHC) as mandated by the WHA in in Geneva, Switzerland, the Indonesian government attempted to ensure health for society through the JKN system by issuing a set of programmes. They are called “ASKES” and “JAMSOSTEK” for civil servants, pensioners, veterans and private employees, “JAMKESMAS” and “JAMKESDA” for lower-class people. Nevertheless, all these programmes are still not effective to address the health crisis in society. The emergence of Law No. / on the SJSN and Law No. / on the BPJS in fact cannot minimise health problems in society mainly in disadvantaged regions. Instead, these systems add to the complexity of coping with health affairs (Kemenkes Republik Indonesia, : p. ). Summary This chapter has presented the development of democratisation and good governance in contemporary Indonesia as the theoretical framework of this study. Starting with the selected theories of democracy, this study reviewed the brief democratisation wave in contemporary Indonesia since until . The democratisation wave in Indonesia is moving in a positive trajectory. Indonesia can be classified as the most consolidated democracy in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, the development of the decentralised system has both positive and negative impacts on local politics. Thus, much effort and energy are needed for Indonesia to accelerate the development and governance mainly in disadvantaged regions. Likewise, the development of the reforms of good and clean governance and the realisation of public services in society is still moving slowly towards embedded democracy. The fulfilment of two major BN, education and health, for Indonesian society has positive developments merely in the quantity of facilities. Nonetheless, the increase of facilities is not in line with the improvement of the quality of education and health services. This is a dilemma in the process of democracy and governance in Indonesia. 3. 3. Summary 41 Chapter II Political Ideology and Political Parties in Indonesia This chapter describes the analytical framework in three main sections: political ideology, political parties and the selected parties. First is explaining the concept of ideology in the political context and the variants in Indonesian society. Second is describing the concept of political party, the model of party classification, the change and goal in the political party and the configuration of political cleavage. Third is demonstrating the development of PDIP, PAN and PKS in – . This analytical framework is applied in subsequent chapters. Political Ideology Defining Ideology in the Political Context The term “ideology” consists of two words, “ide” or idea and “ology” as the field of scientific study (logos). Etymologically, ideology can be understood as the scientific study of ideas. In the Cambridge Dictionary ( ), the word “ideology” means a theory, principles or set of beliefs primarily in a political system, a political party or an organisation. As summarised by Sargent ( : pp. – ), ideology was first introduced by Antonie Louis Claude Destutt, Comte de Tracy at the end of the eighteenth century to understand how ideas are formed. In the following development, precisely in the mid-nineteenth century, this term was dominated by the Marxist approach pioneered by Karl Marx and Friedrich Angels, Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, Georges Sorel, Sigmund Freud and Karl Mannheim. In the twentieth century, the discourse of ideology became a contested concept developed by Clifford 1. 1.1. 43 Geertz, Paul Ricoeur, Charles Taylor, Michael Freeden and Francis Fukuyama. Various concepts of ideology are widespread in the academic literature. This study, however, will apply the relevant concepts. According to Sargent ( : p. ), ideology is a system of values and beliefs concerning the various institutions and processes of society which are acknowledged as the truth by a group of people. Ideology will provide a depiction of the world both as it is and as it should be, and it organises the tremendous complexity of the world into something fairly simple and understandable. Furthermore, Ball et al. ( : pp. – ) attempted to stress the concept of ideology as a set of ideas which performs four functions for people: explaining and evaluating social conditions, helping people understand their place in society and providing a programme for social and political actions. Ideology attempts to link up thoughts (ideas and beliefs) to action, to shape how people think and in turn how they act. Each ideology provides a vision of the social and political world to inspire people to act either to change or to preserve their way of life. Regarding political ideology, it concerns political issues and systems. Easton ( : p. ) emphasised the political system as the authoritative allocation of values for society while Lasswell ( ) defined politics as “who gets what, when and how”. Therefore, this study applies the concept of political ideology formulated by Sargent ( : pp. – ) which theorises that political ideology relates to the beliefs of a certain political group about how they behave and how they should behave. What they have behaved usually becomes beliefs rather than normative statements. Numerous political ideologies can be found in the political stage, including Marxism, communism, liberalism, socialism, nationalism, conservatism, anarchism, fascism, feminism, ecologism, Islamism, fundamentalism and so on. Each country has its own ideology so that it is likely one ideology can grow in a certain state, but it cannot exist and survive in other states, and vice versa. For instance, China, Cuba and North Korea are representative states which adopt communism as their ideological base, but this ideology cannot be found in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and most countries in the MENA region as representatives of the Islamic state. How about with Indonesia? This study classifies Indonesia as a theo- Chapter II 44 democracy state with Muslims as a majority and Pancasila as its philosophical foundation as well as with unique features in its society. From those numerous political ideologies, this study nevertheless will explain some relevant political ideologies in contemporary Indonesia: nationalism, Marxism and communism, secularism, Islamism and Pancasila. Nationalism. According to Kedourie ( : p. ) and Vincent ( : p. ), the word “nation” is derived from the Latin terms nasci (to be born) and nation (belonging together by the similarity of birth or place of birth, larger than family, but smaller than a clan), frequently connected with the chance of birth or birthplace. Hence, Anderson ( : p. ) defined nation as an imagined community and as inherently limited and sovereign. Furthermore, Ball et al. ( : p. ) conceived of a nation as a group of people who in some sense share a common birth place so that a person’s nationality might be separate from his or her citizenship. Therefore, Sargent ( : p. ) argued that one of the most common identifying characteristics of a nation is language and, thus, when someone in a certain state speaks divergent languages, it usually means that different groups of people exist who have separate identities. As one of the Third World countries, the process of nationalism in Indonesia, applying Sargent’s ( : pp. – ) framework, has passed the stage of colonialism, the revitalisation of indigenous cultures, neo-colonialism and political instability so that flags, national anthems and other symbols of nationhood should be accepted by the people and become part of their personal identities. Regarding the concept of nationalism, Sargent ( : p. ) and Ball et al. ( : pp. – ) described some features. First is the national consciousness of oneself as part of a group. Second is the national identity with the group. Third is the identification with a place. Fourth is patriotism or love of the group. Fifth is the demand for action to enhance the group. Despite an unfinished concept amongst scholars on whether nationalism is ideology or not, this study applies Freeden’s ( ) notion of nationalism as a “thin ideology”. Communism. This study considers the roots of communism in the thoughts of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, called Marxism. This ideology is a powerful tool for understanding social relations and change, and many thinkers still find the Marxist critique of capitalism to con- 1. Political Ideology 45 tain considerable truth. An essential part of Marxism is the class struggle, a hypothesis used to explain change. The class struggle is produced by the contradiction between the forms of production and the relations of production. In short, Marx and his followers produced communism, one of the dominant ideologies from World War I to the early s. A number of variants exist and are still powerful in some countries such as China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos; communist political parties flourish in many parts of the world. Hence, communism has not disappeared entirely. Although Marxism and communism are no longer amongst the most important ideologies in many countries, they are still considered a fundamental method to understand human relations (Sargent, : pp. – ). There are four vital tenets to identify the ideology of communism. First is the necessity of monopoly of power. Second is democratic centralism. Third is the commitment to state ownership for the means of production. Fourth is the centrally planned economy is more just and more efficient than a market economy (Brown, : pp. – ). Secularism. Literally, the word “secular” means not having any connection with religious affairs while “secularism” denotes a belief that religion should not be involved with social and political activities in a country (Cambridge Dictionary, ). It is in line with Bhargava’s ( ) concept that secularism advocates for the separation of politics from religion. Per Taylor ( : p. ), there are two models constituting a secular regime. Both involve some kind of separation of the church or mosque and the state. Hence, the state cannot be linked to some religious confessions except in a vestigial and largely symbolic sense. Taylor proposes three goals of secularism: religious liberty including the freedom not to believe, equality amongst people of different faiths and fraternity for those who live inside a country. Likewise, Bilgrami ( : pp. – ) formulated three fundamental features of secularism. First is related to a stance taken about religion. Second is that secularism is the name of a political doctrine. Third is that the stance regarding religion is restricted to the polity. Thus, if a state tries to separate between government and religious affairs in a public life, it can be categorised as a secular state such as America, France, Germany and modern Turkey. In this context, if a political party adopts secularism as its value or ideology, it means that the party obviously rejects Chapter II 46 the introduction of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state in a country. In contrast, it attempts to remove religious symbols in the public sphere and does not recognise the role of religion in addressing social and political affairs. Islamism. This ideology denotes two opposing Islam schools, Sunni and Shiite, which are still fighting for Islamist agendas: the establishment of sharia. They believe that this agenda will earn an Islamic theocracy and a full realisation of the ideal Islamic community. This notion is usually traced to the thoughts of Ayatollah Khomeini, Abul A’la Al-Maududi and Sayyid Qutb. Global developments demonstrate the fact, as was explained by Browers ( : pp. – ), that Islamism can be divided into two contrasting groups: conservative Islamism and moderate Islamism. The former concentrates its activities on the structural political way and struggle for the introduction of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state while the latter can be called “the new Islamist” and stresses their activities on intellectual orientations rather than political strategy. Some political parties around the world attempted to create new or reform themselves from conservative to moderate such as the Nahda Party in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the Reform Party in Algeria, the Jordanian Islamic Action Union, the Umma Party in Kuwait and the Yemeni Reformist Union (Islah). This trend is caused by the change in thinking of Egypt’s Ikhwanul Muslimin from conservative in the s to moderate in the mid– s, from the rejection of the idea of direct participation in the political process to the approval of participation in parliamentary elections in alliance with other political parties. According to Al-Qardhawi ( : p. ), the moderate Islamists emphasise their ideology on the understanding of Islam as a comprehensive way of life and as an alternative to secular ideologies. Moreover, Browers ( : p. ) postulated that the moderate integrates Islamic values and other secular values: democracy, pluralism and human rights, placing Islam at the centre. Pancasila. This is Indonesia’s philosophical foundation. The term “Pancasila” etymologically is derived from two old Javanese words (originally from Sanskrit): panca meaning five, and sila meaning principles. It encompasses five principles considered to be inseparable and interrelated. First is belief in the one and only God. Second is just and 1. Political Ideology 47 civilised humanity. Third is the unity of Indonesia. Fourth is democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives. Fifth is social justice for all people of Indonesia. These five principles denote the existence of monotheism, humanism, nationalism, deliberation and social justice. This foundation has been written in the preamble of Indonesia’s Constitution. Despite debatable discourse, most scholars concur that Pancasila was born from the thought of Soekarno, Indonesia’s first president, when he delivered a historical and sparkling speech related to Pancasila on June st, in the front of the session of BPUPKI. Moreover, the existence of Pancasila became stronger when, in , the New Order regime imposed all political parties and organisations to adopt Pancasila as their ideological foundation and in turn affected the alienation of Islam mainly since the mid– until the early s. Those kinds of ideology nonetheless cannot be disconnected by the discourse of political parties. Freeden ( : p. ) hypothesised that there is no doubt that ideology and political parties can be reinforcing companions, even Budge ( ) and Freeden ( : p. ) argued that ideology is strongly associated with political parties and should be reflected in official programmes of parties. Due to merely offering a sub-set of ideological discourse and production, the party ideology can be manifested if it achieves power. Therefore, Jackson and Kingdon (in Freeden, : p. ) stated that parties behave as channels which reflect public opinions and attempt to shape the ideological dispositions of the citizenry, fusing rational and emotional performativity. The linkage between the party ideology and voting patterns is quite salient. Knutsen and Scarbrough ( : pp. – ) and Freeden ( : p. ) concurred that the party organisation has a fundamental role towards the increase or decrease of ideological polarisation through so-called “value cleavages”. It can alter the identity of interest and pressure groups and the sub-ideologies and can encourage ideological elasticity by refocusing on different electoral demands or presumed preferences in the process of negotiating policy. The ideology in the regions of South Asia and Southeast Asia, according to Bajpai and Bonura ( : p. ), has a historical relation with European colonialism, because colonialism more or less influenced these areas, whether in the management of education, race, fam- Chapter II 48 ily and sexual relations, religious practice and law. Colonial administrations have contributed to the formation of nationalist and communist movements and critiques of majoritarian nationalism. Hence, Bajpai and Bonura ( : pp. – ) selected five relevant ideologies in these regions: liberalism, communism, nationalism, religious ideologies and ideologies of race, indigenity and caste. The former two are ideologies familiar from ‘North Atlantic’ debates and the latter two are ideologies associated with these regions. In the meantime, nationalism is a debatable concept that Anderson ( ) called an “imagined community” in which this notion originally derived from South Asian and Southeast Asian materials. In the context of Indonesia, some political ideologies were robust prior to the nation’s independence: communism (represented by PKI), nationalism (represented by PNI) and Islam (represented by Sarekat Islam). After independence, primarily during the Old Order regime, some ideologies were leading: nationalism, Islam, communism and socialism, but the last ideology was abandoned at the end of the regime. That is why Soekarno under his Guided Democracy regime grouped those three leading ideologies into one term, NASAKOM (Nationalism, Religion, Communism), to unify the Indonesian politics at the time. Afterwards, during the New Order regime, the politics of aliran was muted and in turn accommodated into only two mainstream ideologies: nationalism and Islam while communism was deeply buried. In the post-New Order regime, hundreds of political parties were emerging; nevertheless, parties were allowed to participate in the election. The number of political parties was reduced in the following elections due to political and electoral systems. The ideology adopted by parties is not far from the spectrum between secularism on the one hand and Islamism on the other hand, with some parties attempting to combine these two ideologies. Figure . is a brief illustration of the current political ideology in Indonesia whereby the ideology of secularism is more or less coloured by the values of Marxism and Communism while the ideology of Islamism is influenced by the doctrines of Ikhwanul Muslimin. Nevertheless, these ideologies are supportive and friendly to the values of nationalism: Pancasila. This study divides the political ideology in contemporary Indonesia into three major forces: the nationalist-secular 1. Political Ideology 49 group, the nationalist-Muslim group and the nationalist-Islamist group. The former is on the one spectrum and the latter is on the other spectrum. Meanwhile, there is a middle group which tries to incorporate both ideologies in their platform and actions as a moderate path. These three political ideology groups will be addressed later. Political Ideologies in Contemporary Indonesia The Variants of Indonesian Society The first Indonesianist who introduced the classification of Indonesian society based on ideological orientations to the scholarly public is Clifford Geertz with his multi-year study of religious life in the small town of Modjokuto, East Java, during the s. Despite numerous critiques about this thesis, most scientists apply the dichotomy of abangansantri to understand the religious and political orientations in Indonesia. Geertz ( ) discerned three kinds of Indonesian social classes: abangan, santri and priyayi. Furthermore, Yon Machmudi ( ) tried to offer a new kind of growing santri in recent Indonesia namely Jemaah Tarbiyah. This study applies these two theories based on a twofold consideration. First is the relevance of these theories to this study. Second is that Geertz and Machmudi are representative scientists with high authority in their fields respectively. In this context, abangan, santri and Jemaah Tarbiyah will be applied as the analytical framework to portray the common political ideologies in contemporary Indonesia. Figure . 1.2. Chapter II 50 The Abangan Variant The word “abangan” etymologically is a Javanese term, which indicates a nominal Muslim society, but does not execute the Islamic teachings entirely (kbbi.web.id). As the core rite, the religious customs among abangan society are made up mainly from the communal feast called slametan, extensive and intricate complex spiritual beliefs and an entire set of theories and practices of curing, sorcery and magic. It is a prevalent ritual in Indonesian society primarily in rural areas. Therefore, the abangan stresses animistic aspects of the overall Javanese syncretism and broadly related to peasant elements (Geertz, : pp. – ). According to Geertz ( : pp. – ), the term slametan originated from a Javanese word, taken from “slamet” meaning “there isn’t anything” or more aptly “nothing is going to happen (to anyone)”. It denotes a common religious ritual, the communal feast and symbolises the mystic and social unity of those participating in it. Friends, neighbours, fellow workers, relatives, local spirits, dead ancestors and nearforgotten gods all get bound into a defined social group pledged to mutual support and cooperation. At a slametan, everyone is treated the same. No one feels different from anyone else, no one feels lower than anyone else, and no one has a wish to split off from the other person. After carrying out slametan, the local spirits will not bother the group, will not make them feel ill, unhappy or confused. Slametan aims to form a kind of social joint, fitting the numerous aspects of social life and individual experience and minimising uncertainty, tension and conflict. A majority of slametans are held in the evening, just after the sun has gone down and the evening prayer, because almost everyone is at home. It is usually for a special ceremony such as a birth, a circumcision, a name-changing, a harvest or a death. The host will ask the religious specialist to determine an auspicious day, according to the numerological interpretation of the Javanese calendrical system. If it is a death or a birth, the event itself determines the timing. People invited are all close neighbours within a short distance from one’s house. They are called together by a messenger of the host only a few hours, even minutes prior to the slametan is to begin and they have to come immediately (Geertz, : pp. , – ). 1.2.1. 1. Political Ideology 51 In addition, the matter of social organisation for abangan is also important. The basic social unit is referring to the household, a man, his wife and his children. The household invites other households to come and attend his slametan. The invited households then carry some foods from the location for other members of their families. Afterwards, there is what so-called as bersih desa, “the cleansing of the village” as a regular activity in the abangan system. This activity is conducted by a certain society in cleansing the physical image of their village/kampung/RW/RT. After doing this, the food will be brought from people’s separate kitchens. Aside from coming with their food, there is a religious ritual conducted by special clubs or fraternities (Geertz, : p. ). All of these rituals can be classified as activities comprising “the old abangan”. Furthermore, Geertz ( : pp. – ) postulated the emergence of a modern abangan in a politico-religious sect namely Permai founded on December th, in Cimerta, Subang, West Java. The word “Permai” means “beautiful”, derived from the Indonesian word. It adopts Indian-Hinduism ideas and practices and extremely virulent to Islam. It has primarily two functions: as a political party and as an abangan mystical association. Hence, this political organisation: first, encourages traditional abangan beliefs and “pure native science”, “original” Javanese spirit ideas, slametan practices and curing techniques; second, it supports the communist political policy in Indonesia; and third, it purifies abangan rites of even the remnant of Islam still contained in them. Permai often uses a special term, Marhaen, for “common people”. This term denotes people, despite being oppressed, exploited and despised, who still have belief in their own power and will organise themselves to oppose and evict even shatter imperialism and capitalism and destroy all arbitrary oppressions and exploitations. The “common people” are a group in society who have become poor and despised, but they still respect themselves as human beings who should live in this world and are conscious of their rights. With this consciousness, they seek to claim those rights. In the following development, the “common people” are also called “wong cilik” or little people, a Javanese term. The wong cilik can be defined as the oppressed people who live under the grip of the rich people and the ruler. Chapter II 52 The doctrine of Permai is well-known as “Marhaenism”. According to the speech of Soekarno which was delivered at the PNI gathering on July rd, , the thirtieth anniversary of the party’s establishment, Marhaenism etymologically is taken from the name of a small farmer, a very poor land farmer whom Soekarno met in the rice field in the south of Cigereleng, Bandung, West Java. His name is Marhaen. He owns a rice field, hoe, sickle and the means of production, but he suffers a great deal, he is still a pauper, he is poor, he lives in poverty and he does not have enough to live on. Then, Soekarno was inspired to use his name to describe the destitute people of Indonesia. At the time, Soekarno strongly believed that almost all of Indonesian people are poor, not only one million, not two million or three. All of them are poor workers, poor peasants, poor fishermen, poor clerks, poor stall vendors, poor cart drivers and poor chauffeurs. All of these common people are embraced by the one term, Marhaen. He is a symbol of the small man of Indonesia, a symbol of the power of the Indonesian people and a symbol of the explosive force (Soekarno, a: pp. – ). Marhaen has been the symbol for the teachings of Soekarno, called Marhaenism. This term was used first by Soekarno in his speech: Indonesia Menggugat, Indonesia Accuses, which was delivered in the trial, Landraad, Bandung. Therefore, Marhaenism is the ideology which resists the oppression of human by human or nation by nation. Its aim is to raise the dignity of the life of wong cilik. The ideology of Marhaenism can be traced back to the values of the Pancasila on st June consisting of five principles: nationalism, humanism, deliberation, social justice and belief in God. These five principles can be compressed into three principles. The first and second principles can be compressed into one: “socio-nationalism”. The third and fourth principles can be compressed also into one: “sociodemocracy”, which is not the democracy of the West. Meanwhile, “belief in God” is the one principle left. These are known collectively as tri-sila, three principles. Furthermore, the tri-sila can be made into one genuine term: Gotong Royong, mutual cooperation. The principle of gotong royong is between the rich and the poor, between the Muslim and the Christian, between non-Indonesians and those of foreign descent who became Indonesians. It is something marvellous: a Gotong Royong state (Soekarno, b: pp. – ). Soekarno stated that: 1. Political Ideology 53 Gotong royong is a dynamic concept, more dynamic than the family principles, friends. The family principle is a static concept, but gotong royong portrays one endeavour, one act of service, one task, what was called by Mr. Sukardjo one karyo, one gawé. Let us complete this karyo, this gawé, this task, this act of service, together. Gotong royong means toiling hard together, sweating hard together, a joint struggle to help one another. Acts of service by all for the interest of all. Ho-lopis-kuntul-baris--- One, two, three, heave! for the common interest. That is gotong royong! (Soekarno, b: p. ). It is important to explain some similar terms: “marhaen”, “marhaenist” and “marhaenism”. An organisation affiliated with the Marhaenism ideology established on January st, namely KBM attempts to define those three distinctive terms. Based on AD ART Keluarga Besar Marhaenis ( ) Article as was decided at the Second Munas KBM in – March in Yogyakarta, “Marhaen” is poor people or impoverished by capitalism and imperialism in all forms and manifestations. Moreover, “Marhaenist” is each person who struggles together and protects the fate of Marhaen as well as elevates their dignity from poverty and destitute situations towards physical and spiritual prosperity: independence, sovereign and becomes the master in their own country. In the meantime, “Marhaenism” is a tenet, an ideology, a theory and practice of struggle to elevate the dignity of Indonesian Marhaen from the shackles of political economic and cultural imperialism in all forms and manifestations for independence and sovereignty. Marhaenism is also the whole teaching of Soekarno whether as an ideologue, a politician or a statesman in the written and oral form which should be implemented in accordance with the situation of present and future. Many organisations or associations adopt Marhaenism as their ideological foundation either explicitly or implicitly, either at the level of national or local across the country. The reproduction of cadres in Marhaenism-based organisations started since the secondary school with the existence of GSNI, founded in . The reproduction of its cadres is continued at the level of university or college with the existence of GMNI, established since . At the youth level, the Democrat Youth was founded in and GPM. Other organisations affiliated with Marhaenism are KBM and GRM. Nevertheless, the existence of some of these organisations seems to be not quite robust in society. Chapter II 54 Instead, local Marhaenism alliances have a special space in the heart of society due to their alignments. Moreover, the networks of Marhaenism sympathisers, descents of activists in mainly PNI and PKI and Soekarno devotees, who are not involved structurally in Marhaenism organisations, but merely having a similarity in political orientation, have contributed in cultivating Marhaenism alliances across the country. The Santri Variant The term “santri” has a broad and narrow meaning. In the narrow sense, it describes a student at a religious school or pondok or pesantren, the latter name constructed as a root and place for santris. In the broad and more common sense, it denotes a devout Muslim group of the Indonesian population who take their Islam seriously, praying, going to the mosque on Friday, fasting in the Ramadhan month and so on (Geertz, : p. ). As the basic ritual of Islam, santri has fundamental religious traditions for regular execution: prayers and fasting. The santri ritual life is modulated in time by the five fixed prayers: dawn (the early morning), noon, afternoon, sunset and evening. It is compulsory for each santri and repeated day in and day out in the same simple form. Especially for Friday, there is jumatan which represents a symbolic coming together of the ummah surrounding the mosque (Geertz, : p. , – ). The jumatan is obligated for each santri, mainly male Muslims. In the meantime, fasting is also important to indicate a true santri or not. The obligatory fasting is during the Ramadhan month, around days, repeated once per year while the other kinds of fasting are optional such as a weekly fasting on each Monday and Thursday. Hence, Geertz ( : p. – ) argued that santri emphasises the importance of Islamic tenets referring to Al-Qur’an and As-Sunnah as the core guideline and beliefs of Islam: first is a superior ethical code for modern men, second is a workable social doctrine for modern society, and third is a fertile source of values for modern culture. Praying is the most basic thing to distinguish a true santri. In addition, the sense of ummah is a principal for santri. Islam is seen not merely as a set of beliefs, as a general system of values to which they are committed, 1.2.2. 1. Political Ideology 55 as a kind of abstract philosophy where society constantly repeats the name of the Prophet, praying and chanting Al-Qur’an, but also institutionalised into some social groups. When santri speaks Islam, there is always in the back of their minds a social organisation in which the Islamic creed is the defining element. It can be a charitable organisation, a woman’s club, a mosque committee, a religious school, a political party and the like. In this context, Geertz ( : p. ) divided santri into two opposite groups: conservative versus modern. The doctrinal differences between these two groups persist. Each one is somewhat hostile and has distinctive followers. Furthermore, Geertz ( : p. – ) described five doctrinal differences between what he called the conservative group on the one hand and the modernist group on the other hand. First is that the conservative group stresses a relationship to God in which the reception of blessings as acts of His Grace and every human made is fated by God’s Will. Meanwhile, the modernist group emphasises a relationship to God in which hard work and self-determination are important. Second is that the conservative believes that religion has a total and significant role in deciding all human endeavours while the modernist believes that religion only has a particular role in guiding human life. Third is that the conservative allows non-Islamic rites within the religious sphere and has no concern with the purity of their Islam while the modernist tends to insist on all sorts of rituals outside Islam. Fourth is that the former underlines the customary aspects of religion or religious experiences while the latter points out the instrumental aspects of religion or religious behaviour. Fifth is that the former tends to justify the practice by custom and by detailed scholastic learning in traditional religious accounts while the latter tends to justify it upon the basis of its pragmatic value in contemporary life and by general reference to Al-Qur’an and As-Sunnah. These two opposite religious outlooks create two distinctive social organisations of the santri community. First is Nahdhatul Ulama (the Resurgence of Islamic Scholars) as a representation of the conservative group. This organisation can be classified as the most powerful traditionalist-Muslim organisation in Indonesia founded in Surabaya, January st, by Hasyim Asy’ari with the membership recently approximately at million (Bush, : p. ) or estimated million Chapter II 56 (Ufen, b: p. ) or about to million (Carnegie, : pp. – ). Plenty of pesantrens in Indonesia are identical structurally and culturally to the NU traditions. Second is Muhammadiyah as a representation of the modernist group. Literally, “Muhammadiyah” is derived from the Arabic term referring to the followers of the Prophet Muhammad SAW. This organisation can be categorised as the most powerful modernist-Muslim organisation in Indonesia established in Yogyakarta, November th, by Ahmad Dahlan which has a vast number of education centres from kindergarten to universities and hospitals/healthcare centres across the country. Its membership currently is allegedly million (Ufen, b: p. ) or slightly under million (Bush, : p. ) or around million (Carnegie, : pp. – ). Supporting Geertz’s thesis, Mehden ( : p. ) classifies santri into four groups: traditionalist, modernist, neo-modernist and Islamist. The first two groups refer to the earlier explanation while the rest are the new type. The neo-modernist denies the formal interpretation of Islam, but it stresses ethical and pious behaviour. It also clearly encourages a pluralistic perspective with attention to human rights encompassing women’s rights and democracy. Meanwhile, the Islamist tends to impose sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state and expounds anti-Christian and anti-secular groups. Moreover, Samson ( : pp. – ) proposes three other kinds of santri. First is the fundamentalist. It strongly affirms the pure interpretation of Islam, rejects Western influences and Javanese syncretism beliefs and insists on the primacy of religion over politics. Second is the reformist. Despite still emphasising the primacy of religion over politics, this group can cooperate with secular elements and also has concerns with making faith compatible with the modern life. Third is the accommodationist. It appreciates the importance of the framework of unity between Islam and secular groups on social and political interests, even cooperation between them. Regarding the education system of santri, the traditional school system rests on pondok or pesantren. The pesantren contains, at least, a teacher-leader, commonly a pilgrim (haji) who is called a kyai and a group of male or female pupils. The santris live at the pondok in cloister-like dormitories, cook their own food and wash their own clothes 1. Political Ideology 57 (Geertz, : pp. – ). For local activities of santri, they rely on the buildings of masjid and musholla or langgar. A musholla is the same as a mosque except smaller. Although some mushollas are public buildings, they are frequently privately owned and jumatan is not conducted in it. For santri, mosques and mushollas are the real terminal points of the communication network (Geertz, : p. ). Due to the influence of western education models of “school”, most santris in current life study in the school with arranged schedules, planned curriculum and secular modern subjects. Nowadays, as the result of modification, religious schools are well-known as madrasah, widespread in Indonesia to bridge the gap between religious teachings and secular subjects. Amongst these two santri organisations, this study focuses on the modernist group, Muhammadiyah. The human sources of Muhammadiyah are supplied from cadres who have been educated and trained in organisations at the secondary school level: IPM founded since and a little bit coming from PII which was set up since . The process of cadrerisastion is continued into organisations at the student college level such as IMM established since and HMI since . At the youth level, there is the Muhammadiyah Youth for male activists since and Nasyiatul ‘Aisyiyah for young female activists since . In the meantime, ‘Aisyiyah is the Muhammadiyah’s wing for women group activists founded in . In addition, the existence of Muhammadiyah sympathisers and descents of Muhammadiyah activists, who are not involved in this organisational structure, but have an emotional bond, have contributed in fostering and enlarging Muhammadiyah da’wa. The Jemaah Tarbiyah Variant One of the beneficial and systematic studies was conducted by Yon Machmudi ( ) in the mid– s on the emergence of the new santri in Indonesia as the product of Muslim activists during the New Order regime. It seems that Machmudi sought to develop Geertz’s findings. According to Machmudi ( : p. ), the emergence of new santri, in general, could be detected since the outset of the New Order regime consolidation in . It emerged in the early s when the 1.2.3. Chapter II 58 younger generation of Indonesian Muslims began to demonstrate a growing distance from their elders. As explained by Anwar ( : pp. – ), if the “old santri” is the result of the political contest, the “neo-santri” identifies itself with cultural Islam. The latter has no direct experiences with the New Order regime repression, but they learned politics primarily from their involvement with Islamic student organisations. There are three variants of the new santri as classified by Machmudi ( : pp. – ). First is the convergent santri, emerging in the s. This variant is the result of both traditionalist and modernist activists who tend to merge with each other. Due to the unwillingness of the New Order regime to accommodate their political interests, this group focused their energy on two types of activities: renewal and predication movements. Second is the radical santri, appearing in the s. They are usually pessimistic with the traditionalist and modernist struggles in Islam and demand a radical change in Indonesia. The establishment of an Islamic state would be the core agenda to replace the existing state. Thus, this group is supposedly associated with radical activities in Indonesia mainly referred to as the NII which later shifted into the more violent global movement of Jemaah Islamiyah. Third is the global santri, emerging in the s. This group is more influenced by trans-national movements in the Middle East, but still form part of both traditionalist and modernist groupings. They develop their own ways of identifying their situation, based on their own interpretation of the conditions of Muslims abroad, either by reading books translated from Arabic into Indonesian or by listening to lectures delivered by various preachers who graduated from Middle-Eastern institutions. Jemaah Tarbiyah, Salafi groups and Hizbut Tahrir can be described as the global santri. As one of these global santri, Jemaah Tarbiyah has contributed to influence Indonesian Islam through religious movements, particularly in secular universities. Literally, the term “Jemaah Tarbiyah” is derived from the Arabic word, which means “education movement”. According to Machmudi ( : p. ), this movement emerged in the mid– s, when certain cadres first made contact with and experienced religious trainings under the moderate wing of Ikhwanul Muslimin. Jemaah Tarbiyah can provide religious trainings to enthusiastic Muslim students 1. Political Ideology 59 in public universities and, in turn, its activists succeeded to control intra-campus student organisations since the s. They have organised Islamic activities for students based in mosques or mushollas or in campuses and have founded a forum for Islamic studies in many faculties. They also began to control FSLDK to organise Islamic activities amongst the universities in Java and the outer islands. Subsequently, these activists have been able to take over the central leadership of student senate organisations at the faculty and university level through student general elections. After the downfall of the New Order regime in , activists in Jemaah Tarbiyah who involved themselves in FSLDK established an extra-campus organisation, KAMMI on March th, in Malang, East Java. Both organisations, LDK and KAMMI, adopt Islamic tenets as their ideological foundation and harness campuses as the core strength and people who live inside the campus particularly students as the key actors. As explained by Machmudi ( : pp. – ), the pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah have inherited santri traditions but have gone through different religious and intellectual experiences from their forbears. They are the children and grandchildren of both traditionalist and modernist santri of the s and s. Moreover, this organisation believes that Islam does not provide a detailed account on political and governmental matters. Therefore, the state should assure and maintain the survival of religion while the Islamic parties are needed to bring gradual changes in the state to take a more open stance towards Islam. It was the reason why Jemaah Tarbiyah eventually transformed itself into a political party, the PK early after the downfall of the Authoritarian Rule in . Hence, Machmudi ( : pp. – ) further believes that the emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia is part of the Islamisation process. It has devoted its energies to Islamise Indonesia at the levels of society and the state with accommodative, flexible and non-violent approaches. The Islamisation process carried out since the s has brought cultural and political changes leading to demands that the state better accommodates the so-called cita-cita Islam (the ideals of Is- FSLDK consists of LDK, one of the official campus organisations concentrating itself in the field of da’wa, founded in all universities since the s. Chapter II 60 lam). At the level of society, it offers the tarbiyah model as an alternative Islamisation to seek balance between two opposite approaches in Islamising Indonesia: Muhammadiyah as the purificationist group and NU as the accommodationist group. The latter younger generation of Indonesian Muslims has been uninterested in the opposite groups. Instead, they adopt new ideas coming from the Middle East mainly inspired by the thoughts of Hassan Al-Banna ( – ), the founder of Ikhwanul Muslimin. Meanwhile, at the level of the state, Jemaah Tarbiyah proposes a new typology to Islamise the state neither by applying the structural mean which promotes the legal and formal approaches nor the cultural method which endorses a substantialist approach. It plays a mediating role between those two conflicting strategies, regarded as a pragmatic approach, shaping the political praxis of PK/PKS to be addressed. More specifically, the tarbiyah model applies the da’wa way and sets up so-called as halaqah in campuses. They attract many students and provide them with scholarly tutorials and moral motivations. For a student interested in studying Islam deeply, he/she will be advised to attend a regular halaqah (Tim Kaderisasi DPP PK Sejahtera, , pp. – ). Throughout the halaqah, new members are cultivated and their responsibility towards Islam is enhanced. They are not merely supported to examine the mandatory duties as prescribed in the five principles of Islam, but also optional and recommended responsibilities such as reading Al-Qur’an, pursuing religious knowledge, visiting their Muslim brothers and sisters and so on. Subsequently, members of the halaqah have to cultivate their religious capacities and loyalties and, in turn, to call other people, including their relatives and buddies to observe all religious obligations. By attending a routine halaqah, commonly once a week, the members are expected to study religious obligations in the right manner, referring mainly to Al-Qur’an and As- Sunnah (Putra, : p. ). In addition, using the term halaqah, there is another more common term liqo’. This term is also familiar amongst activists in Jemaah Tarbiyah. The liqo’ consists of not merely scholarly tutorials like halaqah, but also meeting, deliberation and the like. However, both terms are familiar among members and activists in Jemaah Tarbiyah. According to Rahmat ( : p. ), halaqah and liqo’ recently are not on- 1. Political Ideology 61 ly growing in the campuses, but also amongst society primarily for women groups through Salimah, a woman’s welfare association and the PWK. These two organisations, according to Hamayotsu ( : pp. – ), provide a variety of social services concentrating on family-friendly services targeted at housewives, mothers and children including the donation of books and school materials, mobile libraries for children, promotion of recycled products, classes on home health care and baby nutrition, catering and sewing training to empower single mothers. Female cadres organise these activities in their neighbourhoods to build social networks among housewives. Besides usual students serving as agents of Islamisation, as explained by Tandjung ( : p. ), there are other ideologues coached in Islamic institutions in Middle-East states and in modern Islamic schools in Indonesia such as Pesantren Gontor in Ponorogo and Pesantren Maskumambang in Gresik, both East Java. Others are LIPIA in Jakarta and the web of UIN/IAIN. They continuously appeal to large numbers of students primarily from secular state universities, who are convinced of the effectiveness of tarbiyah as the alternative model of doing Islamisation in Indonesia. This model, for them, is truly a process of Islamisation, which encourages deep changes in individuals in terms of morality, intellectuality and spirituality. JSIT, as an institutionalisation of the values of the tarbiyah movement, is a social organisation for education affairs. Although various SITs have already emerged since , they decided to unify under an agreed organisation, JSIT, on July st, in Yogyakarta. Despite having no structural relationship, most founders of JSIT culturally originated from activists in Jemaah Tarbiyah and actively as being part of elites, politicians, cadres and supporters of PKS. When the general chairperson of JSIT, Sukro Muhab, was interviewed by the Republika, one of Indonesia’s leading newspapers, this question was raised: There is an assumption that JSIT is the school network of PKS. Is it right? Muhab responded to the question that was published in the Republika, February th, : Well, it should be clarified. In what year was PKS born? , isn’t it. Meanwhile, SIT has been existing since . If anyone comments that SIT belongs to PKS, that’s not correct. We were first born, right? If anyone comments that most SITs belong to PKS’ cadres and the place for their Chapter II 62 children going to school, it cannot be denied. If it (SIT) belongs to PKS, that’s not right, because the party has not allowed for having a school/ schools. Given an ideological bond, the existence of IT school networks flourished with Jemaah Tarbiyah as the cultural trajectory in educating younger generations in order to have Islamic perspectives in line with the tarbiyah model. Although there is no structural connection, the construction of Islamic orientations is an effective path to inspire pupils in the secondary schools. Prior to the emergence of the IT schools, the existence of ROHIS as an extra-school organisation for pupils in the secondary schools in observing Islamic studies more or less contributed to supply cadres in Jemaah Tarbiyah. It was confirmed by Rahmat ( : pp. – ) that LDK and ROHIS are culturalideological paths to produce cadres and, in turn, to supply activists in Jemaah Tarbiyah including its political wing: PKS. Hamayotsu ( : p. ) postulated that the strategic coalition of Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS with religious NGOs and organisations such as ROHIS, LDK, Salimah, PWK and JSIT are motivated by a political imperative to penetrate society and to circumvent suspicion among Muslim communities about parties. Political Parties Concept of Political Parties The political party is one of the most appealing subjects in social and political science discourses. It has been recognised as the critical link to democratic governance (Katz & Crotty, : p. ) and its position as power seeking, where the power is one of the core goals in politics. According to Scarrow ( : pp. – ), the study of political parties academically has been developed by scholars since the third quarter of the nineteenth century. During this time, scholars examined the party as mainly a response to the swift improvement of the role of political parties in the government. Meanwhile, studies on political parties deal with new discourses in the late nineteenth century, when parties became an extra-parliamentary organisation. Ostrogorsky ( ) and 2. 2.1. 2. Political Parties 63 Michels ( ) could be considered the first scholars concerned with the political party. In the later development, studies on parties were advanced with various approaches and theories related to the development of political parties, including their ideology, political culture, political development and democratisation, their links to the political and party systems and institutionalisation. Regarding the definition of political party, it can be found in various scientists’ works. Neumann ( : pp. – ) argued that the political party denotes an articulate institution of society’s active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental power and who compete for popular votes and support with other groups holding divergent outlooks. The party should represent the connecting link between administration and public opinion. Similarly, Sartori ( : p. ) forcefully stressed that the party has vital roles as a mediator or a channelling organisation between a state and society’s interests. The party is a fundamental element of the democratic government and a tool of society in articulating their aspirations. Along with Neumann and Sartori, Mainwaring ( : p. ) highlighted that parties are not mere abstract institutions which follow some mechanical rules in the political system. They are institutions created above all by politicians, and the way they relate to civil society and the state, as well as their capability to represent and impede the representation of interests. Thus, Poguntke ( : p. ) argued that the party needs collateral organisations for two objectives: to extend its anchorage in society beyond its core constituency and to stabilise its electorate. Although such organisations have no formal ties with parties and rely only on a reciprocal interest, according to Poguntke ( : pp. – ), there are two kinds of organisation which are tied to parties: ancillary organisations and affiliated organisations. The former is integrated into the party structure while the latter only represents conscious organisational strategies. Other scholars describe a party as a system. Eldersveld ( : p. ) hypothesised that the political party is a social organism and a miniature political system. It has a representative process, an electoral system, and sub-processes for recruiting leaders, defining goals and resolving internal system conflict. Likewise, Maor ( : pp. – ) argued that a party has several internal duties such as organising popular Chapter II 64 supports, rewarding activists, modifying electoral strategies, producing a cohesive legislative party, ensuring party cohesion, extending electoral support and maintaining electoral strength. Maor’s finding regarding the internal problems of the party is an important way to understand a party’s behaviour and goals. Based on these approaches, this study underlines the political party as groups of people bound by similar beliefs, interests and commitment to promote their ideal goals, whether offering an alternative policy for the administration or occupying vital public positions in a constitutional manner. Referring to its functions, political parties should articulate and aggregate social interests as well as express public expectations and demands in order to influence the government policies. Additionally, parties recruit and invent better leaders to lead the administration based on peoples’ wishes (Hofmeister & Grabow, : p. ). Parties are extremely crucial as they are the foremost mediators and the potential channels between the citizens or voters and their interests (Eldersveld, : pp. – ; Puhle, : p. ). Yet, as a matter of fact, parties are usually established as a means of articulating political beliefs with the aim of gathering other people with similar ideas to strengthen their position to achieve outcomes that meet their aspirations. Whether they are members of the party they vote for or not, voters generally support a party as they agree with what they believe the party is fighting for (Hofferbert, : p. ). Concerning party finance, routine public subsidies are available annually for party operations and campaigns. The parties usually earn an amount of money for every vote polled (Nassmacher, : pp. – ). Other incomes are likely to be gained by parties such as from member dues or external donations. In developing countries, Randall ( ; : pp. – ) and Mainwaring ( : pp. – ) presumed that studies on the political party in this region usually correlate with issues around democratisation, ideology, party system and institutionalism. An empirical study conducted by Mainwaring in Latin America revealed that democracy is still not stable. In Argentina and Brazil, parties have been less central political actors. In terms of social structure, Argentina was relatively similar to Chile and Uruguay but never consolidated a stable system of parties in the way that the other two countries did. The counterpart to 2. Political Parties 65 the fragility of political parties has been the strength of cooperative organisations, especially the unions and the armed forces. Meanwhile, Brazil can be typified by the weakness of parties vis-a-vis the state. More terrible, in Argentina the weakness not only occurs in parties but also in civil society and the politics remained largely limited to elite struggles as a whole (Mainwaring, : p. ). In the case of Indonesia, the performance of political parties broadly is quite in line with democratisation values and they can participate in free and fair elections. Moreover, the influence of the military on parties is obviously declining and electors could give a warning to parties which have bad performances (Ufen, : pp. – ). Nonetheless, the party competition in the era with a multiparty system will end after the election and will be followed by the creation of a cartel. The origin of the cartelised party system is the parties’ collective dependence on rent-seeking to meet their financial needs. This, in turn, creates a circumstance in which parties’ political and economic fates are tied together as a collective. Their survival as individual parties is defined by their ability to maintain the existence of the cartel. The source of cartelisation is in the state’s non-budgetary funds, which encourage parties to perform illegal rent-seeking activities as these funds are not intended for financing the parties (Ambardi, : pp.iii, – ). Although Mietzner ( : p. ) supported Ambardi’s ( ) thesis that Indonesia’s parties attempt to exploit democratic institutions as alternative sources of income, depend on external donors with narrow business interests, invent a central-regional board gap in their self-financing and have an ability in financing their own candidates in the regional head elections, Mietzner ( : p. ) further believed that not all Indonesia’s parties are cartilised. Some major reasons are the inherent ideological cleavage in a Muslim society and the close ties between some parties and mass organisations. In the context of party institutionalisation, Tan ( ; : pp. – ), Ufen ( ), Tomsa ( : p. ), Choi ( ) and Hamayotsu ( : p. ) postulated that Indonesia’s parties and party system, in general, are poorly institutionalised. Nevertheless, in the regional and global trends, Ufen ( b), Hamayotsu ( ), Croissant and Völkel ( ) and Mietzner ( ) put forward that Indonesia’s parties and its party system are well institutionalised if compared to Chapter II 66 the rest of Asian countries, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. It indicates that, in line with Noor’s ( : p. ) thesis, Indonesia’s parties have a bigger chance to preserve cohesion, but it is likely for them to be fragmented parties if they are weakly institutionalised. At the local stage, Fionna ( : p. ) selected PDIP, Golkar, PAN and PKS in Malang, East Java, as institutionalised parties, thus, she believed that more institutionalised party branches have a greater capacity to perform various agendas and provide channels for political participation, conversely, less institutionalised branches tend to be passive and ineffective. The political situation in the era of reformation, as tested by Liddle and Mujani ( : pp. – ), shows that the leadership and party identification are more influential on voting behaviour than religious orientation. It was also strengthened by Ufen ( : p. ) who believed that parties currently are no longer social movements with their own tight network of organisations like in the era of the s. In the direct elections of regional heads, Rinakit ( ) and Djadijono ( ) stated that the selection of candidates by parties, the decisions of voters and the partisan coalition building are not the result of long-term loyalties but of pragmatic decisions so that many coalitions are formed just for the sake of winning. Hence, the politics of aliran is feeble. According to Ufen ( a: pp. – ; : pp. – ) and Tan ( : p. ), the weakness of aliran are accompanied by seven problematic developments: the rise of presidentialised parties, the increasing intraparty authoritarianism, the prevalence of money politics, the lack of meaningful political platforms, weak loyalties to parties, cartel-like cooperation and the upsurge of new local elites. Regarding the organisational structure of parties in Indonesia, most of them apply a similar top-down pattern. This is also caused by a set of regulations related to the establishment of political parties. There is a central board at the national level, usually centred in the capital of the country. At the level of province, there are provincial boards usually located in the capital of the province. There are municipal/district boards at municipal/district levels, sub-municipal/sub-district boards at sub-municipal/sub-district levels and village boards at village levels. The party members in Indonesia, referring to Heidar’s ( : p. ) thesis, are normally obligated to pay membership dues despite not 2. Political Parties 67 working effectively and to pledge to be a member only to one party. Consequently, socialist parties tend to suggest that their members join trade unions or Islamist parties may expect their admirers to be practising Islamic tenets. Hence, Heidar’s ( : pp. – ) account indicates that the relationship between parties and members is grounded on reciprocal motives for each other. Model of Party Classification Political parties can be categorised into a range of different criteria, based on the degree of organisation, the socio-political objective, the social classes which they intend to represent, the positioning towards the political system, or the name which expresses certain socio-political objectives which the parties desire to be identified with. There are two groups in this classification. The first group consists of conservative, liberal, Christian democratic, social democratic, in-part socialist and also parties which define themselves by religion as long as they do not represent extremist positions. The second group comprises extreme rightist or leftist parties and among those the communist parties, besides others (Hofmeister & Grabow, : pp. – ). This study classifies parties based on socio-ideological orientations, as a vast number of these parties establish their agendas based on ideological convictions. The ideology will influence its followers on what to do and how to do it, with proponents frequently claiming that their views are truly scientific. For instance, if you are a communist, you believe it is important to raise working-class consciousness to prepare for the overthrow of capitalism and the seizure of state power. If you are a libertarian, your political programme will include proposals for eliminating government interference in people’s lives and liberties. In the meantime, if you are a traditional conservative, you may want the government to intervene to promote morality or traditional values (Ball et al., : p. ). Thus, different ideologies recommend distinct agendas. Most scholars attempt to classify Indonesia’s parties in post-New Order based on ideological considerations. Liddle ( : p. ) classified them into three groups: the nationalist-soekarnoist like PDIP, the uni- 2.2. Chapter II 68 versalist such as Golkar, PKB and PAN and the Islamic: PPP, PBB and PK/PKS. Baswedan ( : pp. – ) categorised them into four groups. First is the nationalist-secular group such as PDIP. Second is the Islam-friendly group such as Golkar. Third is the Islam-inclusive group like PAN and PKB. Fourth is the Islamist group such as PKS, PPP and PBB. Moreover, Ufen ( : pp. – ; : p. ) classified them into two main groups. First are secular parties such as PDIP, Golkar and the Democrat Party. Second are Islamic parties. Ufen divided the latter group into several distinctive clusters. PAN and PKB are moderate Islamic parties. PPP is the Islamist party with modernist and traditionalist features while PKS and PBB are modernist Islamist parties. In the same vein, Mietzner ( : pp. – ) separated Indonesia’s parties into two opposing spectrums: secular and Islamic. The former can be represented by PDIP and the latter can be embodied by PKS and PPP. There are some parties which position themselves in the middle spectrum, i.e., PAN and PKB. From a different perspective, Fionna ( : pp. – ) examined four major parties at the local level with a comparative study between the city and the district of Malang, East Java. She selected PDIP, Golkar, PAN and PKS as the field research object because these four parties have been considered successful parties in managing their organisational structure at the local level and representing their ideological background. This chapter pays attention to so-called “Islam-based parties”. According to Al-Hamdi ( : p. ), this term could be defined as an organisation which struggles for a set of Islamic values and Muslim society’s interests by occupying government institutions both legislative and executive in a constitutional manner. Gaining power can be earned by participating in the election: political campaign, expanding popular support and votes and promoting various agendas based on Islamic teachings. Based on this concept, Salim ( : p. ), Fatah ( ) and Romli ( : pp. , ) divided them into three groups. First, the party which establishes Islam as its foundation. Second, the party which uses a set of Islamic symbols such as the crescent and star, ka’bah, or Arabic words as its foundation despite not being purely based on Islam, conversely, applying Pancasila. Third is the party which does not adopt Islamic symbols, but synthesises Islam and other ideologies as its foundation and has a close linkage with Muslim com- 2. Political Parties 69 munities. Moreover, Basya ( : pp. – ) classified them into four groups: the traditionalist, the modernist, the neo-revivalist and the post-traditionalist. The former two are based on earlier accounts. The neo-revivalist is frequently correlated with the Middle East political movements such as Ikhwanul Muslimin. Meanwhile, the post-traditionalist is a new form of the traditionalist. They are part of the NU generation, but they have their own novelty in Islamic thoughts which the Islamic legacy should be contextualised every time and everywhere. The last group is occasionally called a synthesis between modernist and traditionalist groups. Most Indonesianists such as Machmudi ( ), Permata ( ), Nurdin ( : pp. – ), Ufen ( : p. ), Sukmajati ( : pp. – ), Hadiz ( : pp. – ), Hidayat ( : p. ), Priamarizki ( ) and Woischnik and Müller ( : pp. – ) postulated some features of Islam-based parties in contemporary Indonesia. Firstly, they have hybrid features and can adjust to the political system. Secondly, they rely on rational calculations rather than ideological considerations. Thirdly, the introduction of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state are no longer their main objective. Fourthly, they have potential to become democracy-friendly and moderate actors. In addition, they are unable to be the ruling party by applying Feith’s ( : p. ) class of parties, the medium-sized parties are a proper position for them. In other words, “the middle player” is an epithet for Islambased parties. This study classifies political parties in contemporary Indonesia into three main groups. First, they represent three variants of Indonesian society in recent developments: abangan, santri and Jemaah Tarbiyah. Second, they represent major forces of people’s aspirations both at the national and local levels. Third, they have already participated in four election cycles and have won seats repeatedly in the national and local parliaments. The three groups are the nationalist-secular party, the nationalist-Muslim party and the nationalist-Islamist party. Why are all of the groups categorised as nationalist? First, the first two groups declare Pancasila as their ideological foundation. Second, although the latter does not adopt Pancasila as its ideological base, it welcomes Pancasila as the core values within the party platform. Thus, the third group is friendly towards Pancasila. Third, as the symbol of national- Chapter II 70 ism, Pancasila, in fact, has similar values with the platform of three groups of political parties. In other words, there are no contradicting values between Pancasila, secularism and Islamism. First is the nationalist-secular group. There is a fivefold reason why this group is classified as “nationalist-secular”. First, the party adopts Pancasila as its ideological base. Second, the party encourages the separation of state and religious affairs primarily related to public matters. Third, the party rejects the introduction of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state. Fourth, the party declares itself as a secular group. The platform of this party can be traced back to the teachings of Soekarno, Marhaenism. The influence of Marhaenism can be confirmed in the new statute and bylaws of PDIP, well-known as AD/ART. Therefore, the historical bond between PNI and PDIP is quite robust. Most scholars agree that Marhaenism tenets cannot be disconnected with the doctrines of Marxism, as Soekarno himself is a Marxist. Fifth, there are similar values between PDIP and communism. It can be seen in PDIP’s statute. In AD ART PDI Perjuangan ( : pp. – ) Chapter III, Part on the party duties, Article Point h, it was stated that: …to build consolidation and solidarity amongst the nation’s components as the symbol of the resistance to liberalism and individualism. Again, in statute Chapter V, Part in the second paragraph, Article , the general chairperson of the central board is the centre of political power of the party having absolute authority to rule the party. This party has a necessity to rule and control the government. The existence of Megawati Soekarnoputri as “the everlasting president” of the party is in line with the second doctrine of communism: democratic centralism. The AD/ART and the party performance indicate the encouragement of the third and fourth tenets of communism: the commitment to state ownership of the means of production and the centrally planned economy is more just and more efficient than a market economy. The involvement of former communist activists and the descent of communist activists into PDIP strengthen this hypothesis. Hence, Marxism and communism have contributed to the PDIP platform. Regarding its supporters, this group is close to broad communities related to the values of nationalism-Marhenism and Pancasila, indeed, consisting of 2. Political Parties 71 multi-religious and ethnic groups. In other words, abangan is the core supporter. Second is the nationalist-Muslim group. This term was developed by Webber ( ) and Sukmajati ( ). Other scholars proposed different names such as “Islam-inclusive parties” (Baswedan, ), Islamic-oriented parties (Nasr, ), “secular-oriented Muslims parties” (Machmudi, ), “substantive sharia group parties” (Hosen, ), “moderate Muslim parties” (Abuza, ), “pluralist Islamic parties” (Barton, ; Hwang, ) and “Muslim democratic parties” (Yildirim, ). There is a fourfold reason why this group is categorised as “nationalist-Muslim”. First, it adopts Pancasila as its ideological foundation and prefers to establish more inclusive and pluralistic platforms. Second, it uses religious values as the political base and tends to realise the substance of Islamic universal teachings rather than formalistic-symbolic ways. The Islamic teachings are, of course, referring to two main sources, Al-Qur’an and As-Sunnah. Thus, this group prefers to combine the relationship between state and religion into a proportional cooperation. Third, despite employing Islamic tenets and symbols to attract popular votes, the party clearly rejects the introduction of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state. Fourth, the main supporters, members and functionaries of the party originated from santri communities mainly modernist-Muslim organisations such as Muhammadiyah. PAN will be selected as the representative in this group. The closeness between PAN and Muhammadiyah can be indicated by a fourfold feature: history, symbols, platform and actions. The relationship has been built up since the commencement of establishment in , where Amien Rais is the central figure. About the symbols, the flags for both use the symbol of the sun. The values of moderate Islam and Muhammadiyah implicitly inspire the platform of PAN. One of the proofs can be seen in the form of the party’s musyawarah, where after the congress at the national level, PAN has Muswil at provincial levels, Musda at district/municipal levels, Muscab at sub-district/submunicipal levels and Musran at village levels. Afterwards, it is undeniable that cadres and sympathisers originating from Muhammadiyah have been involved inside the party at various levels of the organisational structure from the national to the village. Most of them have an Chapter II 72 ability to rule and control the party. In the context of struggling for the interests of Muhammadiyah mainly at the local level, PAN is more representative than other parties. Third is the nationalist-Islamist group. Previous scholars tend to provide distinctive terms for this group such as “Islamist parties” (Baswedan, ; Abuza, ; Webber, ; Permata, ; Mecham & Hwang, ), “formalist Islamic parties” (Barton, ), “modernist Islamist parties” (Ufen, ) and “formal sharia group parties” (Hosen, ). There is a fourfold reason why this group is considered “the nationalist-Islamist”. First, it welcomes the values of Pancasila, as the values are compatible with the party platform. Second, it no longer imposes the introduction of sharia and the establishment of an Islamic state as its main goal. Instead, it prefers to underpin democratic and governance issues and revises its image by focusing on the issues of prosperity and justice, corruption eradication, religious tolerance, bureaucratic reform and the like. Third, it adopts Islam as its ideological foundation and applies Islamic symbols and teachings to its party attributes. Fourth, most elites and functionaries are dominated by orthodox Muslims either at the national or local levels. PKS is representative of this group. Although this party applies Islam, it is considered “ modernist-Islamist” rather than “conservative-Islamist”. Still relying on the network of Jemaah Tarbiyah across the country, this party attempts to reach out to a wider network with all of society, even approaching non-Muslim communities as the impact of applying pragmatic ways. Nevertheless, no legislator outside Muslims at the national level was elected in the and elections respectively, but in the local context mainly in the east of Indonesia, some elected legislators from PKS are non-Muslims. Change and Goal in a Political Party As an organisation, political parties experience internal dynamics and have main goals. Party change, according to Harmel and Janda ( : p. ), can be defined as any variation, alteration or modification in how parties are organised, what human and material resources they 2.3. 2. Political Parties 73 can draw upon, what they stand for and what they do. Harmel and Janda ( : pp. – ) convincingly provided three variables which determine a change in the party. First is leadership change. The shift in party functionaries may be part of the main indicator to change, where the new leadership accomplishes changes which have already been decided upon. As an illustration, leaders may be replaced for personal reasons such as the decision to pursue other interests, ill health, age or even death. New leaders hopefully are able to create significant changes in the party. Second is change in dominant factions. Generally speaking, all parties have identifiable factions within them. Some parties can be classified as groups of rival factions. However, although the leadership alterations can occur without factional displacements, conversely, the factional displacement cannot occur without changes in leadership. In brief, the factional displacement is a result of leadership change. Third is external stimuli comprise an external shock which is immediately correlated to performance considerations on a party’s main goal and causes the party’s decision-makers to undertake a vital re-evaluation of the party’s effectiveness on that goal dimension. It embraces a range of social, economic and political factors in environmental changes outside the party such as constitutional reforms, provisions for public funding, the birth of relevant new parties and changes in the proportions of votes and seats obtained by the party (electoral or parliamentary threshold). Concerning the party’s goals, Strom ( : p. ) classified three kinds of distinctive primary goals which will be achieved by the party: vote-seeking, office-seeking and policy-seeking. Downs ( : p. ) identified that winning elections are the main goal for every party as the party can obtain the office and other objectives. However, according to Deschouwer (in Harmel & Janda, : p. ), although electoral defeat is the mother of change and the electoral result is important, not all parties have equal goals of winning elections as their main objectives. Particular parties prefer to pursue power through a coalition so that electoral losses can less important. The third alternative goal is a representation mission in policy making. It can be embraced by the broader concern for intraparty democracy. Hence, Price ( : p. ) argued that representing and mediating public interests to the larger political world are part of the party’s goal. Chapter II 74 Combining the thinking of Strom, Downs, Deschouwer and others, Harmel and Janda ( : pp. – ) employed a fourfold treatment of possible primary goals for political parties: vote maximisation, office maximisation, policy advocacy and intraparty democracy maximisation. Firstly, for vote maximisers, the most obvious shock wave for the party is electoral failure. The party will debate on how to wake up from dismal situations and seek another way to improve the party’s achievements. Secondly, for office maximisers, this only occurs in a country which adopts multiparty systems, not in pure two-party systems. In the latter system, one cannot distinguish between vote maximisers and office maximisers as winning the election embraces controlling the government. Office maximisers focus on reaching power in a coalition government. Thirdly, for policy/issues/ideology advocates, the shock directly related to the party’s policy positions is more important than the electoral failure and loss of participation in the administration. Such a shock can cause alteration of the party’s identity and the loss of the party’s confidence. Fourth, for intraparty democracy maximisers, the source of change for these parties occurs in their choice as an active representation which articulates members’ majority wishes. External changes such as societal or party system changes can alter the makeup of the party’s membership. Based on the preceding accounts, Harmel and Janda ( : pp. – ) identified four party goals. First is winning votes/elections. The victory in vote seeking is measured by the percentage of votes or seats which the party wins in the legislative elections. Second is gaining executive office. There is a distinction between winning elections and gaining executive office. For an illustration in Indonesia, the Golkar Party dominated the parliamentary seats for the period of – , but it lost its president candidate. The success of office seeking typically is measured by participation in the administration cabinet and by number of ministries held. Third is advocating interests/issues/ideology. Some parties pursue office, whether through a coalition or not as a means of influencing policy. Fourth is implementing party democracy. As a matter of fact, merely a small set of parties want this goal. The German Green Party in the s and the US Democratic Party in are some instances of this goal. It can be called democracy-seeking. 2. Political Parties 75 Additionally, according to Hall ( : p. ), as an organisation, the party is controlled by a dominant coalition, which is embraced in the power centre of the organisation. This power centre or coalition is which makes the strategic choices in regard to the organisation and its structure. Meanwhile, Panebianco ( : p. ) argued that the dominant coalition consists of, whether inside or outside of the organisation itself, the alliance of factions who control the most vital zones of uncertainty, e.g., professional knowledge, environmental relations, communications, rules, financing and recruitment. Thus, as described by Panebianco ( : p. ), there are two concepts in analysing a dominant coalition. First is conformation which refers to the distribution of power relationships among the party’s division leaders and existing factions. The greater the dispersal of power among factions, the weaker the conformation of the dominant coalition. Second is composition which refers to the specific people who serve as top leaders, middlelevel leaders and factional leaders. In this regard, Harmel and Janda ( : pp. – ) stated that if the dominant coalition is factionalised, the dominant faction is the one most likely to earn its way within the coalition. A participating faction is any non-dominant faction in the dominant coalition. An outside faction is any faction outside the dominant coalition. The Configuration of Political Cleavage The concept of cleavage, according to Mair ( : p. ), is usually connected with belief systems such as class or religion, and therefore, Mair ( : p. ) proposed three fundamental features of cleavage: first, a cleavage comprises a social division which distinguishes between groups of people on the basis of social structural characteristics such as status, religion or ethnicity. Second, it involves a collective identity where the cleavage is grounded on a shared identity and interest as farmer, workers, Muslims, Catholics, etc. Third, it has to find an organisational expression whether through a party, a trade union, a religious organisation and the like. Randall ( : p. ) and Vassallo and Wilcox ( : p. ) identified some potential cleavages: religion and state, centre and periphery, urban and rural sectors, land and in- 2.4. Chapter II 76 dustry and labour (worker) and capital (owner). In Indonesia, Ambardi ( : pp. – ) attempted to classify three configurations of political cleavage: the religious-secular, the national-regional and the class. The first two pairs of cleavages were created during the colonial era while the latter denotes the tension between the capitalist and working classes formed during the New Order regime when massive industrialisation occurred. According to Liddle ( : pp. – ), the religioussecular cleavage is more dynamic than others and will be the focus of this study. The configuration of religious-secular cleavages historically can be traced back to the early twentieth century when numerous nationalist and religious movements emerged in the resistance to colonisation. This can be seen with the foundation of Boedi Oetomo, a Java-based organisation, in and Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) in . Moreover, the establishment of Muhammadiyah in and NU in , on the one hand, and the institutionalisation of Permai and PNI in , on the other hand, strengthen the configuration of religious-secular cleavages in Indonesia. This cleavage indeed, continued during the Old and New Order regimes. Although other political ideologies such as communism and socialism were also influential during the colonial and Old Order eras, these two ideologies were, in fact, muted by the New Order regime. In the aftermath of the fall of the President of Soeharto on May st, , according to Salim ( : p. ), approximately political parties emerged immediately on the political stage with different features. Some of them were disqualified by Indonesia’s ministry of law and others intentionally did not register with the ministry of law. This evidence demonstrates that there are some parties called “banner parties” due to their fearfulness of being shown to the public. The other parties registered themselves with KPU to participate in the election. As a result, KPU eventually decided parties were allowed to participate in the election. In the following elections, there were parties in , parties and four local parties only in Aceh in , and parties and three local parties merely in Aceh in . During these four election cycles, parties came and went, because their fate is determined primarily by the required electoral or parliamentary threshold. 2. Political Parties 77 Based on ideological orientations, the configuration of political cleavage in contemporary Indonesia could be simplified into two main alirans: nationalist-secular parties and Islam-based parties. Regarding nationalist-secular parties, they usually dominate the electoral vote and parliamentary seats. In and , PDIP and Golkar led the elections respectively. By , there were three top parties: the Democrat Party, Golkar and PDIP. Meanwhile, in the election, the three top parties were PDIP, Golkar and Gerindra. Therefore, applying Feith’s ( : p. ) classification on the degree of parties, major parties are a precise position for nationalist-secular parties. Recent developments reveal a common trend of presidentialised parties such as PDIP under Megawati Sukarnoputri, the Democrat Party under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Gerindra under Prabowo Subianto, Hanura under Wiranto and Nasdem under Surya Paloh. This fact, according to Samuels ( : p. ), tends to sacrifice policy concerns and the party organisation will be marginalised in setting the party agenda and establishing the party ideology. Nevertheless, according to Kawamura ( : pp. – ), presidentialised parties can occur only in big parties which have a solid organisational structure and have a chance to compete in the presidential election, rather than small and medium-sized parties which are not actively involved in the presidential election as they prefer to maximise votes merely in the parliamentary election. According to Poguntke and Webb ( : pp. – ), this is a global phenomenon in almost all democratic states caused by the increased capacity of political leaders to bypass their party machines and to appeal directly to voters. The effect is the emergence of an authoritarian personalism. In the electoral stage, nationalist-secular parties almost gained victory rather than Islam-based parties. PDIP and Golkar always led in the four election cycles. Two other nationalist-secular parties, the Democrat and Gerinda, also led in and respectively. Nonetheless, it was not a total loss for Islam-based parties, as PKB, PPP and PAN were ranked third, fourth and fifth in the election and the spectacular performance made by PKS in the election. At certain levels of administration, Islam-based parties can triumph and dominate the vote. In the election, PKB and PPP were the ruling party in some dapils mainly in East and Central Java. Even PAN domi- Chapter II 78 nated the total vote in the Southeast Sulawesi Province. At district and municipal levels, Islam-based parties indeed have performed best in various political events. Nevertheless, nationalist-secular parties dominate the field. There is a fourfold reason. First, although a majority of Indonesian people are Muslims, most of them are nominal Muslims but not pious. Hence, animistic abangan is dominant rather than orthodox santri. Second is the influence of Western perspectives of democracy to society. The influence can be delivered in formal lectures like studying in colleges or informal meetings such as trainings and short courses among society. Commercial ads in the public spheres really help in shaping societal opinions. Third is that political Islam has no ability to prove that it can address common public interests, particularly related to basic human needs, economy and stability. Instead, political Islam frequently shows the image of unfinished conflicts among of them rather than beneficial achievements. Fourth is that many Muslim politicians are involved and arrested due to corruption, bribery and moral cases. Consequently, poor impressions of political Islam are embedded in society. Fifth, society no longer supports the notion of sharia or Islamic state. In addition, the Islam-based parties are unable to deal with two main public issues in Indonesia: economic weakness and political turmoil (Lee, : pp. – ). Secondly, nationalist-secular parties are more accommodating and supporting of Muslim and Islamist agendas. In fact, Muslim elites enrol not merely with Islam-based parties but also with other secular parties. Thirdly, the channel to implement Islamist agendas not only in Islamist parties can also be obtained through civil society such as NGOs and Muslim organisations (Mustarom & Arianti, : pp. – ; Tanuwidjaja, : p. ). Fourthly, in the electoral stage, Islam-based parties have been weakened by fierce intra-party competition caused by the most-open party list system (Buehler, : p. ). Fifthly, elites in Islam-based parties no longer have credibility and charisma because of the entanglement in scandals, whether material or moral (Woischnik & Müller, : p. ). 2. Political Parties 79 Selected Parties: Formulating the Analytical Framework This study selects three major political parties based on three considerations. First, they represent political ideologies in contemporary Indonesia. Second, they represent core forces of people’s aspirations both at national and local levels. Third, they have participated in four election cycles and obtained significant votes both at national and local levels. Fourth, they have seats in the parliament continuously, whether at national or local levels. The three parties are PDIP, which represents the nationalist-secular group, PAN, which represents the nationalist- Muslim group and PKS, which represents the nationalist-Islamist group. The Nationalist-Secular: PDIP Historically speaking, the establishment of PDIP can be traced back when five parties, namely PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo and Catholic Party created the Democratic Development Community on March th, and established this community on October th, . The first three parties represent nationalist-secular-progressive-populist values while the last two parties represent religious and spiritual orientations. These five parties eventually combined on January th, into an agreed political party based on Pancasila values, PDI. Moreover, at the closing of the second congress of PDI in Jakarta, January th, , these five parties ended and declared their fusion (AD ART PDI Perjuangan, : pp. – ). Then, an internal clash took place from to between the Megawati-Faction (supported by a majority of the party’s activists) and the Soerjadi-Faction (supported by the New Order regime). As a result, the PDI Pro-Mega held a national congress on October – , in Bali and declared itself PDIP on February th, in Jakarta characterised by nationality, populist and social welfare. Due to the influence of the teachings of Sukarno on Marhaenism, Pancasila is its ideological foundation (PDIP Perjuangan at www.pdiperjuangan.or.id; Salim, : p. – ). PDIP cannot be separated from the spirit of those five parties, particularly PNI and the values of Pancasila st June . 3. 3.1. Chapter II 80 Therefore, the figure of Soekarno could be the unifying symbol for functionaries, cadres, activists, devotees and sympathisers in PDIP. That is why this party never changed its “party president” since until at least . Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Soekarno, seems to be the immortal president of the party, unless something revolutionary or spectacular happens or she dies. The clan of Soekarno is extremely robust and it will be maintained for the party’s existence. Soekarno eventually is not merely the party figure but also a doctrine and a school. About its relation to society, PDIP tends to rely on the networks of wong cilik, or voters coming from multi-religions, ethnic minorities and Sukarno admirers. In addition, this party has a close relationship with various organisations which adopt Marhaenism and Pancasila as their foundation. Some of them are GSNI, GMNI, GAMKI, PMKRI, the Democrat Youth, the Catholic Youth and KBM. Although some of these organisations are religion-based organisations, they adopt Pancasila as their ideological foundation. Some of their alumni are core elites and cadres in PDIP. The organisational structure of the party at the national level is manifested by the DPP Party. At the regional level, there are the DPD Party at provinces and the DPC Party at districts and municipalities. Moreover, there is the PAC Party at sub-district and sub-municipal levels. In the grassroots, the organisational structure of the party is represented by the PRP at village levels and the PAR Party under villages. In addition, PDIP has an organisational structure in foreign countries called the DPLN Party at state levels and the PPLN Party at federal states or provincial levels. The organisational structure of DPLN and PPLN is equal with the DPC Party and has a special direct relation with the central board of the party. Regarding the organisational deliberation of the party, there is a congress at the national level, Konferda at provincial levels, Konfercab at district and municipal levels and Musyawarah Anak Cabang Partai (Sub-District/Sub-Municipal Deliberation) at sub-district and submunicipal levels, Musyawarah Ranting Partai (Village Deliberation) at village levels and Musyawarah Anggota Anak Ranting Partai (Sub-Village Member Deliberation) at sub-village levels. Meanwhile, in foreign 3. Selected Parties: Formulating the Analytical Framework 81 countries, there is so-called Konferensi Perwakilan Luar Negeri (Foreign Representative Conference). In terms of electoral performance, PDIP became the ruling party in the election by obtaining , , votes ( . percent) and seats ( . percent). Unfortunately, the party vote decreased drastically in the following elections. In , it was second following Golkar with , , votes ( . percent) and seats ( . percent). By , it was third after the Democrat Party and Golkar with , , votes ( . percent) and seats ( . percent). In , although it successfully dominated the election with , , votes ( . percent) and seats ( . percent), this party could not regain the electoral glory it had in . As the ruling party, it eventually delivered one of its cadres Joko Widodo as the elected president of – . More specifically, in the election PDIP was the dominant party in out of the dapils across the country. The party has the ability to dominate more than percent of all dapils. In Java Islands, it won in Jakarta, Banten III, Yogyakarta, seven out the dapils in West Java, eight out the ten dapils in Central Java and four out the dapils in East Java. Outside Java, it can dominate in North Sumatera I, Riau I, Jambi, South Sumatera II, Lampung, Bangka Belitung, Riau Islands, Bali, West and Central Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku and Papua. According to Mietzner ( : p. ), the PDIP’s nationalist, pluralist and populist image still finds a loyal support base, with non-Muslims, secular Muslims and less educated and low-income voters forming a core constituency from which the party can draw. The Nationalist-Muslim: PAN The history of the creation of PAN in cannot be separated from the role of Muhammadiyah where Amien Rais at the time was still the chairperson of the central board of Muhammadiyah. Numerous aspirations were coming from delegations who attended the Muhammadiyah Tanwir sessions in Semarang, Central Java, – July . According to Pimpinan Pusat Muhammadiyah ( : p. ), the tanwir is the highest forum in Muhammadiyah after muktamar which should be 3.2. Chapter II 82 held three times during a period. Those delegations proposed the importance of establishing a political party directly by Muhammadiyah. However, Muhammadiyah did not establish the political party, but it allowed Amien Rais to create a political party without a structural relationship with Muhammadiyah. Rais together with various national leaders set up PAN on August th, in Wisma Tempo Sirnagalih, Bogor, West Java and, in turn, declared it in Istora Senayan Jakarta on August , with a number of Indonesian nationalist leaders such as Amien Rais, Goenawan Mohamad, Zumrotin, Abdillah Toha, AM Luthfi, AM Fatwa, Ismid Hadad, Albert Hasibuan, Rizal Panggabean, Rizal Ramli, Toeti Heraty, Emil Salim, Faisal Basri, AM Fatwa and Alvin Lie Ling Piao (Amir, : pp. – ; PAN at www.pan.or.id). Due to promoting inclusive and nationalism principles, this party adopts Pancasila as its ideological foundation. Hence, the purpose of PAN is to realise a new Indonesia by upholding and enforcing the values of faith and piety, people’s sovereignty, social justice and prosperity within Indonesia. In the beginning of its establishment, the party attempted to involve all communities within PAN. Nonetheless, this party in further developments depends on Muhammadiyah linkages both at national and regional levels. Most local elites of Muhammadiyah took part in the establishment of PAN and have been serving as the top leader and functionaries at provincial, district/municipal, sub-district/sub-municipal and village levels across the country. PAN relies on Muhammadiyah networks since its first establishment, because Muhammadiyah has large networks. Muhammadiyah not only has organisational networks from the national up to the ranting levels but also powerful linkages mainly in education and health affairs. By , Muhammadiyah structurally had provincial boards, district/municipal boards, , sub-district/sub-municipal boards and , ranting boards. The board of Muhammadiyah at the ranting levels is in line with the level of villages or RT or RW or certain communities. In education affairs, it had , PAUDs and kindergartens encompassing the Preschool Education of Al-Quran, , primary and secondary schools and student colleges. In health affairs, it had more than hospitals and health clinics. 3. Selected Parties: Formulating the Analytical Framework 83 In addition, Muhammadiyah recently had potential resources in the field of community-based economic empowerment, philanthropy, entrepreneurship and disaster management. These strengths are not owned by other voluntary and religious organisations in Indonesia except Muhammadiyah. Thus, these potential resources are beneficial for political purposes of PAN. Moreover, although PAN has been involving other stakeholders outside Muhammadiyah and Muslim communities as the party functionaries, in fact, most PAN elites have either a structural or cultural relationship with this organisation. This party frequently needs Muhammadiyah encouragement in various political moments mainly in the election. The organisational structure of the party at the national level is manifested by DPP. At the regional level, there are DPW at provincial levels and DPD at district and municipal levels. DPC is at sub-district and sub-municipal levels. In the grassroots, the organisational structure of the party is represented by DPRt at the levels of desa or kelurahan or nagari and Pengurus Rayon and Pengurus Sub-Rayon (Sub-Village Board), the latter is under the village level or mass communities without territorial boundaries. Besides, PAN has an organisational structure in foreign countries called KLN in foreign countries. The organisational structure of KLN is equivalent with DPD and has a special direct relation with the central board of the party. In terms of the organisational deliberation of the party, there are congresses at the national level, Muswil at provincial levels, Musda at district and municipal levels and Muscab at sub-district and sub-municipal levels. There is Musran at village levels. In foreign countries, there is so-called Musyawarah Koordinator Luar Negeri (Deliberation of Foreign Coordinator). In electoral performance, PAN was fifth in the election with , , votes ( . percent) and seats ( . percent). In , although its vote decreased to , , votes ( . percent) and ranked seventh, its seats increased to ( . percent). By , it achieved fifth position with , , votes ( . percent) and seats ( . percent). In , its vote rose slightly to , , ( . percent) and seats ( . percent) in fifth position. Concerning the leadership change, after Amien Rais headed the party since until , Soetrisno Bachir replaced his position for – . Moreover, Chapter II 84 through the congress in Batam, Hatta Rajasa was elected as the top leader five years later. Furthermore, Zulkifli Hassan was voted as the general chairperson of PAN for the period of – through the congress in Bali, . In addition, it is important to note that this party already created Amien Rais as the spokesperson of MPR in – , and was successful in leading the amendment of the Constitution. Another cadre of PAN, Zulkifli Hassan was also appointed as the spokesperson of MPR for – . In the election, PAN was the ruling party in one province: Southeast Sulawesi. The PAN victory in this province cannot be separated from the role of its governor who has been serving as PAN’s cadre. Nevertheless, the vote of this party is prevalent in a majority of dapils. The Nationalist-Islamist: PKS PKS is a metamorphosis from the Justice Party (PK) which was created on July th, and did not pass the required . percent electoral threshold in the election. The party originally was developed from a religious organisation, Jemaah Tarbiyah. Despite adopting Islam as its ideological foundation and influenced by Ikhwanul Muslimin, according to Machmudi ( : p. ), PKS reformulates the concept of sharia through a campaign for justice and welfare. The party vision is to realise a civil society with justice, prosperity and dignity. In the grassroots, its activists have started to educate Indonesian Muslims about the essence of sharia through the da’wa activities. It hopes that the demand for the application of sharia will come from the grassroots and does not need to be imposed by the state. Therefore, Munandar ( : pp. – ) classified PKS as a religious movement-based cadre party. At least Muslim leaders declared PK in the inception of its establishment such as Hidayat Nurwahid, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, Yusup Supendi, Untung Wahono, Almuzzammil Yusuf, Fahri Hamzah and Nurmahmudi Ismail (Damanik, ; Rahmat, ; Noor, ). The latter led the party from to . By , PK reinvented itself with a new name, PKS, founded on April th under the leadership of Hidayat Nurwahid. Furthermore, inasmuch as 3.3. 3. Selected Parties: Formulating the Analytical Framework 85 Nurwahid was elected as the spokesperson of MPR in , his position was continued by Tifatul Sembiring for approximately five years. After the election, PKS was part of the government coalition and Sembiring was appointed to enrol in the administration cabinet. Sembiring’s position was replaced by Luthfi Hasan Ishaq for more than three years. Sadly, in early , Ishaq was arrested by the KPK due to beef bribery. Soon after this tragedy, PKS laboured to consolidate internal forces of the party and in turn announced Anis Matta as the next leader. On August – , , Mohammad Sohibul Iman was established as the PKS president for five years. According to Machmudi ( : pp.xvii-xviii) and Priamarizki ( ), this party chooses pragmatic ways in order to attract popular support and no longer imposes sharia as its main goal, rather, it attempts to revise its image by focusing on the issues of prosperity and justice. The discrepancy between the Islamist party’s ideological aspirations and its actual behaviours, as explained by Permata ( : p. ), is not a result of a deliberate plan or hidden agenda to cheat the democratic game. But rather it indicates an unavoidable influence of institutions on the behaviours of rational actors. The political participation of Islamist parties in Indonesia is increasingly being normalised. According to Hwang ( : pp. – ), there are some indicators of Islamist normalisation: Islamist parties participate regularly in elections, often forming electoral and legislative coalitions with nationalist parties to increase the likelihood of winning elections and to leverage their influence in the legislature. It is the reason why PKS is considered the nationalist-Islamist party. With respect to its members and supporters, by , PKS had narrow supporters which concentrated largely among members and alumni of Jemaah Tarbiyah. The party eventually expanded into new segments of society which can be classified as young, urban, educated, pious middle classes and students (Hassan, : p. ; Hamayotsu, : pp. – , ). By , it made inroads among workingclass voters in urban areas, who benefited from the PKS social service and community welfare programmes. Afterwards, it declared itself in as an open party and invited non-Muslims to join as well as made further inroads into rural communities, particularly in Central and East Java. Muhtadi ( : pp. – ) provided some tangible proof Chapter II 86 that this party tends to be an open party and reaches all segments of the voter: publishing public figures such as Ahmad Dahlan, Hasyim Asy’ari and Soekarno in the PKS commercial ads in several televisions and the presence of pop music groups like Gigi in the PKS campaign in . Nevertheless, there is no evidence that non-Muslims are joining the party in significant numbers (Hwang, : p. ) and, in fact, none of PKS’ national legislators elected in the and elections were non-Muslims. To continuously attract popular support, this party applies cultural approaches by enhancing the network of JSIT across the country. It is undeniable that this approach is quite effective for PKS. The JSIT coordinates all IT schools with the vision of becoming the centre for empowering Indonesia’s IT schools towards an effective and qualified school. By , the JSIT nationally had , schools consisting of kindergartens, primary schools, junior high schools, senior high schools and three student colleges (Republika, ). Although the JSIT has no structural relation with PKS, in fact, many activists, members and supporters have been involved in developing JSIT whether as donors, founders, owners, teachers or other crucial roles, even their children are learning in those schools. In addition, PKS and the JSIT have a similar platform on education affairs. Their symbols also denote a tight linkage. Outside the JSIT, PKS keeps its culturalideological relation with ROHIS, LDK, Salimah and PWK. The organisational structure of the party at the national level is manifested by the DPTP. At the regional level, there are DPTW at provincial levels and DPTD at district and municipal levels. DPC is at sub-district and sub-municipal levels. In the grassroots, the organisational structure of the party is represented by DPRt at village levels. Concerning the organisational deliberation of the party, there are Musyawarah Majelis Syura (Shura Assembly Deliberation) and Munas at the national level. Moreover, there are Muswil at provincial levels, Musda at district and municipal levels, Muscab at sub-district and submunicipal levels and Musran at village levels. In the election, in PKS gained , , votes ( . percent) and seven seats ( . ). Its performance rose spectacularly in by obtaining , , votes ( . ) and seats ( . percent). By , its vote was quite stable with , , ( . percent) and seats 3. Selected Parties: Formulating the Analytical Framework 87 ( . percent). In , it earned , , votes ( . percent) and seats ( . percent). Based on the election, the voter base of PKS was found particularly in urban areas of Java and outside Java. Despite having no ability to dominate a certain dapil, its electors are prevalent in all regions. Summary The analytical framework was outlined in this chapter. This study conceptualises political ideology as the linkage between the beliefs or platform adopted and owned by a political party and how it behaves and how it should behave. Based on the preceding accounts, the ideological cleavage currently in Indonesia could be based on two opposing sides: secularism versus Islamism. The leading variant of Indonesian society includes three groups: abangan, old-santri and new-santri. The former is represented by various distinctive marhaenism-based organisations, the middle is represented by modernist-organisations like Muhammadiyah, and the latter is represented by Jemaah Tarbiyah. Three major groups of political forces emerged. First is the nationalist-secular, embodied by PDIP. Second is the nationalist-Muslim, characterised by PAN. Third is the nationalist-Islamist, symbolised by PKS. The Invention of Political Ideologies and Their Institutionalisation in Contemporary Indonesia Source: compiled by the author. As displayed in Figure . , there are three types of political ideology in contemporary Indonesia with its institutionalisation. The first creation is formulated by the abangan variant with Marhaen as its society. This variant adheres to Soekarno’s Pancasila and Marhenism values as its 4. Figure . Chapter II 88 life guideline. It rejects the introduction of sharia and supports and involves itself with nationalist-secular political groups. The institutionalisation of this variant can be manifested in PDIP. The second creation is the old-santri variant with Muhammadiyah (modernist santri) as its society. This variant utilises Pancasila as its worldview still referring to religious universal values. It too denies the introduction of sharia and tends to encourage and involve itself with nationalist-Muslim political groups. The institutionalisation of this variant is represented by PAN. The third creation is constructed by the novel-santri variant with Jemaah Tarbiyah as its society. This variant considers Islam as its vital values. Although it does not impose sharia, this variant favours Islamising society first and then the state with accommodative and flexible approaches. Thus, this variant tends to support and engage itself in nationalist-Islamist political groups. For the institutionalisation, it can be found in PKS as its da’wa bridge. To sum up, this analytical framework will be applied in the following chapters. 4. Summary 89 Chapter III Yogyakarta: The Country’s Leading Municipality Before presenting the empirical analysis on the policy, agenda and strategy of three major political parties, this chapter portrays the sociopolitical conditions of Yogyakarta Municipality which serves as the area of study. In doing so, there are four sections which will be explored further. First is an overview of Yogyakarta Municipality consisting of demography, history, population, religion and ethnic characteristics. Second is exploring the development of public services in the municipality, mainly in education and health affairs. Third is depicting four main governance actors within the municipality: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society. Fourth is portraying three ideological parties within the municipality: PDIP, PAN and PKS as representatives of local political forces. As a brief overview, it is important to define here the concept of municipality. According to Law No. / on the Regional Government, a municipality is a territory with particular boundaries where its society has core activities in industry and service sectors. There are two concepts related to municipality. First is the municipality as an autonomous region, managed by the municipal government. Second is the municipality as an urban area, consisting of part of a district or part of two or more districts directly adjacent. The latter type is managed by the district government or an independent body established by the district government. Nevertheless, this study uses the first concept of municipality. 91 Introduction Yogyakarta Municipality is the capital of DIY Province. It is located in the centre of the province and borders the Sleman District to the North, the Bantul and Sleman Districts to the East, the Bantul District to the South and the Bantul and Sleman Districts to the West. Covering an area of . square kilometres or , hectares (ha), Yogyakarta Municipality is merely . percent of the province area. Yogyakarta is the smallest area among other districts and municipalities within the province. Topographically, the municipality is part of the lowlands located on the slope of Merapi Mountain. There are three rivers crossing the municipality: the Gajahwong River, which flows in the eastern part of the municipality, the Code River in the middle part and the Winongo River in the western part (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). Covered by a mainly urban area and multi-ethnics, Yogyakarta is also recognised as “the city of tolerance” in Indonesia. By , the municipality had a total population of , including , males or . percent and , females or . percent with an average density of , people per km2. The densest population is in the Ngampilan Sub-Municipality that is equal to , people per km2 while the most sparsely populated is the Umbulharjo Sub-Municipality with , people per km2. Regarding religion, the highest percentage is Muslims at . percent. The rest are Catholics at . percent, Protestants . percent, Buddhists . percent, Hindus . percent and others . percent (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – , ). Moreover, the number of religious worship facilities within the municipality is mosques, mushollas, Catholic churches, Protestant churches, Buddhist monasteries, Balinese Hindu temple and pagodas (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). With regard to ethnicity, Javanese is still dominant, although some non-Javanese have been entering due to marriage and occupational reasons; even a few foreign people reside there. However, there are no statistics on this issue. 1. DIY, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, itself is located in the centre of Java Islands and borders Central Java to the West and with East Java to the East. More than a half of the total of Indonesian people live on Java Island. Chapter III 92 Historically speaking, the establishment of Yogyakarta Municipality can be traced back to the Treaty of Giyanti on February th, . The content of the treaty stated that the Mataram Empire is divided into two distinctive kingdoms: The first one belongs to the Surakarta Kingdom and the rest is ruled by the Prince Mangkubumi centred in Yogyakarta. To establish the kingdom’s capital, Yogyakarta Municipality eventually was chosen as the formal capital on October th, . After Indonesia’s Independence Day on August th, , the municipality was not directly recognised as an autonomous town, as the local authority at the time was still controlled by the provincial government. The official government of Yogyakarta Municipality was founded on June th, under Act No. / as “Haminte Kota”. Under Act No. / , the term Haminte was changed to “Kota Besar”. On December th, the term Kota Besar was replaced with “Kotapraja”. Afterwards, with the implementation of Act No. / , the term Kotapraja was altered to “Kotamadya”. When the era of the reformation was established, Act No. / changed the term Kotamadya to “Kota” (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, c: p.xv; Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). The term “kota” is derived from an Indonesian word, meaning municipality or city. It is important to underline that Yogyakarta Municipality once served as the capital of Indonesia for almost four years from January th, until December th, when the Netherlands and its allies colonised Indonesia. As one of the country’s leading municipalities, Yogyakarta envisions itself for – as the city with qualified education, culturebased tourism and an environment-oriented service centre. To implement its vision, the municipality has nine missions. First is maintaining the municipality as the city of education. Second is maintaining the municipality as the city of tourism, the city of culture and the city of struggle. Third is realising the competitiveness of the municipality in outstanding public services. Fourth is realising a comfortable and friendly city to the environment. Fifth is realising the municipality with morality, ethics, being civilised and cultured. Sixth is realising the municipality which has good governance and clean government, justice and law-oriented and democratic. Seventh is ensuring safety, order, being united and peaceful. Eight is realising qualified infrastructures. 1. Introduction 93 Ninth is realising the municipality as the city of health (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). For almost a decade, between and , the municipality had distinctive achievements and awards at the national and international levels: awards in government and public service affairs, awards in environmental affairs, awards in infrastructure affairs, awards in health affairs, five awards in education affairs and five awards in tourism affairs (Retno, : pp. – ). Numerous provincial awards were also acheived by the municipality in different issues. It is a remarkable progress (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). Some relevant achievements can be presented here. In early , Yogyakarta Municipality was chosen and recognised as the country’s cleanest city from corruption by reaching the highest score . on the corruption perception index. The survey was conducted in cities by Indonesia’s International Transparency. A year later, , Yogyakarta Municipality received the Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award due to its commitment in eliminating corruption. In the same year, the municipality also achieved the highest score of . in the PI- AK. The PIAK is a measurement tool to assess the development of public institutions in supporting corruption eradication programmes. Yogyakarta Municipality was considered the most successful city in implementing good governance, particularly in four municipal agencies. The participants in the PIAK were ministries, two provincial governments, four municipal governments and two district governments in Indonesia. Not surprisingly, the municipality obtained the top rank as Indonesia’s most livable city in and respectively (Retno, : pp. – , – ). Thus, the HDI in Yogyakarta Municipality increased continuously between and as depicted in Table . . It is measured by three main indicators: health (life expectancy), education (literacy rate and the average length of attending school) and economy (the average real spending per capita). The HDI in was . , it rose to . in and . in . An HDI score above can be categorised as high. If this HDI is compared with the condition prior to Indonesia’s economic crisis in – , the HDI in Yogyakarta Municipality since was higher rather than the HDI in (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, a: pp. – ). This meant the municipality was first in Chapter III 94 HDI achievement at the DIY provincial level and second at the national level (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, a: pp. – ). The Human Development Index in Yogyakarta Municipality, – No Indicators Year The life expectancy at birth (year) . . . The literacy rate ( ) . . . The average length of going to school (year) . . . The average real spending per capita (IDR) . . . Human Development Index . . . Source: BPS Kota Yogyakarta, a: p. . By , Yogyakarta Municipality was appointed by the Kemitraan, an independent organisation centred in Jakarta which promotes governance reform in Indonesia, as the country’s best city among selected districts and municipalities in reaching Indonesia Governance Index’s (IGI’s) highest standard. These districts and municipalities were selected based on representative high, middle and low levels of their HDI. Besides, the guidance on the EKPPD which was issued by Indonesia’s ministry of home affairs is also used as one of the indicators to measure the leadership effectiveness of local officials. Afterwards, four governance arenas in each district and municipality were measured by indicators and six principles of good governance. Applying the scale of (very poor) to (very good), the political-office arena in Yogyakarta Municipality reached . (fairly poor), the bureaucracy attained . (very good), the civil society gained . (good) and the economic society obtained . (fair). Table . 1. Introduction 95 Indonesia’s Governance Index in Yogyakarta Municipality, Arena Scale of Arena Participation Transparency Fairness Accountability Efficiency Effectiveness Political- Office . . . . . . . Bureaucracy . . . . . . . Civil Society . . . . . . . Economic Society . . . . . . . Source: Tim Indonesia Governance Index, : p. . Table . demonstrates some interesting findings. The political-office has the highest score in transparency and the lowest score in fairness. The same pattern also occurs in the bureaucracy. This denotes a positive sign that corruption is not rampant within the municipality and can be controlled by the applied system. The highest score in civil society is accountability while the lowest is participation. Although the participation scale is at the lowest level, it reached . – almost “fairly good”. Moreover, the highest score in economic society is fairness while the lowest is transparency. This is a sensitive issue where economic society has a very poor grade in transparency at . . Nonetheless, this result is the maximum achievement of Indonesia’s local government and Yogyakarta Municipality is considered as the best benchmark in the world. In , Yogyakarta Municipality achieved the top position in the Islamic City Index (IKI) amongst municipalities across Indonesia. The research was carried out by the Ma’arif Insitute Jakarta between January and March by applying three main indicators: secure, prosperous and happy. Based on these three indicators, the Islamic city, according to this research, can be defined as a secure city, a prosperous city and a happy city. The IKI uses the scale of zero ( ) for the lowest and a hundred ( ) for the highest. Yogyakarta reached the first rank with a score of . , followed by Bandung and Denpasar in second Table . Chapter III 96 and third positions, respectively (Tim Peneliti IKI, ). Although this research triggered various reactions among Indonesian society and Muslim scholars, whether refusal or approval, Yogyakarta Municipality can be considered as the benchmark for the application of Islamic universal values in a society. Public Services The development of public services in Yogyakarta Municipality has been achieving positive growth. In , it was selected by Jawa Pos Pro Otonomi as a leading innovative city on public accountability. In , it gained “the Investment Award” from Indonesia’s BKPM, selected as the best implementation of the PTSP. By , it earned the award “Citra Pelayanan Prima” from Indonesia’s president due to the tiptop performance of the Licensing Agency as the unit of public service. In , it obtained an award from Indonesia’s finance minister due to successful performance in the field of finance, economy and prosperity. Still in the same year, it was selected by Indonesia’s minister of administrative and bureaucracy reforms as the district/municipal government with a good performance in public services. By , it was categorised by Indonesia’s minister of home affairs in the top ten municipal governments. There are, indeed, lots of public services within Yogyakarta Municipality. Some of them are education, health, public transportation, road infrastructure and licensing. This study focuses only on two public services, education and health, as these two issues are the core programme of the municipality. Education Although Yogyakarta Municipality is the nation’s city of education, prior to , the local government did not forcefully encourage education programmes, comprising under five percent of the budget in . In addition, the government paid less attention to the importance of providing excellent education for people. Only a half million IDR per 2. 2.1. 2. Public Services 97 year was spent on scholarship programmes for education. The gap in quality is also suffered by particular schools. Other problems are correlated with accountability and transparency. Since the municipal government has sought to improve access and quality of education (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). The programmes related to education in Yogyakarta Municipality are executed by the Education Agency (Dinas Pendidikan). In the post- New Order regime, the officials called “Kepala Dinas or Kadin” (Head of the Agency) who already led the Education Agency in Yogyakarta Municipality were Drs. H. Syamsury, MM from to and Drs. Edy Hery Suasana, M.Pd from to present. Moreover, the vision and mission of the municipal government on education is implementing qualified, characterless and inclusive education with the support of professional human resources. To realise the vision, the municipal government has four missions (Dinas Pendidikan Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). The budget for education after was increased by . percent in , . percent in , . percent in and . percent in . Furthermore, many programmes were conducted by the municipal government between and . First is providing pupil scholarships from kindergarten to secondary school. Second is providing budgets for school needs to avoid a quality gap among schools. Third is improving teachers’ wages and status. Fourth is increasing pupils’ nutrition. Fifth is technology-based new pupil registration since and online learning consultation. Sixth is the provision of funds for the PAUD. Seventh is the establishment of the Taman Pintar in as a public sphere to learn about science and technology. It, in fact, is becoming the icon of educational tourism within the municipality and, in turn, strengthening the image of Yogyakarta as the city of education (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). The Number of Schools in Yogyakarta Municipality, No Level of School Public Private Total Kindergartens Primary School Junior High School Table . Chapter III 98 Senior High School Vocational High School Extraordinary School Total Source: BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – . Regarding education facilities within the municipality, as depicted in Table . , the highest number of schools in was primary schools with units. In contrast, the lowest number is the vocational school with units. Moreover, the number of private schools were higher than public schools except for primary school. Private sectors have a significant role in progressing education affairs and have been reinforcing the epithet of the city of education. The most interesting is that the municipal government seemingly paid less attention to the development of kindergartens. Public kindergartens had merely two units. In addition, based on data from BPS Kota Yogyakarta ( : pp. – ), the municipality in had student colleges, both public and private, with various faculties and departments. In the second semester of , it had , students and , lecturers. Concerning literacy inside the municipality, it increased from . percent in to . percent in (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, b: p. ). This is a tremendous achievement. Moreover, in , the rate of school participation reached . percent for the primary school, . percent for junior high school and . percent for senior high school (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). This reveals that the higher the school level the less the students participate in going to school. The Number of Schools, Classes, Students and Teachers in Yogyakarta Municipality, Level of School Public Private Classes Students Teach-ers Ratio of Students to Teachers Kindergarten - . - , . - . Table . 2. Public Services 99 Primary School - , , . - , , . - . - . Junior High School - , . - , , . - . - , . Senior High School - , . - , . - , . - , . Vocational High School - , . - , . Extraordinary School - . - . Source: BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – . Table . depicts that each teacher educates between six and kids in kindergarten, between eight and pupils in primary school, between ten and pupils in junior high school, between eight and pupils in senior high school, between eight and pupils in vocational high school and between two and three pupils in extraordinary school. This indicates that the higher the school level the less the teacher’s burden in teaching. The Number of Students who Passed their Exam in Yogyakarta Municipality, Level of School Public Schools Private Schools Participants Passed Participants Passed Primary School , , . , , . Junior High School , , , , . Senior High School , , , . Table . Chapter III 100 Vocational High School , , . , , . Source: BPS DIY, : pp. – . Meanwhile, Table . reveals that percent of students in public secondary schools in passed the national examination. Moreover, public and private vocational schools reached nearly percent. The others also reached a high percentage between . percent and . percent. In general, this positive development should increase in the years to come. In addition, the dropout in was students from primary school, students from junior high school, one from senior high school and students from vocational high school. For schools not under the Education Agency, the dropout was students from junior high school and three students from senior high school (BPS DIY, : p. ). Furthermore, three is a threefold indicator to assess the development of education in Yogyakarta Municipality. First is access to education. The target of the municipality is minimising the number of children with an education level below senior high school. Therefore, the municipal government ensures that there are no children who cannot go to school due to expenses, because children categorised as the KMS- Group will be subsidised by the municipal government. There is no payment for such children if they are registered pupils in public schools while the government will optimise additional supports if they are registered pupils in private schools. Since , there is a special quota for pupils of the KMS-Group in public schools: percent in each vocational high school and percent in each senior high school. Nowadays, there is no operational extortion in the primary school and the junior high school as in the past. In addition, the lowest charge for education can be found in this municipality. In , the monthly tuition fee for senior high school was , IDR (slightly under Euro) and for the vocational high school it was , IDR. Moreover, the annual BOSDA for each pupil in primary school was , IDR, in According to the Provincial LOD in DIY, Yogyakarta Municipality in achieved the lowest amount of extortion in the school amongst other districts/municipalities at the provincial level. 2. Public Services 101 junior high school one million IDR, in senior high school , , IDR and in senior vocational school , , IDR. Second is the quality of education. If the standard of education quality is the achievement on the national exam, this municipality always achieved the highest rank at the provincial level particularly from to . Besides, it has been realising some novel education models such as a character-based education, an affective-based religious education and an inklusi (literally: inclusive) education. Third is the governance of education. This measures the management of education being implemented based on governance principles. Hence, the municipal government created the PPDB and RTO in as online systems for new pupils registering to schools so that the registration no longer used manual-offline systems. In addition, various mayoral regulations (Perwal) were also issued to support the education system within the municipality such as the Perwal No. / on Guideline of the School Committee Formation, the Perwal No. / on Guideline in Making and Managing APBS, the Perwal No. / on Inclusive Education Organising, the Perwal No. / on Guideline in Making School Rules and the Perwal No. / on Development of Character Education. These mayoral regulations are quite effective to control the implementation of the education system in Yogyakarta Municipality. It is important to underline here that private schools also have significant contributions in strengthening the existence of Yogyakarta as Indonesia’s city of education. Outside public schools, there are some leading private schools in this area. According to Budi Santosa Asrori (interview, Sept. ) of the Education Agency, at the level of primary school, the top quality was reached by Muhammadiyah schools such as the SD Muhammadiyah Sapen, the SD Muhammadiyah Wirobrajan III and the SD Muhammadiyah Suronatan, followed by the SDIT and schools under Protestant foundations. At the level of junior high school, the top quality was earned by Catholic schools such as the SMP Pangudiluhur I, followed by the SMPIT Abu Bakar and other Muhammadiyah schools like the SMP Muhammadiyah and Mu’allimin and Mu’allimaat Muhammadiyah Boarding Schools. At the level of senior high school, the top quality was obtained by Catholic schools such as the SMA Stelladuce I, followed by the SMA Muhammadiyah Chapter III 102 while at the level of vocational school, Muhammadiyah institutions were leading. To strengthen the claim that the governance of education is growing better than before, Andar Rujito (interview, Oct. ) of SMA Bopkri I Yogyakarta stated that: As a headmaster, I never ever spend one IDR for earning my position right now. When various headmasters outside Yogyakarta visited our school, they were shocked with how to develop the school. In addition, only in Yogyakarta, children of state officials were not accepted by the favourite public school; due to their score, they were not qualified. As a result, between and , the municipality received around nine achievements in education affairs. By , it achieved the award “Widyakrama” from Indonesia’s ministry of education due to successful completion of nine years of compulsory education. During , it obtained three different awards. On July, it achieved “Anugerah FASI ” from the chairperson of FASI Mufidah Jusuf Kalla because of the contribution in improving kindergartens. On September, it attained “Mitra PAUD Berprestasi ” from the general chairperson of MIPI Fauzi Bowo due to the role of its mayor in the development of PAUD. In December, it reached “Satya Lencana” from Indonesia’s President because its mayor had a concern with the development of education affairs (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). In , it gained an award from Indonesia’s ministry of education and Indonesian Batik Foundation for its success in preserving and developing batik activities in the school (Retno, : p. ). In , for the third time, the municipality received the “Ki Hajar Award” from Indonesia’s ministry of education and culture as the country’s best city which encouraged utilising technology information (Dinas Pendidikan Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). Health As the nation’s city of education, Yogyakarta Municipality prior to was in a situation where the health service was feeble and awful for poor people. It was caused by the weak data on poor people so that health services could not reach all poor people. Moreover, the prelimi- 2.2. 2. Public Services 103 nary health service for children, mothers and elderly people was also not optimal. This co-occurs with the decrease of the role of “Posyandu” in providing preliminary health services. In addition, the municipal society addressed a range of infectious diseases, particularly dengue hemorrhagic fever and tuberculosis as well as drug abuse among young generations. The tiny budget for health insurance programmes at the time was also a barrier faced by the municipality (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). There are some indicators to measure the degree of societal health. The first indicator is life expectancy at birth. Yogyakarta Municipality achieved positive development in life expectancy between and . The babies born in and have a life expectancy up to . years old and . years old respectively. In the meantime, those born in have a life expectancy up to . years old. The second one is the diseases suffered by society. The highest disease suffered by the municipal dwellers is coughs and colds reaching . percent and . percent, respectively. The rest are . percent heat illness, . percent headache, . percent toothache, . percent diarrhea, . percent asthma and . percent other illnesses (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, a: pp. – ). The municipal government executed some agendas between and . First is the implementation of JAMKESDA system for poor people. In doing so, the municipal government issued the KMS-Group programme. This programme is especially for poor residents in the municipality. If the residents come to the health centres, they only show the KMS-Card and, in turn, there is no payment. All poor people thus obtained health services. Second is the revitalisation and development of the Posyandu as the public health service for babies, pregnant mothers and elderly people. The other function of the Posyandu could be used for parenting education. Third is providing additional food for children (from baby to primary school level) to increase their nutrition. To execute this programme, the municipal government involved the school committee and the Puskesmas. Fourth is the implementation of PHBS for students in the school. There are two activities: ) the municipal government supplied faucets for each school to increase healthy behaviours among students; and ) the implementation of “Semutlis” for students to clean the school for ten minutes. Fifth is the establish- Chapter III 104 ment of the NCC collaborating with Indonesia’s GRANAT and the Karang Taruna to counter drug abuse particularly among young generations. Sixth is granting thousand IDR for each person with tuberculosis and their caretakers to stimulate their life to be a healthy human (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). Furthermore, the nutrition status of children under five increased from to . Undernourished children decreased from . percent in to . percent in , malnourished children also decreaed from . percent in to . percent in . In contrast, normal nutrition of children was growing by . percent in to . percent in . Likewise, overnourished children increased by . percent in to . percent in (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). This shows that the municipal government seriously fought to minimise the number of undernourished and malnourished children. In addition, to control the population growth, the municipal government attempted to socialise the KB programme. This programme has been positively accepted so far as indicated by a large number of active acceptors. In , there were , acceptors or . percent of fertile age adults within the municipality. Injection was a contraception choice used by . percent and IUD was the second, with as many as . percent (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). Regarding the number of health facilities, in , the municipality had nine general hospitals, six special hospitals, puskesmas, sub-puskesmas, mobile-puskesmas, polyclinics and , bed capacity ( in public hospitals and , in private hospitals), dispensaries and pharmacies. The number of health workers based on work units and health service facilities in was doctors, , nurses, midwives, pharmacists, nutritionists, medical technicians, personnel in sanitary and public health degrees. In particular, the doctors within the municipality consisted of specialists, general doctors, dentists and dental specialists (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). Additionally, there were KKBs and PPKBDs (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). Recently, the municipal government established “a hospital without classes” namely the Pratama Hospital, built between and . 2. Public Services 105 With positive developments in health services, the municipality earned awards between and . The first award was “Manggala Karya Kencana” in from Indonesia’s minister of health affairs due to being the national best in the implementation of health affairs. The second award was “Manggala Karya Bakti Husada” in from Indonesia’s president because it was the national best for the city of health. The third award was “Swasti Saba Wiwerda” in from Indonesia’s minister of health affairs due to being the national best in developing health affairs. The fourth award was “Posyandu” in from Indonesia’s minister of health affairs as the national champion expectations II for the Posyandu. The fifth award was “Ksatria Bakti Husada Arutala” in from Indonesia’s minister of health affairs because of leadership in developing health affairs. The award “Swasti Saba Wistara” was received three times in , and respectively from Indonesia’s department of health affairs in the development programme of the city of health. The following award was “Manggala Karya Bakti Husada Arutala” in from Indonesia’s minister of health affairs as the nation’s fourth in the achievement priority indicators in health development. The rest were the award “Manggala Karya Bakti Husada Adiyat” in from Indonesia’s minister of health affairs for being successful in developing a health city programme. In , it received two awards: The “Karya Bakti Husada Kartika” for successful development of innovation in health affairs and the “Manggala Bakti Husada Kartika” for being successful in empowering society for a healthy life (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ; Retno, : pp. – ). All programmes related to health issues in Yogyakarta Municipality are led and executed by the Health Agency (Dinas Kesehatan). In the post-New Order regime, the officials called “Kepala Dinas or Kadin” (Head of the Agency) who led the Health Agency in Yogyakarta Municipality were dr. Choirul Anwar, M.Kes from to , drg. Tuty Setyowati from to and dr. Vita Yulia, M.Kes from to present. Recently, the Agency has a vision: Becoming a facilitator, a motivator, a regulator and a provider of quality and affordable health services. To realise this vision, it has six missions. First is increasing community empowerments in health development towards a healthy and independent society. Second is improving quality and affordable Chapter III 106 health care. Third is improving a health information system based on accurate data. Fourth is enlarging networks among society, government and private sectors. Fifth is increasing the functions of health regulations and resources. Sixth is improving the availability of pharmacies and medical devices (Dinas Kesehatan Kota Yogyakarta at http://kesehatan.jogjakota.go.id). Governance Actors As explained in the preceding chapter, the governance arena consists of four major actors. They are executive, legislature, civil society and economic society. These four actors have distinctive functions and performances which altogether determine the quality of governance in each district/municipality. The first two actors could be classified as the state actors or municipal authorities while the rest are considered society actors. Further explanations on the performance of four actors in Yogyakarta Municipality since until are provided below. Executive The regional government in Yogyakarta Municipality is ruled by a mayor as the head of the executive branch. He is assisted by a vice mayor. Historically, soon after the founding of the municipal government on June th, , the first mayor was Ir. Moh. Enoh in . In the same year, Mr. Soedarisman Poerwokusumo replaced him from to . The following mayors were Soedjono AY ( – ), H. Achmad ( – ), Soegiarto ( – ), Djatmikanto D. ( – ) and R. Widagdo ( – ). The mayor and vice mayor elected by the municipal parliament after the downfall of the New Order regime were H. Herry Zudianto, SE, Akt, MM and HM. Syukri Fadholi, SH for the period of – . They were supported by mainly two fractions: PAN and the Islamic Union. Zudianto’s background is a businessman while Fadholi is a PPP politician. Nonetheless, both are Muhammadiyah cadres and Indonesia’s potential leaders. 3. 3.1. 3. Governance Actors 107 In , the mayoral election well-known as Pilwalkot took place. It was the first time for the city’s citizens to choose their local leaders directly. There were two official pairs of candidates running as mayor and vice mayor. The first pair was Dr. Med. dr. H. Widharto PH, Sp.FK and HM. Syukri Fadholi, SH. The parties supporting this candidate were PDIP, PPP and PKS. Meanwhile, the second pair was H. Herry Zudianto, SE, Akt, MM and Drs. H. Haryadi Suyuti. They were nominated mainly by PAN and Golkar. The first pair obtained . percent while the second pair earned . percent. Thus, the second pair automatically was elected as the official mayor and vice mayor for five years. It was the second term for Zudianto to lead the municipality with a different partner. Prior to running on the political stage, Haryadi Suyuti was a professional businessman. He was also a Muhammadiyah’s cadre and was involved in some other organisations such as PERBASI and PSIM. The following Pilwalkot in Yogyakarta Municipality took place on September th, . There were three pairs. First was Muhammad Zuhrif Hudaya, ST and Drs. Aulia Reza Bastian, M.Hum, proposed primarily by PKS. Second was Ahmad Hanafi Rais, SIP, MPP and Ir. Tri Harjun Ismaji, M.Sc, encouraged by many parties such as PAN, the Democrat Party and PPP. Third was Drs. H. Haryadi Suyuti and Imam Priyono D. Putranto, SE, M.Si, recommended by two parties: PDIP and Golkar. The first candidate gained . percent, the second one earned . percent and the last one obtained . percent. Hence, the third candidate won. Imam Priyono is a businessman and an activist in PSIM. As displayed in Figure . , for managing and implementing the municipal government programmes, the mayor and vice mayor are assisted by so-called “Sekda”, some expert staff and three kinds of personal assistants. For tackling particular issues, the municipal government has many agencies and technical institutions. Each of them has different tasks and functions, although they have to coordinate with one another. By , the municipal government had sub-municipalities and kelurahans, surrounding groups and , neighbouring groups. In addition, the municipal government has to coordinate with the municipal legislature, particularly in budgeting and legislating local regulations. Chapter III 108 Yogyakarta Municipality Administrative System Source: Bagian Organisasi Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, . Moreover, Table . depicts the highest number of kelurahans, RWs, RTs and population at the sub-municipal level is obtained by the Umbulharjo Sub-Municipality. In contrast, the lowest number is reached by the Pakulaman Sub-Municipality. The large area (km ) nevertheless is the determinant factor which differentiates among of them within the sub-municipality. Figure . 3. Governance Actors 109 The Profile of the Regional Government in Yogyakarta Municipality, No Sub-Municipali-ties Area (km ) Kelurahan RW RT Population Male Female Mantrijeron . . Gedungkiwo . Suryodiningratan . Mantrijeron , , Keraton . . Patehan . Panembahan . Kadipaten , , Mergangsan . . Brontokusuman . Keparakan . Wirogunan , , Umbulharjo . . Giwangan . Sorosutan . Pandean . Warungboto . Tahunan . Muja-Muju . Semaki , , Kotagede . . Prenggan . Purbayan . Rejowinangun , , Gondokusuman . . Baciro . Demangan . Klitren . Kotabaru . Terban , , Danurejan . . Suryatmajan . Tegalpanggung . Bausasran , , Pakualaman . . Purwokinanti . Gunungketur , , Gondomanan . . Prawirodirjan . Ngupasan , , Ngampilan . . Notoprajan . Ngampilan , , Wirobrajan . . Patangpuluhan . Wirobrajan . Pakuncen , , Table . Chapter III 110 No Sub-Municipali-ties Area (km ) Kelurahan RW RT Population Male Female Gedongtengan . . Pringgokusuman . Sosromenduran , , Jetis . . Bumijo . Gowongan . Cokrodiningratan , , Tegalrejo . . Tegarlrejo . Bener . Kricak . Karangwaru , , Total . , , , Source: BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. , – , . It is important to note that the number of civil servants in was , employees in which . percent were women and the rest were men. Most of them were diploma IV/bachelor graduates ( . percent). . percent graduated from primary and secondary schools, . percent were diploma I-III graduates, . percent were master graduates and none of doctoral graduates (BSP Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. , ). Legislature Before elaborating further on the election results, the parliamentary seats and the brief profile of legislators since until , this section provides an overview of the former heads of the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality prior to . They were KPH. Mr. S. Poerwokoesoemo, Hertog and Toposubroto who had already led the DPRD during the Old Order regime; unfortunately, the fixed period for those persons cannot be explained here. During the New Order regime, most heads of the DPRD were from the military. They were Letkol L. Soemartono from to . He was replaced by KRT Projowidjono for – , Letkol H. Rusmadi in – , Kol. Wahyu Hard- 3.2. 3. Governance Actors 111 jono in – and Kol. H. Sukedi in – (Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Nine Parties in the Election No Party Votes(from a total of , votes) Seats (from a total of seats) PDIP , PAN , Golkar Party , PPP , PKB , PK , PBB , PKPI , PDKB , TNI-Polri - Source: Panitia Pemilihan Dati II Kotamadya Yogyakarta, . In the election, there were political parties which participated in Yogyakarta Municipality. Of them, nine parties had parliamentary seats. The election produced legislators between – in which four were representatives of TNI and POLRI. The election result showed that PDIP was the ruling party obtaining . percent votes and . percent of seats while PAN was the runner-up earning . percent votes and . percent of seats. Golkar was third receiving . percent votes and percent of seats. Afterwards, PPP and PKB gained two seats respectively. The rest had only one seat, i.e., PK, PBB, PKPI and PDKB. There were six parties which could not make a fraction (fraksi) due to their inability to reach the minimum requirement of three seats. Therefore, PPP, PK and PBB created a new fraction namely FPI while PKB, PDKB and PKPI together grouped themselves under a novel fraction: FKDK. Six fractions were created for the period of – : FPDIP, FPAN, F-Golkar, Military-Police Fraction, FKDK and FPI. Table . Chapter III 112 The Profile of Legislators, – No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion PDIP Fraction Ir. Cinde Laras Yulianto Head A M Bachelor Islam Karsono Soemardihardjo Vice Head E M HighSchool Islam Ary Dewanto Secretary D M HighSchool Islam TH. Sumardjono Member D M HighSchool Catholic Bahtanisyar Basyir, SE Member Head ofDPRD M Bachelor Islam Nuryadi Member B M HighSchool Islam M. Surandi Member E M HighSchool Catholic Herimawan, SH Member A M Bachelor Islam Rahajeng Arhuna Adan-inggar Member B M High School Islam Turino Junaidy Member B M HighSchool Islam Drs. Herkitanto Djawadi Member D M Bachelor Catholic Hanung Heru Hayoto La-gat K. Member B M High School Christian Drs. Tjatur Gono Member C M Bachelor Islam Djati Waluyo Member E M HighSchool Islam Sutaryo Member C M HighSchool Christian PAN Fraction Herman Dody Isdarmadi,A.Md., Ak Head D M Diploma Islam Herman Hilmy Vice Head A M HighSchool Islam Nazaruddin, SH Secretary A M Bachelor Islam Drs. Abdul Malik Hasan Member E M Bachelor Islam Table . 3. Governance Actors 113 No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion Arief Eddy Saubianto Member C M HighSchool Islam Awang Nuryanto Member B M HighSchool Islam Muhammad Hatta Member D M HighSchool Islam R. Soehardiman, BcHk Member E M Bachelor Islam Ir. Sukardi Yani, MM Member Vice Headof DPRD M Master Islam Golkar Party Fraction H. Suwandono, BA Head A M Bachelor Islam H. Totok Pranowo, BA Vice Head B M Bachelor Islam Drs. Suhartono, ST Secretary E M Bachelor Islam Drs. H. Najib B. Saleh D Member C M Bachelor Islam Military-Police Fraction Letkol. Inf. H. Suroso,S.Sos Head D M Bachelor Islam Letkol. Inf. AgustinusMargoyono Vice Head A M High School Catholic Letkol. Laut (KH) Bam-bang Kustono Secretary B M Bachelor Catholic Letkol. Tek. Eddy Pra-mono Member C M Bachelor Islam Justice and Democracy Awakening Fraction Ir. H. Mustofa Head D M Bachelor Islam Anderias Neno, BSc., SE.,MM Vice Head B M Master Christian Sutarno Secretary C M HighSchool Islam H. Muhamad Wahid Member Vice Headof DPRD M High School Islam Islamic Union Fraction HM. Wajdi Rahman, SIP Head A M Bachelor Islam H. Muhammad WasulWidyaprananta, BA Vice Head E M Bachelor Islam Nanda Irwan, SH Secretary Vice Headof DPRD M Bachelor Islam Chapter III 114 No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion M. Syalthut Aridloi, SE Member C M Bachelor Islam Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ ; Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ . Between – , Bahtanisyar Basyir of PDIP served as the head of the DPRD, accompanied by Sukardi Yani of PAN, Nanda Irawan of PPP and Muhamad Wahid of PKB as the deputies. By gender, all of them were men. By education, a majority of legislators were bachelor graduates ( percent). . percent were high school graduates, percent master graduates and . percent three-year diploma graduates. Meanwhile, by religion, a majority of the DPRD were Muslims ( percent), . percent were Catholics and . percent were Christians. Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Six Parties in the Election No Party Votes(from a total of , votes) Seats (from a total of seats) PDIP , PAN , PKS , Golkar Party , Democrat , PPP , Source: KPUD Kota Yogyakarta, . In the election, there were political parties which participated in the municipality. The election produced legislators between – . Nevertheless, of those parties merely six earned parliamentary seats. PDIP was the dominant party achieving . percent of the votes and . percent of the seats. The second position still belonged to PAN gaining . percent of the votes and . percent of the seats. The third position was PKS although it had similar seats with Golkar. The Democrat Party as the new party reached spectacular votes and seats due to the national trends and the figure of Susilo Bam- Table . 3. Governance Actors 115 bang Yudhoyono who ran as the president candidate. Meanwhile, PPP attained merely one seat, so it could not make a fraction and had to join with the other fraction due to its inability to reach the minimum requirement of three seats. Five fractions for the period of – were established: FPDIP, FPAN, FPKS, F-Golkar and F-Democrat. The Profile of Legislators, – No Name Position Commission Sex Education Religion PDIP Fraction Suwarto Head Two M HighSchool Islam Supardi Antono Vice Head Three M HighSchool Islam Y. Eko Rintarjo, STP Secretary Three M Bachelor Catholic Irintoko Cahyo Dumadi,BSc Member One M Bachelor Islam Henry Kuncoroyekti, SH Member Two M Bachelor Catholic Chang Wendryanto, SH Member One M Bachelor Chris-tian Ir. Andrie Subiantoro Member Vice Head Iof DPRD M Bachelor Islam Ary Dewanto Member Three M HighSchool Islam Hery Setyo Pamuji Member One M HighSchool Christian Sujarnoko, SE Member One M Bachelor Islam Suharyanto Member Two M HighSchool Islam PAN Fraction H. Awang Nuryanto Head Two M HighSchool Islam Ir. H. Sukardi Yani, MM Vice Head Three M Master Islam Iriawan Argo Widodo,SIP Secretary One M Bachelor Islam Arif Noor Hartanto, SIP Member Head ofDPRD M Bachelor Islam H. Herman Dody Isdar-madi, AMd, Ak Member Three M Diploma Islam Table . Chapter III 116 No Name Position Commission Sex Education Religion Hj. Sri Kustantini, S.Sos Member Three F Bachelor Islam Siti Majmu’ah, S.Ag Member Two F Bachelor Islam Nur Rosyidah, SP Member One F Bachelor Islam Yusron Achmadi, S.Ag Member One M Bachelor Islam PKS Fraction M. Zuhrif Hudaya,Dipl.Rad Head Two M Diploma Islam Drs. Ahmad Nur Umam,MM Vice Head Two M Bachelor Islam Ardianto Secretary One M HighSchool Islam Ida Nur Laela, S.Si., Apt Member Three F Bachelor Islam Dwi Budi Utomo, S.Pt Member Vice Head IIof DPRD M Bachelor Islam Golkar Party Fraction Drs. H. Najib M. Saleh D. Head Two M Bachelor Islam H. Toto Pranowo, BA Vice Head Two M Bachelor Islam R. Bagus Sumbarja Secretary One M HighSchool Islam Drs. Suhartono, ST Member Three M Bachelor Islam Dwi Astuti Member Three F HighSchool Islam Democrat Fraction Agus Prasetio AS, ST Head Three M Bachelor Islam Supardi B. Vice Head One M HighSchool Islam Justina Paula Suyatmi, BA Secretary One F Bachelor Catholic RM. Sinarbiyat Nujanat,SE Member Two M Bachelor Islam Supriyanto Untung Member Three M HighSchool Islam Source: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – . Although PDIP was the ruling party in the election, Arif Noor Hartanto of PAN served as the head of the DPRD, accompanied by Andrie Subiantoro of PDIP and Dwi Budi Utomo of PKS as the deputies. These three parties were in the top position of the DPRD. 3. Governance Actors 117 Their legislators were spread throughout all commissions. By gender, women in the DPRD were merely . percent and the rest were men. By education, a majority of legislators were bachelor graduates ( percent), . percent were secondary school graduates, . percent were three-year diploma graduates and . percent were master graduates. None of the legislators had master or doctoral degrees. Meanwhile, by religion, a majority of DPRD were Muslims ( . percent), . percent were Catholics and . percent were Christians. It is important to note that although PPP had one seat with Supriyanto Untung, it could not make fraction so it joined the Democrat Fraction. During the period of – , there was change of members in some DPRD’s fractions. In the PDIP Fraction, Ary Dewanto was replaced by YB Murdiyatno (M/Bachelor/Catholic). In the PAN Fraction, Nunik Yohana (F/Bachelor/Islam) was replaced by H. Awang Nuryanto. In the PKS Fraction, Ida Nur Laela, Ssi., Apt was replaced by Anis Sri Lestari (F/Bachelor/Islam). Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Seven Parties in the Election No Party Votes(from a total of , votes) Seats (from a total of seats) PDIP , Democrat , PAN , PKS , Golkar Party , PPP , Gerindra , Source: KPUD Kota Yogyakarta, . In the election, there were political parties which participated in the municipality and parliamentary seats for the period – . Of those parties, merely seven had parliamentary seats. PDIP was still running for the ruling party in Yogyakarta Municipality by achieving . percent of the votes and . percent of the seats. The second position was the Democrat Party with . percent of the Table . Chapter III 118 votes and percent of the seats. PAN, PKS and Golkar had five seats respectively. Meanwhile, PPP and Gerindra attained two seats respectively. These last two parties joined with other fractions. As a result, five fractions for the period of – were established: FPDIP, F- Democrat, FPAN, FPKS and F-Golkar. The Profile of Legislators, – No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion PDIP Fraction Sujarnako, SE Head D M Bachelor Islam Antonius Fokki Ardiyanto,SIP Vice Head A M Bachelor Catholic Emanuel Ardi Prasetya,Amd Secretary D M Diploma Catholic Dwi Saryono Member A M HighSchool Islam Henry Kuncoroyekti, SH Member Head ofDPRD M Bachelor Catholic Chang Wendryanto, SH Member A M Bachelor Chris-tian Suharyanto Member B M HighSchool Islam Suwarto Member C M HighSchool Islam Dra. Dewi Irawati Member D M Bachelor Islam Tatang Setiawan, SH Member C M Bachelor Catholic Dwi Wahyu Budiantoro,S.Pd Member B M Bachelor Catholic Christiana Agustiani Member C F HighSchool Catholic Anton Parabu Semen-dawai, SH Member B M Bachelor Islam Democrat Party Fraction Ir. Toni Ariestiono Head D M Bachelor Islam Ign. Prayogo Sunaryo Vice Head A M HighSchool Catholic Table . 3. Governance Actors 119 No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion Agung Atmodjo Secretary D M HighSchool Islam Agus Prasetio AS., ST Member D M Bachelor Islam RM Sinarbiyat Nujanat, SE Member Vice HeadI of DPRD M Bachelor Islam Danang Wahyu Broto, SE Member B M Bachelor Islam R. Eko Purnomo Kas-biyantoro, SH Member A M Bachelor Islam Ervian Parmunadi Member C M HighSchool Islam Robert Silvianus Dendeng Member C M Diploma Chris-tian Marwoto Hadi, SH Member B M Bachelor Islam PAN Fraction Rifki Listianto, S.Si Head B M Bachelor Islam Zulnasri Vice Head A M HighSchool Islam HM. Fursan, SE Secretary C M Bachelor Islam Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE,MM Member D M Master Islam Agung Damar Kusuman-daru, SE Member Vice Head II of DPRD M Bachelor Islam Ida Ariyanti, S.Hut Member B F Bachelor Islam M. Hasan Widagdo Member D M HighSchool Islam PKS Fraction M. Zuhrif Hudaya, ST Head C M Bachelor Islam Muhammad Syafi’i, S.Psi Vice Head D M Bachelor Islam Muhammad Fauzan, ST Secretary A M Bachelor Islam Dra. Azizah Member - F Bachelor Islam Ardianto Member B M HighSchool Islam Golkar Party Fraction Augusnur, SH., SIP Head A M Bachelor Islam Bambang Seno Baskoro,ST Vice Head C M Bachelor Islam Chapter III 120 No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion Dra. Sri Retnowati Secretary B F Bachelor Islam Fatchiyatul Fitri, SH Member D F Bachelor Islam R. Bagus Sumbarja Member B M HighSchool Islam Source: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – . In – , Henry Kuncoroyekti of PDIP served as the head of the DPRD, accompanied by RM. Sinarbiyat Nujanat of Democrat and Agung Damar Kusumandaru of PAN as the deputies. By gender, women in the DPRD were only . percent and men were . percent. By education, a majority of legislators were bachelor graduates ( percent), . percent were high school graduates, percent were threeyear diploma graduates and . were percent master graduates. Meanwhile, by religion, a majority of DPRD were Muslims ( . percent), . percent were Catholics and percent were Christians. It is also useful to explain that although PPP and Gerindra had two seats, both parties, nonetheless, joined with other fractions. PPP, consisting of Ida Ariyanti and M. Hasan Widagdo, joined the PAN Fraction while Gerindra, containing Christiana Agustiani and Anton Parabu Semendawai, joined with the PDIP Fraction. During this period, there were some replacements of the DPRD members. In the board position, RM Sinarbiyat Nujanat was replaced by Agus Prasetio and Agung Damar Kusumandaru was replaced by Muhammad Ali Fahmi (Keputusan Gubernur DIY No. /KEP/ and No. /KEP/ ). In the Democrat Party Fraction, Robert Silvianus Dendeng was replaced by Anjarwati (F/High School/Islam), Marwoto Hadi, SH was replaced by Selviany, SH (F/Bachelor/Christian), R. Eko Purnomo Kasbiyantoro, SH was replaced by R. Ayu Siti Sudarijah, SH (F/Bachelor/Islam), RM Sinarbiyat Nujanat, SE was replaced by Harweni Puji Hastuti, SH (F/Bachelor/Islam) and Danang Wahyu Broto, SE was replaced by Seno Pratomo (M/High School/ Islam). In the PDIP Fraction, Dra. Dewi Irawati was replaced by Mugiyono Pujo Kusumo (M/High School/Islam). In the PKS Fraction, Ardianto was replaced by Lisferi Setiarini, SE (F/High School/Islam) and Dra. Azizah was replaced by Bambang Anjar Jalumurti, S.Pi (M/ 3. Governance Actors 121 Bachelor/Islam). The replacement of Azizah with Jalumurti took place around August , three months after the KPUD announced the official elected legislators. Azizah died at the time. Moreover, Jalumurti replaced Muhammad Fauzan in the position of secretary of the PKS Fraction in the middle period. Distribution of Votes and Seats for the Big Eight Parties in the Election No Party Votes(from a total of . votes) Seats (from a total of seats) PDIP , PAN , Gerindra , Golkar Party , PKS , PPP , Democrat , Nasdem , Source: KPUD Kota Yogyakarta, a. In the election, there were political parties which participated in Yogyakarta Municipality with parliamentary seats for the period of – . Of those parties, only eight had parliamentary seats. For the fourth time, PDIP was the ruling party in Yogyakarta Municipality with . percent of the votes and . percent of the seats. The second position was earned by PAN by . percent of the votes and . percent of the seats. Three parties, namely PAN, Gerindra and Golkar had five seats each. Meanwhile, the Democrat Party and the Nasdem Party obtained merely one seat respectively. These two last parties had to group themselves with other fractions. Six fractions for – were established: FPDIP, FPAN, F-Gerindra, FGolkar, FPKS and FPPP. Table . Chapter III 122 The Profile of Legislators, – No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion PDIP Fraction H. Danang Rudiyatmoko Head B M HighSchool Islam Tatang Setiawan, SH Member A M Bachelor Catholic Sujanarko, SE Member Head ofDPRD M Bachelor Islam Y. Kelik Mulyono, S.IP Member A M Bachelor Islam Drs. Alb. Y. Sudarma Member B M Bachelor Catholic GM. Deddy Jati S. Member B M HighSchool Catholic Suharyanto Member B M HighSchool Islam Antonius Suhartono Member C M HighSchool Catholic A. Fokki Ardiyanto, S.IP Member D M Bachelor Catholic Emanuel Ardi Prasetya Member C M HighSchool Catholic Febri Agung Herlambang Member C M HighSchool Islam Dwi Saryono Member D M HighSchool Islam Mugiyono Pujo Kusumo Member D M HighSchool Islam Suryani, SE., M.Si Member D F Master Islam Suwarto Member C M HighSchool Islam Sigit Wicaksono, S.Kom Member A M Bachelor Islam PAN Fraction Rifki Listianto, S.Si Head B M Bachelor Islam HM. Fursan, SE Member C M Bachelor Islam Estri Utami, SE Member A F Bachelor Islam Agung Damar Kusuman-daru, SE Member D M Bachelor Islam Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE,MM Member Vice Head I of DPRD M Master Islam Table . 3. Governance Actors 123 No Name Position Commis-sion Sex Education Religion Gerindra Fraction Novi Allisa Semendawai,SH Head B F Bachelor Islam Ririk Banowati Per-manasari, SH Member Vice Head II of DPRD F Bachelor Islam Christiana Agustiani Member C F HighSchool Catholic Dhian Novitasari, S.Pd Member D F Bachelor Islam Andri Kusumawati, SE Member A F Bachelor Islam Golkar Fraction Augusnur, SH., S.IP Head A M Bachelor Islam Bambang Seno Baskoro, ST Member C M Bachelor Islam Dra. Sri Retnowati Member B F Bachelor Islam H. Sugiyanto Saputro, BA Member B M Bachelor Islam R. Ay. F. Diani Anindhitiati,S.Sos, MM Member D F Master Catholic PKS Fraction Nasrul Khoiri, S.Far., Apt Head B M Bachelor Islam Bambang Anjar Jalumurti,S.Pi Member A M Bachelor Islam Dwi Budi Utomo, S.Pt Member D M Bachelor Islam Muhammad Fauzan, ST Member C M Bachelor Islam Syamsul Hadi, SE Member D M Bachelor Islam PPP Fraction Supriyanto Untung Head B M HighSchool Islam HM. Fauzi Noor Afshochi Member D M HighSchool Islam Sila Rita, SH, MH Member A F Master Islam M. Hasan Widagdo W. Member C M HighSchool Islam Source: http://dprd-jogjakota.go.id. In – , Sujanarko of PDIP served as the head of the DPRD, supported by M. Ali Fahmi of PAN and Ririk Banowati Permanasari of Chapter III 124 Gerindra as the deputies. By gender, women in the DPRD were merely percent and men were percent. By education, a majority of legislators were bachelor graduates ( . percent), . were high school graduates and percent were master graduates. Meanwhile, by religion, a majority of the DPRD were Muslims ( percent), percent were Catholics. In addition, the Democrat Party containing Syamsul Hadi joined the PKS Fraction while Nasdem encompassing Sigit Wicaksono joined the PDIP Fraction. Civil Society Hundreds of social-religious organisations and NGOs have been operating within Yogyakarta Municipality. Based on the data issued by Kantor Kesatuan Bangsa Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta ( ), there are more than religious organisations, NGOs in social affairs, NGOs in education affairs, nine NGOs in political law and advocacy affairs, seven NGOs in economic affairs and seven NGOs in children and women empowerment issues. Among those organisations, only a few leading organisations have concerns with education and health affairs, with schools, universities and healthcare centres. They are Muhammadiyah, ‘Aisyiyah, Catholic, Protestant, Tamansiswa and the JSIT. Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta Municipality is well-known as the PDM. This organisation could be categorised as the most powerful and leading religious group within the municipality. For organisational structure, Muhammadiyah in the municipality recently had submunicipal boards called the PCM and approximately ranting boards called the PRM. It has seven autonomous organisations: ‘Aisyiyah, the Muhammadiyah Youth, Nasyiatul ‘Aisyiyah, IMM, IPM, Hizbul Wathan for a scouting group and Tapak Suci for martial arts. Moreover, this organisation has various councils and divisions to develop its programmes and agendas. In addition, Muhammadiyah has a number of mosques and mushollas, pengajians, mubalighs and ustadzs which supporting Muslim activities within the municipality. In particular, ‘Aisyiyah is categorised as one of the leading women organisations 3.3. 3. Governance Actors 125 in the municipality. Its organisational structure tends to duplicate the Muhammadiyah model. Christianity in Yogyakarta Municipality is the second religion after Islam, consisting of Catholics and Protestants. Despite minor religions, they do play a role in supporting education and health developments. For Catholics, religious activities are situated in the parish, the Roman Catholic Church. There are seven parishes inside the municipality centred in Kidul Loji, Baciro, Bintaran, Jetis, Kotabaru, Kumetiran and Pugeran. There is a subsidy from these parishes for Catholic schools in the municipality, even if a person obtained a letter of recommendation from a Romo (a call for Indonesia’s Catholic pastor), they are not obligated to pay the tuition fee in the Catholic schools. For Protestants, religious activities are centred in churches without a structural and horizontal relation among of them. Thus, the number of Protestant churches is higher than Catholic churches. According to the municipal bureau of statistic ( ), there are Protestant churches inside the municipality. Each Protestant adherent can conduct his/her religious ritual in a particular church. Concerning Christianity’s health centres, they can be autonomous institutions, but they always assist the parish’s activities. Tamansiswa is an education foundation established on July rd, in Yogyakarta by Ki Hadjar Dewantara, the Indonesia’s first minister of education affairs. At the time, the emergence of this institution was a symbol of the resistance movement to the colonial government where education was dominated by European paradigms and not in line with Indonesian culture. Recently, the Tamansiswa has hundreds of schools across the country and organised structurally by an official foundation, the United Honorable Assembly of Tamansiswa (Majelis Luhur Persatuan Tamansiswa), centred at Jalan Tamansiswa No. , Wirogunan, Mergangsan, Yogyakarta . However, the recent development of Tamansiswa seems to run slowly even experiencing regression. Lastly, the network of JSIT in Yogyakarta Municipality could be presented by the existence of some foundations which supervise and manage the IT schools. They are the Mulia Foundation, the Al- Khairaat Foundation and the BIAS Foundation. Although the network of this organisation is still small inside the city, its existence really sup- Chapter III 126 ports the development of education inside the municipality and can compete with other old organisations having similar concerns in education issues such as Muhammadiyah and Tamansiswa. Economic Society Farming was the main natural resource in Yogyakarta Municipality. The decrease of farming areas and the increase of trading and modern market centres caused a change in Yogyakarta as the city of tourism. Service and trading sectors have eventually become a new way for people to increase their income. One of the leading services, education, has been affecting indigenous inhabitants to provide the kos-kosan, affordable and unique restaurants, computer and movie rentals, Internet shops, laundry services, etc. Other services are sectors of government and defence, social, entertainment, culture, trading, hotel, transportation and communication. The existence of tourism areas also affects informal sectors such as street-based vendors and souvenir/keepsake vendors. Hence, the high number of tourists has a positive impact on the growth of hotels, restaurants and tourism services. Since , tourism is the backbone of the city’s economy life (Dinas Pariwisata Seni dan Budaya Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ; BPS Kota Yogyakarta, a: p. ). Therefore, most economic life in Yogyakarta Municipality is dominated by small and medium-sized enterprises (UMKM). In , this municipality had traditional markets with , sellers consisting of , kiosk sellers, , lapak sellers and , los sellers. Moreover, the number of companies in comprising limited companies, firms, nine cooperative partnerships and personal enterprises (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). Meanwhile, the cooperative, a fundamental economy, plays a significant role in the life of the city’s people. In , the municipality had types of cooperatives with total cooperatives and , members. In the same year, the volume of cooperative business reached , billion IDR. It increased to . percent from previous years and the surplus was , billion IDR (BPS Kota Yogyakarta, c: pp. – ). 3.4. 3. Governance Actors 127 In recent developments, the centre of societal economic life within the municipality could be found in three kinds of spots. First are modern spots such as Malioboro Street, the Taman Pintar and the XT- Square. Second are traditional markets in various spots such as in Beringharjo, Giwangan, Kotagede, Sentul, Bugisan, Kranggan and Kuncen. Third are gift and souvenir spots which can be found in the centres of food like bakpia and gudeg and local souvenirs such as clothing and accessories. In addition, there are other middle-class companies which concern daily needs and lifestyle within the municipality such as the Pamella Group Company and the Margaria Group Company. Moreover, there is a factory producing various kinds of Indonesian milk namely the Sarihusada Company, near the town hall. Due to lots of tourists and visitors, coming from outside Yogyakarta or outside Indonesia, the tourism business is booming. Various exotic places are available in the surrounding municipality such as the Keraton Palace, the Tamansari historical buildings, the Beteng Vredeburg Museum, the Taman Pintar, the Parangritis Beach, the Kaliurang Mount, the Borobudur Temple, the Prambanan Temple, etc. As the city of education, numerous media industries particularly printed-media are growing. The Kedaulatan Rakyat (KR) is one of the most powerful newspapers not merely for the Yogyakarta territory, but also for neighbouring regions. This daily newspaper is controlled and managed by the Samawi family, where one of their family members, Idham Samawi, had ruled the Bantul District for two periods ( – ). Samawi himself is the PDIP’s key elite in DIY and personally close to the Yogyakarta’s Mataram Kingdom. The other local printed newspapers are Bernas, Radar Jogja, Harian Jogja and Tribun Jogja. In the context of education and health industries, various social and religious organisations in Yogyakarta Municipality have concerns with these profitable affairs, because both issues are becoming the core programmes in the municipality. Of them, particular institutions are leading and influential mainly managed by Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah, Christianity (Catholic and Protestant), Tamansiswa and the JSIT. The former two have education and health institutions while the latter two have only education institutions. Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah can be categorised as foundations which have a powerful role in encouraging Yogyakarta as the city of Chapter III 128 education. Among other social organisations, these two organisations have the biggest education and health networks within the municipality. In education affairs, they have institutions from kindergarten, even from baby daycare groups to college. Currently, these two organisations have PAUDs containing TK ABAs, playgroups and eight baby daycare groups, SDs, SMPs and SMAs including SMKs. At the level of college, Muhammadiyah has two campuses: UAD with five main different buildings and STIKES ‘Aisyiyah which currently is a university, namely UNISA, Universitas ‘Aisyiyah. In health affairs, Muhammadiyah has two prominent hospitals: The PKU Muhammadiyah Private Hospital and the RSKIA PKU Muhammadiyah Kotagede. Meanwhile, ‘Aisyiyah has approximately ten local healthcare centres. Christianity plays a significant role in education and health affairs inside the municipality after Muhammadiyah. More specifically, both Catholics and Protestants have TKs, SDs, SMPs and SMAs including vocational schools. Some of these schools are also leading. At the college level, they have three campuses: UKDW, STIKES Bethesda YAKKUM and ASMI Santa Maria. UKDW and STIKES are owned by the Protestant Foundation while ASMI is owned by the Catholic Foundation. In health affairs, they have two famous private hospitals: the Panti Rapih Hospital and the Bethesda Hospital. The former is Catholic while the latter is Protestant. Tamansiswa has education centres from kindergarten up to college. At the kindergarten level, it has two: the TK Taman Indria IP and the TK Taman Indria Jetis. At the primary school level, it also has two: The SD Taman Muda IP and the SD Tamansiswa Jetis. It has one junior high school, namely the SMP Taman Dewasa IP. In the senior high school, it has two: the SMA Taman Madya Jetis and the SMA Taman Madya IP. Afterwards, there are two senior vocational schools: the SMK Taman Siswa Jetis and the SMK IP Taman Siswa. It has one campus: UST. Meanwhile, JSIT has education institutions from kindergarten to senior high school. Some of their school names refer to names of Muslim scholars. At the kindergarten level, it has five: the TKIT Mekar Insani, the TKIT Salman Alfarisi, the TKIT Bina Anak Sholeh, the TKIT Al Khairaat and the TKIT Nyai Ahmad Dahlan. At the primary school 3. Governance Actors 129 level, it has two: the SDIT Luqmanul Hakim and the SDIT Al Khairaat. In the junior high school, it has three: the SMPIT Abu Bakar, the SMPIT Masjid Syuhada and the SMPIT Bina Anak Sholeh. Moreover, it has only one senior high school namely the SMAIT Abu Bakar. Three Ideological Parties In four election cycles in Yogyakarta Municipality, there were parties in , parties in , parties in and parties in . The parties which gained the DPRD’ seats were nine parties in , six parties in , seven parties in and eight parties in . Of those parties, five parties usually had seats during the four election cycles: PDIP, PAN, Golkar, PKS and PPP. Nonetheless, PPP could not make its own fraction during three periods of the DPRD. In – , PPP created a new fraction together with two other Islamist parties, PBB and PK, under the Islamic Union Fraction (FPI). In – and – , it joined with the Democrat Party Fraction and the PAN Fraction, respectively. Further, it created its own fraction in – by gaining four seats. Based on theoretical (Liddle, ; Baswedan, ; Ufen, ; Fionna, ; Mietzner, ) and empirical approaches, this study concentrates ideologically on three distinctive parties. PDIP represents nationalist-secular parties, PAN represents nationalist-Muslim parties and PKS represents nationalist-Islamist parties. Unfortunately, Golkar is not part of the analysis as PDIP is more representative due to its overwhelming power within the municipality. The Pilwalkot also showed that these three ideological parties are representative of major political forces within the municipality. 4. Chapter III 130 The Electoral Performance of PDIP, PAN and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality ( ) Source: compiled by the author. Figure . and . demonstrate that, in general, PDIP usually gained the top position and dominated the elections and the parliament, followed by PAN and PKS. Yogyakarta Municipality is the voter base of PDIP and implies that the more inclusive the party identity the higher the number of votes. In particular, the votes for PDIP and PAN eroded continuously in two elections, and , but their votes increased in . In the meantime, the vote for PKS increased drastically in , but declined in and . PDIP and PAN have similar trends with their highest votes in , while the highest vote for PKS was in . Figure . 4. Three Ideological Parties 131 The Parliamentary Seats of PDIP, PAN and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality ( ) Source: compiled by the author. Regarding DPRD seats, the percentage of seats for PDIP decreased in two periods ( – and – ), but increased in – . For PAN, although the number of seats was same in the first two periods at nine seats, its percentage rose in – . The PAN seats decreased dramatically in – . In – , the percentage stayed the same as the preceding period. Meanwhile, the percentage of PKS seats went up spectacularly in – , but decreased in the following two periods. According to Wawan Budiyanto (interview, Sept. ), the chairperson of the KPUD in Yogyakarta Municipality, sociologically there are three major political forces within Yogyakarta Municipality. First is the Keraton, a symbol of the Yogyakarta Mataram Empire. The existence of the king known as Sultan has an outstanding influence on the public. The majority of people within the municipality nevertheless still obey the Keraton’s advice and statements. Second is Muhammadiyah. Since it was founded in this municipality, most Muslims adhere to Muhammadiyah tenets. Third is the Kedaulatan Rakyat (KR), the largest printed daily newspaper in DIY and its surrounding areas. The KR contents and news usually become public references when Figure . Chapter III 132 making life decisions. It is not surprising if the KR is always available every single day on the public board in each RT within the municipality so that any dweller can read it at any time. In short, the Keraton represents the government power, Muhammadiyah represents civil society power while the KR represents economic power. Each of them has considerable influence on the municipal public. PDIP To trace back the establishment of the DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality, it cannot be separated from the earlier history of the clash between the PDI Pro-Mega and the PDI Pro-Soerjadi between and . After the PDI Pro-Mega held the national congress in , a number of PDIP local leaders in the municipality also declared their party in the same year. Some declarators were TH Sumardjono, Tarjo Suryo Budi Utomo, Nuryadi, Widi Pratomo and Supriyanto. After the national declaration on February th, , the organisational structure in the municipality was formed. The first chairperson of the DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality was TH Sumarjono in – . The top leaders were Andre Sugiantoro ( – ), Irianto Cahyo Gunadi ( – ), Sujanarko, SE ( – ) and H. Danang Rudiyatmoko ( – ). The organisational structure of the party at the municipal level for the period of – is manifested by the DPC Party. It consists of a head, a set of deputy heads, a secretary and two deputy secretaries, a treasury and a deputy treasury. A set of deputy heads focus on some affairs: internal organisation, cadrerisastion and ideology, winning elections and political communication, politics law and security, fisheries, urban workers, farmers and animal husbandry, women and children, youth sport and art-culture and creative economy. Each deputy head of the DPC has the authority to form autonomous bodies. The number of functionaries in the DPC Party should be between and persons, the PAC Party should contain between five and persons and the Village Board should be between five and nine persons. In the meantime, the maximum number of functionaries in the Sub-Village Board is five persons. 4.1. 4. Three Ideological Parties 133 With regard to its members and supporters within the municipality, the party still relies on the networks of wong cilik, usually from lower-social classes such as labourers, parking officers, pedicab drivers and dwellers who live in the surrounding Code River. More precisely, they come from interreligious communities (mainly former supporters of PNI, IPKI, Murba, Parkindo and the Catholic Party) who promote the values of nationalism and Marhaenism. This can be seen from the legislators who are not only Muslim, but also Catholic and Christian. Concerning the party finance, the main income is derived from two main sources. First is the annual financial support provided by the municipal government budget. Since , it gained around million IDR per year ( , valid votes x , IDR). Second is from the PDIP legislators. Each legislator has to give percent of their monthly wages to the party. The other sources come from personal donators outside the party and the patungan system among its functionaries. Nevertheless, these two last financial sources are incidental and depend on programmes and activities. It could be twice or once per year or maybe never. In electoral performance, PDIP was continuously the ruling party in four election cycles in Yogyakarta Municipality. Although the vote decreased dramatically from . percent in to . in and to . percent in , the vote increased in by . percent. Regarding the seats in the DPRD, seats were won in , seats in and respectively and seats in . Despite some decreases, this party can place its cadres at the head of the DPRD: Bahtanisyar Basyir in – , Andrie Subiantoro in – and Sujarnoko in – . Despite being the ruling party, it was unable to win in the and mayoral elections. However, it did win the mayoral election by nominating the candidates Haryadi Suyuti and Imam Priyono. More specifically, in the election, PDIP had dominant votes in out of the sub-municipalities, winning all submunicipalities except the Kotagede Sub-Municipality. It ranked third in Kotagede after PPP and PAN. At the kelurahan level, it dominated out of the kelurahans in . PDIP became the powerful party in percent of kelurahans. Chapter III 134 PAN Soon after the declaration in Jakarta, the DPD PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality was established and declared on October th, at the Alun-Alun Lor of Yogyakarta or in front of the Sultan palace. The party in the municipality was initiated structurally by the executive board of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta Municipality. Some initiators were HM. Bachrun Nawawi, Drs. Abdul Malik Hasan, Drs. Rinto Tri Nugroho, Ir. Muhammad Sofyan, Drs. Heroe Poerwadi, MA, Drs. H. Anis Santosa as well as activists and academicians who were affiliated with Muhammadiyah. The first top leader of the DPD PAN within the municipality was HM. Bachrun Nawawi in – . The following were Ir. Sukardi Yani, MM ( – ), Ir. Muhammad Sofyan ( – ) and Drs. Heroe Poerwadi, MA ( – and – ). The organisational structure of the party at the municipal level is represented by the DPD consisting of a head, a set of deputy heads, a secretary and its deputy secretaries, a treasury and a deputy treasury. The DPD has the authority to establish autonomous bodies and divisions, task force teams and other relevant teams to support the party activities at the municipal level. In addition, the executive board of the party is supervised by so-called “MPP”. The majority of PAN members and supporters inside the municipality are Muhammadiyah admirers. This is because the history of the establishment of PAN was born from the central figure of Muhammadiyah, Amien Rais. Second is that Muhammadiyah was founded in Yogyakarta since and a number of people inside are influenced by Muhammadiyah’s teachings. Third is the declarators of the party within the municipality are functionaries in the PDM. Additionally, this party also gained support from moderate Muslims and rational voters due to the legislative candidates. With regard to party finances, the main income is from the annual financial support provided by the municipal government budget. Since , it obtained approximately . million IDR per year ( , valid votes x , IDR). Second is the party legislator dues. Each legislator has to hand over percent of the total wages (except housing allowance) to the party. The other source comes from personal donators who have already joined PAN. 4.2. 4. Three Ideological Parties 135 The last income depends on the activity. If the party has an event, it will look for donations. In electoral performance, the party ranked second after PDIP in three distinctive elections, , and , and ranked third in the election after PDIP and the Democrat Party. Its vote decreased from . percent in to . percent in and drastically to . percent in . In the election, it increased slightly above percent. In the parliament, the party won nine seats in and , and five seats in and . The achievement of nine seats in and was due to, more or less, the figure of Amien Rais and the image of PAN as the reformist party while in the latter two because of the party performance. In spite of reaching ranked second, PAN won two mayoral elections, and . PAN can be categorised as the governing party for a decade, from to . In addition, in the legislative period of – , the head of the DPRD was Arif Noor Hartanto of PAN. More specifically, in the election, PAN ranked second in eight sub-municipalities, third in three sub-municipalities and fourth in three sub-municipalities. At the kelurahan level, it had the dominant vote in Notoprajan and Prenggan. Moreover, it ranked second in kelurahans, third in kelurahans, fourth in six kelurahans, fifth in one kelurahan and sixth in four kelurahans. PAN votes are prevalent in all kelurahans. PKS PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality was initiated by numerous activists and students in universities. A majority of them at the time, , were still young and coming from Islamic student organisations such as LDK and KAMMI as well as other Islamic student movements within the universities. After its establishment in within the municipality, the first party’s top leader was Drs. H. Basuki Abdurrahman, M.Si since until . Afterwards, his position was continued by Dwi Budi Utomo, S.Pt ( – ), M. Zuhrif Hudaya, Dipl.Rad ( – ), Muhammad Rosyidi, ST., MT ( – ), M. Idham Ananta, ST., M.Kom ( – ), Muhammad Rosyidi, ST., MT ( – ), 4.3. Chapter III 136 Ardianto ( – ) and Muhammad Syafi’i, S.Psi ( – and – ). The organisational structure of the party in the municipality is represented by the DPTD with three kinds of structure. First is the MPD containing a head, a secretary and some commissions. Second is the DPD consisting of a general chairperson, a vice general chairperson, a general secretary, a general treasury as well as some divisions. Three is the DSD encompassing a chairperson, a secretary and lajnah-lajnah (committees). The MPD represents legislative functions, the DPD represents executive functions and the DSD represents judicative functions. In particular, the DPD has wide authority to create independent bodies and divisions, task force teams and other relevant teams to support the party activities at the municipal level. Regarding members and supporters of PKS within the municipality, nevertheless, Muhammadiyah communities are their main network to earn votes and support. First, PKS and Muhammadiyah are educated people and growing particularly in urban areas. Second, many party functionaries are also cadres in Muhammadiyah. Third, both hold similar views on religious teachings. To enlarge popular votes, the party also optimises the figure of legislative candidates and cadre networks to attract more votes. Outside Muhammadiyah, the party can reach out to moderate Muslims, mainly people who usually attend the pengajians held in mosques. In terms of party finances, the main income is from three sources. First is the annual financial support provided by the municipal government budget. Since , it earned roughly million IDR per year ( , valid votes x , IDR). Second is regular dues paid by party cadres. Each cadre has to spend four percent of their basic wages each month. Third is regular dues from the party legislators and the cadres who hold a political office. Each legislator or official has to pay two percent of their monthly wage. The incidental earnings come from entrepreneur aids, but this is very rare. In electoral performance, the party achieved distinctive positions in each election. In the election, it ranked sixth at percent. By , its vote increased dramatically by . percent ranking third. Nonetheless, the vote decreased by . percent in and ranked fourth. In , the vote fell to . percent obtaining fifth position. The party never achieved the top rank. In the parliament, the party ob- 4. Three Ideological Parties 137 tained one seat in , five seats in and and four seats in . In the election, PKS only reached second position in one sub-municipality namely Danurejan. The rest were fourth in one submunicipality, fifth in five sub-municipalities, sixth in six sub-municipalities and eighth in one sub-municipality. At the kelurahan level, the party never reached the first rank. It earned second rank in three kelurahans, third rank in four kelurahans, fourth rank in ten kelurahans, fifth rank in nine kelurahans, sixth rank in ten kelurahans, seventh rank in five kelurahans and eighth rank in four kelurahans. Concluding Remarks This chapter has described Yogyakarta as one of Indonesia’s leading municipalities. Covering an area of . square kilometres, the municipality has made overwhelming developments in two public services: education and health affairs. This development cannot be separated from the role of four interconnected governance actors: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society. The former two could be called “state actors” while the latter two can be called “society actors”. In addition, the three selected parties inside the municipality were discussed in terms of their history, organisational structure, members and supporters, electoral performance and income. This chapter is a basic account, but it is really vital and beneficial as a guideline to continue the following analysis on the party policy and agenda. 5. Chapter III 138 Chapter IV Towards a Welfare State: Party Policy After describing the study area including three major political parties, the following chapter analyses the policy of three political parties in addressing two public services: education and health issues. There are three main sections which will be elaborated in this chapter. First is the policy of PDIP, PAN and PKS in coping with education and health issues. Second is the party elites who have a vital influence in making the party policy. Third is determining factors in the process of policymaking inside the three parties. Although there is no an accepted definition for the concept of “policy” in the academic discourse, this study defines policy as guidance which is too imprecise to be of great use (Pal, : p. ). Some relevant concepts are proposed by Jenkins ( : p. ) and Dye ( : p. ) who argue that policy is a set of interrelated decisions taken by political actors regarding the selection of goals and the ways of obtaining them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve. Therefore, policy is whatever the actors choose to do or not to do as well as why they execute it. Because all sorts of organisations embracing political parties have policies to address everything, according to Pal’s ( : p. ) concept, this study defines policy as a course of action or inaction decided by the party’s authorities through official meetings to cope with a given problem or interrelated problems. The policy eventually will assist in formulating party agendas and strategies. As guidance for actions, Pal ( : pp. – ) and Jann and Wegrich ( : p. ) proposed three steps in the creation of a policy: first, the definition of problems; second, the formulation of goals; and, three, the consideration of distinctive action alternatives. According to Pal ( : pp. – ), defining and 139 identifying problems are the heart of the policy and the key to deciphering its meaning and logic. It is a creative act. Once a problem is recognised, many possible means to alleviate, mitigate, or resolve it can be explored quickly and tentatively. Thus, the definition of the problem is inextricably bound to policy goals. Meanwhile, goals are what the policy is attempting to attain – its aims and its directions. A policy goal is formulated by the problems the policy identifies. Furthermore, analysing the policy is the most fundamental way to decide a final policy, as it is an activity in drafting problems which would be solved by a set of specified knowledge. As a result, there are some features in the policy analysis. First, the policy process is related to discussions and debates on ideas surrounding priorities, problems and solutions. Second, the policy process is a collective activity as policy decisions are usually made on the basis of organised and collaborative knowledge regarding policy problems. Third, chatting on the policy analysis cannot be disconnected with public problems (Pal, : pp. – ). As mentioned by Pal ( : pp. – ), there are two main components in the policy process. First is portraying the determining factors in creating the party policy. This study classifies two determining factors: ) internal stimuli, i.e., political culture, leadership change and internal conflict; ) external stimuli such as the election result, the birth of new parties, interest groups and public opinion. These two factors are strengthened by Harmel and Janda ( ) as elaborated in Chapter II that three determining variables in the party change are leadership change, change in dominant factions and external stimuli. These three variables could be summarised into internal and external stimuli. Second is depicting the policy content. The content can begin with a pair of explanations: ) the identification of problems and the classification of issues of the policy which it will address; ) the formulation of goals with a specific purpose. Pal ( : pp. – ) stressed that utilising academic sources such as journals, reports and any studies published by research institutes is important when deciphering policy content, because a good description of the content depends on consulting a wide range of official and unofficial sources to build a rich and textured portrait of the content. Chapter IV 140 It is also important to understand the policy process by recognising actors behind the policy content. According to Harmel and Janda ( : p. ), as an organisation parties have structural hierarchies of authority and five types of organisational actors: ( ) the top leaders who constitute the key decision makers; ( ) the middle-level leaders who lead and control its divisions; ( ) the activists who regularly conduct party operations; ( ) the members who occasionally assist the party with votes, funds or activities; ( ) the supporters who vote for the party in elections. At any time, some of these actors consist of a party faction or any intraparty combination. Pal ( : p. ) posited that each player attempts to influence the policy process in their favour and to reach the outcomes which reflect their interests. Party Policy Prior to analysing the party policy in Yogyakarta Municipality towards education and health issues, it is fundamental to highlight the recent vision of three political parties as written in their own statute after the national congress in . PDIP has two core objectives as mentioned in its statute, Article . First is realising justice and a welfare society in line with the dreams of the independence proclamation on August th, as stated in the Preamble of Indonesia’s Constitution in the frame of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity). Second is struggling for the realisation of Indonesia as a welfare state with social justice orientations, with sovereignty in political affairs, autonomy in economic affairs and its own local customs and practices. Moreover, the goal of PAN as shown in its statute, Article is realising a novel Indonesia by upholding the values of faith and piety, sovereignty, social justice and prosperity in the frame of NKRI. In the meantime, the vision and mission of PKS can be found in Articles and : Being the pioneer in realising the national dreams of Indonesia as written in the preamble of Indonesia’s Constitution. Thus, PKS wants to be a bridge for gaining so-called masyarakat madani (loosely, imagined society) with the characteristics of justice, prosperity and dignity. 1. 1. Party Policy 141 Education Issues PDIP. The party vision is education for all. Nationally, there are ten policies. First is ensuring an affordable education with no payment up to secondary school. Second is providing funds for students from poor families. Third is designing the learning curriculum by focusing on student improvement and removing the national exam system. Fourth is removing the Act of Legal Body of Education (BHP) and encouraging the social responsibility of favourite schools to provide chances for poor talented children. Fifth is ensuring justice among regions by building basic and supporting facilities based on the standard quality within the local area. Sixth is providing incentives for teachers and education technicians, particularly in isolated regions. Seventh is removing the taxes on textbooks and stopping the change of textbooks each year. Eighth is ensuring internet access in schools and providing approximately three computers for each primary school, ten computers for each junior high school and computers for each senior high school. Ninth is providing a credit system for buying computers for students at the university with the goal of one million laptops for students per year. Tenth is supporting the development of education which encourages creative industries by involving private sectors and BUMN through CSR activities (DPC PDIP Kota Yogyakarta, ). In Yogyakarta Municipality, the DPC PDIP has some policies to deal with education issues. First is supporting free education up to secondary school. Second is supporting people from the KMS-Group category to earn their rights to come to school, although they have an inability to pay the school tuition. Third is supporting the programme of years of compulsory education so that all children within the municipality will graduate from secondary school. Fourth is increasing the financial subsidy for public and private schools including pupils from poorer families. Fifth is creating a task force to assist society in addressing financial problems, especially in private schools, even negotiating with the school board and helping to pay off their debts. These five policies are in line with the statement of the chairperson of the DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality, Danang Rudyatmoko. He uttered that: 1.1. Chapter IV 142 We (DPC PDIP) consistently struggle for not merely a slogan, but also for the real people’s prosperity. Therefore, education and health are the first steps which have to be realised, as they are basic needs. People cannot reach prosperity without education. (interview, Sept. ) PAN. Since until , this party has had nine major policies at the national level. First, the education system has to produce educated and moral humans and to encourage human independence and creativity. Second, the party encourages basic education for all, the eradication of illiteracy and the rights to attend school. Third, scholarly activities and its results should be published for the public. Fourth, the rapid change in technology must be used to improve education in all regions. Fifth, higher education should be directed to master sciences, technology and value-added economically as well as to increase the quality of manufacturing sectors. Sixth, all children have the ability to access basic education so the education budget must be increased continuously and, in turn, students are free from all payment and financial burden. Seventh is promoting the teachers’ status as an honourable profession by increasing their personal competence and wealth. Eighth is making teachers and students the subject of education. Ninth is improving the capacity of human resources in education to adapt their lives to the regional and global environment so that they can address all types of crises and obstacles (DPP PAN ; ; ; ). In Yogyakarta Municipality, the DPD PAN has a ninefold policy related to education issues. First is free education from preliminary to secondary school. It is prioritised for public schools while private schools will be subsidised optimally. Second is encouraging children from poorer families to register in public schools. Third is increasing the budget for education affairs. Fourth is improving the quality not merely in public schools, but also private schools so that public and private schools earn similar subsidy. Fifth is providing a subsidy for teachers’ education if they interest to gain master or doctoral degrees. Sixth is supporting a financial subsidy for children from poorer families to study at universities. Seventh is providing funding for all citizens in Yogyakarta who study outside the municipality to still obtain the financial subsidy from the municipal government. Eighth is striving for the financial subsidy for the schools belonging to the DEPAG. 1. Party Policy 143 Ninth is providing a subsidy for nutrition for children from poorer families. These nine policies are in line with the statement from the chairperson of the DPD PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality, Heroe Poerwadi. He stated that: Right now, the DPD PAN has a policy that education in public schools in Yogyakarta Municipality, from the primary school to the secondary school, should be free of charge and any payments. Meanwhile, for private schools, there is a financial subsidy for them from the municipal government budget. (interview, Sept. ) PKS. The party policy in coping with education issues is creating a fair education for all people in three ways. First is providing a chance for all people to gain their education rights with affordable prices and suitable for local abilities, free of charge for nine to years of compulsory education. Thus, the education budget must be a minimum percent of the national and local budgets. Second is creating an integrated, comprehensive and qualified national education system with an inclusive agenda in order to produce a person who has independence and high competitiveness. Improving the curriculum is not merely in cognitive aspects, but also in skill capabilities to deal with working industries. Third is increasing teachers’ ability and wealth as the main pillar of the national education development (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PKS, : pp. , , ). Hence, this party has strategic steps. First is creating a comprehensive, integrative and applicative national education system. Second is encouraging nine-year compulsory basic education and achieving a -year compulsory education by providing learning facilities. Third is increasing the competence, wealth, appreciation and protection to teachers as the main pillar of national education. Fourth is realising the education budget a minimum percent of the national and local budget. Fifth is monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the SPN continuously. Sixth is providing entrepreneurship skills to cope with future challenges. Seventh is supporting the fundamental improvement in the decentralised education management so that the local potency grows positively. Eighth is encouraging the quality of the school management and learning process based on local situations and needs. Ninth is providing cheap, excellent and global-oriented education. Tenth is taking into account the devel- Chapter IV 144 opment of students with special needs, whether due to mental illness or special talents. Eleventh is developing formal education as a bridge for leadership training and nationalism. Twelfth is building public awareness where the main responsibility in education belongs mainly to parents. Thirteenth is utilising technology and communication functions to increase the quality of education (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PKS, : pp. – ). In Yogyakarta Municipality, the DPD PKS has seven policies to address education issues. First is free education from preliminary to secondary school. Second is supporting years of compulsory education. Therefore, the municipal government has to fulfil people’s basic needs in education, particularly in public schools. Consequently, citizens within the municipality are obligated to finish their study through senior high school. Third is struggling for a similar subsidy between public and private schools. Fourth is encouraging the improvement of qualified teachers in teaching methods and their wages as well. Fifth is improving education facilities. Sixth is supporting the increase of scholarships for pupils who live inside the municipality. Seventh is rejecting extortion or additional payments carried out by the school board to pupil’s parents. These seven policies are in line with the testimony of the chairperson of the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality, Muhammad Syafi’i. He said that: Due to basic human needs, education should be supported by the municipal government. We said this, as we have already calculated the municipal budget and, in turn, we concluded that the municipal government has an ability to do and execute this notion. Thus, education has to be free of charge from primary school to secondary school, mainly in public institutions. (interview, Sept. ) Health Issues PDIP. This party at the national level has eight policies to address health issues. First is re-implementing the KB programme to control the number of children born. Second is improving the role of family prosperity empowerment. Second is improving the role of the PKK, the Posyandu and the Puskesmas by increasing the facilities and quality 1.2. 1. Party Policy 145 of services. Third is empowering fresh graduates and medical doctors through a government programme in disadvantaged regions. Fourth is activating the Revolusi Putih (White Revolution) by providing milk for poor children and vitamins and eggs for primary school children. Fifth is improving the Klinik Desa (village clinics) and the Rumah Sehat Pedesaan (Rural Health House). Sixth is encouraging research activities and innovations in health issues as well as creating specific and integrated health service centres at regional levels. Seventh is reducing the import of medicine by increasing the subsidy for health sectors and generic medicine production. Eighth is issuing a health insurance system for poor people (DPC PDIP Kota Yogyakarta, ). In Yogyakarta Municipality, the DPC PDIP has some policies. First is providing free healthcare for people to visit all hospitals and health centres whether public or private. Second is initiating the establishment of “a hospital without classes” for all people within the municipality, particularly for lower-class society. Third is establishing a task force to assist society in coping with health affairs, mainly related to finance and payment in hospitals. Regarding this issue, the chairperson of the DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality, Danang Rudyatmoko, uttered that: Similar with education, health issues are also our main concern to be realised for people. It is almost not possible for sick people to have an ability to seek a better education. Thus, education and health are basic human rights. (interview, Sept. ) PAN. This party nationally has six main policies dealing with health issues. First is a healthy society as a requirement for a sturdy and stable state. Second is providing qualified, affordable and accessible health service for people by increasing the number of health centres and medicine production by the government. Third is providing trained and skilled personnel in assisting with childbirth to minimise maternal mortality. Fourth is improving socialisation and protection from widespread outbreak, infectious diseases, narcotics and drugs as well as effective rehabilitation for addicts. Fifth is increasing sanitation for society so that if someone has no clean water or a toilet, the government should help them. Sixth is encouraging the programme of JKN and controlling its implementation so that all people benefit from the programme (DPP PAN ; ; ; ). Chapter IV 146 In Yogyakarta Municipality, the DPD PAN has some policies. First is providing medical treatments in all public health centres free of charge. Consequently, all kinds of diseases should be paid by the municipal budget. Second is reducing the costs of health insurance for society. Third is increasing the municipal budget for health issues. Fourth is improving the quality of public health centres. Fifth is encouraging the establishment of “a hospital without classes”. These four policies are in accordance with the statement delivered by the chairperson of the DPD PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality, Heroe Poerwadi. He testified that: We also attempt consistently to struggle for free healthcare services, for all kinds of disease, mainly in public health institutions such as Puskesmas and RSUD. When the municipal government planned to establish a hospital without classes, the DPD PAN strongly supported this policy. Although we are not part of the government, the struggle for free healthcare services will usually be continued. (interview, Sept. ) PKS. The policy of this party in coping with health issues is to realise health for all people in two ways. First is with the health of body, mind and society so that they have an ability to build the nation to worship Allah (God in Islam). Second is optimising the health budget and all resources to provide excellent services (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PKS, : pp. – , – , ). Health for all starts with health for individuals, health for family, health for society and finally health for the nation. To realise this aim, the party has strategic solutions. First is supporting the implementation of comprehensive and integrated SKN to reduce maternal and child mortality. Second is increasing the number of professional health human resources by promoting honesty, commitment, hard work, creativity and innovation. Third is increasing the health budget for poor people. Fourth is developing a fair health care insurance system for all people. Fifth is encouraging the development of excellent health facilities based on societal needs which can be accessed easily by people. Sixth is increasing societal roles in health development by revitalising NGOs which have a concern with health issues. Seventh is repairing health management systems consisting of health information system, finance, human resources, regulations and healthcare administration. Eighth is providing qualified and affordable medicine by developing research on original medicines and local phar- 1. Party Policy 147 macy industries made in Indonesia. Ninth is encouraging society to live healthier. Tenth is supporting the implementation of the pharmacy of health and repairing the regulations on health and pharmacy issues. Eleventh is improving the quality of sciences and technology in health affairs. Twelveth is creating a national financial system so that the efficiency and quality of health services can be maintained (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat PKS, : pp. – ). In the local context, the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality has some policies. First is that as part of people’s basic needs, the municipal government has to subsidise health issues completely. Second is supporting the improvement of health facilities in the Puskesmas so that society can obtain excellent service when they attend those health centres. Third is encouraging the establishment of a hospital without classes. These three policies are in accordance with the statement delivered by the chairperson of the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality, Muhammad Syafi’i. He uttered that: In addition to education, health issues have to be fulfilled by the municipal government as the people’s mandate. It is also part of our concern that we will struggle for it in each discussion of the APBD. We are usually consistent. (interview, Sept. ) Party Policy-makers Broadly speaking, the organisational structure within political parties has its own rights and duties from the central headquarters to provincial boards, district/municipal boards, sub-district/sub-municipal boards and village boards. Hence, the organisational decision comes from the centre to the lower level in “the top-down model”. Nonetheless, particular cases in the local context can merely be solved by elites inside the municipality. The organisational decision within PDIP, PAN and PKS share a similar pattern which is decided by a collective-collegial system. Each decision should be made and decided through the musyawarah system where each issue or problem should be discussed together in an official forum or meeting to have common agreement and, in turn, its solutions. There are some different steps in deciding a policy amongst these 2. Chapter IV 148 three parties after the musyawarah. In PDIP, if the agreement cannot be reached by the musyawarah, the decision will be made by a representative system. If the latter does not work, the decision will be handed over to the party board one level above. In PAN, after the musyawarah, the decision will be solved by a voting system where one person equals one vote. The final decision is based on the majority vote. In the meantime, PKS prefers to use ijma after the musyawarah. If the latter does not work, PKS will adopt a voting system. All participants who come to the forum have to abide by the last decision. Furthermore, the structural hierarchy of authority within PDIP, PAN and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality is similar where the top leader or the chairperson has dominant power. There is a fourfold reason. First is that the chairperson is elected by the official deliberation so that the chairperson is the organisational mandate. Second is that as a part of the organisational responsibility, the chairperson is like a captain or pilot who is responsible for the survival of the organisation. Third is that the chairperson is wiser in making a decision, as has a lot of information from multiple sides and, of course, the decisions are for the good of the organisation. Fourth is that in many cases, there is no difference between the organisational decision and the chairperson’s statement and vise versa. It means that sometimes the chairperson’s statement could be assumed as the organisational decision and, similarly, as if the organisational decision is made personally by the chairperson. The following policy-maker after the chairperson is the Pengurus Harian (Daily Board). This board manages and controls the organisational activities day in and day out. Outside the chairperson, the Daily Board usually consists of vice chairpersons, a secretary, a treasury and deputies. PDIP and PAN tend to adopt this model. Meanwhile, PKS has a different model. The Daily Board within PKS encompasses a vice chairperson, a secretary, a treasury and the coordinator for the division of cadre. In addition, the chairperson and secretary of MPD and the chairperson and secretary of DSD are part of the policy-maker. Thus, there are nine persons who can be categorised as the core policymakers within PKS. 2. Party Policy-makers 149 Policy Determinants The policy determinants could be defined as a set of factors, whether internal or external which can influence political parties in making a policy or policies. Based on the theories introduced by Pal ( ) and Harmel and Janda ( ) as elaborated earlier, this study identifies three main factors influencing the three parties in the process of policy making. They are party regulations, internal stimuli and external stimuli. Determining Factors Influencing the Party Policy Source: compiled by the author. Party Regulation The party regulations consist of all rules made and issued officially by a political party, such as vision and missions, congressional decisions, the party instructions, the decisions of official meetings and the like. In deciding a policy, PDIP, PAN and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality have a common tendency where the party regulation is the main guidance to decide the following steps and strategies inside the party. Nonetheless, the central board of the party plays a dominant role to control provincial and municipal/district boards, particularly in determining top local leaders, whether inside the internal party or in the regional head elections. Each party has its own strategy for winning the 3. Figure . 3.1. Chapter IV 150 election. Hence, functionaries of these three parties within the municipality have no absolute power. More specifically, the party regulations which are usually used by PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality as guidance are the decisions made by congress, DPP, Rakernas, Rakornas, Konferda and all organisational decisions above the DPC PDIP. Furthermore, the kinds of decision within PAN are congress, Rakernas, Muswil, Rakerwil and all organisational decisions above the DPD PAN. Meanwhile, PKS uses these decisions as guidance: Munas, the Syuro Assembly decision, the Sharia Assembly decision, Muswil and all official decisions above the DPD PKS. Internal Stimuli PDIP has two internal determining factors in the process of policy making. First is the meeting of three pillars consisting of structural, legislative and executive. The structural pillar denotes all functionaries in the organisational structure of the DPC PDIP, the legislative pillar is all parliamentarians originating from PDIP while the executive pillar indicates the PDIP cadres with a position in the administration such as mayor or vice mayor. Second is the report of three service centres: DPC, fraction, and PAC-DPRt. The former denotes the office of the DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality. The middle signifies the PDIP’s fraction in the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality. In the meantime, the latter indicates the party offices in all sub-municipalities (PAC) and kelurahans (DPRt) in Yogyakarta Municipality. Through these three centres, any one within the municipality can deliver their aspirations and complaints. Furthermore, PAN itself has an internal driving factor in the process of policy making, namely the reports coming from the organisational structures of the party in DPC and DPRt inside the municipality. In doing so, PAN’s functionaries in DPC and DPRt usually will receive information and complaints when they attend the meetings held by the RT board and the RW board as well as from informal discussions among society in public spheres. 3.2. 3. Policy Determinants 151 Meanwhile, PKS also has an internal determining factor in the process of policy making, i.e., the Jaring Aspirasi Kader (cadre aspiration web). More technically, the DPD PKS will invite all core cadres within the municipality to discuss particular or several issues at a certain time. According to Muhammad Syafi’i (interview, Nov. ), PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality recently has between and core cadres. All aspirations coming from these core cadres will be considered by the DPD PKS when making the final decision. Nevertheless, the DPW PKS still supervises the municipal board of the party in certain cases. The mechanisms which apply in each party denote “the bottom-up model” that the party policy considers as public aspirations and proposals. After each mechanism has been implemented, the Daily Board has great authority in determining the final decision of the party still considering internal aspirations. If the final decision is not in line with the public aspiration, the Daily Board usually will explain the reasons and clarify why it has a different decision. In responding to particular cases, the Daily Board or even the party chairperson can deliver their spontaneous statements due to public demand mainly from media. Thus, the chairperson has to be able to build up the party image and attract society sympathy for the survival of the party. External Stimuli PDIP, PAN and PKS generally have similar external stimuli in the process of policy making, but in particular cases, they have some differences. The similar factors are fivefold. First is MUSRENBANG. It is an annual agenda held by the municipal government to gather people’s aspirations on municipal development so society can deliver their proposals and complaints directly. It started at the kelurahan level and continued to the sub-municipal and municipal levels. Second is reses. It is a period where legislators conduct activities outside the DPRD secretariat usually three or four times each year. Their activities mostly include visiting constituents or society and doing something for society. Third is public opinion. It represents a majority view among society on certain issues. Fourth is public hearings. It is an open forum for society 3.3. Chapter IV 152 held by the parliament or by the party to hear public aspirations and complaints. Fifth is society reports. The society reports can be divided into two kinds: ) the suggestions or complaints coming from society informally delivered to each party’s functionary or parliamentarian; ) certain communities which visit the party board or the party’s fraction officially and report on recent circumstances on particular cases or problems. Moreover, PAN and PKS frequently invite experts in their own internal forum to discuss certain issues. It can be an evaluation on what the party has to do and how the party can participate. In addition, these two parties also receive complaints and proposals from interest groups. PAN has a close relationship with Muhammadiyah while PKS has a cultural linkage with the JSIT. In particular, PAN has some other important external stimuli. First is electoral regulation. The decision made by the Constitutional Court in the election system is based on the majority vote (open proportional system). Heroe Poerwadi (interview, June ) of PAN stated that this regulation really disrupted the PAN’s strategy, as the decision was issued at the end of while PAN had activated its own strategy with the closed proportional system. This party had fewer seats than earlier elections. Second is the election result. It, of course, does not alter the party policy in general, but it changes the party strategies in winning the next elections. Third is aspirations of the municipal agencies. Particularly during Zudianto’s regime, PAN sometimes invited experts from the municipal agencies to discuss certain issues. PAN at the time was the regime party meaning it was easy to deliver ideas to the regime. Fourth is recent circumstances in the municipal government such as the name change of some municipal agencies or omitting certain irrelevant agencies and creating other agencies. Concluding Remarks PDIP, PAN and PKS tend to have similar policies in addressing two public service issues: education and health. These three parties envision free education and the improvement of school facilities, teacher quality and pupil scholarships. In the same vein, they together advo- 4. 4. Concluding Remarks 153 cate for free healthcare and the improvement of health centre facilities and worker quality. They agree that education and health are basic needs for human life which should be subsidised fully by the municipal budget. They seem to be the fighters of people’s welfare or the so-called “welfare state”. In this context, the concept of welfare could be related to other features of ‘rights’, ‘needs’, ‘equality’, ‘government policy’ and the like such that “a welfare state might be conceived as a state which views the welfare of its citizens as the primary claim on its policy-making, or it might be conceived as a state which enacts particular welfare policies” (Hamlin, : p. ). This study classifies the concept of welfare as an ideology and, therefore, it could be labelled as “welfarism”. Honderich ( : p. ) and Pike ( : p. ) postulated that welfarism is a state that has some responsibilities in securing the well-being or welfare of its people. This ideology has been developed by some liberaldemocratic theorists such as Adam Smith, Leonard T. Hobhouse and John A. Hobson as well as socialist thinkters such as Richard H. Tawney. These theoritsts support state responsibility for individual welfare ‘from the cradle to the grave’. It was in line with the thought of Honderich ( : p. ). Welfarism has been adopted by some countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and the USA. Indonesia seemingly could duplicate this model of welfarism into its government and governance systems. Yogyakarta Municipality is considered one instance for this model. Concerning the party policy-makers, although all parties apply the collective-collegial mechanism, the chairperson and the daily board (Pengurus Harian) have dominant authorities in formulating and deciding on a set of policies. It also proves that the hierarchy of authority hypothesised by Harmel and Janda ( ) is still applicable to analyse political parties in contemporary Indonesia. Lastly, there are three main determining factors which influence the party policy: party regulations, internal stimuli and external stimuli. This finding confirms the relevance of the thesis introduced by Pal ( ) and Harmel and Janda ( ). Chapter IV 154 Chapter V Fighting for People’s Interests: Party Agenda This chapter continues the empirical analysis by exploring the effectiveness of the party agenda for PDIP, PAN and PKS in coping with education and health issues in Yogyakarta Municipality. As an introduction, some concepts will be explored here such as what is “effectiveness” and, what is “agenda”? Effectiveness could be defined as the judgements about whether an organisation is functioning satisfactorily or not (Narayanan & Nath, : p. ). An agenda is “a collection of problems, understanding of causes, symbols, solutions and other elements of public problems that come to the attention of members of the public and their governmental officials”. Hence, an agenda like a list of bills means a list of problems that should be addressed by governance actors (Birkland, : p. ). In this context, the party agenda could be defined as a set of actions to be pursued by the party. It is typically more specific and operational than policy, used to measure the performance and actions carried out by those three parties since until . To measure the party agenda effectiveness, Narayanan and Nath ( : p. ) proposed four criteria: the clarity of goals; the linkage between input and output; the nature of coupling between inputs, process and outputs; and the ease of establishing criteria. Moreover, this study applies three steps for organisational effectiveness developed by Hall ( : pp. – ) and Narayanan and Nath ( : p. ). It begins with the input step. In this context, the input consists of human and natural resources owned by Yogyakarta Municipality, i.e., elected legislators and political officials in five years, bureaucrats and civil servants, the local revenue each year and existing systems which were established earlier. These inputs will be brought together in the second process: conversion. In this step, the DPRD legislators will play their roles in the process of legislating, budgeting and controlling the gov- 155 ernment performance which are part of their major duties as the legislative wing. The last step is output (goal) which comprises two tangible proofs: well-implemented municipal governance particularly in education and health sectors and the achievement of external recognition whether nationally or internationally. This process is depicted in Figure . . The effectiveness of the party agenda in this chapter will be elaborated in two main sections. First is the party involvement in five DPRD’s tool fittings: the DPRD board, the commission of social welfare, the legislation body, the budgetary body and the special committee. Second is the party attitude towards local regulation drafts known as Raperda related directly to education and health issues. The former demonstrates the structural while the latter indicates the functional way. The Effectiveness Process of the Party Agenda Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings The tool fittings, known also as Alkep, group the parliamentary duties into some bodies. In Yogyakarta Municipality, the DPRD has seven kinds of tool fittings: The DPRD board, the commissions, the consultative body, the legislation body, the budgetary body, the honorary body and other necessary tool fittings established by the DPRD plenary session, such as the special committee. This study describes party involve- Figure . 1. Chapter V 156 ment in five tool fittings: the DPRD board, the commission of social welfare, the legislation body, the budgetary body and the special committee. The others are not relevant for this study. Involvement could be defined as participation of political parties in the structure of those five tool fittings including their positions. In the post-New Order regime, the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality experienced four election cycles in line with the national electoral circulation. Table . reveals that PDIP steadily earned the top position in the DPRD board except in the second period which was led by PAN. Unlike in other periods, regulation in the period – did not automatically decide which ruling party would reach the DPRD head as this position was decided through the voting mechanism. In addition to PDIP, PAN always gained DPRD board seats whether as the head or as the deputy head. PKS reached the board only once in the second cycle ( – ). These positions imply that parties which have a high number of votes and seats will obtain board positions. With an ability to gather more votes than others, PDIP and PAN always achieved a DPRD board seat. The DPRD Board in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Period Name of Board Party Origin Position – Bahtanisyar Basyir, SE PDIP Head Ir. Sukardi Yani, MM PAN Vice Head Nanda Irawan, SH PBB Vice Head H. Muhammad Wahid, SE PKB Vice Head – Arif Noor Hartanto, SIP PAN Head R. Andrie Subiantoro PDIP Vice Head I Dwi Budi Utomo, S.Pt PKS Vice Head II – Henry Koncoroyekti, SH PDIP Head Agus Prasetio AS, ST Democrat Vice Head I Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE., MM PAN Vice Head II – Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Head Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE., MM PAN Vice Head I Ririk Banowati Permanasari, SH Gerindra Vice Head II Source: compiled by the author. Table . 1. Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings 157 The Commission of Social Welfare After the legislative candidates were decided as the elected members of the DPRD, they have to create the parliamentary duties based on commissions. The commissions are permanent tool fittings in the DPRD, established for the first time in a five year period and usually divided based on sectors: government, economy, finance, development and social welfare. Each member of the DPRD except the board has to involve itself in one of the commissions. It is useful to explain here that each period of the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality has had different numbers of commissions: five commissions in – , three commissions in – and four commissions in – and – . The commissions are divided based on existing sectors, but in other periods, some sectors are grouped into one commission. With regard to commission duties, there are ten types. First is implementing local government responsibilities in line with legislation. Second is discussing local regulation drafts and the parliamentary decision drafts, depending on the commission’s duties. Third is supervising local regulation drafts and local budgets depending on the commission’s duties. Fourth is assisting the DPRD board in solving problems, whether from the report of the mayor or society. Fifth is receiving, accommodating, discussing and following up on society’s aspirations. Sixth is increasing social welfare. Seventh is making a field visit after receiving the DPRD board’s approval. Eight is organising internal meetings and hearings. Ninth is giving suggestions or proposals to the DPRD board based on its commission duties. Tenth is providing a written report on its commission programmes which have been implemented by the DPRD board (Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : p. ). The social welfare commission commonly comprises some issues related to education, health, woman empowerment, family planning and welfare family, social labor transmigration, youth and sport, library, food security, culture and religion. Table . depicts that there are five structural replacements in the commission of social welfare. During this period, PDIP usually had more delegates than others. 1.1. Chapter V 158 Parties’ Involvement in the Commission of Social Welfare, – Period Total of Dele-gates Number of the Party Delegates PDIP PAN PKS – - – – – – Source: compiled by the author. For the key positions, Appendix demonstrates that PDIP gained three times as the chairperson, once as the vice chairperson and once as the secretary. Moreover, PAN obtained the chairperson and the vice chairperson twice respectively. In the meantime, PKS was the vice chairperson once. PDIP and PAN repeatedly have a significant role in each process of policy-making related to education and health issues. Firstly, they always obtain vital positions so that their roles are more considerable than ordinary members. Secondly, their delegates in each period dominate more than others. Legislation Body The legislation body known as Balegda in the DPRD of Yogyakarta Municipality is permanent and, therefore, a party’s role in the legislation could be represented by its involvement in this body. Each DPRD fraction has to decide who can and how many members are involved in this body. The legislation body in Yogyakarta Municipality was officially established in . In two earlier periods of the DPRD, each regulation draft had to be discussed in the consultative committee (Panmus) which, at the time, was still provisional. Based on the Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /DPRD/ on the Standing Orders (tata tertib), Article , the legislation body in the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality has some duties. First is drafting local legislation programmes. Second is coordinating the Table . 1.2. 1. Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings 159 drafting of local regulation programmes between legislative and executive wings. Third is preparing the local regulation draft proposed by the DPRD based on the priority programme. Fourth is harmonising and finishing the local regulation draft proposed by parliaments, commissions, joint commissions or society before being presented to the DPRD board. Fifth is providing suggestions and considerations for each local regulation draft proposed by parliaments, commissions, joint commissions or society. Sixth is discussing, correcting and completing the local regulation draft commissioned by the consultative body. Seventh is following recent developments and evaluating the contents of the local regulation draft through coordination with commissions or the special committee. Eighth is giving suggestions to the DPRD board on the local regulation draft proposed by society. Ninth is making a performance report and legislation problem lists at the end of the DPRD period. Parties’ Involvement in the Legislation Body, – Period Total of Dele-gates Number of the Party Delegates PDIP PAN PKS – – – Source: compiled by the authorc Because the legislation body in – was not formed yet, no data can be displayed here. Table . portrays that there were three structural replacements in the legislation body between and . PDIP had the most delegates. For key positions, as seen in Appendix , PDIP was the chairperson once and twice the vice chairperson, PAN was the chairperson once and PKS was the vice chairperson once. Broadly, the three parties have played crucial roles in making regulations in Yogyakarta Municipality. Numerous local regulations (perda) were executed to ensure the basic needs of people who live inside the municipality. Between – , there were perdas related to government affairs, retributions and taxes, municipal development and governance, infrastructure and licenses. Between and , there Table . Chapter V 160 were perdas in which were joint local regulations (perda bersama) and seven were initiative local regulations (perda inisiatif). The former is discussed and executed between the DPRD and the municipal government whereas the latter is executed only by the DPRD. During this period, the DPRD issued seven perdas each year. Major issues included the municipal budget, government, retributions and taxes, license, health and education. From to , there were perdas in which were perda bersama and six were perda inisiatif. These were related to issues of municipal budget, government and politics, health, license, manpower, enterprises, poverty alleviation, environment and garbage, disaster, retribution and tax, motor vehicle and The Number of Local Regulations Issued by the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Year Number of Perdas TOTAL Source: compiled by the author. Table . 1. Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings 161 parking, trading and tourism. Between and there were ten perdas related to municipal budget, spatial, advertisement, enterprises, bank, tourism, child-friendly city and simple flats. Table . shows that for years, the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality has produced slightly under perdas in which the most productive year was with perdas and the least productive in with only one perda. In general, because Yogyakarta Municipality is located in an urban area and used as the centre of trading, business and tourism, most perdas are always related to retributions and taxes, licenses as well as municipal governance. There was a positive improvement from period to period on how the DPRD governs local governance affairs. Between and , the produced regulations were still focused on infrastructure and government affairs. Five years later, the regulations attempted to address basic human needs such as education and health. Since until the present, the regulations have been associated with manpower, enterprises, poverty alleviation, environment, garbage, disaster, spatial, advertisement, child-friendly city and simple flats. As a result, the effectiveness of those perdas can be seen in various appreciations nationally and internationally earned by Yogyakarta Municipality. Between and , it obtained recognitions in government and public service affairs, appreciations in environmental affairs, acknowledgments in public facilities and infrastructure affairs, recognitions in health affairs, five acknowledgments in education affairs and five awards in tourism affairs (Retno, : pp. – ). Numerous provincial awards were also collected (Pemerintah Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – ). Not surprisingly, Yogyakarta Municipality was recognised as the country’s cleanest city from corruption by Indonesia’s International Transparency in and by the Bung Hatta Anti-Corruption Award (BHACA) in . Subsequently, the municipality was considered Indonesia’s most livable city in and by the Ikatan Ahli Perencanaan Indonesia (Expert Association for Indonesian Planning). The Human Development Index (HDI) in this municipality has increased continuously over three years, from . in into . in ; HDI scores above in the international scale are high. By , it was appointed by the Kemitraan as the country’s best city among select- Chapter V 162 ed districts and municipalities, reaching the highest standard of the Indonesia Governance Index (IGI). In , it ranked first in the Indeks Kota Islami (Islamic City Index, IKI) amongst Indonesia’s selected municipalities, researched by the Maarif Institute. Budgetary Body The budgetary body known as Banggar is part of the permanent tool fittings, established in the first period of the DPRD. Based on the Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /DPRD/ on the Standing Orders (tata tertib), Article , the budgetary body in Yogyakarta Municipality has seven duties. Firstly, the body together with the municipal government creates main policies on the municipal revenue and budget as guidance for the municipal agencies in proposing the budget. Secondly, the body alongside with the city mayor decide the municipal budget by considering proposals from the relevant commission. Thirdly, the body with the mayor discuss the local regulation draft on the municipal budget by referring to the session decision between the commission and the mayor. Fourthly, it synchronises the discussion results in the commission on the work and budget plans in the municipal agencies. Fifthly, it discusses the realisation and prognosis related to the municipal budget. Sixthly, it discusses the explanation of the local regulation draft on the accountability of the municipal budget realisation. Seventhly, it discusses the financial report of the mayor, including the verification result of the BPK. Between – , the name of this body was the budgetary committee known as Panggar and, at the time, it was provisional. The term “Banggar” has been used officially since until present. In general, the board of Banggar is usually the board of the DPRD. Table . demonstrates the budgetary body has been replaced six times over two decades. Like other tool fittings, PDIP has more delegates than other parties although in certain periods, the number of delegates between PDIP and PAN was the same. In two periods between and , PKS had no delegate in this body with only one seat. For vital positions, PDIP was the chairperson four times and twice the vice chairperson. Moreover, PAN was the chairperson once, three times the 1.3. 1. Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings 163 vice chairperson and twice the secretary. Meanwhile, PKS was the vice chairperson once. These three parties have vital contributions in the process of budgetary making. The annual budget in Yogyakarta Municipality has continuously improved from year to year. The municipal income in was billion IDR. In , it rose to billion IDR, then in and it increased to billion IDR and billion IDR respectively. By , it improved drastically to . trillion IDR. In the same vein, the municipal budget for education and health sectors has also increased from year to year. By , the budget for education sectors was still under five percent, it rose to . percent in and increased to . percent in . Moreover, it improved spectacularly to . percent in . The budget for this sector in was more than a third of the total annual budget of the municipality. This was the biggest budget of all sectors, followed by the issues related to regional autonomy and health in second and third ranks respectively (see Table . ). Yogyakarta Municipality can be recognised as the country’s city of education. Likewise, the municipal budget for health sectors from to was continuously increasing as well. The budget in was . percent, in was percent and in was . percent. Parties’ Involvement in the Budgetary Body, – Period Total of Dele-gates Number of the Party Delegates PDIP PAN PKS – - – - – – – – Source: compiled by the author. Table . Chapter V 164 The Income and Expenditure Budget in Yogyakarta Municipality No Description Amount (IDR) A MUNICIPAL INCOME , , , , Municipal-owned Revenue , , , Balance Fund , , , Other Legal Municipal-owned Revenues , , , B MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURE , , , , . Compulsory Affairs , , , , . Education , , , . Health , , , . Public Works , , , . Housing , , , . Room Planning , , , . Development Planning , , , . Transportation , , , . Environment , , , . Defense , , , . Population and Civil Registration , , , . Women Empowerment and Children Protection , , , . Family Planning and Welfare Family , , , . Social , , , . Labour , , , . Cooperative Small and Middle Enterprises , , , . Investment , , . Culture , , , . Youth and Sport , , , . Nation Unity and Domestic Politics , , . Regional Autonomy, General Government, Municipal Finance Administration, Municipal Device, Employee Affairs and Coding , , , . Food Security , , , . Social Empowerment , , , . Table . 1. Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings 165 Statistic , , , . Archival , , , . Communication and Informatics , , , . Library , , . Optional Affairs , , , . Farming , , , . Forest - - Energy and Mineral Resources - - Tourism , , , . Marine and Fisheries , , . Trade , , , . Industry , , , . Transmigration , , . C MUNICIPAL FUNDING , , , Financing Revenue , , , Financing Expenses , , , Source: Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / . Table . reveals that the municipal expenditure in was approximately . trillion IDR. The municipality’s income was around . trillion IDR while the deficiency was covered mainly by the remaining balance budget in the previous budget year with roughly billion IDR. Table . also portrays that the expenditure for education and health sectors were prioritised. If both expenditures, . percent and . percent, are totalled, the amount was . percent. The budget for education and health sectors in was more than half the total budget. Therefore, it is not surprising that the municipality obtained many prizes in the field of education and health from various credible institutions. Special Committee The special committee known also as Pansus is a provisional body, established by the DPRD plenary session based on parliamentarian proposals and the consultative body (Bamus) considerations. It has a spe- 1.4. Chapter V 166 cific duty relying on particular issues and restricted by a certain time as well. For instance, a pansus for the health insurance issue, the time restriction is from January to November . The pansus for local regulation drafts which will be discussed in this study is related directly to education and health issues. Between and , there were eight pansuses for eight raperdas as displayed in Table . . Of them, seven are on health issues and one is on education. The education system in Yogyakarta Municipality is more stable than the health system and, hence, it requires little regulation. Meanwhile, serious attention was paid by the municipal government to govern the health system and, thus, many regulations were produced. Broadly, the members of the special committee represent all parliament fractions and, thus, each fraction has delegates in each special committee. Unfortunately, two kinds of pansus could not be displayed here given unfixed and unreliable data. Table . portrays that PDIP delegates were higher than others although there were similar delegates between PDIP and PAN in some raperdas. For board positions, as displayed in Appendix , PDIP was the chairperson twice and once the vice chairperson. Furthermore, PAN was the chairperson once and twice the vice chairperson. In the meantime, PKS was the chairperson once and twice the vice chairperson. Parties’ Involvement in the Special Committee for Raperda, – Year Raperda/Issues Total of Delegates Number of the Party Delegates PDIP PAN PKS Retribution of health services atRSUD - - - - Retribution of health services atPuskesmas - - - - Retribution of health services atPuskesmas License in operating health facilitiesand workers Education system Table . 1. Party Involvement in the DPRD’s Tool Fittings 167 Retribution of health services atPuskesmas Health insurance Exclusive breastfeeding Source: compiled by the author. It is quite important to explain here that especially the pansus of exclusive breastfeeding included members of the commission of social welfare at the time. There is also no different number of members and board between the commission and the pansus. This local regulation draft was initiated by the executive wing so this draft was a joint effort between the municipal government and the DPRD. Establishing a special committee in this raperda is not needed at all. Party Attitudes towards Raperda The local regulation draft known as raperda is the initial concept related to a particular public issue which rules all interrelated stakeholders in a certain district/municipality/province prior to being decided together by executive and legislative wings as an official binding regulation. Meanwhile, the party attitude can be defined as an official decision made by a political party in responding to particular issues. To trace back the source of the party attitude, this study is going to explain it in two ways. First is a personal view delivered by elites and legislators of the party towards the raperda. Second are pemandangan umum (general statements) which refer to the report made by the party’s fraction and presented in the DPRD plenary sessions in responding to a particular raperda. These two sources are employed to figure out the political attitude of PDIP, PAN and PKS towards the policymaking process of the local regulation draft related to education and health issues in Yogyakarta Municipality. 2. Chapter V 168 Education System There is one raperda which regulates the education system, later being the Local Regulation (Perda) of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Education Organising System. The scope of the regulation is for early childhood education (PAUD), primary and secondary education as well as non-formal education which are part of the municipal government’s responsibility. This regulation aims to realise the equalisation of qualified education and to ensure access expansion and affordable education for society. The target is that children are faithful and devout humans by having good morals, health, intelligence, are creative, independent and self-confident so that children can be democratic and responsible citizens in society. PDIP argues that public schools have to be prioritised for poorer people who are classified in the KMS-Group. This party will safeguard and control the implementation of this regulation because children from poorer families are still dealing with financial problems in the school. They do not know how to solve their own problems. It frequently shall be found in not only public schools but also private schools. PDIP strongly advocates for these isolated people until they earn back what is part of their rights. “We strive for problems not only related to BOSDA and KMS, but also tiny problems such as the inability in paying uang gedung (expenses for school’s building construction and renovation) and baju seragam (school uniform). Our party has a task force to deal with these issues”, Sutaryo (interview, Sept. ) confirms. Therefore, this party does not mind if many people outside Yogyakarta Municipality want to be a part of the city’s citizens due to this pro-poor people policy. PAN advocates poor people to register their children in public schools. Such people will be subsidised fully by the municipal budget through the JPD programme. If each public school has the quota of seats for pupils of poorer families, a lot of such pupils earn qualified education. Moreover, this party supports the municipal government to subsidise the poorer pupils who have a good performance to continue studying at the university level. The municipal government should provide special scholarships for pupils who have good intelligence and also scholarships for teachers. Because there are so few of these kinds 2.1. 2. Party Attitudes towards Raperda 169 of pupils and teachers, it means it is easy for the municipal government to execute it. Furthermore, PAN always strives for similar financial subsidies between private and public schools, as the high payment will be found in private schools. In addition to public schools, many private schools inside the city have significant contributions in educating young generations. Nevertheless, the municipal government has no authority to ban private schools from “financial extortion”. Moreover, this party also advocates for a financial subsidy for poor citizens within the city who study outside the city and a subsidy for schools under the DE- PAG system through the budgetary body sessions. Regarding the establishment of the Taman Pintar, this party claims to be part of the initiator in creating this programme, as the idea first appeared in the Zudianto regime. Meanwhile, PKS believes that to realise free education, particularly in public schools, the municipal government should subsidise it fully as long as central and provincial governments still subsidise the city as well. For private schools, this party advocates them through the budget. Consequently, public schools are banned from conducting financial extortion while private schools are expected to decrease such extortion. Moreover, struggling for additional scholarship for pupils, the improvement of school facilities and the increase of the teachers’ wages are also part of the party’s agenda. However, although PKS has already discussed with the related agencies to implement this universal coverage for education affairs, in fact, many barriers must be dealt with. One of the vital barriers is the willingness of the mayor to execute this policy or not. If the mayor and the related agencies are willing, everything can be reached easily. If the head of the education agency and headmasters have numerous innovative programmes, but less encouragement from the mayor and vice mayor, the innovation will proceed slowly. Moreover, this party always asks the municipal government to design that all schools have similar quality. It is to attract people to apply to any school. One of the PKS’ original agendas which have been applied by the municipal government under the Suyuti administration is Kampung Ramah Anak (Child-friendly Village). It aims to create a kelurahan as a comfortable place for children to play and grow. Chapter V 170 Retribution of Health Services7 There are five interrelated raperdas linked to the issue of the retribution of health services in public health centres in Yogyakarta Municipality. Those raperdas later being the Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Retribution of Health Services at the RSUD, the Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Retribution of Health Services at the Puskesmas, the Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Retribution of Health Services at the Puskesmas, the Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on License in Operating Health Facilities and Workers and the Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Retribution of Health Services at the Puskesmas. These five local regulations aim to ensure the health service system within the municipality, including the technical procedure and the price of health services. There are no significant differences among these regulations except related to the adjustment of the price of health services due to novel economic situations. One of the most important things is that PDIP, PAN and PKS in concur that citizens in Yogyakarta Municipality will obtain a reduction of percent for common treatment services and percent for health action services. PDIP has three main views in responding to this issue. Firstly, the municipal government has an obligation to finance public health, as it is part of the government’s responsibility. Secondly, most people who come to the Puskesmas are lower and poorer-class who have no money to go to a hospital or a private health centre. Thirdly, the existing local budget is still not optimised for increasing the quality of health services in the Puskesmas or the RSUD. Therefore, the municipal government could optimise the existing budget for health before deciding on this regulation. In addition, PDIP has some basic questions: “It is a vital question for us, will the municipal government make the health sector as a resource to increase the income?”, “We need recent data regarding the customer of health services in all Puskesmas in Yogyakarta 2.2. Some views of parties in this part are also compiled from “Pemandangan Umum Fraksi PDIP, PAN, PKS ( )”, in: Risalah Rapat Paripurna DPRD Kota Yogyakarta II, October ; Risalah Rapat Paripurna DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /RIS/ , January . 2. Party Attitudes towards Raperda 171 Municipality?”, “Could the municipal government explain us concerning the user of all budget allocations for the health sector?”. Moreover, PAN points out some its own views. Firstly, although the promotion of free healthcare services is our common hope, it cannot be realised totally due to the limitation of the municipal budget. If the DPRD tries to execute free healthcare services, it will take the budget of other sectors. Hence, PAN prioritises free care for poorer people while rich people have to pay the retribution. Secondly, people have to be educated to use their income firstly for vital needs, such as health. Thirdly, we do not agree that customers who come to the Puskesmas are merely poorer people, because, as a matter of fact, most rich people also take advantage of the services in the Puskesmas as well. Fourthly, PAN can understand the government’s desire to increase the retribution price in order to improve the quality of public health centres. Nevertheless, is it realistic or not to charge the public? Fifthly, PAN agrees Yogyakarta citizens would be subsidised by the municipal budget for this issue. Sixth, if the municipal government increases this retribution each year, it should explain its indicators and why the price has to be raised. Meanwhile, according to PKS, when the regulation is going to be discussed, the municipal government should follow up with any complaints reported by society on the worst public health services. It shall be an evaluation for the municipal government to behave better than before. There are three main views of PKS. Firstly, the regulation should list in detail the price of all sorts of retribution in order to calculate the price for each health service. Secondly, the municipal government has to subsidise Yogyakarta citizens fully while citizens who come from outside the city have to pay the retribution as listed in the regulation. Thirdly, it is good if the subsidy is no longer for health centres, but for people directly. For instance, if the subsidy is , IDR Pemandangan Umum of the PDIP Fraction was delivered by Suwarto of PDIP, in the DPRD plenary session, October . This party agreed with the Raperda before decided by the session, January . This attitude is strengthened by interviews with PDIP elites. Pemandangan Umum of the PAN Fraction was delivered by Iriawan Argo Widodo of PAN, in the DPRD plenary session, October . This party also agreed with the Raperda before decided by the session, January . This attitude is strengthened by interviews with PAN elites. Chapter V 172 per person per month and there are , citizens multiplied by months, the result is . million IDR per year. This subsidy is smaller than the subsidy for health centres. Fourth, it is important that we should differentiate the retribution between for social services and for professional business. The retribution for social purposes should be lower than business taxes. The increase of fuel oil followed by the increase of other basic needs must be considered prior to deciding the regulation. Health Insurance Regarding health insurance in Yogyakarta Municipality, there is one Perda namely the Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Health Insurance Organising System. It is also well-known as the local regulation regarding JAMKESDA. This regulation aims to provide protection for decent health for people within the municipality, particularly coming from poorer families so that they can live in a cozy situation financially. During the discussion process in making this regulation draft, each party has its own views. PDIP argues that it is the initiator in creating this regulation because it encouraged the municipal government between and to conduct an initial trial of JAMKESDA in five kelurahans randomly. This programme seems to be an effective way to cope with health issues. Therefore, JAMKESDA is an effort to protect people’s health inside the municipality, particularly poorer families. More technically, when Yogyakarta citizens go to any hospital inside the city whether public or private as well as the Puskesmas for medical checks or treatments, they merely register themselves with an ID-Card or Kartu Keluarga (Family Identity Certificate). If they want to stay in the third class, 2.3. Pemandangan Umum of the PKS Fraction was delivered by Muhammad Zuhrif Hudaya of PKS, in the DPRD plenary session, October . This party also agreed with the Raperda before decided by the session, January . This attitude is strengthened by interviews with PKS elites. For more detail on the explanation related to the classification of the participant in this program, the payment mechanism and the service standard, see two mayoral regulations in Yogyakarta Municipality No. / and No. / , both on the organising of JAMKESDA. 2. Party Attitudes towards Raperda 173 no payment will be charged to them. In other words, it is free of charge as was regulated by the local regulation. Before the implementation of JAMKESDA, PDIP already assisted these poorer people to gain decent health services in the hospitals or other healthcare centres. Poorer people would be assisted by PDIP volunteers to have so-called “Surat Keterangan Tidak Mampu” (a certificate which states that a person has no ability to pay the bill). This certificate usually will be obtained if someone asks the head of RT and also the head of RW where he/she lives. If a person has such a certificate, similar to the JAMKESDA system, he/she will not be charged. Furthermore, PAN claims it too is also part of the architect of JAMKESDA. Nothing is wrong in this matter, as at the time the mayor was a PAN cadre. Therefore, the party tried to increase the municipal budget for JAMKESDA so that all kinds of diseases could be paid fully by the municipal government. PAN has already calculated the budget and estimated how much the municipal government has to pay with the number of existing citizens. This party believes that the municipal budget can cover all expenses. Nevertheless, by , the central government issued a new regulation whereby all people within the country have to join the BPJS system where health insurance is also governed inside. Consequently, JAMKESDA which was established by the municipal government has to join with BPJS, and, in turn, it is not working anymore. The party views that in the context of Yogyakarta Municipality, although the implementation of BPJS seemingly is an unprepared system, it should be reserved for not only poorer people but also all people within the city, poor or not. If the BPJS is merely for poorer people, some Yogyakarta citizens will lose their rights which were covered previously by JAMKESDA. In the meantime, PKS argues that addressing health issues cannot be separated from access and quality. The party believes that as one of the basic needs, the municipal government should cover this matter entirely. Consequently, this party always faces this concern in the budgetary and legislation sessions. Each citizen within the municipality Compiled from the interviews with PDIP elites, some of them are Danang Rudiyatmoko, Sutaryo and Sujarnoko. Compiled from the interviews with PAN elites, among of them are Heroe Poerwadi, Muhammad Ali Fahmi and Rifki Listianto. Chapter V 174 will not be charged if they come to health centres as long as they want to be nursed in the third class, rooms for lower-class patients. Afterwards, this party supports improving health centre facilities, because it receives a lot of complaints and critiques from society on how bad the public health centre services are. Hence, the basic problem in health insurance is financing and the municipal government has to solve this issue. In addition, PKS is one of the parties which strongly encourages the establishment of “a hospital without classes”. It argues that although the central government has a new regulation on BPJS, it still believes that JAMKESDA is the spectacular way the municipal government protects society in health sectors. This party continuously tries to improve the best system for serving people. For now, according to PKS, the third class service is not too bad. Exclusive Breastfeeding There is one raperda directly related to the issue of the importance of full breastfeeding for infants, the Local Regulation of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Exclusive Breastfeeding. The emergence of this regulation was caused by the fact that formula milk is used instead of bresatfeeding, or mix of these two. Thus, this regulation has three main objectives. First is to protect the infant’s rights in obtaining breastfeeding fully for six months without any formula milk. It is, of course, for the infant’s growth. Second is providing protection for mothers in exclusive breastfeeding for their babies. Third is increasing the role and support of family, society and the municipal government to this agenda. Furthermore, before the draft will be decided as a regulation, each party has its own views. PDIP has four main views. Firstly, it must synchronise between the regulation on the freedom of information and this perda in Article related to the ban on the health centres, hospitals and the Puskesmas in giving data about pregnant mothers, baby’s mothers and babies to any manufacturers and distributors of food or milk. Article verse 2.4. Compiled from the interviews with PKS elites, some of them are Muhammad Syafi’i, Dwi Budi Utomo and Muhammad Fauzan. 2. Party Attitudes towards Raperda 175 could be changed with this sentence: “Each health worker is banned from giving the data of pregnant mothers, baby’s mothers and babies to the distributors of box milk and baby food products which can hamper this programme”. Secondly, concerning the reward to anyone or any institutions which support this programme as was stated in Chapter XI Article , the party argues that the municipal government should give the reward based on qualified conditions, as many volunteers in villages have a good ability in assisting pregnant mothers. Thirdly, with regard to Chapter VI Article on the breast milk aids, the party needs an explanation related to medical reasons, religious values and social-cultural values on this concern due to various perspectives among society. Fourthly, the party supports this draft becoming a regulation, as it can strengthen the role of health volunteers in assisting the pregnant mothers at the RW levels. Moreover, this regulation has to be socialised amongst society, especially young generations, such as pupils and students inside the municipality (Pemandangan Umum Fraksi PDIP, ). Further, PAN believes that to gain better health, the public health centres have to provide not merely rehabilitative services, but also preventive actions and a healthy lifestyle. One of the preventive services is exclusive breastfeeding to infants in order to have better growth and life. Thus, the party really encourages this draft, as the draft also includes the provision that exclusive breastfeeding is the infant’s right. It is compulsory for each mother who has given birth. Nonetheless, the party is afraid if there is no punishment for people who do not abide by this regulation, everything is useless. If the punishment does not seem effective, formulating ethical rules in this regulation is a must so that if people do not obey this, they suffer the loss. In addition, this party tends to doubt the seriousness of the municipal government in executing a sanction for health centres, manufactures and distributors of formula milk/baby foods if they violate the regulation. The following is a question: is this punishment effective for them? Most importantly, the real commitment and the budgeting support of the municipal government is a necessity to educate society on the importance of exclusive breastfeeding for infants (Pemandangan Umum Fraksi PAN, ). Chapter V 176 Lastly, PKS argues that exclusive breastfeeding is a right which should be earned by each infant. According to Muhammad Syafi’i (interview by phone, May ) of PKS, his party delivers encouragement for this regulation based on a fourfold reason. First is a religious reason based on Islamic teachings, that each baby under two should have exclusive breastfeeding. Second is a health reason that each mother has to feed her baby up to six months. Third is an educational reason that when the infants can grow in a healthy way, the development of their brain grows very well. Fourth is a psychological reason that exclusive breastfeeding will positively affect the personal and emotional relationship between the mother and her baby making a close and harmonious relationship amongst of them. In addition, most medical literature posits that exclusive breastfeeding will support the child’s immune system, as it is the best food endowed by Allah or God for the child’s growth. In short, by realising exclusive breastfeeding, there is insurance that each infant can grow mentally and in a healthy way. Concluding Remarks The party agenda can be viewed in two distinctive ways: structurally and functionally. The former describes the party’s involvement in the DPRD’s tool fittings. With many seats in parliament, PDIP, PAN and PKS have already contributed with different positions in the DPRD tool fittings. The more seats held by a party in the DPRD means it has more roles in various agendas related to legislation and budgeting. These three parties have proven their vital contributions structurally in legislating, budgeting and controlling. The latter describes the parties’ attitude towards local regulation drafts related to education and health issues. The attitude can be traced back to the parties’ pemandangan umum and the personal views of the party elites. The three parties have their own attitudes in responding to four issues: education system, retribution of health services, health insurance and exclusive breastfeeding. Although there are different expressions and stresses in delivering their responses, the points of view broadly are very similar and support each other. 3. 3. Concluding Remarks 177 With those ways which played by the three parties, the positive growth in education and health sectors within the municipality is plain. The municipal budget in these two sectors has grown each year. The annual budget for both sectors in was more than half the budget total. All local regulations (perda) since until were officially discussed and issued by the DPRD through consultative and deliberative ways and its tool fittings are encouraging each other as well. This development demonstrates that all political parties are fighting for people’s interests so that the party agendas are working effectively. Chapter V 178 Chapter VI Changeable Politics: Parties and the State The two preceding chapters have explained the parties’ policy and agenda in coping with education and health issues. The next two chapters will analyse the party strategy in interacting and cooperating with so-called “governance actors” within Yogyakarta Municipality. Conceptually, the party strategy could be defined as the way the party enacts its policies and agendas in interrelated ways. As explained in Chapter III, this study posits four governance actors: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society. This chapter examines the relationship between parties and the state actors in Yogyakarta Municipality consisting of the municipal government and the DPRD. Communication, according to Porter et al. ( : p. ), is a vital process in a relationship, because it is a principal medium in human interaction and cooperation. According to Scott and Mitchell ( : p. ), it links individuals or organisations from various parts and subsystems into a unified, goal-oriented and purposeful activity or organisation. In this context, communication is also a vital part of the relationship between parties and governance actors, because the communication built up by parties with such actors determines the trajectory of parties in various political events such as local elections, a coalition in the government or parliament and a compromise/consensus in particular public issues. Hence, Scott and Mitchell ( ) argued that the communication process is dynamic and should also change, to alter or to reinforce, the actions of various segments of political parties. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena This section examines the formation of political cleavage (Liddle, ; Mair, ; Randall, ; Vassallo & Wilcox, ; Ambardi, ) in 1. 179 the relationship between the three parties and the political officials, particularly with mayor and vice-mayor as well as the related municipal agencies. The analysis will cover until . The year was the first municipal government elected in post-Soeharto while the year is the end of this field research activity. During this time, the analysis will be divided into three main parts based on the municipal government period. As a brief account, the dynamics of contemporary local politics in Yogyakarta Municipality demonstrates three distinctive models of political cleavage as seen in Figure . . The process of creating cleavage could be commenced since the inception of the mayoral election. The cleavage will end in the end of the elected mayor term. These three models in three distinctive periods denote that political cleavage is fragmented into two main opposite fighters. The first block is led by PDIP and the other block is led by PAN. Each of them has their own alliances. In the meantime, PKS is not quite robust. The political ideology in the executive arena metamorphosed from the ideological approach ( – ) to the pragmatic approach ( – ) and altered again into the opportunist pragmatic-approach ( – ). In other words, this demonstrates the waning of political ideology in Indonesia. The Creation of Cleavage in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Source: compiled by the author. Figure . Chapter VI 180 Ideological Approach: 2001–2006 Based on Law No. / , the regional head is elected by the parliament; the mayoral election which took place in Yogyakarta Municipality should abide by the regulation. Therefore, the candidate was proposed by the DPRD fractions. On July th, , all six fractions submitted their own candidates. The PDIP Fraction proposed Endang Darmawan and Muhammad Wahid as the first candidates and Haryo Sasongko and Muhammad Wahid as the second candidates. Moreover, the PAN Fraction nominated Herry Zudianto and Syukri Fadholi as the first candidates and Herry Zudianto and Bambang Purwoatmodjo as the second candidates. Then, the Golkar Fraction proposed Haryo Sasongko and Muhammad Bambang Dwi Pribadi as the first candidates and Herry Zudianto and Bambang Purwoatmojo as the second candidates. Afterwards, the FPI nominated Herry Zudianto and Syukri Fadholi as the first candidates and Bambang Supijanto and Suwandono as the second candidates. Furthermore, the FKDK proposed Endang Darmawan and Muhammad Wahid as the first candidates and Herry Zudianto and Bambang Subandang as the second candidates. Meanwhile, the Military-Police Fraction did not nominate any candidate (DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, ). These data demonstrate that the first alternative candidates between the PDIP Fraction and the FKDK were the same. In the last candidacy, the PDIP Fraction together with the FKDK nominated Endang Darmawan and Muhammad Wahid. Darmawan is a retired military officer, but he is close culturally with PDIP while Wahid is a PKB legislator and the NU’s elite within the municipality. There is a twofold reason for the appearance of this pair. First is that PDIP needed a potential partner who has power to run together in the mayoral election. The FKDK is one of the potential forces within the DPRD and, at the time, Wahid was the deputy head of the DPRD. Hopefully, it would be easy for PDIP and the FKDK to influence the parliament force. Second is PDIP and PKB culturally have similar voters. Both keep a close relationship with Marhaenism devotees and abangan-Muslims. The PAN Fraction alongside with FPI nominated Herry Zudianto and Syukri Fadholi. This pair was supported by Muslim political forces, as they are structurally and culturally cadres in Muhammadiyah. 1.1. 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 181 At the time, Zudianto was the treasury of the DPW PAN in DIY while Fadholi was the vice chairperson of the DPW PPP in DIY and the former chairperson of the DPC PPP in Yogyakarta Municipality in – . Although the Military-Police Fraction officially did not nominate any candidates, it culturally supported Zudianto-Fadholi. Meanwhile, the Golkar Fraction nominated Haryo Sasongko and Muhammad Bambang Dwi Pribadi. Sasongko was the Golkar functionary and a lawyer with a good reputation. Darmawan-Wahid was nominated by two fractions: PDIP and FKDK, Zudianto-Fadholi was proposed by two fractions: PAN and FPI, and Sasongko-Pribadi was nominated only by Golkar. Meanwhile, the Military-Police had no nomination. These three pairs of candidates ran in the mayoral election within Yogyakarta Municipality. The election was held on August th, in a closed-door voting session at the secretariat of the DPRD. There were two rounds of voting in this election. In the first round, Darmawan-Wahid gained votes, Zudianto-Fadholi obtained votes and Sasongko-Pribadi had votes. No pair won the required absolute majority in the first round. Hence, a second round was held. In the second round, the first pair earned votes, the second pair received votes and the third pair had no vote. Meanwhile, vote was deemed to be invalid in the second round. The total votes were . Zudianto-Fadholi won (Risalah Rapat Paripurna Khusus DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, ). There are two main determining factors for the failure of PDIP’s candidate. First is the emergence of a wide refusal movement from the PDIP supporters for the candidacy of Darmawan as the mayor candidate from PDIP. Darmawan was deemed to have insulted Yogyakarta due to his statement in the presentation of vision and mission as the city mayor. He said that he can buy the city with his own treasury. Second is the internal conflict among PDIP elites on the candidacy of Darmawan. On the one hand, the DPC PDIP instructed its fraction to boycott the election. PDIP wanted to change Darmawan with another candidate. On the other hand, some PDIP functionaries in sub-municipalities did not agree with the DPC’s decision. Thus, PDIP within the municipality suffered a dilemma. This situation demonstrates that PDIP was not solid. It had legislators and four additional votes from Chapter VI 182 the FKDK. If they were a solid team, they would obtain the minimum votes, but, they only had votes in the second round of voting. Zudianto-Fadholi were elected as the official mayor and vice mayor for the – period at the DPRD plenary session on August th, . However, a debate and conflict among members of the DPRD took place within the session. The session led by Bahtanisyar Basyir of PDIP was followed by out of the members of the DPRD where five of the members were from PDIP. The conflict started with the request of the PDIP Fraction to the DPRD board to read the letters from society, but the PAN Fraction and the FPI rejected the PDIP’s proposal. The board also denied PDIP’s request, because such unauthorised letters were not qualified to be discussed in the session. The following interruptions during the session came from the head of the PDIP Fraction, Cindelaras Yulianto. He continuously asked the board to read the letters, but the majority of parliamentarians refused to discuss the letters. The lobby and break sessions were conducted, but the result was nothing so that five PDIP legislators who came into the session walked out of the forum including Basyir. Consequently, the board of the session was led by the vice head of the DPRD Sukardi Yani of PAN. PAN assessed that PDIP was not ready to lose. The actions conducted by the PDIP Fraction indicated that it wanted to cancel the inauguration of Zudianto-Fadholi as the elected mayor and vice mayor in the session. In this period, PAN and PK were part of the municipal government regime. They had power to influence and execute the government policies directly. Therefore, the relationship and communication between these two parties and the municipal government were very close. Meanwhile, PDIP was positioned as the opposition fighter. Conflict between PDIP and the municipal government frequently occurred in this period. There were two kinds of cases which were driving factors of the conflict. The first case is the relocation of PKL and traditional markets. This case is one of the debatable issues during the period. The municipal government attempted to rearrange and relocate a number of PKLs and traditional markets around – , particularly surrounding Malioboro Street and the Shopping Centre near the Beringharjo traditional market. Nonetheless, stakeholders rejected this government plan. The public assumed that the municipal government 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 183 would evict and expel those traders and markets from the municipality. Various demonstrations took place in city streets. PDIP was allegedly behind these actions, as some of the elites were bosses of these locations. This conflict intensified the political feud between the santri group (PAN, PK and PPP) as the municipal regime and the abangan group (PDIP) as the opposite fighter. As the vice mayor of Yogyakarta Municipality – , Syukri Fadholi (interview, Oct. ) stated that: At the time, the municipal government had a slogan “no eviction, but the arrangement and the relocation”. Several kinds of demonstrations created by the PKLs were taking place. They illustrated Pak Herry and me around as a terrifying monster. Afterwards, the longest case was the relocation of the traditional market in the area of the Shopping Centre (Now, the Taman Pintar) and PKLs throughout Malioboro Street. The opposite party was PDIP. It was a long process to handle these cases because it involved lots of stakeholders, primarily military and gali (gangsters). Even Pak Herry and I were brought to the court by the boss of the Shopping Centre, Ginggin (Onggo Hartono). Nonetheless, we eventually won. The conflict warmed up at the higher level when the municipal government planned to close social illness spots. The social illness spots can be defined as any location used for activities related to nightclubs, discotheques, casinos, drug trade and prostitution. They were rampant within the municipality since the s until the early s so that, by , the municipal government issued the Mayoral Regulation (Perwal) of Yogyakarta Municipality No. / on Closing of Nightclubs and Casinos to reduce this concern. After issuing the Perwal, the municipal government created a task-force to control this regulation in society. This team performed effectively and a number of those locations were closed. Numerous people, particularly entrepreneurs and employees, protested and rejected the regulation and the team actions, even demonstrating in the streets. They strongly insisted that the municipal government revoke the regulation as people who worked in those locations were unemployed. In the parliament, PDIP was the sole fighter in denying the closure of locations and its fraction walked out of the session due to the disagreement to discuss this issue. In addition, PDIP allegedly supported those demonstrations and mobilised the people to refuse the closing, because lots of PDIP functionaries also obtained income from those locations. On the other Chapter VI 184 hand, to balance the rejections, Muslim political forces from any society within the municipality conducted a similar demonstration in the streets. They encouraged the mayoral regulation and the team actions to make Yogyakarta a better city than before. PAN, PPP and PK, of course, were part of the actions to ensure that the municipal government can control the regulation in society. About this business, Syukri Fadholi (interview, Oct. ) shared his experience: Thousands of labourers of the nightclubs protested against me regarding this policy. Nevertheless, almost all Islamic organisations in the municipality supported me, as I definitely cannot address this issue alone. PDIP, indeed, was the rival to us, because it relates to their main income. It doesn’t matter for the municipal government. Consequently, PDIP frequently hampered the municipal government programmes and even threatened us. In the DPRD, PDIP seemed to be the opposite fighter with this municipal government policy, as Pak Herry and I witnessed its views in each plenary session. Although PDIP and the municipal government where PAN, PPP and PKS were confronting each other in those two debatable issues as elaborated above, the confrontation could be controlled and managed. The municipal government attempted to apply a soft strategy to solve the conflict among stakeholders. As a businessman, Zudianto continuously communicated to all parties within the municipality so that the political conflict seemed not to be extreme. The problems were solved one by one. Although Zudianto (interview, Oct. ) applied a soft strategy to address this conflict, Fadholi employed a hard and stiff strategy to deal with the PDIP raid. Given Zudianto’s approach, the relationship between the mayor and the vice mayor seemed disharmonious. The less harmonious relationship among of them was strengthened by the following fact: in , Zudianto planned to provide the DPT for the – legislators, but Fadholi did not agree with this plan. According to Fadholi (interview, Oct. ), the DPT is not part of the municipal government budget and violates the regulation. In the following years, this case caused the arrest of some municipal legislators . Sixteen former – legislators were sentenced as prisoners between two and five years. During this period, PAN and PK interacted and collaborated with the municipal government agencies either formally or informally. Every barrier and problem from society could be communicated directly 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 185 to the appropriate agencies. Meanwhile, PDIP experienced difficulty in collaborating with the agencies, because the conflict between PDIP and the municipal government started in the mayoral candidacy. A lot of public policies were criticised and rejected by PDIP as elaborated earlier. The political cleavage between the santri coalition represented by PAN and the FPI and the abangan coalition represented by PDIP and the FKDK illustrates the ideological contest in the executive arena. Pragmatic Approach: 2006–2011 This was the first time people in Yogyakarta Municipality chose their local leaders in Indonesia’s post-New Order regime; in the preceding period the mayor and vice mayor were elected by members of the parliament. In this period, there were three candidates in the mayoral election (pilwalkot). The first coalition was led by PAN. The majority of Muslim political forces within the municipality supported the incumbents Herry Zudianto and Syukri Fadholi to run in the mayoral election, even Amien Rais strongly supported them. Fadholi agreed to be the vice candidate for Zudianto, but Zudianto refused it. There is a twofold reason for the disagreement over Zudianto. First is the preceding experience that Zudianto personally suffered some internal conflicts and discrepancies with Fadholi. He did not want the conflict to hamper the development within the municipality in the next period. Second is the external factor: the pressure of business groups on Zudianto to not approve Fadholi as his running mate. This was attributed to closing some nightclubs, discotheques, casinos and the like. In addition, if Fadholi ran as the vice candidate of Zudianto in and in turn the pair won the election, there was a big chance for Fadholi to run as the mayor candidate in . Consequently, PAN would be unlikely to gain the top position in the election. Hence, Fadholi was not approved as Zudianto’s vice by this coalition and PPP eventually left the coalition. In the same vein, PKS also left this coalition. Golkar made a coalition with PAN creating the KRJ-Coalition. This coalition then selected alternatives for the position of vice mayor. The potential candidates were Achmad Charis Zubair, Gideon 1.2. Chapter VI 186 Hartono, Haryadi Suyuti, Haryawan Emir Nuswantoro, Munajat and Henry Subiakto. Nonetheless, this coalition preferred Haryadi Suyuti. Suyuti was considered to have lots of experiences in management and technical issues with the hope that Suyuti would assist Zudianto in accelerating municipal development and governance. In addition to being a Golkar cadre, Suyuti also comes from the Muhammadiyah family. It strengthened the support of the Muhammadiyah network. The coalition nominated Zudianto-Suyuti. Other support was coming from the KPM-Coalition consisting of some parties with no seats in parliament. They were the Marhaenism Party, the Pelopor Party, PNBK, PPD, PKPI, PBSD, PDS and the Pancasila Patriots’ Party. The unification between the KRJ-Coalition and the KPM-Coalition created the Work- Coalition (Koalisi Kerja). The second coalition was led by PDIP. This party for the first time nominated Muhammad Nurcahyo R. Honggowongso as its mayor candidate. Meanwhile, the vice mayor candidate was Syukri Fadholi. It is an interesting decision made by PDIP which approved Fadholi of PPP to join the coalition, as PDIP and PPP within the municipality never ever can be united due to the different ideology among of them. There are two main reasons for this coalition. First is the disapproval of Fadholi as the vice mayor candidate in the KRJ-Coalition. Second is a pragmatic approach that the figure of Fadholi as Muslim representation has the power to attract voters from santri communities to likely strengthen the coalition. The support of this coalition also came from PKS, because the party had already decided to separate itself from the KRJ-Coalition and preferred to support the Fadholi candidacy. However, the concealed internal conflict was suffered by PDIP due to its coalition with PPP. It seems that PDIP did not totally support this pair. When the pair Honggowongso-Fadholi registered with the KPUD, they did not fulfill the administrative qualification. The vague situation within PDIP made the KPUD afraid when the mayoral election could not be realised as was scheduled due to having merely one candidate. Based on Law No. / in the Regional Government, the local election could not be executed with only one candidate. Therefore, PDIP decided to replace the candidacy of Honggowongso with Widharto. Honggowongso is a businessman and seemingly wanted to focus on his business career and preferred avoiding the political stage. Mean- 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 187 while, Widharto had an academic background from UGM. Furthermore, this coalition also wanted to demonstrate to the public that the abangan group can integrate itself with the santri group which had never happened previously within the municipality. The coalition which labelled itself as the KMP-Coalition consisted of PDIP, PPP and PKS. Outside those two mainstream coalitions, there was the KJB- Coalition led by the Democrat Party. This coalition was supported by some parties such as the Democrat, PBB, PBR, the Merdeka Party, PKPB, PPDI, PSI-Union Party and PKB. Outside the Democrat, other parties were non-parliament parties. This coalition planned to nominate the pair Endang Darmawan and F. Setya Wibrata as its mayor and vice mayor candidate. Darmawan was the candidate who ran in the earlier election in while Wibrata was a politician of the Democrat Party. In fact, there were two factions within the Democrats at the time. The first faction was the Democrat under the chairperson of Mirwan who supported Zudianto-Suyuti. The second faction was the Democrat under the chairperson of Wibrata who supported Darmawan-Wibrata. The first faction was admitted by the central board of the Democrat while the second faction was illegitimate. Nevertheless, this coalition never registered its candidate with the KPUD due to the internal conflict and united itself with the KRJ-Coalition. Thus, the mayoral election eventually had two registered candidates. The first pair was Zudianto-Suyuti nominated by the KRJ-Coalition consisting of PAN, Golkar and the Democrat as well as some parties within the KPM- Coalition. The second pair was Widharto-Fadholi proposed by the KMP-Coalition encompassing PDIP, PPP and PKS. The pilwalkot was conducted on November th, . According to the KPUD Kota Yogyakarta ( ), there were , permanent voters encompassing , males and , females with polling stations (TPS). The voters who participated in the election and came to the TPS were merely . percent ( , voters). . percent ( , voters) did not use their rights. These data implied that the people’s participation in the election was quite bad because the percentage was almost under fifty percent. The valid votes were , or . percent while the invalid votes were , or . percent. Widharto-Fadholi obtained , votes or . percent Chapter VI 188 while Zudianto-Suyuti earned , votes or . percent. Zudianto-Suyuti was decided by the KPUD through a plenary session on November th, as the elected mayor and vice mayor of Yogyakarta Municipality. It was a second time for Zudianto as the municipal mayor with a different partner. Nevertheless, the Tim Sukses (Success Team) of Widharto-Fadholi rejected the decision, as they argued that Zudianto-Suyuti carried out political abuses during the campaign period such as money politics and wearing the candidate attributes in surrounding polling stations. The KMP-Coalition team left the session as a protest and did not admit the KPUD’s decision. The inauguration of the elected candidate was held on December th, . In this period, Zudianto succeeded in building communication with all political parties, including the parliament. Signs of progress were made by him and dozens of awards were earned by the municipal government under his regime. Consequently, it affected the emergence of the central figure of Zudianto inside the municipality. He had an ability to control and influence all municipal stakeholders. Although different views still existed and that is normal, the conflict did not look too conspicuous compared to the preceding period. After the first three years Zudianto (interview, Oct. ) ruled the municipality since , he plunged directly into society, communicated and discussed with them any topics each Tuesday and Friday between . am and . am or before going to the town hall and doing official activities. Society could communicate with him by phone and other social media like Facebook. He also read daily newspapers to find out recent circumstances and discussed with all kinds of media weekly to inform them of the real situation. In short, he preferred to listen to society. Hence, percent of the ideas made by Zudianto (interview, Oct. ) originated from society’s aspirations and complaints. For instance, in the case of the relocation of some traditional markets in Beringharjo in and in Ngasem later, it was not an easy process for him to convince society because a change in life is feared by any people. Based on these considerations, he attempted to position himself as they are, as a toiler, as a street vendor and so on. Therefore, Zudianto (interview, Oct. ) believed that the reason people hold different positions is not because they reject his statements, but lack information. 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 189 Furthermore, PDIP and PKS admitted that their relationship with the second Zudianto’s regime was better. Although these two parties were not part of the regime, Zudianto frequently received proposals and suggestions from them and even involved them in many municipal issues. Dwi Budi Utomo (interview, Sept. ), the chairperson of the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality – and the vice head II of the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – , and Sujarnoko (interview, Oct. ), the chairperson of the DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality – , confirmed that the leadership and communication made by Zudianto in this period were generally quite good, especially in physical affairs such as tamanisasi, the city cleanliness and garbage issues. In particular, Sujarnoko (interview, Oct. ) stated that: He (Zudianto) always says to us that he is not the city mayor, but the head of service. It is in line with our platform. Both of us knew our own duties. The jobs and functions are clear and so on. Our communication continued until the end of his period. The successful leadership by Zudianto (interview, Oct. ) can be attributed to four main principles which he believed. First, the leader should have a vision, as the leader can influence and inspire others, not merely to obtain a position. Second, the leader is not arrogant, but should hear more and more. Third, the leader is not allowed to be afraid of taking a decision. Fourth, the leader is exemplary in real life so that be a good exemplar for people. According to Zudianto (interview, Oct. ), people prefer to adhere to regulation due to being disinclined and shy not because of truly obeying the rule. Moreover, Zudianto (interview, Oct. ) stated: I didn’t know my principle would be approved or not, I have a principle: I should feel to possess all and be possessed by all. Although I was supported by parties and it is, of course, in line with the regulation, but, after the election, I must possess all parties and be possessed by all parties also. Zudianto’s attitude indicates minimising the party’s role in his performance and convincing other parties to develop the municipality. This can be seen with various informal and cultural meetings between Zudianto and all parties outside the regime coalition. He argued that as the party which nominated him, PAN should prepare itself to lose him. Nevertheless, Zudianto believed that a successful leader can involve all Chapter VI 190 of society and regulation transforms itself into a social movement and the programme transforms itself into values amongst society. Thus, he seemed to adopt depoliticisation during his second period. The most important thing is, according to Zudianto (interview, Oct. ), earning a lot of achievements and doing everything without any personal interests. Most people acknowledged the successfulness of Zudianto in leading the municipal administration for a decade. In addition, during this period PAN had nine seats in the parliament and was quite balanced with eleven seats for PDIP. The head of the DPRD in – also came from the PAN cadre, Arif Noor Hartanto. Hence, this period could be called the golden epoch of PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality. It succeeded in reaching out to both sides, legislative and executive, in the same period. This situation strengthened the regime to accelerate municipal development. Regarding the relationship between the three parties and the municipal government agencies, there is no distance amongst of them. If PDIP, PAN and PKS received society complaints or did not concur with certain policies which were decided by the agencies, they can talk and call the agencies directly to solve the problems. According to Syamsury, the head of the Education Agency in Yogyakarta Municipality in – (interview, Oct. ), almost all political parties communicated with him directly whether by phone or direct meetings. The cooperation carried out by these two different institutions, the Education Agency and political parties, related to addressing education issues was quite supportive and mutual. Therefore, Syamsury (interview, Oct. ) confirmed: Nonetheless, when those politicians assisted us (the Agency), they have other missions behind their hospitality. In fact, PAN and PKS prefer to struggle for budgeting orientations and insist on compelling us to provide the subsidy for schools. The former tends to struggle for the Muhammadiyah schools and the latter tends to struggle for the IT schools. In the meantime, PDIP prefers to struggle for individual interests from society. PAN and PKS tend to struggle for institutional orientations while PDIP prefers to struggle for personal interests. PAN and PKS have a close bond with particular private schools. The former is close to the Muhammadiyah institutions while the latter is close to IT institutions. Meanwhile, PDIP has no sturdy tie with private schools, although 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 191 some elites and legislators have a special relation with Catholic and Protestant institutions inside the municipality. Thus, during this period, each political party represented their own communities for a particular interest, a particular issue, a particular policy or a particular budget. During this period, since the candidate proposed by PPP and PKS was not approved by PAN, they eventually united themselves into the opposition, PDIP. They realised that they were not strong parties so the best choice was merging themselves with the existing fighter. This clash indicated that political competition was rooted in a pragmatic orientation. The cleavage was based on the likes and dislikes amongst them and there were no ideological considerations. Pragmatic-Opportunist Approach: 2011–2015 In this period, Zudianto no longer had a chance to run in the mayoral election, as he had already led the municipality for two periods. Hence, it was an open competition for all candidates. There were three coalitions in the mayoral election. First is the coalition led by PDIP. PDIP wanted to nominate Imam Priyono D. Putranto as its mayor candidate. Putranto at the time was the president director of the PDAM Tamantirta, one of the BUMDs in Yogyakarta Municipality. Nevertheless, some elites of the party preferred another candidate, because Putranto was considered not famous enough for the Yogyakarta people. Moreover, Haryadi Suyuti finally was selected as the mayor candidate nominated by PDIP and Putranto was the vice mayor candidate. There is a threefold reason why PDIP decided to choose Suyuti despite being a Golkar cadre. Firstly, Suyuti is more famous than Putranto, as Suyuti was the existing vice mayor at the time. Secondly, there was no fixed party which fully nominated Suyuti, because Golkar suffered an internal conflict related to the candidacy of Suyuti. Therefore, there was a good chance for PDIP to nominate Suyuti. Thirdly, Suyuti came from the Muhammadiyah family, which can strengthen the candidate figure and attract voters from Muhammadiyah, as this organisation is one of the influential political forces within the municipality. 1.3. Chapter VI 192 The decision to nominate Suyuti as the mayor candidate did not come from the DPC PDIP within the municipality, but it was an elite decision pressed and forced mainly by the DPP PDIP in Jakarta and the DPD PDIP in DIY. In the meantime, the decision to nominate Putranto as the vice mayor candidate was established in the Rakercabsus on August th, . Furthermore, this pair could be called HATI, an acronym from Haryadi Suyuti-Imam Priyono. Outside this party, support was coming from Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, the governor of DIY. There is a twofold reason why Sri Sultan supported this candidate. First is that Suyuti is the Golkar cadre. Second is a close relationship between Sri Sultan and Idham Samawi, the chairperson of the DPD PDIP in DIY at the time. In addition, other support came from some Muhammadiyah followers who were hurt and disappointed with Amien Rais. Thus, HATI, in general, was nominated, particularly by PDIP and Golkar, as a symbol of the Old Order and the New Order regimes. The second coalition was led by PAN. This party for the first time had five alternative candidates. They were Immawan Wahyudi (the chairperson of the DPW PAN in DIY), Ahmad Hanafi Rais (the first son of Amien Rais), Arif Noor Hartanto (the provincial legislator in DIY), Latifah Iskandar (the former national legislator) and Dyah Suminar (businesswoman and the wife of Zudianto). Although Suyuti was nominated by PAN as the vice mayor candidate in the mayoral election, he was not in . This was due to the poor performance in the preceding period. On December th, , the Third Musda of PAN eventually decided to nominate Ahmad Hanafi Rais as the mayor candidate. PAN attempted to communicate with other parties. Meanwhile, the vice mayor candidate was Tri Harjun Ismaji, the former provincial Sekda in DIY. This pair was a combination between young and old generations and was called FITRI, an acronym from Hanafi- Tri Harjun. Many parties joined this coalition. They were nationalist-Muslim parties such as PAN and PKB and nationalist-Islamist parties like PPP, PBB and PKNU. The rest were nationalist-secular parties: Gerindra, the Democrat, PKPI, PDK, PPPI, PDP, PPRN and PDS. Hence, the coalition can be called the “Rainbow Coalition”. Amien Rais, the founder of PAN and the father of Hanafi Rais, did, of course, fully sup- 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 193 port his son in this pilwalkot. Other support came from Herry Zudianto and Gandung Pardiman. Although Zudianto had already declared supporting Suyuti earlier, he changed his decision and, in turn, supported the pair FITRI. Afterwards, Pardiman, the chairperson of the DPD Golkar in DIY – , also encouraged this candidate, although his party at the municipal level officially supported the pair for HATI. FITRI was nominated by the reformation force because all parties which supported this candidate were established after the downfall of Soeharto in except PPP. Some leading parties could be represented as the symbol of reformation forces: PAN, Democrat, Gerindra and PKB. The third coalition was led by PKS. This coalition had a pair of candidates, namely Muhammad Zuhrif Hudaya and Aulia Reza Bastian as the mayor and vice mayor respectively. Hudaya was the PKS’ politician while Bastian was the NGO activist who later involved himself as a politician in the Nasdem Party. Outside PKS, support was coming from some parties: the Hanura Party, PKDI, the Republican Party and PKPB. One of the reasons for the emergence of this coalition was caused by the PDIP decision which rejected PKS from joining with its coalition due to the failure in the preceding mayoral election. Although PKS seems to unite itself with the FITRI, it is unlikely because of the concealed conflict between PAN and PKS. Some sources stated that PKS asked for the money to the FITRI with the nominal around two or three billions of IDR as “the political contract”, but the request was not fulfilled so PKS had its own candidate. In addition, numerous views testified that this pair seemed to break the FITRI’s vote, because this candidate also gained votes, particularly from Muhammadiyah followers. Meanwhile, some elites of the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality confirmed that this accusation was not true. The mayoral election was held on September th, with , permanent voters consisting of , males and , females and polling stations (TPS). Based on the data from KPUD Kota Yogyakarta ( ), there were , voters or . percent while , did not vote or . percent. It was better than the earlier election. In the meantime, the valid votes were , . Hudaya- Bastian had , votes or . percent, FITRI had , votes or . percent and HATI had , votes or . percent. On Chapter VI 194 September th, , the KPUD Kota Yogyakarta ( ) decided Suyuti-Putranto was the official elected mayor and vice mayor for the – period. Political competition in was the Old and New Orders vis-a-vis the Reformation Order. Although PDIP was part of the regime, its relationship with the elected mayor was not as good as with the earlier mayor. Meanwhile, the role of Putranto was restricted by his rights and duties. This can be seen in the case of licences for building hotels. Under the Suyuti leadership, the municipal government allowed the establishment of various hotels within the municipality and numerous stakeholders complained about this matter. Meanwhile, PDIP did not agree and criticised the government policy. As stated by Sutaryo (interview, Sept. ) of PDIP, although the investment was important for the municipal development, the existence of hotels would upset and harm ecosystems surrounding society. He mentioned some effects of the foundation of those hotels. First is the emergence of deep wells which affect the wells owned by society where the water permeation will be sucked by the hotel’s wells. Second is the unhealthy air circulation amongst society surrounding the hotels. Third is that houses located behind the western side of hotels will not receive the light of the sun each morning. Fourth is the television display owned by society surrounding the hotels will be in the poor status. Sutaryo (interview, Sept. ) added: All of these problems have already been discussed by our party and also the PDIP Fraction in the DPRD. Likewise, PAN critically assessed this policy as well. This party believed that the policy to allow the establishment of hotels will harm the societal environment. Economically speaking, the establishment of those hotels would close down older hotels. Moreover, the party also argued that the Suyuti leadership seemingly did not have an obvious vision. There was no new breakthrough nor was a spectacular policy made and formulated like in the preceding government. Although lots of proposals from the municipal agencies and bodies or public elements were received by Suyuti, none of them were executed. Therefore, this period was slow, even decreasing. In other words, this period could be called “The autopilot for the municipality without a mayor”. As the opposing fighter, PAN indeed frequently criticised what the municipal 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 195 government did. PAN within the municipality through its chairperson strongly criticised the corruption cases involving executive agencies such as providing financial support of approximately six billion IDR for the KONI and the case of procurement of health tools at the RSUD Wirosaban. It is a normal attitude because this period was not as good as when PAN controlled the municipal government in the preceding period. Thus, PAN in this period seemed to keep a distance from the municipal government. Meanwhile, PKS institutionally was positioned as the opposing fighter. The relationship between this party and the elected municipal government occurred in formal meetings rather than in informal talks. However, according to Muhammad Syafi’i (interview, Nov. ) of PKS, his party was always open to ideas related to the municipal development. Although most elites of PKS have no close relationship with the mayor, particular elites have a special connection because of the effect of the election such as Zuhrif Hudaya. Hudaya himself claimed that each leader has his/her own strengths and weaknesses. According to Hudaya (interview, Oct. ), Suyuti’s strength was realising the infrastructure development in kelurahans, RWs and RTs while Zudianto’s strength was realising street lighting, relocating and renovating bus stations, founding the Taman Pintar and the tamanisasi movement: I was the former head of RT for two periods, the former head of RW for two periods. So, I really like this period (the Suyuti regime) which not occurred in the Zudianto regime. It is my personal opinion so that if you ask me, which one I prefer to choose? Indeed, I prefer to close and communicate easily with Suyuti. Both regimes had their own stresses. However, Hudaya liked Suyuti’s style. Regarding the weaknesses of both regimes, Hudaya (interview, Oct. ) said that it depends on personal opinions; he stated it is a positive act made by Suyuti, other people possibly say a negative one, and vice versa. For instance, most people said that it was difficult to meet with Suyuti, but Hudaya (interview, Oct. ) confirmed that he could contact the mayor any time he wants. In the case of the establishment of various hotels inside the municipality during the Suyuti regime, Hudaya encouraged the policy in giving a licence for the establishment of hotels. He argued that the establishment of hotels was Chapter VI 196 more beneficial rather than the foundation of malls and modern supermarkets like Alfamart and Indomart. He added that the hotel tax belongs to the municipal government and the hotel foods are made from local products while the tax on malls belongs to the central government and the mall’s foods are taken from numerous factories outside the municipality. The closeness between Hudaya and Suyuti was strengthened with the application of Hudaya’s ideas into government projects, such as the project of Jogja Cyber Village. Early on in his leadership, Suyuti created a poor impression, mainly among Muslim communities in where he ignored them. For instance, he avoided the invitation of a certain Muslim community and attended a non-Muslim activity instead. Moreover, the financial support for Muslim organisations in this period was reduced by the municipal government. Due to the support of PDIP, he had close ties with non-Muslim constituents. Nevertheless, approaching the end of his regime, Suyuti seemed to come close to the Muslim community. It can be seen when he involved himself in the case of horizontal conflict between the SMP Muhammadiyah Karangkajen and the society surrounding the school in early January . There is a twofold reason why Suyuti stood up for the Muhammadiyah school. First is the disharmony between Suyuti and Putranto. Second is he needed the political support of Muhammadiyah for the upcoming mayoral election. The concealed conflict between Suyuti and Putranto is caused for three reasons. First is that Suyuti frequently has different policies with PDIP while Putranto has no more authority to involve himself in those policies which are part of Suyuti’s responsibility. Second is poor communication among of them causing slow development of the municipality. There were no sparkling achievements in this period, except the establishment of a new public hospital namely the Pratama Hospital. Third is that each of them seems to consolidate himself to run in the upcoming election. Suyuti himself tends to be close with Golkar while Putranto is supported by PDIP. Thus, neither PAN nor PDIP and PKS has a good communication with the municipal mayor. In particular, PDIP has a close relationship merely with Putranto as he is the party’s cadre. PDIP and PKS seemed to be in a vague situation. On the one hand, they criticised the government policy, but, on the other hand, 1. The Creation of Cleavage: Parties in the Administration Arena 197 they approached it. PAN is the party which has an obvious position as the opposition fighter in dealing with the municipal government. In , the conflict between Suyuti and Putranto continued to break their partnership when each of them eventually ran for the mayoral election. There are two pairs of candidate who will compete in the election. The first pair is Haryadi Suyuti and Heroe Poerwadi, nominated by six main parties: Golkar, PAN, Gerindra, PKS, PPP and the Democrat Party. The second pair is Imam Priyono and Achmad Fadli, proposed by at least three parties: PDIP, Nasdem and PKB. According to Al-Hamdi ( ), the existence of PAN, PKS and PPP in one coalition under the umbrella of “Koalisi Jogja Berkemajuan” (Progressive Jogja Coalition) could represent the santri coalition which contends the PDIP’s abangan coalition. The inability of PAN in nominating its own cadre as the mayor candidate is caused by real facts, where Muhammad Ali Fahmi (interview by Whatsapp, Oct. ) confirmed that PAN has only five seats in the DPRD. To propose a candidate, his party would need a minimum of eight seats so that the coalition with the incumbent candidate is a plausible choice. It was also admitted by Muhammad Syafi’i (interview by Whatsapp, Oct. ) of PKS that Haryadi-Heroe was the lucky choice for his party. Although PKS initially will nominate its own pair of candidates, there is no chance to win and, as a matter of fact, the vote base of Muhammadiyah will rupture like in the election. The absence of communication between PDIP and PKS is also a robust factor which prevents these two parties from being in the same coalition. Regarding the relationship between the three parties and the Education Agency, both have a normal relationship with their own unique approaches. According to Budi Santosa Asrori (interview, Sept. ), the secretary of the Education Agency in Yogyakarta Municipality – , when PDIP communicates with him, this party tends to articulate societal interests, mainly their constituents’ aspirations related to expenses such as tuition fees. Meanwhile, PAN and PKS focus on school operating budgets. If PDIP articulates individual interests, PAN and PKS express institutional interests. Therefore, PDIP, PAN and PKS focus on their own group’s interests. This period indicates that parties do not merely have pragmatic orientations, but also opportunistic considerations. Each party has a Chapter VI 198 vigorous ambition to take a chance and position in controlling the municipal government through the pilwalkot. After PAN and PDIP selected their own candidates, PKS decided to nominate its own candidate. PKS seeks to win the election and rule the municipal government. This is a definite model for the pragmatic-opportunist approach. Relying on Issues: Parties in the Legislative Arena In addition to having the tool fittings, the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality has fractions (fraksi) where they group parliament members based on political forces as the result of the election. Hence, each period of the DPRD has different fractions. Nevertheless, not all political parties which obtain parliamentary seats can create their own fractions if they cannot reach the minimum required three seats. Consequently, parties with fewer than three seats should create a new fraction with other parties or unite with existing fractions. Although there are nine parties which gained parliamentary seats in , the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality between and had five party-based fractions and one military-police fraction. In – , it had five fractions from six parties which gained seats. In – , it still had five fractions from seven successful parties. In – , it had six fractions from eight successful parties. PDIP and PAN continuously created their own fractions during four election cycles of the DPRD period as they gained the minimum requirement. Meanwhile, PKS created its own fraction in the three last periods. Due to gaining merely one seat in , PKS would not create a fraction and, in turn, united with the FPI, PPP and PBB. This section will analyse the internal and external relationships. Internal explains the relationship between the three parties and their own fraction in the DPRD. External portrays the partnership amongst the party’s fractions in the DPRD. 2. 2. Relying on Issues: Parties in the Legislative Arena 199 Party and its Fraction: Seemed Solid with a Tiny Clash Broadly speaking, a fraction in the DPRD represents the party’s existence in the legislative function, as its legislators are proposed and nominated by the party when they run as legislative candidates in the election. Therefore, this sub-section analyses the relationship between PDIP, PAN and PKS and their own fractions. PDIP. After the internal clash during the s between two mainstream blocks, Megawati vis-a-vis Soerjadi, this party became the solid party in Yogyakarta Municipality. The legislative candidates were definitely people with strong loyalty and commitment to the Megawati leadership. Likewise, the party threw out people who part of the Soerjadi supporters and did not accept them as the PDIP’s legislative candidates. In – , the PDIP Fraction was led by Cinde Laras Yulianto while the DPC PDIP was led by TH Sumarjono ( – ) and Andre Sugiantoro ( – ). Both Sumarjono and Yulianto are Megawati loyalists making it easy for them to coordinate with one another. At the time, Sumarjono was also one of the PDIP elected legislators and Bahtanisyar Basyir, the secretary of the DPC PDIP, was appointed as the head of the DPRD. They were a great team in the DPRD. The solidity of the party in – was not as vigorous as before. During this time, the party was led by Irianto Cahyo Gunadi while the fraction was led by Suwarto. Despite being the ruling party in the municipal legislative election, PDIP had no ability to gain the position of the DPRD head. This position was earned by the PAN legislator. In the meantime, the PDIP representative, Andrie Subiantoro, became deputy head I of the DPRD, first, because the regulation stated that the ruling party was not automatically the head of the municipal parliament and second, the party seats in the parliament dropped from in to in . Based on this, PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality consolidated and evaluated its performance to employ the strategy where the fraction head should be the chairperson of the DPC. This can be illustrated with the existence of Sujarnoko as the head of the PDIP Fraction in – and also elected as the chairperson of the DPC PDIP in – . In the same vein, Danang Rudiyatmoko is the head of the PDIP Fraction for the period of – and was elected as the par- 2.1. Chapter VI 200 ty chairperson in – as well. It seems to control the balance between the party and the fraction and to ensure that there is no internal conflict among them so that each problem in the party or the fraction can be coordinated and handled by the same person. Besides, to support its solidness, the party has a so-called “meeting of three pillars” containing structural functionaries, the party’s legislators and the party’s cadres holding a political office. This forum could be used to communicate any problems and complaints among these three pillars. PAN. After its establishment in within Yogyakarta Municipality, this party was also a solid party. The national figure of Amien Rais was living close to this municipality and by the reformation values embedded within the party. Thus, politicians who joined the party in the municipality were people who came from moderate urban society, particularly the Muhammadiyah linkage. In – , the head of the PAN Fraction was Herman Isdarmadi while the chairperson of the party was Bachrun Nawawi ( – ) and Sukardi Yani ( – ). These three PAN elites originated from the Muhammadiyah environment, and, in particular, Yani at the time was the deputy head of the DPRD making it easy for them to coordinate with one another. In – , the solidity of the party in general increased. The party retained its seats in the parliament with nine seats in – and – . It was strengthened by the fact that the party could reach the top position of the DPRD as represented by Arif Noor Hartanto, a PAN young legislator. Nonetheless, a few clashes can be found in this party. At the time, the party chairperson was Muhammad Sofyan and the PAN Fraction head was Awang Nuryanto. The PAN Fraction in certain cases made its decision without a consultation with the party so that the fraction’s decision occasionally was not in line with the party policy. The party had no more power in influencing the fraction decision, particularly related to parliamentary issues. For instance, the party decided the persons who would gain the position within the DPRD tool fittings, but the fraction altered the composition of the tool fittings because of political situations without any consultation with the party. Hence, the party evaluated this problem and in turn tried to find the solution. The top leader of the DPD PAN and the head of the PAN Fraction during the next two periods were led by the same person. 2. Relying on Issues: Parties in the Legislative Arena 201 Heroe Poerwadi led the party for – and – while Rifki Listianto led the fraction for – and – where Listianto currently is the secretary of the DPD PAN for – . It is easy for Poerwadi and Listianto to communicate and coordinate with one another. This fact demonstrates that the party tends to maintain political stability within the party and to increase itself in the following political contests, whether in the mayoral or municipal legislative elections. To encourage this strategy, the party has been holding a weekly meeting with its fraction to report and inform on current circumstances. If the party and its fraction need a deep analysis on particular issues, the party will invite external experts or related municipal agencies to solve the issue/policy. PKS. At the outset of Indonesian democratisation after the tragedy, PK in Yogyakarta Municipality was a weak party. It had only one seat in the municipal parliament – so that alongside with PPP and PBB, it created a new fraction: the FPI. Although PPP had two seats within the fraction, PK was the head of the fraction. Nevertheless, PK could not intervene the fraction deeply meaning many decisions were made via compromises among the members of the fraction. The national trend of PKS in the election affected the existence of this party in Yogyakarta Municipality where its seats increased drastically from one seat in to five seats in . Between – , the party created its own fraction with Zuhrif Hudaya as the head. At the time, there were three replacements of the chairperson within the party. They were Muhammad Rosyidi ( – ), M. Idham Ananta ( – ) and Muhammad Rosyidi ( – ). Although the party experienced many leadership changes, the coordination among these elites was managed in a good way meaning no crucial conflict between the party and its fraction. In – , the head of the fraction was still led by Hudaya while the party chairpersons during this period were Ardianto ( – ) and Muhammad Syafi’i ( – ). They still had an ability to maintain the organisational rule so that the party elites and the fraction head had similar views on each issue. Its solidness was reinforced by the fact that Muhammad Syafi’i was re-established as the top chairperson for the period – and Nasrul Khoiri, the head of the Chapter VI 202 PKS Fraction in – , was appointed as the secretary of the DPD PKS Yogyakarta Municipality for the same period. They can coordinate easily every time and everywhere. Among Fractions: Occasionally Thawing and Freezing The interaction amongst the DPRD’s fractions can be found in two kinds of meetings: formal and informal. In a formal way, the plenary sessions are where the fractions present their views on a certain issue or a certain public policy. This is a structural approach. Informally, personal discussions and talks amongst legislators occur outside the formal forum, such as relaxed direct conversations or talks via telephone. This is a cultural approach. In general, each fraction communicates with other fractions to struggle for their interests, because many agendas are decided upon in the DPRD. Therefore, all legislators will inevitably meet each other almost every day and it is not possible to avoid face to face meetings. On the one hand, the approval among fractions can be reached easily when they discuss legislators’ wages, the DPRD tool fittings and public policies (e.g., education and health issues). They are always liquefying and almost have no crucial differences in this regard even mocking fellow legislators are common. On the other hand, it is difficult to achieve final approval on the issues related directly to religion, ethnic and ideology. For instance, PDIP asked that financial support of churches in Yogyakarta Municipality be made equal with the financial support to the mosques. Meanwhile, other parties argued that the number of mosques is higher than churches so that the support has to be made based on the number of worship places. In another instance, when PKS proposed the establishment of a sharia-based public bank in Yogyakarta Municipality, PDIP, other nationalist-secular parties strongly rejected the idea. The conflicting ideas can happen on other issues, such as nightclubs and casinos. Strain can occur among political parties if they cope with these sensitive issues. After the legislative election held on April th, the national conflict between the KIH-Coalition and the KMP-Coalition had a huge effect on political situations within Yogyakarta Municipality. 2.2. 2. Relying on Issues: Parties in the Legislative Arena 203 DPRD tool fittings in this area were established on August th, . It was too late. The impact was that numerous agendas could not be decided by the DPRD. For instance, the DPRD did not discuss the revised APBD or “APBD Perubahan” while the budget plan was discussed merely around a fortnight, a brief time. It was handled by the task-force, not by the DPRD. The elected head of the DPRD, Sujarnoko (interview, Oct. ) of PDIP, confirmed that this conflict was exhausting and upsetting to all legislative duties at the time. Thus, it is likely PDIP, PAN and PKS have similar views in responding to a particular issue. In other cases, PKS and PDIP have opposite decisions. The conflicting decisions can take place among PAN- PKS versus PDIP or PDIP-PKS versus PAN or PAN-PDIP versus PKS and so on and so forth. In a different case, after the election, Gerindra decided to unite itself into the PDIP Fraction, but it did not support mayor and vice mayor candidates nominated by PDIP in the mayoral election. Gerindra, however, was still in the PDIP Fraction from – . The political situations amongst the DPRD fractions in Yogyakarta Municipality are fluid and changeable depending on the issue or interest or policy or ideology. Simply put, it could be a close friend today, but tomorrow a mortal enemy. Nevertheless, there are different strategies in communication among PDIP, PAN and PKS with other parties. PDIP generally admitted that it is easy to communicate and create a coalition with PKS rather than with other parties. PKS tends to create an alliance with the biggest fraction namely PDIP. If PDIP and PKS have a similar opinion, it is not difficult for them to invite others to join with the coalition. There is a threefold reason why PDIP and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality have a close relationship. First is a similar platform in struggling for people’s interests. If PDIP strives for the wong cilik, PKS will strive for ummah. There is an identical meaning between the wong cilik and ummah, i.e., grassroots. Second is that culturally legislators between PDIP and PKS are close with each other. Third is a pragmatic approach conducted by PKS to PDIP as the biggest fraction. It is also beneficial for PDIP, if there are other fractions which want to create a coalition to support its agendas. It can be a reciprocal relationship. However, the conflict between PDIP and PKS is still apparent. This can be seen in the mayoral election where PDIP obviously rejected forming a Chapter VI 204 coalition with PKS. There is a twofold reason. First is the failure in the mayoral election where PDIP formed a coalition with Muslim political forces, namely PKS and PPP. Second is that it is difficult for PDIP and PKS to unite themselves in the grassroots due to the distinctive ideology. Meanwhile, PAN, in general, can communicate and create a coalition with all parties. Although it is easier for PAN to collaborate with Golkar than other parties, this party also communicates with PKS and PPP. In the mayoral election, PAN already formed a coalition with PK/PKS in but not in and ; it was in the same coalition with PPP in and but not in , also in the same coalition with Golkar in but not in and . Yet, PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality never formed a coalition with PDIP. In the parliament, sometimes they are on the sime side and other times not. Party politics within the parliament depends on the issue and interest. Concluding Remarks This chapter presented the relationship between the three political parties and the state actors. The relationship begins with the creation of a coalition in the mayoral election and stops at the end of the regime period. The new coalition will begin again in the following mayoral election and so on. In Yogyakarta Municipality, there have been three political coalitions: – , – and – (see Figure . ). Each period has its own political cleavage. The political contest from to was based on the ideological approach. Hence, the political cleavage was between the Abangan-Coalition (FPDIP and FKDK) and the Santri-Coalition (FPAN and FPI). Moreover, the political contest between and was based on the pragmatic approach. The cleavage was the KMP-Coalition (PDIP, PPP and PKS) visa-vis the KRJ-Coalition (PAN and Golkar). In the meantime, the political competition from to was based on the pragmatic-opportunist approach. The cleavage took place among three main political parties: PDIP, PAN and PKS. These three models of cleavage indicate that the political ideology in the government arena is waning. 3. 3. Concluding Remarks 205 Furthermore, the relationship between parties and the legislative actors begins after the legislative election and discontinues at the end of the DPRD period. There are two kinds of relationships between parties and the legislature. First is the relationship between parties and their own fraction in the DPRD. Second is the relationship amongst the DPRD fractions. In Yogyakarta Municipality, there have been four periods of the parliament: – , – , – and – . In PDIP, the relationship between the party and its fraction seemed solid despite some conflicts, mainly in – . A solid relationship also took place within PAN and PKS, although a small clash was suffered by PAN, primarily in the period of – . Regarding the relationship among fractions within the parliament, it depends on the issue or interest. On the one hand, the situation will tend to liquefy if they discuss issues related to public policies and parliamentary affairs, such as wages and the parliament tool fittings. On the other hand, the circumstances will become extreme clashes if they deal with religion, ethnicity and ideology. To sum up, the way parties interact and communicate with the state actors indicates that the development of the party politics in Indonesia’s post-New Order in Yogyakarta Municipality follows the model of changeable politics. Therefore, changeability is a feature embedded in Indonesian political praxis. In the context of this study, the political ideology in the power arena is inactive or blunt. Nonetheless, is such a feature also occurring in the relationship between parties and society? The following chapter will examine how parties interact with the society group consisting of civil society and economic society. Chapter VI 206 Chapter VII The Resurgence of Ideology: Parties and Society The prior chapter analysed the parties’ strategy in interacting and communicating with the state actors represented by the municipal government and the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality. As part of the interrelated analysis, this chapter explores the parties’ strategy in interrelating and communicating with two other governance actors: civil society and economic society. This study calls these two actors the society group because their existence indeed represents societal interests. If civil society tends to strive for charitable purposes, economic society struggles for commercial goals. The interests are absolutely embedded with their own agendas. This is in line with what Diamond ( : p. ) called a “parochial” and “economic” society namely inward-looking spiritual groups and business actors. In the last section, this chapter illustrates the emergence of so-called “kampung santri” inside Yogyakarta Municipality. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society In the framework of the relationship between parties and civil society, this study first and foremost postulates that ideology is still alive. Applying Poguntke’s ( : p. ) theory, civil society can be understood as affiliated organisations or independent organisations which are linked to their party on the elite level through ex officio seats of the affiliated organisation’s leadership in party executive bodies. The relationship takes place not merely in electoral events but also when parties struggle for their constituents’ aspirations, a certain issue, a certain regulation, a certain budget or a certain public opinion. That is why Mietzner ( : pp. – , ) has no doubt that parties in Indonesia have a vigorous rootedness with mass organisations including religious 1. 207 groups or what Poguntke ( ) called “collateral organisation”. As ideological representations, PDIP, PAN and PKS, in fact, cannot be disconnected from the process of their establishment. In each establishment, a party can create its own identity and ideological base. Although the development of each party can change from time to time, one thing is definite – parties cannot escape from their own history of establishment. This study furthermore argues that PDIP, PAN and PKS have their own strategy in interacting and communicating with civil and economic societies. It starts when the parties recruit cadres from their networks and affiliations. After parties collect and select the cadres, the elected cadres will be the core actors to mobilise the societal power and to attract the popular vote. Subsequently, people will make a decision to support and vote for the party based on their own preferences. Personal involvement in a particular organisation, mainly religious-based organisations, will influence the way somebody thinks. These kinds of organisations teach a set of basic paradigms, a set of core doctrines or a set of religious outlooks. The way somebody thinks will affect the way he/she acts, and when making a decision to vote for a certain party. He/she will look for and vote for the party with a similar platform and culture to one’s own social background and points of view. He/she voluntarily will promote the organisation and the political party to family members, relatives, colleagues and friends. This is in line with Mainwaring and Torcal’s ( : p. ) hypothesis that voters choose a party because it represents their ideological or programmatic preferences. This process could be called “the triangle in the creation of political forces” as pictured in Figure . . Chapter VII 208 The Creation of Political Forces Source: compiled by the author. Based on this logical framework, this study has no doubt that PDIP, PAN and PKS can revive their own political ideology when they interact and communicate with society, groups and people who have similar thoughts, ideas, objectives, customs and practices. When the relationship between parties and society are built without any barriers, it is easy for parties to create programmes and agendas. The data gathering and the respondent interviews which will be presented further, indeed, strengthen the study’s finding that parties eventually have to keep their political ideology with collateral organisations and people. With ideology, parties can attract people’s encouragements and sympathies. With ideology, mass organisations and people enthusiastically encourage their party with effort. Hence, PDIP cannot be separated from socalled Marhaenism devotees, PAN with Muhammadiyah linkages and PKS with liqo’ networks. These relationships will be explained below. Figure . 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 209 PDIP: Strengthening Marhaenism Devotees During the Old Order regime, communist and nationalist groups were the voting base in Yogyakarta Municipality. PKI and PNI were leading parties in the Yogyakarta provincial election of by obtaining approximately , and , votes respectively. Meanwhile, Masyumi and the NU Party had around , and , respectively. It is an interesting question: why are the two abangan parties, PKI and PNI, the strongest party in this area? The communist strength was greatest in areas of extreme poverty, agricultural depression and population pressure. The South Coast areas mainly are dry and generally cannot supply their own rice needs. There are three main reasons. First is the decline in communal land ownership to landlessness. Second is the increase of economic differentiation in villages. Third are the ravages caused by the Japanese occupation and particularly the Revolution, which not merely affected the severe material, economic disruption and social dislocation but also created unemployment with youths uprooted from the village life. It sharpened the class struggle in the village and provided political leaders for poor peasants and landless labourers (Feith, : pp. – ). Moreover, during the New Order regime, although Golkar was dominating the municipality, Yogyakarta people tended to be loyal to the nationalist party, PDI. Various sources revealed that PDI’s vote was higher than PPP for years from to . The proximity of Yogyakarta people to the nationalism ideology cannot be separated from the role of the Mataram Kingdom as the cultural patronage which communicates with society by applying the nationalism approach. The integration of Yogyakarta into the Republic of Indonesia in was tangible proof that the ideology of nationalism existed within the municipality prior to this republic reaching independence. The poor situation and the rampant poverty which took place in Yogyakarta in the s made PNI and PKI release people from poverty and vulnerability. Due to the long history of nationalism, it is not difficult for PDIP to interact and communicate with society. Marhaenism devotees are widespread within the municipality in institutions and individuals. Some organisations such as ABY and KSPSI prefer to communicate 1.1. Chapter VII 210 with PDIP rather than other parties because of the similarity in the way of thinking, ideas and culture. The secretary-general of ABY, Kirnadi (interview, Oct. ), confirmed that there is a twofold reason for this closeness. First is that PDIP has a concern and is familiar with labourer issues and aspirations as well as struggles for labourer interests in the legislation and budgeting. Most supporters and sympathisers of PDIP are labourers. Second is that the PDIP seats in the parliament are higher than others. Kirnadi (interview, Oct. ) said: Labourers are the grassroots of PDIP. It is more beneficial for us if we can create an alliance with the biggest fraction in the DPRD like PDIP. We often communicate with Chang Wendryanto as a quick path to deal with labour-industrialist problems. The reason is simple, we only know personally legislators who originated from PDIP. If we are also familiar personally with other legislators outside PDIP, maybe we will contact them. In the same vein, Protestant and Catholic believers acknowledge that they are closer to communicate and act together with PDIP rather than with other parties. It is driven by the fact that PDIP is more accommodative ideologically to all religions. Its functionaries and legislators consist of not merely Muslims but also Catholics and Protestants. Therefore, although this party is more accommodative with any society, in fact, only the society with similar ideas and cultures seeks to interact with this party. Regarding this relationship, Alexander Budi Suwarno (interview, Nov. ), a Catholic, delivers his personal statement: In the DPRD of Yogyakarta Municipality, Catholic legislators are available in PDIP. Relying on these legislators, Catholic aspirations are indeed delivered to them. It is because of religious sentiment. I personally prefer to be close with secular parties like PDIP and also Golkar rather than other religious parties. They are more accommodative with us due to applying Pancasila. In contrast, it is difficult for Catholics to join with religious parties as their affiliation is with Islam communities. The plurality of PDIP can also be seen in the personal background of the elected legislators. All of them were former activists of the PDI Pro- Mega during the New Order regime and have already been involved in various organisations with multi-religions. There were legislators elected in . Sumardjono TH was a former activist in the Catholic Youth and the Karang Taruna. Cindelaras Yulianto and Herimawan 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 211 were former activists of GMNI and the Democrat Youth. Herimawan was the former head of the RT in the Cokrodirjan area. Moreover, M. Surandi was the former activist of PMKRI and one of the boards in the Catholic Kemetiran Church Yogyakarta. Nuryadi was a former activist of the Karang Taruna. Djati Waluyo was a chairperson of the stalls vendor in the Pasar Kembang (literally means: flower market) and one of the boards of the Foundation for Yogyakarta Intermediary Traders Association. One elected legislator at the time was still a college student: Rahajeng Arhuna Adaninggar. Despite being Muslim, Adaninggar was educated in Catholic institutions from primary school to university. The other legislators were toilers, labourers and entrepreneurs. They were Bahtanisyar Basyir, Karsono Soemodihardjo, Turino Junaidy, Herkitanto Djawadi, Hanung Heru Hayoto Lagat K., Tjatur Gono, Sutaryo and Ary Dewanto. Among these legislators, ten were Muslims, three were Catholics and two were Protestants. In the election, PDIP gained seats. All elected legislators were persons never elected before except Ary Dewanto. Y. Eko Rintarjo, Hery Setyo Pamuji and Suwarto were PDIP sympathisers before they joined this party. Supardi Antono was a sympathiser of PNI and PDI prior to joining PDIP. Iriantoko Cahyo Dumadi was a former chairperson of KONI and former treasury of PSIM in Yogyakarta Municipality. Furthermore, Henry Kuncoroyekti was a former chairperson of PBVSI. Next, Chang Wendryanto was an attorney and admirer of Soekarno tenets. Andrie Subiantoro was a former member of GMNI from to , a former chairperson of the Indonesian Manager Association in DIY from to and former chairperson of the Electricity Service Cooperative in – . Sujarnoko was a former activist in FORMI and actively assisted in advocacy activities in Yogyakarta Municipality. Suharyanto was a musician. Amongst these legislators, there were seven Muslims, two Catholics and two Protestants. In the election, six out of the elected legislators were new persons. Antonius Fokki Ardiyanto was a PDI/PDIP sympathiser since he was a pupil in senior high school. Dwi Saryono was an ordinary entrepreneur and activist in some societal associations. Dwi Wahyu Budiantoro and Dewi Irawati were PDI/PDIP sympathisers prior to joining the party. Tatang Setiawan and Emanuel Ardi Prasetya were PDI Chapter VII 212 sympathisers prior to contesting the political stage and elected as DPRD legislators. Among these legislators, there were five Muslims, five Catholics and one Protestant. In the election, eight out of the elected legislators were new persons. Danang Rudiyatmoko was a former activist of GSNI, GMNI, the KBM Yogyakarta, and Gapeknas as well as the son-in-law of Endang Darmawan, the former candidate in the mayoral election. Yustinus Kelik Mulyono was a former activist of PNI and PDIP devotee prior to joining this party. Albertus Yoseph Sudarma was a former fighter for the PDIP Pro-Mega. GM Deddy Jati Setiawan was an entrepreneur and admirer of Soekarno. Mugiyono Pujo Kusumo was a former activist of PDI since he was young in . Suryani was the wife of the vice mayor Imam Priyono Dwi Putranto and former vice chairperson of the PAUD Forum in Yogyakarta Municipality. Antonius Suhartono and Febri Agung Herlambang were PDIP sympathisers prior to joining this party. Amongst these legislators, nine were Muslims, six were Catholics and none were Protestant. In interacting with society, PDIP has three kinds of centres for people services. The function of these three centres is to receive people’s aspirations and complaints related to public issues which should be solved by the municipal government. The first centre is the DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality. The second centre is the PDIP Fraction in the DPRD office. The third centre is the offices of the PAC PDIP and the village board of the party within the municipality. In addition, the party uses the forums of MUSRENBANG from the village level to the municipal level to communicate with society. People can interact and ask for assistance directly to the PDIP’s functionaries and legislators. After this party receives numerous aspirations from those people, it will safeguard the collected interests through the legislation and budgeting process. By having those three centres, each PDIP parliamentarian has a moral responsibility to take action for any problems faced by people related to BN. PDIP legislators always respond and handle people’s problems by themselves. Whenever people call them and attend their home, they will do their best in providing solutions. In Javanese philosophy, it is called “wong legan golek momongan”, someone seeks any additional works. Sujarnoko (interview, Oct. ) of PDIP said that: 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 213 If people come and need my help, I will give them the best solution. If they didn’t understand what I suggested, I by myself will accompany them to handle their problems even come to the location directly. For instance, there was someone who called me on the phone. I didn’t know this person. He needed my help to handle his own problem at the police station where his family was a victim of a traffic accident and I went to the location two hours later after he phoned me. Furthermore, Antoniyus HW of PDIP who serves society and addresses BN affairs frequently receives lots of problems from many persons. He even obtains three problems from three different people each day. Nevertheless, it is a voluntary job. Only the ideology can convince him to do this charitable activity. As a token of appreciation, the party will provide a certain beneficial project for Antoniyus and other volunteers. Occasionally, the people who have been assisted by Antoniyus give a little bit of thanksgiving such as a pieces of bread. In education issues, Antoniyus (interview, Sept. ) often found cases related to the debt of school fees when graduation neared or the next semester approached, around May-June and December- January each year. He shared one of his experiences: I got a report, a local resident in the city has school debt. He doesn’t care about his own problem. He is afraid when he comes to the school because of his debt he will be billed by the school staff. Although I don’t know who this is, I assist him in solving his problem. I accompany him to the school by bringing the KMS-Card and the declaration letter of poor condition. The school asks him to assign the letter of the willingness to paying the debt so that his child can participate in the school exam. The problem was solved. So, society sometimes doesn’t know what they must do and from where they will start to deal with their own affairs. (interview, Sept. ) In health issues, Antoniyus has interesting experiences when he helped a patient to negotiate with a hospital official related to medical expenses. For more detail, Antoniyus (interview, Sept. ) said that: In , someone else informed me that his mother had been staying at the Bethesda Hospital for five days. The doctor said that this patient should pay the medical expenses. Then, because this mother is one of the KMS-Card holders, I negotiated with the doctor that there is a subsidy for this kind of patient from the municipal government. I somewhat insisted with my own opinion. After we debated for a long time, the doctor eventually agreed that there was no payment for this patient.” Chapter VII 214 Likewise, Chang Wendryanto of PDIP frequently spends his money on people who come to his residence, whether they are Muslims or not, or whether these people cannot pay the tuition fee for their children or they cannot pay medical expenses in the hospital, and so on. He occasionally comes directly to the location to tackle problems related to the building licence or urgent things such as helping a family who cannot bring their son’s corpse home from the hospital. However, according to Wendryanto (interview, Oct. ), we have to educate society. Although they always need our help, sometimes they do not know that their actions are wrong. Wendryanto (interview, Oct. ) shared his experience: For instance, there is someone who cannot pay his children’s fees at the school, but he can buy cigarettes and liquor. Again, somebody has a child. His child suffered cataract. After I interrogated him, his child’s disease was caused by alcohol. Another instance, I was asked to help someone who suffered a traffic accident. After I asked him to explain the cause, in fact, the victim drank alcohol. So, I didn’t want to help these people. Nonetheless, they were angry at me. For Wendryanto, he will help people who really need assistance or they are poor people. Despite being difficult, educating society is a must for PDIP. Thus, this party will help society if they frequently ask for help. As mentioned by Wendryanto (interview, Oct. ), it is not good if everything is free of charge, as there is no responsibility from society. For this party, it is better if society and the government together have the same burden to build our nation. By applying the analytical framework depicted in Figure . , the recruitment of cadres in PDIP is supplied from various mass organisations and alliances, mainly those which adopt the values of Soekarno’s Marhaenism and Pancasila, as evidenced in the social and organisational background of the elected legislators. To communicate with society, this party relies on the network of Marhaenism devotees in multireligions and minor ethnic groups. Nonetheless, the role of the party cadres and legislators is extremely significant in interacting and communicating directly with any society. 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 215 PAN: Depending on Muhammadiyah Networks In the creation and establishment of the organisational structure of PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality, Muhammadiyah proved a vital role. This organisation invited all stakeholders to come to the PDM office to initiate and establish PAN. Many of Muhammadiyah’s cadres have been involved in this party since its establishment. The top leaders who have already led this party, Bachrun Nawawi, Sukardi Yani, Muhammad Sofyan and Heroe Poerwadi, have an emotional and cultural tie with Muhammadiyah. Personally, Nawawi was an activist in Muhammadiyah and the NGO. Yani was a former vice chairperson of PCM in the Danurejan Sub-Municipality. Sofyan at the time was an ordinary member of Muhammadiyah and currently he is serving as one of the functionaries in the PRM Patehan. Poerwadi was a former activist of PII and HMI UGM as well as a former journalist for Editor Magazine and SCTV television prior to joining PAN. There is a fourfold fundamental reason why PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality has a special tie with Muhammadiyah. First is that the PAN founder, Amien Rais, originates from this region. In addition, when the party was established in , Rais was still the top leader of the Central Board of Muhammadiyah. Second is that Muhammadiyah was born in Yogyakarta Municipality in so the teachings of this organisation influence society. Third is the Muhammadiyah tenets are widespread in society, hence, most functionaries of PAN have a cultural bond with it. Fourth is that Muhammadiyah including ‘Aisyiyah in this municipality has powerful and large networks, primarily in education and health issues as explained in Chapter III. PAN can mobilise them in dealing with political affairs. The closeness of this relationship is supported by the data demonstrating that most elected legislators of PAN in the election were activists of Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah. Sukardi Yani, in addition to serving in Muhammadiyah, was previously a former activist of HMI Yogyakarta. Moreover, Herman Dody Isdarmadi was an activist in PRM Minggiran (located in the Mantrijeron Sub-Municipality). Abdul Malik Hasan was a former activist of PII and IMM and the vice chairperson at the PDM Yogyakarta Municipality – as well. Herman Hilmy was one of the functionaries at the Council of Islamic 1.2. Chapter VII 216 Propagation and the Council of Library Affairs, both at the central board of Muhammmadiyah. Alongside with IMM, Hilmy had quelled the communist movement in the tragedy. Muhammad Hatta was an activist of the Muhammadiyah Youth and PCM, both in the Kotagede Sub-Municipality. In addition, some legislators graduated from Muhammadiyah schools such as Awang Nuryatno and Nazaruddin, where the former at the time was the vice chairperson of the Coordinating Council of the Preschool Education of Al-Quran in DIY while the latter was a former activist of HMI when he was a university student. The other was Arief Eddy Subianto who was involved in the Al- Qur’an Study Group at the Salman Mosque, Bandung and the former chairperson of the Karang Taruna in Bandung. Meanwhile, R. Soehardiman was a former chairperson of the Black Belt Assembly of INKAI in the Provincial Board of DIY and the head of the RW IV in the Kelurahan of Notoprajan. In the election, seven out of the nine elected legislators were new persons. First was Iriawan Argo Widodo who was a former general chairperson of the Muhammadiyah Youth in Yogyakarta Municipality and former head of the office of the central board of Muhammadiyah. Arif Noor Hartanto was an activist of the Muhammadiyah Youth and PCM, both in the Kotagede Sub-Municipality. Sri Kustantini was a former activist of ‘Aisyiyah. Siti Majmu’ah was a former teacher in some Muhammadiyah schools and former activist of ‘Aisyiyah at the levels of the Jetis Sub-Municipality and Yogyakarta Municipality. Nur Rosyidah was a former activist of the ‘Aisyiyah Karangkajen and former worker of UMY. Yusron Achmadi was a former activist of Muhammadiyah Gondomanan and Nunik Yohana was culturally close to the Amien Rais family prior to being elected as a legislator. In the election, all five elected legislators were new persons. First was Rifki Listianto who was an activist at the PRM Patehan and the PCM Kraton. Muhammad Fursan was a chairperson at the PRM Kauman and member of Tapak Suci since until present. Muhammad Ali Fahmi was a former activist of the Muhammadiyah Youth in Yogyakarta Municipality – and PCM of the Kotagede Sub- Municipality – , both serving as a treasury. Outside Muhammadiyah, Fahmi was active as one of the functionaries of the RW in the Kelurahan of Prenggan. Moreover, Zulnasri originated from 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 217 Padang, West Sumatera and one of the admirers of Amien Rais, and therefore, he is culturally close to Muhammadiyah. Agung Damar Kusumandaru was a former chairperson of the Muhammadiyah Youth and the former vice chairperson of the Karang Taruna, both in the Jetis Sub-Municipality. Kusumandaru had served as the chairperson of the Brajamusti Supporter of PSIM, one of the football organisations in Yogyakarta. In the election, one out of the five elected legislators was a new person. She was Estri Utami, the activist of ‘Aisyiyah at the levels of the Ranting of Bausasran and the Danurejan Sub-Municipality. Utami was also involved in a women’s social organisation namely PKK in the Kelurahan of Bausasran. Previously, when Utami was a pupil at the school she was a former activist in ROHIS. This closeness between PAN and Muhammadiyah was recognised by Aris Madani, the chairperson of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta Municipality. Madani (interview, Sept. ) said that: PAN usually coordinates with us for various interests rather than other parties. When PDM invited Muslim legislators in a certain forum, PAN cadres usually show their commitment by attending this forum. There are two parties which always send letters to us to ask for an official meeting, PAN and PPP. The purpose of the meeting is socialising their new functionaries and the consolidation on a particular issue. They come to us, at least, four times each year. Regarding the way the party interacts with civil society, PAN prefers being close and using the powerful network of Muhammadiyah rather than other organisations. PAN and Muhammadiyah usually carry out two sorts of consolidation. First are ceremonial meetings. Both conduct various planned-official meetings for dealing with some local issues such as the candidacy in the mayoral election, public hearings, discussing municipal regulations and budgets as well as the socialisation of new functionaries of PAN. Through this forum, the party will receive aspirations and complaints delivered by Muhammadiyah elites. The consolidation is not merely carried out by the board at the municipal level but also by the sub-municipality and the ranting board levels. Second are cultural forums. Numerous unofficial forums are held such as Islamic teachings for Muhammadiyah followers at the grassroots level where the speaker is a PAN cadre. Other informal meetings are Chapter VII 218 also conducted between PAN and Muhammadiyah young generations in various events. Muhammadiyah could be categorised as the traditionalist voter base for PAN. One of the elected PAN legislators, Rifki Listianto (interview, Sept. ), said that using the network of Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah is an extremely effective way to attract people’s support to vote PAN. He said that: Once again, I said this net is effective in the context that I am a PAN politician. I cannot say it is also effective if I am politician outside PAN because the history of the establishment of the DPC PAN in was founded by Muhammadiyah activists, including in the Kraton Sub-Municipality where I am dwelling right now. Fortunately, the emotional bond is remaining in a good way. I optimise this net. In addition, ‘Aisyiyah has lots of pengajians. It is also more effective than other networks. Thus, for me, keeping the network with Muhammadiyah is easier than with other links. (interview, Sept. ) Listianto’s statement was also confirmed by Aris Madani that PAN is the sole party which usually struggles for Muhammadiyah interests. Muhammadiyah aspirations are always responded to and fought by PAN, whether in the legislation or in the budgeting. (interview, Sept. ) Himmatus Sudja’ah, the chairwoman of ‘Aisyiyah in Yogyakarta Municipality strengthened Madani’s testimony. According to Sudja’ah (interview, Oct. ), ‘Aisyiyah also delivers its interests to PAN related to education, health, environment and women affairs when they are meeting together in an informal forum such as when legislators have a reses time. She stated that: Although PAN does not assist us fully, it always fulfils our invitation to discuss any topics such as on the legislation draft of Keistimewaan (specialness) of Yogyakarta or the issue related to green movements. Sometimes, they provide lots of trees for our kindergartens. (interview, Oct. ) Meanwhile, to approach other communities outside Muhammadiyah, PAN uses a forum of reses and public hearings for society. Approaching local leaders in society and spending the financial support for mosques or charitable activities are also an effective means to attract public support. 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 219 Hence, by applying the analytical framework as pictured in Figure . , the recruitment of cadres in PAN mainly comes from Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah networks and a few others from Muslim modernist organisations such as HMI and PII. To interact and communicate with society, this party prefers to utilise the networks of Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah as well as other cultural and informal forums with segments outside these two organisations. Of course, the role of the party elites and legislators is significant enough to attract popular votes. PAN could be classified as one of the influential parties in Yogyakarta Municipality. The party seems to represent moderate Muslims and rational voters. PKS: Maximising Liqo’ Linkages Numerous activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who are involved in LDK and KAMMI have vital roles in the institution of PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality. Most of its founders are dominated by former activists in those two organisations, particularly the LDK Jamaah Shalahuddin of UGM. Mohammad Ilyas was the first secretary of the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality – . On March nd, , he confirmed through personal communication that: Almost all core functionaries of the DPD PK/PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality in the outset of its establishment are former activists of LDK, primarily originating from Jamaah Shalahudin of UGM. Basuki Abdurrahman who served as the first chairperson of the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality was a former activist of Jamaah Shalahuddin from to and one of the national founders of KAM- MI. Moreover, Mohammad Ilyas was also a former activist of Jamaah Shalahuddin from to and part of the KAJASHA since until present. Muhammad Wajdi Rahman, the only elected legislator of PK in , was a former general chairperson of Jamaah Shalahuddin from to . 1.3. For further accounts on the existence of Jamaah Shalahuddin, see Karim ( : - ). Chapter VII 220 In the election, there were five elected legislators from PKS. All of them were new persons. First was Dwi Budi Utomo who was a da’wa activist since the RISMA when he was studying at secondary school. At the campus level, Utomo was a former activist of the SKI at the Faculty of Animal Husbandry UGM in the s. The SKI is a continuing ROHIS or the da’wa institute in the campus. Moreover, Zuhrif Hudaya preferred to involve his da’wa activities amongst society through its own NGO or foundation rather than on campus. Furthermore, Ardianto started as the da’wa activist in ROHIS when he was studying in secondary school. He continued his da’wa activities on campus and society. Therefore, he was a former activist of the JMF UGM, the FSRMY Yogyakarta and the FUI DIY. Ahmad Nur Umam is currently serving as the official at the SDIT Luqman Hakim and the vice president of the Genpro in the region of Central Java and DIY. Ida Nur Laela was a former activist of PII in the Wonogiri District, HMI UGM and the Al Khairaat Foundation. In , three out of the five elected legislators were new persons. First was Muhammad Syafi’i who was a former activist of the Muhammadiyah Youth and PRM, both in the Kampung of Suronatan. Outside Muhammadiyah, he was active in the FSRMY, the KMP UGM and the DMI. Moreover, Muhammad Fauzan started his da’wa activities when he was involved in ROHIS of the SMA Negeri I Teladan Yogyakarta. He continued his da’wa activities into wider organisations inside and outside campus such as the SKI at the Department of Chemical Engineering UGM and the FSRMY. There were no data on Azizah since her death in . By , two out of the four elected legislators were new persons. First was Bambang Anjar Jalurmurti. He began his da’wa activities when he was a pupil in senior high school and joined one of the functionaries at the FKPMY. He also was a former activist of the Muhammadiyah Youth and the Karang Taruna as well as a former member of the Predication Institute at the Greater Syuhada Mosque Yogyakarta. Despite not being structurally involved in LDK, Jalurmurti often assisted with various activities held by Jamaah Salahuddin while studying at UGM. Second was Nasrul Khoiri, the former activist of the KAMMI UAD. In society, Khoiri was one of the functionaries at the Khairunnisa Mosque, Ponggalan Giwangan (located in the Umbulharjo Sub- 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 221 Municipality). Some top leaders of PKS at the sub-municipality levels were former activists of LDK. Wartono (interview, Nov. ), the chairperson of the DPC PKS in the Umbulharjo Sub-Municipality – , was a former activist of the RISMA and also the former chairperson of the LDK UKKI Jamaah Basmallah of UST in . LDK and KAMMI are organisations which supply cadres for PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality. Thus, it is not surprising that there is a close tie between PKS and LDK-KAMMI. In addition, some elites of PKS have actively worked in Muhammadiyah institutions such as Abdurrahman who was a lecturer at the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Science UAD and former advisor for the LDK JADDA of UAD, Hudaya who had toiled at the private hospital of RSU PKU Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta and Syafi’i who was a former teacher at the Mu’allimin Muhammadiyah Islamic Boarding School of Yogyakarta. PKS also attracts popular votes from some Muhammadiyah sympathisers. Concerning the relationship between Muhammadiyah and PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality, it is not as good as between Muhammadiyah and PAN. After the election PKS issued some opposing decisions with Muhammadiyah related to religious affairs such as the establishment of the first day in the Ramadhan and Shawwal months. In addition, the existence of PKS’ cadres in various Muhammadiyah institutions, mainly in schools, colleges and health centres does not support the Muhammadiyah vision. Despite working in those institutions, cadres and sympathisers of PKS criticise and even vilify this organisation. Muhammadiyah does not consider PKS as an effective partner but like “a thorn in the flesh”. Hence, a series of negative impressions are always delivered by elites, cadres and followers of Muhammadiyah towards this party. The concealed conflicts suffered by both are frequent on various issues. Such a relationship has been continuing until the present. Only a few sympathisers of Muhammadiyah support PKS, as most of them tend to be close to PAN, PPP and other nationalistsecular parties. As an alternative strategy, this party strengthens the linkages of liqo’ or halaqah as the core method to infiltrate the party ideology. Therefore, most elites of PKS are murabbis in the liqo’ linkages. Members in each liqo’ consist of five persons, a small and intensive group. This forum is, usually, routine and conducted primarily in a mosque or Chapter VII 222 musholla. Occasionally, the meeting can be organised in a home or another place. The content of liqo’ generally is studying related to Islamic doctrines and knowledge, particularly to strengthen the faith. Through this forum, the party consolidation is quite effective to unite the existing forces. The socialisation, direct-communication, clarification due to misperception and critique can be found in this forum to evaluate the party performance and to re-build and re-arrange the new strategies in dealing with various challenges and barriers in the future. Thus, the function of liqo’ is twofold: as the channel for observing Islamic knowledge and the consolidation of the party. Dwi Budi Utomo (interview, Sept. ) said: PKS itself began from the liqo’. Thorugh this forum, the bond amongst of us is becoming stronger and stronger. We have a weekly liqo’ for active cadres. In this forum, we found communication. In this forum, we found socialisation. In this forum, we found internal critique. In this forum, we found everything. The core activity is ngaji, learning Islamic studies, after that, doing coordination and discussing misperception. Still according to Utomo (interview, Sept. ), this party also has a monthly meeting among the party cadres. It is set up for the socialisation of the Munas decisions or for preparing for technical issues of the upcoming Muswil or Musda. It is a must for the PKS’ cadres to have a role as an ustadz, a muballigh or, at least, a public figure who can motivate and influence society. For this party, pengajian is an effective bridge to gain popular support from people. Moreover, as stated by Utomo (interview, Sept. ), becoming a local leader and an influential figure among society at the RT and RW levels are helpful to raise the party image and vote. In addition to strengthen the liqo’ networks, this party also has a close linkage with the JSIT. Numerous elites of PKS are founders and counsellors of foundations which have a concern in establishing and developing IT schools. Zuhrif Hudaya and Cholid Mahmud are counsellors of the Mulia Foundation. Mahmud himself was one of the founders of the DPW PKS in DIY. Afterwards, Sukamta, the general chairperson of the DPW PKS in DIY – , was one the founders of the Muadz bin Jabal Foundation. In addition, Hudaya alongside with Abdurrahman are also counsellors of the Al Khairaat Foundation. Furthermore, Wartono was one of the boards at the Islamic Boarding 1. When the Ideology is Still Vigorous: Parties and Civil Society 223 School of Al Khairaat for male students from to . These three foundations (Al Khairaat, Mulia, Muadz bin Jabal) are interconnected consortiums under the coordination of JSIT Yogyakarta. The proximity between PKS and the JSIT was admitted by Sudiyatna (interview, Nov. ) of JSIT. He stated that there is a twofold reason for this near relationship. First is the similarity of the organisational background between the PKS activists and the JSIT activists that they originated from LDK. Sudiyatna was also a former activist of LDK in Yogyakarta. Second is they have a similar culture, a similar attitude and a similar way of thinking. Sudiyatna (interview, Nov. ) said: If the JSIT has some interests related to the parliament, we prefer to communicate directly with the PKS Fraction. The reason is simple, we have a lot of buddies and colleagues in PKS. So, it is easy for us to do this, I mean to interact. Not surprisingly, PKS will struggle for the JSIT’s interests related to education in the legislation and budgeting process. In other words, if PAN will strive for the Muhammadiyah schools, PKS will struggle for the IT schools. Hence, to interact and communicate with society, this party has two steps. First is the internal consolidation among PKS’ cadres by applying the liqo’ forum. After the first step, the party will continue with the external interaction, by inviting common society and local elders at a certain time and for a specific purpose. It is usually conducted when legislators are doing the reses. Meanwhile, in the election, this party uses three routes to interact and communicate with society. The first route is conducted by the legislative candidates. The second route is carried out by the party cadres. The third route is operated by volunteers who have a desire to assist the party in winning the election. According to Muhammad Syafi’i (interview, Nov. ) of PKS, where there is an elite or cadre of PKS in a particular place, a base of voters and sympathisers of the party will be found. Therefore, this party also receives aspirations and complaints from society and, in turn, communicates those problems with the related municipal agencies. By adopting the triangle framework as displayed in Figure . , the core actors who mobilise the party power are supplied mainly by LDK and KAMMI. The way the PKS interacts with society tends to follow Chapter VII 224 three paths: maximising the net of liqo’ or halaqah, strengthening the IT school networks by providing a positive impression to the public and promoting the devout figure of the party elites, cadres and legislator candidates. PKS is a considerable party in Yogyakarta Municipality, particularly since . This party tends to represent moderate Muslims and rational voters together with PAN with a few different segments of voters. Having Variant Bonds: Parties and Economic Society After analysing the way parties interact and communicate with civil society, this section will continue to examine the way they interact with economic society. Although the power resource in post-authoritarian Indonesia is money (Winters, : p. ) and most of Indonesia’s parties are becoming vitally dependent on the financial aid of individuals or conglomerates with large private fortunes (Reuter, : pp. – ), parties in local politics are not entirely co-opted by resources when the municipal system is governed well. Being the governing party or the opposition party determines its relationship with such a society. From the data gathering and the respondent interviews, this study postulates that parties and economic society have different ties which will be addressed further. PDIP: Attempting to Struggle for Wong Cilik? PDIP is well-known as the advocate of wong cilik including ordinary labourers, small toilers and the like. Nonetheless, this became complicated when this party stood up for labourers who toiled in the industries of nightclubs, discotheques, casinos, drug trade and prostitution as explained in Chapter VI. On the one hand, between and the municipal government desired to close those locations and issued local regulation related to this concern to realise better municipal governance. On the other hand, PDIP rejected this plan because labourers who worked in those locations would be unemployed. Although PDIP did not seem to be too extreme in rejecting the municipal government 2. 2.1. 2. Having Variant Bonds: Parties and Economic Society 225 plan, it encouraged demonstrations in the streets carried out by people who toiled in those industries. Allegedly, the PDIP refusal related to the loss of income of some its elites who have such industries or they have special ties with one of the conglomerates in those industries. This was also acknowledged by Syukri Fadholi (interview, Oct. ). In the same vein, the relocation of PKLs and traditional markets in – around Malioboro Street and the Shopping Centre by the municipal government was rejected by people. A number of demonstrations occurred in the city. PDIP was also allegedly behind such demonstrations because some PDIP functionaries are bosses of those locations. Therefore, the PDIP actions in this context are not purely related to people-friendly policies (kebijakan pro-rakyat) but rather some elites having business interests. In other situations, PDIP could demonstrate its support of wong cilik when it copes with the emergence of modern markets. In the rapid changes of the urban area, such markets mushroom in various corners inside the municipality such as Indomart and Alfamart. This fact, of course, affects the existence of economic societies in Yogyakarta Municipality and most of them are dominated by small and medium enterprises (UMKM) such as street-based vendors or small traders which have been there prior to the modern markets. PDIP will address whoever wants to harm toilers. According to Sutaryo (interview, Sept. ) of PDIP, discussing issues related to the wong cilik is also discussing on ideology or identity. His party will always stand for such vendors. He stated: In the past, I forget the exact year, or , our party had insisted to those modern markets inside the Tugu train station to close their business immediately. Their existence harmed the small vendors which sell wares surrounding that market because these tiny vendors obtained incomes merely from those wares. If it is so, where is the PDIP backing? We almost fought with the bosses of that modern market. We did this, because we have analysed the problems and lobbied interrelated stakeholders and didn’t gain a solution. All processes have been passed through. So, we are not blind. (interview, Sept. ) Nevertheless, PDIP will be lenient to cope with the street vendors if it also involves other stakeholders to discuss and to seek the best solution for them. This can be seen in the case of the relocation of street-based vendors around the Beringharjo traditional market in , where Chapter VII 226 since Taman Pintar has been established in this location. At the time, PDIP was one of the core government partners in addressing the case. Hence, based on the consideration of renovation, spatial and aesthetics of the municipality, this party seriously analyses the case entirely, because relocation involves a lot of people, not merely the vendors and small labourers, but also parking officers, security officers, local gangs, local bosses and so on. What is it supposed to do, Sutaryo (interview, Sept. ) questioned, since the income of most toilers who laboured in this location will be reduced automatically. Therefore, for PDIP, it is not easy and a long process is needed to deal one by one, step by step in order to gain the best result for all sides. In coping with economic affairs, most PDIP elites, cadres and legislators will struggle for and stand for the wong cilik interests. Most of them are involved directly with the case and the location. Chang Wendryanto confirmed this when he was asked by the ABY to assist some toilers who suffered unfair treatments which were conducted by a particular entrepreneur in Malioboro Street. Kirnadi (interview, Oct. ) said: We have already communicated with Pak Chang. After we reported him regarding the case of toilers in one of the Batik stores in the Malioboro Street, Pak Chang came to the store directly. The specific case is that the company did not want to pay the toilers’ wages based on the UMR-standard, and those toilers were not insured yet by the BPJS. When we came to the municipal labour agency, the response was too slow. We eventually reported to the DPRD and were facilitated by Pak Chang. Pak Chang threatened and insisted that this company pay the wages based on the regulation and were obligated to register its toilers with the BPJS. According to Wendryanto (interview, Oct. ), the slogan of the wong cilik nonetheless should be interpreted in a precise context. The wong cilik is not merely translated as poorer people in a vulnerable situation, but also as the precise people who deserves to be helped. Wendryanto (interview, Oct. ) gave an example that one day in the past there was a vendor of angkringan who placed his wage/cart in a banned zone. Consequently, all of his assets were taken by the local authority. This seller asked Wendryanto to help him and even asked for money as compensation for the loss of all of his assets. Wendryanto did not want to help him as this person behaved wrongly. Thus, people frequently judged Wendryanto as the legislator who did not protect the 2. Having Variant Bonds: Parties and Economic Society 227 wong cilik. Another instance, as stated by Wendryanto (interview, Oct. ), is an angkringan vendor who put his cart right in the front of a shop. The face of the shop cannot be seen by people or purchasers and, in turn, it will incur losses. Thus, Wendryanto prefers to stand up for that shop rather than the angkringan, because if the shop fires, at least, more than five toilers, the unemployment will increase. It is, in fact, an awkward choice and a dilemma for Wendryanto. In the context of education affairs, PDIP legislators will respond to all problems from any society, particularly lower-class people who cannot pay all their finances. At the level of institutions, schools affiliated structurally with Christians and Protestants prefer to align themselves with this party. Andar Rujito (interview, Oct. ), the headmaster of the SMA Bopkri I in Yogyakarta Municipality, stated that: In the past, one of the legislators who frequently communicated with me and asked about this school is Pak Chang. It is because we are in the same organisation, hence, we are often meeting one another. I really like the sincerity of Pak Chang. In addition, I was also close with Pak Dwi Saryono. I know more about PDIP as many of my buddies are inside. I also know the dynamics of the election and the candidacy of Sidarto Danusubroto, the PDIP cadre. PAN: Towards a Proportional Cooperation In the early – municipal administration, PAN in some major cases had a poor relationship with the business groups inside the municipality, mainly related to the industry of nightclubs, discotheques, casinos and PKL. This was the impact of the decision made by the municipal government on the closing of those social illness spots and the relocation of street-based vendors surrounding Malioboro Street as explained in Chapter VI. Nevertheless, the relationship between PAN and the business groups experienced a change mainly since the second period of Zudianto. In line with the successful municipal administration in making various overwhelming developments in Yogyakarta Municipality, the business groups attempted to build communication and interaction with PAN. This is because PAN is the governing party which controls the regime. Muhammad Sofyan (interview, Oct. ) said: 2.2. Chapter VII 228 It is not true that the business group closes PAN, as this group prefers to align directly with the municipal government as the executor of the programme. If there is sugar, there is an ant. If Zudianto is sugar, the businessmen are a group of ants who chase the sugar. But, PAN remain to communicate with this cluster,” The relationship between PAN and this profit-oriented group tends to move into a proportional cooperation if one of them needs each other, they will contact others first. The proportional relationship denotes the pattern of a normal partnership amongst of them: no special bond. Therefore, the relationship is based on a particular interest, whether PAN needs them or they need PAN. For instance, if the DPRD discusses a certain local regulation related to business issues, PAN will invite them to share and discuss together. Heroe Poerwadi (interview, June ) said: If we want to discuss issues related to advertisement, we invite our buddies who work in this business. If we want to know more about tourism, we have buddies in Dagadu. With local businessmen, we also communicate with them, including owners of the hotels of melati (kinds of hotels under three stars with an affordable price). We sometimes receive a discount price when we use their hotels, or they give us cash money for using the hotel. Poerwadi (interview, June ) added that occasionally when PAN wants to produce banners for political campaign events, it will obtain a cheap price, even free of charge, from those entrepreneurs. Furthermore, Poerwadi shared another experience: There is an entrepreneur of the massage service who comes to us. He complains about why his business is categorised in the entertainment cluster. Instead, he asked that his business be classified in the health group. This is due to the tax for the entertainment business which is more expensive than health. I asked him to come again tomorrow to the PAN Fraction in order to be assisted and resolve the situation. (interview, Sept. ) Since PAN has serviced business clusters with a quite good relationship, this group, in turn, assists PAN by providing funds or incidental donations for party events. Afterwards, PAN also made quite an impression with the small and medium-sized enterprise groups (UMKM) so that this community occasionally invites PAN’s legislators to come to their community. Muhammad Ali Fahmi of PAN stated that: 2. Having Variant Bonds: Parties and Economic Society 229 I was often invited by them (UMKM), by the owners of catering, by the owners of food stalls and so on. They deliver their own aspirations to me, they ask for the funds to the DPRD for creating an enterprise, they ask to be facilitated in the training and also asking for an exhibition for their properties outside Yogyakarta and so on and so forth. (interview, Sept. ) Regarding the relationship between PAN and business clusters with education and health concerns, this party always keeps in touch with Muhammadiyah networks. In addition to becoming a socio-religious organisation, Muhammadiyah, in fact, is also the legal foundation for all kinds of commercial industries across the country, including Yogyakarta Municipality. The real advocacy which was carried out by PAN to Muhammadiyah in this city can be seen when the party continuously struggles for the importance of the equality of BOSDA between public and private schools, as the number of schools belonging to Muhammadiyah within the municipality is highest amongst private schools. Moreover, with any recent developments related particularly to education issues, PAN will coordinate with Muhammadiyah and inform this organisation immediately. Afterwards, many people, with children as pupils in the Muhammadiyah schools, speak up about their problems. Most problems are related to the high tuition fee and other additional payments. The closeness between PAN and business clusters is also due to some local entrepreneurs being activists of Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah. Some of them are functionaries in PAN. Specifically, Sunardi Sahuri is a religious scholar of Muhammadiyah and the owner of the Pamella Group, one of the largest stores in Yogyakarta Municipality. Moreover, there are Latifah Iskandar and Totok Daryanto. The former is an activist of ‘Aisyiyah and the owner of the Flora and Ar-Rossi stores and the latter is the owner of some private businesses. Both were former PAN national legislators from the DIY Province. The other is Dyah Suminar, the owner of the Margaria Group and the wife of Herry Zudianto. These PAN cadres are local leading entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, the tie between PAN and those entrepreneurs follow a reciprocal pattern. Chapter VII 230 PKS: Tending towards Less Partnership PKS has never held any position in the municipal administration, neither the mayor nor the vice mayor. The relationship between this party and the municipal administration tends to be situated in formal and structural approaches. The interaction takes place merely in arranged and scheduled forums such as the meeting between executive and legislative, between the executive and the DPRD’s commission, or between the municipal agency and certain commissions/fractions. All those meetings occur in a formal-structural way. In addition, most PKS politicians do not come from the business environment. They are, in fact, from campuses and the da’wa activities which have no direct interaction with economic affairs. This can also be seen in the personal background of the PKS’ politicians which was elaborated previously in this chapter. When they are involved in da’wa activities, they tend to observe merely Islamic studies and a few secular topics. Economic clusters do not consider this party as an influential force in business issues. Thus, those business groups will make contact directly with the municipal administration as the central policy-maker. PKS isolates itself from business affairs. Zuhrif Hudaya of PKS said that: With the business clusters, we have no interaction with them. During ten years (as the legislator in the DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality), I felt we never dealt with those businessmen, mainly related to education and health issues. (interview, Oct. ) Hudaya’s statement is strengthened by Dwi Budi Utomo (interview, Sept. ) of PKS that the low interaction with business clusters is a weakness of his party. It cannot be separated from the fact that most vast business companies in Yogyakarta Municipality are owned by Chinese people. Thus, the communication process which was created by PKS is still among young entrepreneurs inside the party. Utomo (interview, Sept. ) confirmed: Approaching outside professional industrialists is not yet occurring. It is our weakness. It is a good suggestion for us to make contact with them. The party programmes planned by PKS related to economic issues still have an inward-looking orientation. They have no external relations 2.3. 2. Having Variant Bonds: Parties and Economic Society 231 with those professional businesses. Nevertheless, changes are happening in this party. Some PKS’ elites personally have been starting to involve themselves in the business world. For example, the business of water drinking was initiated by Muhammad Syafi’i of PKS since . When the Author met him at the office of the DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality, a delivery service car approaches this office and brought drinking bottles. At the time, the Author asked Syafi’i (interview, Nov. ): “What is that, Sir? Do you order those drinking bottles for this office?” He replied: No, no, no. That’s mine, my little business. I started this business last year ( ), mostly for additional income. This brief example shows the importance of doing practical business has been experienced by a few elites inside the party. Nonetheless, it is cannot be said whether this party will continue with business issues in the party agenda seriously or will be carried out merely by individuals in party cadres. In addition, since PKS had its own candidate in the mayoral election, some business clusters attempted to approach PKS. But, it was merely a short relationship in the mayoral election moment. As a result, PKS prefers to close to IT schools as representatives of business clusters. Although both of them have no structural relationship, the existence of the IT schools as one of the leading education institutions inside Yogyakarta Municipality, more or less, strengthens the positive image of PKS. The party will support the development of IT schools through its role in the legislation and budgeting process. Salim (interview, Oct. ) of the SMPIT Abu Bakar Yogyakarta said that a few years ago, through the PKS Fraction, the IT schools delivered their aspirations regarding the teacher incentive not merely for teachers of public schools but also for teachers of private schools. The incentive was eventually provided also for private teachers. Moreover, other proof which shows the close bond is that most children of the PKS’ elites are attending those IT institutions. Salim (interview, Oct. ) said: The direct intervention of PKS in the IT schools is nothing, as we don’t have a structural relationship with the party. But, a cultural tie is, indeed, available. Some of our teachers are active in PKS, also in Muhammadiyah, Chapter VII 232 also in NU. There is no ban to engage in any organisations. But, when they are inside the IT, they should follow our regulations. TRIKASWANI: Kampung Santri in the Root of Marhaen As an outcome of the parties’ interaction with society, it is important to highlight here the existence of abangan on the one hand and santri on the other hand. In order to ease the analysis, the base of the modernist santri and Jemaah Tarbiyah will be unified into one group, santri, as the former is the representative of the old-santri and the latter is the representative of the new-santri. It is undeniable that all data demonstrate that Yogyakarta Municipality is the core base of abangan or Marhaen. Hence, this study explores the so-called “kampung santri”. Literally, the term “kampung” does not denote a particular territory, but it pictures a societal community consisting of a surrounding group (RW) or some surrounding groups (RWs) having a similar culture and practice. Therefore, kampung santri could be defined as the centre of devout Muslim communities to carry out various Islamic and da’wa activities. Prior to deciding the selected kampung santri, this study portrays the political cleavage in Yogyakarta Municipality, as the election is a mirror of the political power. The political cleavage consists of two opposite forces: santri and abangan. The santri forces embrace two kinds of parties: first, parties which adopt Islam as their ideological foundation; and second, parties supported and elected by a majority of Muslim voters. On the other hand, the abangan forces contain all parties outside the first category whether secular Muslims, Christian-Catholic and so on. In the election, there were Islam-based parties and secular parties. In , there were seven Islam-based parties and secular parties. By , there were nine Islam-based parties and secular parties. In , there were five Islam-based parties and seven secular parties. 3. 3. TRIKASWANI: Kampung Santri in the Root of Marhaen 233 The Comparison of Electoral Votes between Islam-based Parties and Secular Parties in Yogyakarta Municipality, – Year of Election Total of Valid Votes Muslim Political Forces Non-Muslim Political Forces Votes Votes , , . , . , , . , . , , . , . . , . , . Source: compiled by the author. Table . depicts how abangan forces are always dominant in the four election cycles compared to santri forces. In particular, the highest percentage reached by the secular group was in while the highest proportion obtained by the Muslim group was in . In contrast, the lowest percentage earned by the secular group was in while the lowest proportion gained by the Muslim group was in . In addition, the PDIP vote in the provincial legislative election in Yogyakarta Municipality was also leading. Even the vote for one legislator candidate originated from PDIP, Chang Wendryanto, can exceed other party votes. The total vote of PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality in for the provincial legislative election was , while Wendryanto himself earned , votes. PAN in this municipality ranked second with , votes while other parties’ votes were under Wendryanto’s vote. In the context of the Regional’s Representative Council (DPD) election, Sidarto Danusubroto, the PDIP cadre, ranked third in this municipality after GKR Hemas, the wife of Hamengkubuwono X, who was first and Muhammad Afnan Hadikusumo, the Muhammadiyah cadre and the former PAN politician, who was second. In fourth place was Cholid Mahmud, the founder of PKS in the DIY Province. Meanwhile, in the presidential election, the candidate nominated by PDIP, Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla, could defeat its rival, Prabowo Subianto-Hatta Rajasa supported by Gerindra, Golkar, Democrat, PAN, PKS and other parties in this municipality. Table . Chapter VII 234 There are three kinds of plausible considerations to classify a certain location as kampung santri. First is a historical reason when the location has historical values or is a heritage site created by earlier Muslim scholars. Second is a socio-religious reason when the location is the core base for devout Muslim activities. There is a twofold indication for this second consideration: ) many resources of ulama, ustadz and mubaligh originate from the location; ) numerous Islamic institutions inside the location are the centre for Muslim activities such as schools/colleges, Islamic boarding schools, mosques and prayer rooms, economic centres and the like. Third is a political reason in reference to the four election cycles. Based on these three considerations, this study selects six locations which can be categorised as kampung santri: Kauman, Karangkajen, Kotagede, Suronatan, Warungboto and Nitikan. They can be abbreviated into one term: “TRIKASWANI”. The “TRIKA” denotes the first three locations while the “SWANI” are the rest. First is Kauman. This is one of the historical centres located right in the western part of the Alun-Alun Lor of Yogyakarta Municipality, precisely in the Kelurahan of Ngupasan, Gondomanan. Muhammadiyah is the core base in Kauman as it was born on this site. Many religious scholars originated from here, such as Ahmad Dahlan, Siti Walidah, Fakhruddin, Ki Bagus Hadikusumo, Ahmad Bawadi, Faqih Usman, AR Fachruddin, Djarnawi Hadikusumo and Ahmad Azhar Basyir. The first three names have been recognised officially by the central government as Indonesia’s national heroes. The main symbol of Muslim activities is Masjid Gedhe (Greater Mosque). Some religious heritage sites can be found in this location: the Langgar KHA Dahlan, the Langgar ‘Aisyiyah, the Langgar Ar-Rosyad and the Langgar An- Nur. All of these prayer rooms were established prior to Indonesia’s independence. Located at the border of the area is PKU Muhammadiyah Hospital, one of the leading hospitals established since . In addition, the grave of Siti Walidah is located in the western mosque. Thus, Kauman has recently become one of the places for historical sightseeing within the city. Education activities in Kauman began since the establishment of the TK ABA Kauman in , located in the western mosque. Some references stated this kindergarten was the first kindergarten in Indonesia. Moreover, in , the SD Muhammadiyah Kauman was es- 3. TRIKASWANI: Kampung Santri in the Root of Marhaen 235 tablished by Ahmad Dahlan, located in the southern mosque. Widespread in this location is female pupil dormitories of the Mu’allimaat Muhammadiyah Boarding School. Furthermore, the result of the municipal legislative election portrays that PDIP was the leading party in the Kelurahan of Ngupasan earning , votes, followed by PAN with votes, Gerindra with votes, Democrat with votes, PPP with votes and PKS with votes. Hence, Islam-based parties cannot dominate this kelurahan, as they merely collected . percent of the vote. Thus, the santri values seem to experience a decrease. This is likely due to the decrease in the number of Muslim scholars inside Kauman and the influence of modern life, where Kauman is located near Malioboro Street, the centre of city tourism and trading. Second is Karangkajen. This is one of the kampungs located in the Kelurahan of Brontokusuman, Mergangsan. Muslim activities in this location are quite vigorous due to the influence of the da’wa of Muhammdiyah since the s. The existence of the Karangkajen Greater Mosque since at the heart of the area strengthens the devotion of its society. Right at the western side of this mosque, there is a graveyard with some Muslim scholars such as Ahmad Dahlan, AR Fachruddin (one of the former chairpersons of the central board of Muhammadiyah), Prof. Fatchurrochman (the former minister of Indonesia’s religious affairs) and Ir. HM. Baried Ishom (one of the founders of the PKU Muhammadiyah Hospital). Education activities for Muslims inside the location can be seen with the existence of the TK ABA Karangkajen. At the primary school level, there are two buildings of the SD Muhammadiyah Karangkajen established since . Furthermore, there are two kinds of junior high schools: the SMP Muhammadiyah and the MTs Karangkajen. The result of the municipal legislative election revealed that PPP was the ruling party in the Kelurahan of Brontokusuman obtaining , votes, followed by PAN with , votes, Gerindra with , votes, PDIP with votes, Golkar with votes and PKS with votes. Overall, Islam-based parties can defeat secular parties in this kelurahan reaching . percent. Third is “Kotagede”. The term “Kotagede” in this context does not denote an administrative territory but the framework of the Kotagede Chapter VII 236 culture in the surrounding traditional market found in the southern end of the sub-municipality, particularly in two kelurahans: Prenggan and Purbayan. Numerous brilliant religious scholars originated from this location. Moreover, the existence of several Islamic boarding schools is proof that this location is the base of observant Muslims. There are five Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) which are widespread in this area: Fauzul Muslimin, Nurul Ummah, Hidayatul Mubtadi’ien, Quthiba and Tahfidz Centre PPA Darul Qur’an. The education activities start at the kindergarten level, such as in TK ABA Tegalgendu, TK ABA Mushola, TK ABA Kleco, TK ABA Komplek Masjid Perak, TK Ma’had Islamy, TK ABA Purbayan, TK ABA Dalem and TK ABA Depokan. At the primary school level, there are SD Muhammadiyah Bodon, SD Muhammadiyah Purbayan, MI Ma’had Islamy and three units of SD Muhammadiyah Kleco. Moreover, SMP Muhammadiyah and MTs Nurul Ummah are activity centres for junior high school. Meanwhile, SMA Muhammadiyah is the senior high school. For health activities, the survival of the RSKIA PKU Muhammadiyah Hospital is tangible proof, located on the northern edge of the traditional market. In economic affairs, there is BMT An-Nikmah (eastern of the Kotagede traditional market). In addition, there are more than mosques or prayer rooms surrounding this area. One of the historical mosques is the Greater Mosque of Mataram established since the s, close to the tombs of the Mataram kings. Therefore, it can be categorised as the oldest mosque in Yogyakarta Municipality. A Japanese anthropologist, Mitsuo Nakamura, has already studied this location and published it under The Cresent Arises over the Banyan Tree for the first time around the s and the second enlarged edition published in . Nakamura postulated the spectacular role of a modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah, in influencing society customs from believing Javanese syncretism to Islamic purification fighters. In the political stage, the result of the municipal legislative election in the Kelurahan of Prenggan revealed that PAN was the ruling party achieving , votes, followed by PDIP with , votes, PPP with , votes, Golkar with votes, Gerindra with votes, the Democrat with votes and PKS with votes. Nevertheless, Islam-based parties, in general, merely collected . percent of the 3. TRIKASWANI: Kampung Santri in the Root of Marhaen 237 vote. Meanwhile, in the Kelurahan of Purbayan, PPP was the leading party with , votes, followed by PAN with , votes, PDIP with votes and PKS with votes. Islam-based parties can dominate this kelurahan reaching . percent. Fourth is Suronatan. This is a tiny kampung consisting of merely one RW located in the Kelurahan of Notoprajan, Ngampilan. It is the closest kampung from Kauman. Thus, Kauman and Suronatan are two kampungs which have long histories with Muhammadiyah. Education activities in this area began since when the Muhammadiyah Suronatan Primary School in the same year was founded directly by Ahmad Dahlan. Hence, it is also one of the oldest schools in Indonesia. The following development was the emergence of the TK ABA Suronatan which was initiated by activists of ‘Aisyiyah in . Right at the border of this location, there is a Muslim boarding secondary school for female pupils established since namely the Mu’allimaat Muhammadiyah Boarding School. Furthermore, Suronatan is the foundation of the education centre for religious scholars known as PUTM which was recently relocated in the hillside of Mount Kaliurang, Sleman District. Demonstrably, the Taqwa Mosque has a vital contribution in the early creation of the PUTM and still shapes devout Muslim activities. In the political stage, the municipal legislative election result demonstrated that PAN was the ruling party in the Kelurahan of Notoprajan by earning votes, followed by PDIP with votes, PPP with votes, Golkar with votes and PKS with votes. Islam-based parties in this kelurahan can win with . percent of the vote. Fifth is Warungboto. This is one of the kelurahans located in the Umbuharjo Sub-Municipality. It is large at . quadrate kilometres with nine RWs and RTs. Right now, many education centres can be found inside the location. The kindergartens include TK ABA Warungboto established since , TKIT Salman Al-Farisi, TKIT Al Khairaat and also Muhammadiyah PAUD. At the level of the primary school, there are the SD Muhammadiyah Sokonandi Warungboto, the SD Islamiyah Warungboto and the SD IT Al Khairaat. One of the UAD campuses is located in this area, precisely at Professor Soepomo Street. Health centres are also available in Warungboto, such as the Hidayatullah Islamic Hospital, one of the leading hospitals in Yogyakarta Mu- Chapter VII 238 nicipality and also the health and maternity clinics in cooperation with the PKU Muhammadiyah Hospital. In social activities, the Muhammadiyah Centre for philanthropy activities was established in , the economic centre namely the KJKS was established in and the learning course centre, i.e. the Final Smart Solution (FiSS). It is also interesting that there is a Muslim grave inside this location established at the end of . In political affairs, the municipal legislative election result in the Kelurahan of Warungboto depicted that PDIP was the ruling party by earning , votes. For the others, PPP had , votes, PAN had votes and PKS had votes. Nonetheless, Islam-based parties in this kelurahan can dominate the others by reaching . percent of the votes. Sixth is Nitikan. This is one of the kampungs in the Kelurahan of Sorosutan, Umbulharjo. Most local people who have been dwelling inside this area believe that the ancestors of Ahmad Dahlan originated from this location. Numerous religious scholars come from Nitikan. In the past, there were two local famous Muslim scholars namely Kyai Sulaiman Rosyid dan Kyai Syafii. The former had an offspring Kyai Ahmad Dahlan while the latter had the following offspring: Kyai Busyro, Kyai Abdullah Hadi, Kyai Mursid and Kyai Hisyam Syafii who were the pioneers in developing Islamic activities in this location. Numerous education institutions can be found here. At the level of kindergarten, there are TK ABA Nitikan established since , Al-Qur’an Nitikan Education Centre established since the s, TK PIRI Nitikan and TK Al-Furqon. At the level of primary school, there are SD Piri Nitikan, SDIT Al-Khairat and SD Muhammadiyah Nitikan. In the meantime, there is the SMP PIRI for the junior high school and the SMK Muhammadiyah for the high vocational school, both located in the main Nitikan Street. Furthermore, Nitikan also has an orphanage owned by Muhammadiyah established since the s. Various mosques and prayer rooms still exist inside, such as Muthohirin, An Nashir, As Salam, Al Ittihad, Al Furqon, Wirotunggal and Al Anwar. The existence of a traditionalist Islamic boarding school for males and females, Al-Luqmaniyyah, also situates Nitikan as the centre of devout Muslims. In political affairs, the result of the municipal legislative election in the Kelurahan of Sorosutan revealed that PDIP was the ruling party. It 3. TRIKASWANI: Kampung Santri in the Root of Marhaen 239 achieved , votes, followed by PPP with , votes, PAN with , votes, Gerindra with votes and PKS with votes. Therefore, Islam-based parties, in general, gained . percent of the vote. Concluding Remarks Supported by representative data and pieces of evidence, this chapter theorised that political ideology is still vigorous when parties interact and communicate with civil society and economic society. With the former group, parties tend to have close ties with collateral-mass organisations and alliances: PDIP with the Marhaenism devotees, PAN with the Muhammadiyah-‘Aisyiyah networks and PKS with the Jemaah Tarbiyah linkage. To build their internal force, each of these parties has their own strategy to recruit cadres and elites. PDIP prefers to recruit cadres from Marhaenism-based organisations. Moreover, PAN tends to recruit cadres mainly from Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah. In the meantime, most cadres of PKS originated from LDK and KAMMI. This evidence reinforces the arguments of Diamond ( ), Poguntke ( ), Mainwaring and Torcal ( ) and Mietzner ( ). Parties have distinctive ties. Although PDIP attempts to struggle for the wong cilik interests in certain cases, some of its elites still have business interests in entertainment industries when the municipal government, at the time, desired to close such industries. The relocation of street-based vendors and some traditional markets is another plain case. Furthermore, PAN prefers to build a proportional or reciprocal cooperation with business clusters, although many of its cadres are leading entrepreneurs locally and nationally. Meanwhile, PKS has little concern with this issue, for two reasons: the social background of its elites and the fact that PKS has never been part of the main regime party. Demonstrably, the findings do not supporting the thesis of Ambardi ( ), Winters ( ) and Reuter ( ) who believe that Indonesia’s parties are entirely cartelised and dependant on conglomerates or tycoons; rather, some of them still keep a distance from businessmen with large private fortunes. Regarding the relationship between parties and society, it is important to postulate here the emergence of ideological cleavage: abangan 4. Chapter VII 240 and santri. The given data reveal that Yogyakarta Municipality is the core base for abangan society or Marhaen devotees. Despite the roots of Marhaen, centres for pious Muslim activities are found inside the municipality, i.e., Kauman, Karangkajen, Kotagede, Suronatan, Warungboto and Nitikan. These six locations could be called “TRIKASWANI”. These six locations were selected based on historical, socio-religious and political considerations. 4. Concluding Remarks 241 Chapter VIII Conclusion: The Waning and Revival of Political Ideology Examining political ideologies and political parties in Indonesia are appealing subjects to examine further. Indonesia is not merely the third largest democratic state of the globe but also the largest predominantly Muslim country with variation among Muslim beliefs and practices and its positive development in economic affairs as well. After roughly four decades, the political ideology has been muted since the end of the s and the breakdown of the New Order regime in provided a chance for the emergence of political ideologies in Indonesia through party politics. Hundreds of political parties were established in post– . Nonetheless, merely parties were allowed to participate in the election, parties in , parties in and parties in . Most of them were founded and their policies and agendas were based on ideological considerations which were designed and stood between two opposing spectrums: secular and religious. At the same time, despite having positive developments, the democratisation wave in Indonesia, by and large, has run at a slow pace towards an embedded democracy. The democracy in Indonesia today falls into the scenario of stability (Merkel & Croissant, ), with neither optimism towards a consolidated democracy nor a regression in the near future. In order to encourage the democratic system, the separation of power between the central and regional governments known as “decentralisation” has been applied as an integrated system where the regional government, mainly the district and municipal levels have high authority to govern their own local resources. By applying the decentralised system, the local governance can realise the state and people’s welfare. 243 Numerous studies have described political parties in Indonesia’s post-New Order regime, whether analysing a sole party or a comparative study. Nonetheless, scrutinising parties in the context of local governance by selecting more than two parties based on ideological considerations and with a long time frame is still rare. Therefore, this study examined the existence of political ideology in contemporary Indonesia, from to . In doing so, selecting a particular district/ municipality with well-implemented local governance was applied in this study. Yogyakarta Municipality was selected. Moreover, three political parties were chosen as being representative; PDIP symbolises the abangan group (nationalist-secular), PAN characterises the old-santri group (nationalist-Muslim) and PKS can be classified as the new-santri group (nationalist-Islamist). Utilising a qualitative research method with in-depth interview and the documentary analysis as the data-gathering techniques, this study answered three interrelated questions: How do the policy and agenda of political parties cope with education and health issues? Do their policies and agendas work effectively? What are their strategies in interacting and communicating with four main actors in the governance arena: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society? The answer to these three questions answered the central question of this study: To what extent does political ideology influence political parties in addressing local governance issues in Yogyakarta Municipality? Towards a Symbiotic Ideology: Welfarism It can be postulated here that contemporary Indonesian parties are characterised by the fact that they are gradually moving towards a symbiotic ideology. The word “symbiotic” is an adjective from “symbiosis” which, according to the Cambridge Dictionary ( ), signifies a reciprocal relationship between two or more types of similar things in which each provides for the other the required conditions for its existence. In this context, symbiotic ideology can be understood as joining distinctive ideologies together into a particular ideology so that each party has an ability to continue its survival. The existence of ideologies in Indonesia today which are situated in the secular-religious 1. Chapter VIII 244 cleavage, is towards into a similar trajectory when parties address issues related mainly to public policies: as the fighter of welfare, primarily for lower-class people. Thus, Welfarism, convinced that a state has some responsibilities in securing the well-being of its people, is the symbiotic ideology adopted by Indonesian political parties in coping with public services. To verify this thesis, the policy of PDIP, PAN and PKS in addressing two main public services, education and health, follows a common pattern. In education issues, they together envision a threefold vision: ) free education, ) the realisation of years of compulsory education, and ) the improvement of school facilities, teacher quality and student scholarship not merely in public schools but also in private institutions. Concerning health issues, they concur to strive for a threefold target: ) free healthcare, ) the increase of the health centres’ facilities and work quality and ) the need to establish “a hospital without classes” prioritised for a poor-class society. Thus, these three parties agree that education and health are basic needs for human life which should be subsidised entirely by the municipal budget. In producing a policy or a set of policies, three main determining factors can influence those parties: the party regulation, internal stimuli and external stimuli. The party regulation will be found mainly in the party’s vision and missions, the party’s statute, the congressional decisions, the instructions made by the central board of the party and the official meeting decisions. In terms of internal stimuli, PDIP has two factors: ) the three pillar meetings consisting of structural, legislative and executive; ) the reports of three centres of the service: the DPC PDIP office, the PDIP Fraction in the DPRD and the PAC PDIP and DPRt PDIP offices. Meanwhile, PAN and PKS have one factor respectively. The reports coming from the DPC and DPRt are owned by PAN and the web of cadre aspirations belongs to PKS. Regarding external stimuli, there are five driving factors: MUSRENBANG, reses, public opinions, public hearings and society reports. Moreover, regarding the main policy makers of the party, although these three parties apply the collective-collegial mechanism and the deliberative system as its embodiment, in fact, the chairperson and the daily board of the party have dominant authorities rather than other positions in formulating and deciding a set of policies in the party. 1. Towards a Symbiotic Ideology: Welfarism 245 Furthermore, concerning the parties’ agenda in coping with two public services, it could be found in two distinctive ways. First are structural ways. It can be seen with the parties’ involvement in the DPRD’s tool fittings. Due to having many parliamentary seats and holding vital positions, PDIP, PAN and PKS have already demonstrated their significant contributions structurally in five distinctive tool fittings: the DPRD board, the commission of social welfare, the legislation body, the budgeting body and the special committee. More specifically, PDIP has already held the head of the DPRD three times, the chairperson of the commission of social welfare twice, the chairperson of the legislation body once, the chairperson of the budgeting body twice and the chairperson of the special committee once. PAN held the head of the DPRD once, twice as the chairperson of the commission of social welfare, once as the chairperson of the legislation body, once as the chairperson of the budgeting body and once as the chairperson of the special committee. In the meantime, PKS once held the deputy head of the DPRD, once as the vice chairperson of the commission of social welfare, once as the vice chairperson of the legislation body, once as the vice chairperson of the budgeting body and once as the chairperson of the special committee. PDIP, PAN and PKS usually have their representatives in those five kinds of the tool fittings so that they have contributed structurally either as the board or as an ordinary member in dealing with education and health issues. Second are functional ways as seen from the parties’ attitudes towards local regulation drafts (raperda) related to education and health issues. In doing so, PDIP, PAN and PKS have their own positions in addressing four sorts of raperda: the education system, the retribution of health services, health insurance and exclusive breastfeeding. The attitudes can be found through fractional views (pemandangan umum) delivered in the DPRD plenary sessions or through personal opinions of their delegates in the special committee. Despite having different expressions and points of view, the views of the three parties generally are encouraging and strengthening one another. With these two approaches played by these three parties, the positive growth of education and health issues in Yogyakarta Municipality is clear. All local regulations (perda) related to public services are usually discussed and issued officially by the DPRD, and all tool fittings Chapter VIII 246 are encouraging each other. Moreover, the municipal budget related to these two issues has been experiencing spectacular improvement from year to year. In , the budget for education sectors was still under five percent. It then rose to . percent in and improved drastically to . percent in . Likewise, the budget for health sectors in was . percent. It increased to percent in and . percent in . Hence, the budget for education in is the biggest of all sectors, followed by the budget for regional autonomy and health in the second and third ranks respectively. The budget for two sectors, education and health, in was more than half of the total annual budget of the municipality. That is why Yogyakarta Municipality could be considered Indonesia’s city of education. It is evident that with all the progress party agendas have done, all of them work effectively and successfully. Blunt in the Power Arena, Sharp to the Grassroots The strategy of the three parties in interacting and communicating with governance actors can be classified into two clusters. First is the relationship between parties and the state actors consisting of the government and the legislature. Second is the relationship between parties and the society groups comprising civil society and economic society. This study hypothesises that the political ideology is blunt in “the power arena” while it is sharp when it copes with “the grassroots”. In other words, the ideology is waning if it appears in the power arena, but conversely will revive if it addresses the grassroots. Waning Ideology: A Contest in the Power Arena The relationship between parties and the executive actors starts with the creation of a coalition in the mayoral election and ends at the end of the regime. The new coalition will begin again in the following mayoral election and so on. Broadly speaking, changeable politics is an embedded feature of the dynamics of local politics in Yogyakarta Municipality for three periods of the administration since until . 2. 2.1. 2. Blunt in the Power Arena, Sharp to the Grassroots 247 This study put forward three models of political cleavage found in the relationship between parties and the executive actors. First is the ideological approach from to . It denotes the relationship which took place between the abangan group (FPDIP and FKDK) and the santri group (FPAN and FPI). The pattern of coalition and clash during the mayoral election were tangible evidence. This clash was supported by some cases related to the relocation of street-based vendors and the closing of so-called “social illness spots” such as nightclubs, discotheques, casinos, drug trade and prostitution. Second is the pragmatic approach from to . This relationship indicates that political competition is rooted in a pragmatic orientation. The cleavage is based on the likes and dislikes amongst of them and preferring to avoid ideological considerations. It could be seen with the existence of the KRJ-Coalition (PAN and Golkar) vis-avis the KMP-Coalition (PDIP, PPP and PKS). Nevertheless, since the successful leadership by Herry Zudianto as the city mayor, the conflict tended to subside. The participation in governing the municipality not merely involves the governing parties but also all interrelated political parties. This is in line with the outstanding growth of the municipality. Third is the pragmatic-opportunist approach from to . It signifies that each of these three parties has the ambition to take a chance and a position in gaining the control of the municipal government through the mayoral election (pilwalkot). Therefore, PDIP, PAN and PKS had their own candidate in the mayoral election. Although PKS did not triumph, some of its elites had special ties with the elected pair of mayor and vice mayor. PAN was seemingly the sole party which always criticised the regime. In the meantime, an internal conflict occurred between the city mayor and its vice mayor, primarily at the end of the period. Each of them attempted to consolidate themselves for the candidacy in the mayoral election. Regarding the relationship between parties and the municipal agencies, the given data imply that PDIP prefers to struggle for individual interests while PAN and PKS tend to strive for institutional interests. PDIP has no special relation to particular institutions related to education and health issues. In the meantime, PAN usually keeps a close bond with Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah while PKS with the Chapter VIII 248 JSIT network. Each party will struggle for their own group or alliance interests. Meanwhile, the relationship between parties and the legislative actors begins after the elected legislators are decided officially by the KPUD and will discontinue until the end of the legislative period. In terms of the relationship of parties and their fraction in the parliament, it, in general, seemed solid in spite of a tiny clash, primarily suffered by PDIP and PAN in – . In the meantime, there was no crucial conflict found in PKS. Regarding the relationship amongst fractions within the parliament, it depends on the issue. If they discuss issues related to public policies and parliamentary affairs such as wages and the tool fittings, the situation will liquefy. On the other hand, if they address issues linked to religion and ethnicity, the circumstances will become extreme clashes. The three models of political cleavage in the executive arena and the relationship pattern depends on the issue or interest in the legislative arena indicating that the political ideology in the power arena is inactive or blunt. In other words, waning of ideology is detected when parties compete for one another in the power arena. In particular, “the symbiotic politics” were found in some contexts. The symbiotic politics signifies the fact that parties direct their different ideologies into a particular goal with a certain interest. In the executive arena, the unification of different ideologies was found, mainly in the municipal election when secular and Islamist parties (PDIP, PPP and PKS) were situated in one coalition and nominated an agreed pair of candidates. This continued during the – municipal administration in another form where all parties seemingly were controlled and tamed by the central figure of Herry Zudianto. Each party together positioned itself as the fighter of people’s interests when it interacted and communicated with the municipal agencies. The symbiotic politics also took place in the legislative arena when parties discussed and addressed welfare issues, either related to people’s or legislators’ interests. Thus, five fractions became one fraction if they dealt with welfare issues, but, one fraction ruptured into two or more fractions when they coped with electoral or religious/ ethnic issues. This phenomenon signifies that when political ideology 2. Blunt in the Power Arena, Sharp to the Grassroots 249 is waning, the more the local governance and even embedded democracy can be achieved. The Revival of Ideology: Approaching the Grassroots Whilst the political ideology is submerged in the power arena, it will revive if political parties interact and communicate with the society groups: civil society and economic society. In doing so, the revival of ideology can be formulated with “the creation of political forces” (see Figure . ). It is commenced, first and foremost, with the way parties recruit cadres from the existing networks and affiliations. After parties select the cadres, these elected cadres will be the key actors who mobilise societal power and attract popular votes. People will vote for the party based on their own preferences. The involvement in certain organisations, primarily religious-based organisations, will influence the way someone thinks. These organisations teach particular doctrines or religious perspectives. The way someone thinks will affect the way he/she votes for a certain party having a similar platform with his/her own social background. Consequently, he/she voluntarily will promote the organisation and the political party among family members, relatives, colleagues and so on. Based on this framework, each party will cultivate close ties with what Poguntke ( ) called a “collateral organisation”. Demonstrably, PDIP attempts to strengthen the web of Marhaenism devotees, PAN will rely on the network of Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah while PKS will maximise the role of the liqo’ linkages originating from the Jemaah Tarbiyah circle. To build their internal force, each of these parties has their own strategy to recruit cadres. PDIP prefers to recruit cadres from Marhaenism-based organisations characterised by multi-religions and multi-ethnics. Moreover, PAN tends to recruit cadres from mainly Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah and a small number from HMI and PII. In the meantime, most cadres of PKS originate from LDK and KAMMI. In the meantime, parties have distinctive bonds with economic society. Although PDIP is well-known with the slogan of struggling for the wong cilik, it does not truly prove such a slogan in its behaviour. 2.2. Chapter VIII 250 The closing of some leisure industries portrays the ambiguity of the PDIP position, whether striving for conglomerates or for labourers. In addition, the relocation of street-based vendors and traditional markets are evidence that PDIP can be a moderate party if it is involved in the process of decision making. Furthermore, PAN prefers to build reciprocal cooperation with business clusters in the proportional framework, although many of its cadres are leading entrepreneurs locally and nationally. Meanwhile, PKS has little concern with this issue for two reasons: the social background of the party’s elites and the fact that PKS has never been part of the main regime party. Regarding the relationship between parties and society actors, it is important to explain here that although Yogyakarta Municipality is the root of Marhaen communities, it is also the basis for kampung santri for pious Muslim activities. They are centred in Kauman, Karangkajen, Kotagede, Suronatan, Warungboto and Nitikan. These six locations could be abbreviated into one term: “TRIKASWANI”. These locations were selected for three reasons: a historical reason, a socio-religious reason and a political reason. Theoretical and Practical Implications From a theoretical standpoint, the findings call into question the hypothesis of Budge ( ) and Freeden ( ) which posits that the political ideology can frequently be reflected in the official programmes (policies and agendas) of the parties; this is frankly not quite accurate in contemporary Indonesia. Parties represented by PDIP, PAN and PKS join together as the fighters of people’s welfare and strive for the poor-class society’s interests. This signifies that the ideological contestation is waning and submerged, as there are no salient differences among platforms of those parties. The waning of ideology is strengthened by tangible evidence that the parties’ performance in the power arena indicates the feature of changeable politics, from ideological features into pragmatic features and again into pragmatic-opportunist features. Hence, the ideology is not applicable when parties address issues related to public policies and parliamentary affairs such as wages 3. 3. Theoretical and Practical Implications 251 and tool fittings. Instead, the ideology is revived when parties cope with issues related to religion and ethnicity. Furthermore, the theory developed by Jackson and Kingdon ( ) and Freeden ( ) that party ideology has a robust relationship with voting patterns is in line with this study. Each party with their own ideologies has a special relationship with societal organisations and alliances. This is supported by empirical findings which demonstrated that PDIP will cultivate its closeness with Marhaenismbased organisations, PAN prefers Muhammadiyah networks while PKS keeps its proximity with LDK and KAMMI communities. Hence, when Liddle ( ) hypothesised that the religious orientation has a weak influence on voting behaviour, it does not indicate that the relationship between parties and society is also feeble. Rather, the study’s findings strengthen the theories by Neumann ( ), Eldersveld ( ), Sartori ( ), Mainwaring ( ), Diamond ( ), Hofferbert ( ), Puhle ( ), Poguntke ( ), Randall ( ) and Mietzner ( ) who posit that parties are definitely associated with collateral-mass organisations and movements. Therefore, Ufen ( ) presumed that parties no longer have a tight network with any mass organisation including religious groups, which is not correct at all. The politics of aliran are not completely feeble as assumed by Ufen ( ). In addition, this study also supports Mietzner’s ( : p. ) argument that compared with other new democracies, Indonesia’s parties have a more solid historical and ideological foundation, cultivate closer ties to societal organisations and movements, have avoided confrontational competition patterns and indeed have contributed to the general stability of the post-authoritarian regime of . The survival of some political ideologies in contemporary Indonesia such as Pancasila, Islamism, secularism and communism-Marxism is encouraging Bajpai and Bonura’s ( ) theory that put forward some leading ideologies in South and Southeast Asia: liberalism, communism, nationalism, religious ideologies and ideologies of race, indignity and caste. The role of European colonialism in the Southeast Asia region has influential contributions in shaping those kinds of ideology. Nevertheless, the political cleavage between abangan and santri is occasionally inactive and alive. The cleavage is waning when it addresses issues related to public services and when it is situated in the Chapter VIII 252 power arena. In contrast, it will revive when it deals with religious and ethnic issues as well as the grassroots. Thus, the dichotomy of abangansantri which was classified by Geertz ( ) in a particular context is hazy and even disappearing. The disappearance of this dichotomy could be detected in some contexts such as in executive and legislative elections and in the discussions related to parliamentary tool fittings and legislators’ wages. Nevertheless, this study supports the theories of Randall ( ) and Mainwaring ( ) that studying political parties in developing countries is associated with the issues of democratisation, ideology, the party system and institutionalism. In addition, this study supports the theories postulated by Strom ( ), Downs ( ) and Harmel and Janda ( ) that each political party pursues four goals: winning the elections, gaining the executive office, advocating for interests or issues and implementing intra-party democracy. Indeed, PDIP, PAN and PKS have a desire to chase and obtain all four goals. It is important to highlight that there are three determining factors which influence a party in deciding on a set of policies namely the party regulation, the internal stimuli and the external stimuli reinforcing the theories of Pal ( ) and Harmel and Janda ( ). In the meantime, the existence of the chairperson and the daily board of the party as the main policy-makers of the party also strengthens Harmel and Janda’s ( ) hypothesis on five structural hierarchies of the authority: top leaders, middle-level leaders, activists, members and supporters. Particularly, this study also attempts to revise the preceding classification of political parties. Most previous scholars have distinctive classifications for PAN. Baswedan ( ) categorised it as the Islaminclusive party and Ufen ( ) grouped it into the moderate Islamic party. This study classified PAN as the nationalist-Muslim party. Moreover, Baswedan ( ), Webber ( ), Abuza ( ) Permata ( ) Mecham and Hwang ( ) categorised PKS as “the Islamist party”, Barton ( ) grouped it as “the formalist Islamic party” and Hosen ( ) catalogued it as “the formal sharia group party”. Nonetheless, this study grouped PKS into the category of “the nationalist-Islamist party”. For PDIP, this study applied Baswedan’s ( ) and Ufen’s ( ) concept: the nationalist-secular party. 3. Theoretical and Practical Implications 253 For practical implications, the formation of the symbiotic ideology among Indonesia’s parties in the context of struggling for social welfare is a positive sign in consolidating and stabilising local democracy. It indicates that all parties perform and work for people’s interests, not for personal ambitions or certain groups. It also denotes the fact that the parties’ platform is applicable with the fifth principle of Pancasila, keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (social justice for all Indonesian people), and no party would endanger the unity of Indonesia as a state or a nation. In the other hand, the symbiotic ideology eventually will obscure the party platform so that it is difficult for any society to differentiate between secular and Islamist parties. Hence, it is a dilemma for ideology-based parties, between struggling for people’s welfare to attract popular votes and losing the party identity. The best but easy choice is indeed striving for people’s welfare without losing the party identity. In the same vein, the waning ideology in the power arena reveals that the politics of aliran is feeble and, in turn, it has some effects. First is the hazy identity which would be suffered by parties so that the party platform is not fundamental anymore. Second is that parties no longer have an obvious guideline in directing their policy, agendas and strategies due to the poor ideology. Third is the increase of authoritarianism, personalism and presidentialised parties as postulated by Samuels ( ), Poguntke and Webb ( ), Ufen ( a) and Kawamura ( ) which will threaten the party’s institutionalisation. In the meantime, the resurgence of ideology in the grassroots is tangible evidence that Indonesia’s parties indeed have a robust ideology and rooted ties to society so that parties could be a real channel for society to convey their aspirations to the state. The waning and resurgence of political ideology could be called “two sides of the same coin” which demonstrates that the more a party has a vigorous ideology and rooted bonds to society the more it has a chance to realise the party’s agendas and goals. The electoral performance of PDIP in and and PKS in and could be appropriate instances. Conversely, the less a party has a vigorous ideology there is more risk for the party to be inactive and lost. The electoral performance of PKB in and and the Democrat Party in are precise cases. Nevertheless, the waning or resurgence of ideol- Chapter VIII 254 ogy seemingly is not too significant for society. The fulfilment of basic needs and the achievement of pleasant life are indeed their real desire. Therefore, the most important thing is how parties capitalise and interpret such desires into a platform and strategies which differentiate themselves from others to earn popular votes and public sympathy. Proposal for Further Research Due to the limitations of this study, it is important to examine further three categories of research. First is conducting qualitative research regarding the policy and agenda of three parties, PDIP, PAN and PKS in dealing with the issues related to religion and ethnicity. Investigating the cases of making sharia regulations or anti-alcohol laws, the establishment of sharia-based Islamic banks, the foundation of sharia-based hotels or the allocation of financial aids for worship places are relevant instances to elaborate in in-depth research. Such research will depict to what extent political ideology is used. Second is carrying out empirical research on the relationship between the three parties and society groups in other districts and municipalities outside Yogyakarta Municipality. Are PDIP, PAN and PKS still relying on collateral-mass organisations and alliances in mobilising societal forces and attracting popular votes? Or, rather, is the organisational machine of the party feeble and inactive? This eventually will confirm the preceding hypothesis, either supporting or rejecting the thesis that political parties have a tight bond with collateral organisations including the determining factors. Third is sociological research on the existence of six kampung santris known as “TRIKASWANI” as elaborated in Chapter VII. First, research should explore the recent development of one of the TRIKASWANIs or a comparative study of two or more kampungs related to their contributions in activating the santri’s activities among the Marhaenist society. Second, research can explore the role of society (it can be specific to an organisation such as Muhammadiyah) in Islam-based parties winning the legislative election, mainly in four kelurahans: Purbayan, Prenggan, Brontokusuman and Notoprajan. 4. 4. Proposal for Further Research 255 Such research will portray the current influence of devout Muslims in Marhenist communities. Chapter VIII 256 Appendices Appendix 1 List of Interviewees Ahmad Qisai, programme manager for Civil Society Governance, Kemitraan, Jakarta, August . Ahmad Salim, headmaster of SMP IT Abu Bakar Yogyakarta – and member of Foundation of Islam Terpadu Abu Bakar, October . Alexander Budi Suwarno, chairperson of Commission of Catholic’s Kateketik Kevikepan in Yogyakarta, November . Andar Rujito, headmaster of Christian’s School SMA BOPKRI I Yogyakarta, October . Antoniyus HW, PDIP politician in Yogyakarta Municipality, September . Aris Madani, chairperson of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Budi Santosa Asrori, secretary of Education Agency in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Chang Wendryanto, PDIP politician and MP of DPRD in Yogyakarta Special Territory – , October . Danang Rudiyatmoko, chairperson of DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Dwi Budi Utomo, chairperson of DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality – and MP of DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Farid Cahyono, researcher at Kemitraan for IGI Project, September . Heroe Poerwadi, chairperson of DPD PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality – and – , June and September . Herry Zudianto, mayor of Yogyakarta Municipality – and – , October . Hery Sulistio, research officer for IGI Project, Kemitraan, Jakarta, August . Himmatus Sudja’ah, chairperson of ‘Aisyiyah in Yogyakarta Municipality – , October . 257 Kirnadi, secretary-general of Yogyakarta Labour Alliance (Aliansi Buruh Yogyakarta, ABY), secretary of All Indonesian Workers Union Confederation (Konfederasi Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia, KSPSI) in Yogyakarta Special Territory, October . Made Dwi Putra, PDIP politician in Yogyakarta Municipality, September . Muhammad Ali Fahmi, secretary of DPD PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality – , deputy head I of DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Muhammad Fauzan, PKS politician and MP of DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Muhammad Sofyan, chairperson of DPD PAN in Yogyakarta Municipality – , October and November . Muhammad Syafi’i, chairperson of DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality – and – , September , November and May . Muhammad Zuhrif Hudaya, chairperson of DPD PKS in Yogyakarta Municipality – and MP of DPRD in Yogyakarta Special Territory – , October . Rifki Listianto, PAN politician and MP of DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – and – , September . Sri Surani, chairperson of Yogyakarta NGO Forum – , September . Sudiyatna, chairperson of the Integrated Islamic Schools Network (JSIT) in Yogyakarta – , November . Sujarnoko, chairperson of DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality – , head of DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – , October . Sutaryo, secretary of DPC PDIP in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Syamsury, head of Education Agency in Yogyakarta Municipality – , October . Syukri Fadholi, vice mayor of Yogyakarta Municipality – , June and October . Tuty Setyowati, head of Health Agency in Yogyakarta Municipality – , October . Wawan Budiyanto, chairperson of KPUD in Yogyakarta Municipality – , September . Wartono, chairperson of DPC PKS in Umbulharjo Sub-Municipality – , November . Appendices 258 Appendix 2 The Board and Members of the Commission of Social Welfare DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – The Board and Members of the Commission E of Social Welfare, – No Name Party Origin Position Drs. Abdul Malik Hasan PAN Chairperson/Member HM. Wasul Widyapranata, BA PBB (FPI) Vice Chair/Member Karsono PDIP Secretary/Member R. Soehardiman, Bc.Hk PAN Member M. Surandi PDIP Member Djati Waluyo PDIP Member Drs. Suhartono, ST Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tentang Penetapan Jumlah Komisi dan Bidangnya, Susunan Pimpinan dan Anggota Komisikomisi DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, in: Risalah Rapat DPRD Kotamadya Daerah Tingkat II Yogyakarta No. /RIS/ Tanggal October . The Board and Members of the Commission I of Government and Social Welfare, – No Name Party Origin Position Irintoko Cahyo Dumadi, BSc PDIP Chairperson/Member Ardianto PKS Vice Chair/Member Justina Paula Suyatmi, BA Democrat Secretary/Member Chang Wendryanto, SH PDIP Member Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Member Heri Setyo Parmuji PDIP Member Iriawan Argo Widodo, SIP PAN Member Nur Rosyidah, SP PAN Member Yusron Achmadi, S.Ag PAN Member R. Bagus Sumbarja Golkar Member Supardi B Democrat Member Source: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – . Appendix 2 259 The Board and Members of the Commission D of Social Welfare, – No Name Party Origin Position Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Chairperson/Member Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE PAN Vice Chair I/Member Ir. Toni Ariestiono Democrat Vice Chair II/Member Emanuel Ardi Prasety, Amd PDIP Member Dra. Dewi Irawati PDIP Member Agus Prasetio AS., ST Democrat Member Agung Atmodjo Democrat Member M. Hasan Widagdo PPP (PAN-Frac-tion) Member Muhammad Syafi’i, S.Psi PKS Member Fatchiyatul Fitri, SH Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal November tentang Penetapan Susunan Pimpinan dan Anggota Komisikomisi DPRD Kota Yogyakarta. In: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, . The Board and Members of the Commission D of Social Welfare, – No Name Party Origin Position Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Chairperson/Member Rifki Listianto, S.Si PAN Vice Chair/Member Agung Atmodjo Democrat Secretary/Member Mugiyono Pujo Kusumo PDIP Member Dwi Saryono PDIP Member Seno Pratomo Democrat Member M. Hasan Widagdo PPP (PAN-Frac-tion) Member Lisferi Setiarini, SE PKS Member Muhammad Fauzan, ST PKS Member Fatchiyatul Fitri, SH Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal November tentang Perubahan Kelima atas Lampiran Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta Nomor: Penetapan Keanggotaan Komisi-komisi DPRD. Appendices 260 The Board and Members of the Commission D of Social Welfare, – No Name Party Origin Position Agung Damar Kusumandaru, SE PAN Chairperson/Member A. Fokki Ardiyanto, SIP PDIP Vice Chair/Member HM. Fauzi Noor Afshochi PPP Secretary/Member Dhian Novitasari, S.Pd Gerindra Member Dwi Saryono PDIP Member Suryani, SE., M.Si PDIP Member Mugiyono Pujo Kusumo PDIP Member R. Ay. F. Diani Anindhitiati, S.Sos,MM Golkar Member Dwi Budi Utomo, S.Pt PKS Member H. Syamsul Hadi, SE Democrat (F-PKS) Member Source: Compiled by the Author. Appendix 3 The Board and Members of the Legislation Body DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – The Board and Members of the Legislation Body, – No Name Party Origin Position Zulnasri PAN Chairperson/Member Fatchiyatul Fitri, SH Golkar Vice Chair I/Member Antonius Fokki Ardiyanto, SIP PDIP Vice Chair II/Member Anton Parabu Semendawai, SH PDIP Member Dwi Wahyu Budantoro, S.Pd PDIP Member Chang Wendryanto, SH PDIP Member Tatang Setiawan, SH PDIP Member R. Eko Purnomo Kasbiyantoro, SH Democrat Member Marwoto Hadi, SH Democrat Member Ign. Prayogo Sunaryo Democrat Member Appendix 3 261 Agung Atmodjo Democrat Member Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE, MM PAN Member Ida Ariyanti, S.Hut PAN Member Muhammad Fauzan, ST PKS Member Muhammad Syafi’i, S.Psi PKS Member Bambang Seno Baskoro, ST Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal November tentang Penetapan Keanggotaan Badan Legislasi Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, in: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, . The Board and Members of the Legislation Body, – No Name Party Origin Position Ervian Parmunadi Democrat Chairperson/Member Antonius Fokki Ardiyanto, SIP PDIP Vice Chair/Member Secretary of DPRD Non-Party Secretary/Non-Mem-ber Chang Wendryanto, SH PDIP Member Dwi Wahyu Budantoro, S.Pd PDIP Member Tatang Setiawan, SH PDIP Member Ir. Toni Ariestiono Democrat Member Agung Atmodjo Democrat Member Agung Damar Kusumandaru, SE PAN Member Zulnasri PAN Member HM. Zuhrif Hudaya, ST PKS Member Fatchiyatul Fitri, SH Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal November tentang Penetapan Keanggotaan Badan Legislasi DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, in: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : p. . The Board and Members of the Legislation Body, – No Name Party Origin Position Tatang Setiawan, SH PDIP Chairperson/Member Bambang Anjar Jalumurti, S.Pi PKS Vice Chair/Member Emanuel Ardi Prasetya PDIP Member A. Fokki Ardiyanto, S.IP PDIP Member Appendices 262 Suryani, SE., M.Si PDIP Member Dhian Novitasari, S.Pd Gerindra Member Sila Rita, SH, MH PPP Member Estri Utami, SE PAN Member Rifki Listianto, S.Si PAN Member R. Ay. F. Diani Anindhitiati, S.Sos,MM Golkar Member Source: Compiled by the Author. Appendix 4 The Board and Members of the Budgetary Body DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – The Board and Members of the Budgetary Committee, – No Name Party Origin Position Ir. Cinde Laras Yulianto PDIP Chairperson/Member H. Suwandono, BA Golkar Vice Chair/Member Arief Eddy Subianto PAN Secretary/Member Ir. Sukardi Yani, MM PAN Member Nanda Irawan, SH PPP Member Turino Junaidy PDIP Member M. Surandi PDIP Member Drs. Herkitanto PDIP Member Herman Helmy PAN Member H. Awang Nuryanto PAN Member H. Suroso, S.Sos TNI Member M. Syalthut Aridloi, SE PPP Member Anderias Neno, SE., MM PDKB Member Agustinus Margoyono,WS TNI Member H. Totok Pranowo, BA Golkar Member Appendix 4 263 HM. Wasul Widyapranata, BA PBB Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal October tentang Susunan Pimpinan dan Anggota Panitia Anggaran DPRD Kota Yogyakarta. The Board and Members of the Budgetary Committee, – No Name Party Origin Position Ir. Cinde Laras Yulianto PDIP Chairperson/Member H. Suwandono, BA Golkar Vice Chair/Member Arief Eddy Subianto PAN Secretary/Member Ir. Sukardi Yani, MM PAN Member Nanda Irawan, SH PPP Member Turino Junaidy PDIP Member M. Surandi PDIP Member Drs. Herkitanto PDIP Member Muhammad Hatta PAN Member H. Awang Nuryanto PAN Member Muchamad Budiarto – Member M. Syalthut Aridloi, SE PPP Member Anderias Neno, SE., MM PDKB Member Bambang Kustono TNI Member H. Totok Pranowo, BA Golkar Member HM. Wasul Widyapranata, BA PBB Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal December tentang Perubahan Susunan Keanggotaan Panitia Anggaran DPRD Kota Yogyakarta. The Board and Members of the Budgetary Body, – No Name Party Origin Position Arif Noor Hartanto, SIP PAN Chairperson/Member Ir. Andrie Subiantoro PDIP Vice Chair/Member Dwi Budi Utomo, S.Pt PKS Vice Chair/Member M. Nur Affandi, SH., M.Hum Non-Party Secretary/Non-Mem-ber Suharyanto PDIP Member Appendices 264 Drs. YB Murdiyanto PDIP Member Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Member Y. Eko Rintarjo, STP PDIP Member Hery Setyo Pamuji PDIP Member Henry Kuncoroyekti, SH PDIP Member Iriawan Argo Widodo, SIP PAN Member H. Herman Dody Isdarmadi, AMd,Ak PAN Member H. Awang Nuryanto PAN Member Nur Rosyidah, SP PAN Member M. Zuhrif Hudaya, Dipl.Rad PKS Member Ardianto PKS Member Drs. H. Najib M. Saleh D. Golkar Member R. Bagus Sumbarja Golkar Member Dwi Astuti Golkar Member Justina Paula Suyatmi, BA Democrat Member Agus Prasetio AS, ST Democrat Member Supriyanto Untung PPP (F-Democrat) Member Source: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – . The Board and Members of the Budgetary Body, – No Name Party Origin Position Agus Prasetio AS, ST Democrat Chairperson/Member Tatang Setiawan, SH PDIP Vice Chair/Member HM. Fursan, SE PAN Vice Chair/Member Emanuel Ardi Prasetya, A.Md PDIP Member Suharyanto PDIP Member Dwi Saryono PDIP Member Henry Kuncoroyekti, SH PDIP Member Dwi Wahyu Budiantoro, S.Pd PDIP Member Suwarto PDIP Member Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Member RM. Sinarbiyat Nujanat, SE Democrat Member Danang Wahyu Broto, SE Democrat Member Ir. Toni Ariestiono Democrat Member Appendix 4 265 Robert Silvanus Dendeng Democrat Member Ervian Parmunadi Democrat Member Agung Damar Kusumandaru, SE PAN Member Rifki Listianto, S.Si PAN Member M. Hasan Widagdo Nugroho PPP (PAN-Fraction) Member M. Zuhrif Hudaya, ST PKS Member Muhammad Syafi’i, S.Psi PKS Member Ardianto PKS Member Bambang Seno Baskoro, ST Golkar Member Dra. Sri Retnowati Golkar Member Fatchiyatul Fitri, SH Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal November tentang Penetapan Susunan Pimpinan dan Anggota Badan Anggaran Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, in: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : p. . The Board and Members of the Budgetary Body, – No Name Party Origin Position Henry Kuncoroyekti, SH PDIP Chairperson/Member Agus Prasetio AS, ST Democrat Vice Chair/Member Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE., MM PAN Vice Chair/Member Secretary of DPRD Non-Party Secretary/Non-Mem-ber Chang Wendryanto, SH PDIP Member Emanuel Ardi Prasetya, A.Md PDIP Member Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Member Suharyanto PDIP Member Suwarto PDIP Member Tatang Setiawan, SH PDIP Member Ign. Prayogo Sunaryo Democrat Member Ir. Toni Ariestiono Democrat Member Ervian Parmunadi Democrat Member Agung Atmojo Democrat Member Rifki Listianto, S.Si PAN Member Ida Ariyani, S.Hut PAN Member Appendices 266 Bambang Anjar Jalumurti, S.Pi PKS Member Muhammad Syafi’i, S.Psi PKS Member M. Zuhrif Hudaya, ST PKS Member Bambang Seno Baskoro, ST Golkar Member Dra. Sri Retnowati Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal November tentang Penetapan Susunan Pimpinan dan Anggota Badan Anggaran Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, in: Sekretariat DPRD Kota Yogyakarta, : pp. – . The Board and Members of the Budgetary Body, – No Name Party Origin Position Sujanarko, SE PDIP Chairperson/Member M. Ali Fahmi, SE, MM PAN Vice Chair I/Member Ririk Banowati Permanasari, SH Gerindra Vice Chair II/Member Tatang Setiawan, SH PDIP Member Emanuel Ardi Prasetya PDIP Member GM. Deddy Jati S. PDIP Member Suharyanto PDIP Member Rifki Listianto, S.Si PAN Member HM. Fursan, SE PAN Member Novi Allisa Semendawai, SH Gerindra Member Christiana Agustiani Gerindra Member Augusnur, SH., S.IP Golkar Member Bambang Seno Baskoro, ST Golkar Member Dra. Sri Retnowati Golkar Member Nasrul Khoiri, S.Far., Apt PKS Member Dwi Budi Utomo, S.Pd PKS Member Supriyanto Untung PPP Member M. Hasan Widagdo W. PPP Member Source: Compiled by the Author. Appendix 4 267 Appendix 5 The Board and Members of the Special Committee for Education and Health Issues DPRD in Yogyakarta Municipality – The Board and Members of the Special Committee for the Discussion of the Local Regulation Draft on the Retribution of Health Services at the Puskesmas, No Name Party Origin Position M. Zuhrif Hudaya, Dipl.Rad PKS Chairperson/Member Dwi Astuti Golkar Vice Chair/Member Justina Paula Suyatmi, BA Democrat Member Irintoko Cahyo Dumadi, BSc PDIP Member Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Member Iriawan Argo Widodo, SIP PAN Member Siti Majmu’ah, S.Ag PAN Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tentang Susunan Personalia Pansus Pembahasan Raperda Kota Yogyakarta tentang Retribusi Pelayanan Kesehatan pada Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat. The Board and Members of the Special Committee for the Discussion of the Local Regulation Draft on the License in Operating Health Facilities and Workers, No Name Party Origin Position Siti Majmu’ah, S.Ag PAN Chairperson/Member M. Zuhrif Hudaya, Dipl.Rad PKS Vice Chair/Member H. Totok Pranowo, BA Golkar Member Ary Dewanto PDIP Member Hery Setyo Pamuji PDIP Member Yusron Achmadi, S.Ag PAN Member Justina Paula Suyatmi, BA Democrat Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal May tentang Susunan Keanggotaan Pansus Pembahasan Raperda Kota Yogyakarta tentang Izin Penyelenggaraan Pelayanan Kesehatan. Appendices 268 The Board and Members of the Special Committee for the Discussion of the Local Regulation Draft on the Education Organising System, No Name Party Origin Position Drs. H. Nahib M. Saleh D Golkar Chairperson/Member Justina Paula Suyatmi, BA Democrat Vice Chair/Member Sujarnoko, SE PDIP Member Iriantoko Cahyo Dumadi, BSc PDIP Member Suwarto PDIP Member Supardi Antono PDIP Member Iriawan Argo Widodo, SIP PAN Member H. Awang Nuryanto PAN Member Hj. Sri Kustantini, S.Sos PAN Member Siti Majmu’ah, S.Ag PAN Member M. Zuhrif Hudaya, Dipl.Rad PKS Member Drs. Ahmad Nur Umam, MM PKS Member Dwi Astuti Golkar Member Supriyanto Untung PPP (F-Democrat) Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal May tentang Susunan Keanggotaan Pansus Pembahasan Raperda Kota Yogyakarta tentang Sistem Penyelenggaraan Pendidikan. The Board and Members of the Special Committee for the Discussion of the Local Regulation Draft on the Retribution of Health Services at the Puskesmas, No Name Party Origin Position Agus Prasetio AS, ST Democrat Chairperson/Member M. Zuhrif Hudaya, ST PKS Vice Chair/Member Suharyanto PDIP Vice Chair/Member Dwi Saryono PDIP Member Emanuel Ardi Prasetya, Amd PDIP Member Agung Atmodjo Democrat Member Muhammad Ali Fahmi, SE, MM PAN Member Fatchiyatul Fitri, SH Golkar Member Source: Keputusan DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /K/DPRD/ tanggal January tentang Pembentukan Pansus Pembahasan Raperda Kota Yogyakarta Appendix 5 269 tentang Retribusi Pelayanan Kesehatan pada Pusat Kesehatan Masyarakat, in: Risalah Rapat Paripurna DPRD Kota Yogyakarta No. /RIS/ , Sekretariat DPRD Tahun Anggaran . The Board and Members of the Special Committee for the Discussion of the Local Regulation Draft on the Health Insurance Organising System, No Name Party Origin Position Chang Wendryanto, SH PDIP Chairperson/Member Zulnasri PAN Vice Chair/Member Ir. Toni Ariestiono Democrat Vice Chair/Member Antonius Fokki Ardiyanto, SIP PDIP Member Dra. 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Abstract

This book examines the influence of political ideology in Indonesia’s political parties to address governance issues during the democratic era, 1998–2015. Further, it investigates the policy, agenda and strategies of three ideological parties in Yogyakarta Municipality in coping with public service issues. The three parties are the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS).

References

Abstract

This book examines the influence of political ideology in Indonesia’s political parties to address governance issues during the democratic era, 1998–2015. Further, it investigates the policy, agenda and strategies of three ideological parties in Yogyakarta Municipality in coping with public service issues. The three parties are the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS).