2 Migration and forced displacement worldwide and in Germany in:

Lilija Wiebe

Rethinking Social Integration, page 15 - 36

Comparing Martha Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach and Friedrich Heckmann's Theory of Integration for the Context of Refugees

1. Edition 2020, ISBN print: 978-3-8288-4434-6, ISBN online: 978-3-8288-7448-0,

Series: Wissenschaftliche Beiträge aus dem Tectum Verlag: Sozialwissenschaften, vol. 93

Tectum, Baden-Baden
Bibliographic information
15 2 Migration and forced displacement worldwide and in Germany 2.1 Introduction The “International Migration Report” of the United Nations” Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines the international migrant as a foreign-born or foreign citizen (UNDESA 2016:1). A more detailed definition is given by the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. It reads as follows: “Migration is when a person spatially moves his/her centre of life. International migration is when this happens across state boundaries”9 (BAMF & BMI 2015:30). The sociologist Ludger Pries distinguishes between four ideal types of migration: “immigration”, “diaspora-migration” and “returnee-migration”; and, he adds the type “transmigration” to the three common ones (Pries 2010b:98). In the concept “transmigration” he captures the form of migration that is pluri-local. This form includes immigrants who experience repeated relocations which turn to be their normality (:100). With transnational, Pries means “across-border” but still anchored phenomenon (Pries 2010a:13). He emphasises that he does not speak of a fluid phenomenon but rather that the nations in which transnational people live represent their point of reference (:12). For example: in a transnational family, one part of the family might live in Istanbul and another part in Cologne. The family members are in constant contact with each other. They meet several times a year, celebrate important holidays with each other and share their everyday life via internet communication. Despite all this, people are also locally anchored and have relatively permanent and dense social relationships in both nations (:13). Further to this change in migration structures there is also a high number of force-displaced people in the world (UNHCR 2017:2). We are in a very diverse time regarding migration. On the one hand, it is possible for people to voluntarily travel between several places worldwide and “be at home” in different places on the globe. On the other hand, at present more people than ever are forced to leave their homes for different reasons. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the phenomenon of migration and forced displacement worldwide. Furthermore, the history of 9 Translation by the author. Original: “Von Migration spricht man, wenn eine Person ihren Lebensmittelpunkt räumlich verlegt, von internationaler Migration, wenn dies über Staatsgrenzen hinweg geschieht.“ 16 migration and the situation of refugees in Germany are delineated. Moreover, the current migration and integration policies and programmes of the German Government are critically reviewed. This is done to illustrate the historical and political framework in which this work is written. 2.2 Migration and forced displacement worldwide In this section, the history of migration and forced displacement is outlined. At this point it should be noted that all people who, for whatever reason, are forced to leave their homeland, migrate. Because of this the terms “migrant/ migration” are used as extended in scope; and, literature about “migration/migrants” is used as well as literature about “refugees” and “integration”. 2.2.1 Migration in history People have always been on the move. For a variety of reasons, new places of residence and homes were sought. Sometimes they leave voluntarily and sometimes involuntarily. The sociologist Douglas Massey divides the modern history of international migration into four periods (Massey 2008). The first one, which he calls the “mercantile period”, came to pass from 1500 to 1800 and was dominated by emigration out of Europe that was influenced by colonization and economic growth. This led to the fact that after 300 years large parts of America, Oceania, Asia and Africa had been taken by the Europeans. During this time almost 10 million African slaves were imported to America for cheap labour. The second period is the “industrial period” starting in the early nineteenth century. In the time from 1800 to 1925 more than 48 million people left Europe in search for new livelihoods in America and Oceania. The third period, from the beginning of World War I until the end of World War II, is one of “limited migration”. Migration was limited due to the outbreak of the World War I in 1914 and the onset of the Great Depression in 1929. During the 1940s the reasons for mobility were mainly flight and displacement caused by the Second World War. According to Massey, the “post-industrial migration” is the fourth period of international migration when, beginning in the 1960s, a shift in the direction of migration occurred in that immigration became a more global phenomenon whereas in earlier periods it was the Europeans that had left to settle elsewhere. A variety of countries started to 17 become both a sending and a receiving country. Also, people from lessdeveloped countries (LDCs) (some of them former colonies of European countries) started to immigrate to more-developed countries (MDCs). As the receiving countries inflicted stronger restrictions on immigration, undocumented migration began to increase (:1–2). The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) has been collecting data on migration since 1990. According to its data there were about 156 million migrants in 1990. The numbers have been measured at five-year intervals and proved to have increased constantly. The strongest increase occurred from 2005 to 2010 (UNDESA 2017). It can be observed that international migration is growing only slightly faster than world population, but that migration from LDCs to MDCs is growing much faster (Castles 2013:123). Wars are often the reason for involuntary resettlement but in the years 1917 to 1922, one to two million people fled from Russia, due to the change of government (Oltmer 2016:21). Later, due to the wars in Europe, the estimated number of people affected by relocations, deportations, flight movements and evictions was probably at least 9.5 million in the mid-1920s. Forced displacement has also had a very brutal face in history. The cruellest kind of forced migration was the deportation of approximately twelve million Africans during the 16th to 18th centuries. This involuntary emigration was a direct consequence of the great world explorations and subsequent territorial colonialization by European countries to develop the colonies using cheap labour. According to estimates about one third of these slaves died on the journey or shortly after arrival (Fisher 2014:76). Forcible displacement has been measured since 1997 by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR). One speaks of forcible displacement when people have to leave their homes due to results of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations. This includes displacement within the borders of the home country, as well as refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR 2017:2). The cause of the highest increase in forcible displacement happened between 2012 and 2015, due to the conflict in Syria. Other conflicts during this time in Iraq, Yemen, sub-Saharan Africa, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan also caused high numbers of forcible-displaced people (:5). Alexander Betts, Professor of Forced Migration and International Affairs, is of the opinion that “the causes, consequences, and responses to 18 refugees and other categories of forced migration are all closely intertwined with world politics” (Betts 2014:60). Migration does not happen in a vacuum. It is a reaction of people to their environment. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) sees poverty, underdevelopment, lack of opportunities, poor governance and environmental factors as some of the drivers of migration (United Nations 2016:23). “Drivers” of migration are the factors that increase the likelihood that people will decide to leave their homes. Sociologist Stephen Castles assumes that there are several “drivers” that motivate emigration. He distinguishes between “[…] neo-liberal globalisation and social transformation; inequality; state security and human security; technology; labour demand; demographic changes; politics; law and governance; the social dynamics of migration; and the role of people who make their living by facilitating migration” (Castles 2013:124). Another point of view in the field of migration and development, which is very controversial, is that of “brain gain” and “brain drain”. Proponents of the “brain gain” theory are of the opinion that the country of emigration will benefit in the long term from the remittance and the education of the emigrated. In contrast, the advocates of the brain drain theory believe that emigration is damaging to the country of emigration. Theophilus Fadayomi considers emigration of skilled professionals from “the” African perspective and evaluates it as critical. He is of the opinion that the emigration of skilled workers, which is also referred to as “brain drain”, results in an inadequate stock of manpower. Nevertheless, this lost expertise would be needed for the development and modernisation of the African countries. He clarifies his perspective that African countries with a high level of emigration have a higher rate of population per physician and a higher student/teacher ratio compared to the African countries with a high immigration rate, where the opposite is the case (Fadayomi 2010:127–128). In his view the commonly used counter-argument that the remittance of the immigrated professional as a compensation of the needed profession is only conditionally tenable since the money is available to the private area rather than the public sector. He also argues that there tends to be a danger of regional inequality, if a lot of emigrants from one region send remittances to their families (:129–131). Florance Tsaguè Assopgoum, who knows both, the global south and the west (born in Cameroon and living in Germany), sees the remittance of the migrants in a more positive perspective than Faayomi. Nevertheless, she also stresses that the remittance money is no solution for a sustainable development in Africa. In her 19 opinion the “Brain drain” can harm the economic, political, social, and cultural development of Africa (Tsagué Assopgoum 2011:119). 2.2.2 Latest history According to the United Nations Migration stock, in the mid-year of 2017, more than 250 million people were living in a country they had not been born in. There were about nine million more male migrants than female migrants (UNDESA 2017). 65.6 million people were forcibly displaced in 2016, which is still a high record. 22.5 million people are refugees, 40.3 million people are internally displaced, and 2.8 million people are seeking asylum outside their county. In the year 2016, 10.3 million individuals were newly displaced by conflict or persecution. This included 6.9 million displaced people inside their own countries, and 3.4 million new refugees and asylum-seekers. With 2.9 million people, Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees worldwide. Compared to the population, Lebanon, with 1 in 6 people, accommodated the largest number of refugees with regard to its national population. 55 per cent of the refugees worldwide came from three countries: Syrian Arab Republic (5.5 million), Afghanistan (2.5 million), and South Sudan (1.4 million). A change in 2016 is that the returning of refugees to their home countries increased. Most people returned to Afghanistan (UNHCR 2017:2). The former United Secretary General Ban Ki Moon (still acting in 2016) was of the opinion that: “We are facing the biggest refugee and displacement crisis of our time. Above all, this is not just a crisis of numbers; it is also a crisis of solidarity" (UNHCR 2016:5). The United Nations General Assembly reacted by adopting the “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants” on 19 September 2016. There it is emphasised that the needs of refugees and migrants are explicitly recognised in the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations 2016:4). Besides that, the Declaration endorsed a set of commitments for refugees and migrants (:5–17). Furthermore, a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) was outlined. The CRRF has the intention to be a framework for a comprehensive and people-centred refugee response. Moreover, it is aimed to support the host states and communities in sharing the burden and responsibility and thereby leads to the protection and good assistance of refugees (:17–22). 20 2.3 Migration in German history Germany has defined itself as a country of migration for only a few years (Woellert u.a. 2009:12). The German migration history is characterised by labour migration. Immigration is a part of the German history that continues to the present. This is what this section outlines. Firstly, the history of immigration into Germany is summarized until 2013. In the second part of this section, the latest migration history is summarized starting 2014. 2.3.1 History of migration to Germany Migration to Germany has a long history. The reasons for migration are very similar – the pursuit of a better life, the fear of political, ethnic or religiously motivated persecution or violent displacement. Examples include that in 1699, 3,000 “Waldenses” refugees were taken in by the Württembergian elector Ludwig; and, in 1865 the 44,000 Huguenots who were persecuted in France for their faith, found refuge in Germany with assistance from Friedrich Wilhelm, the Great Elector of Brandenburg. A different reason for migration relates to the first Polish workers” recruitment for the mining industry of the Ruhr in 1871. This is why these Polish migrants are called “Ruhrpolen” (Dolezal & Moll 2009:n.p.). There has always been emigration from Germany: in 1767 emigration of about 30 000 Germans to Russia occurred after czarina Catherine II adopted a manifesto and invited Europeans to settle in Russia (Schneider 2005:n.p.). Furthermore, in the 19th century, significant numbers of Palatinates and Hesse emigrated to France and thousands of people from Germany left to settle in South America, the USA and Canada (Dolezal & Moll 2009:n.p.). Further outline of Germany’s migration history is based on the historian Ulrich Herbert’s classification into five epochs from 1880 until 2000, that are briefly presented here (Herbert 2003): 1880 – 1914 Foreigners in the German Empire This epoch begins with the emigration of Germans mainly to the United States of America and an increase in migration of agricultural workers to the industrialized regions of the Prussian West. Whereas there were sufficient workers for the Prussian agriculture in 1849, a deficiency was documented in the 1870s which led to the fact that in the early 1880s many East German landowners enlisted workers from the parts of former Poland then occupied by Russia and Austria. The “bringing in” of 21 the workers gave rise to a conflict between economic and political interests (:14–15). This finally led to the deportation back to their homeland of approximately 40,000 Russian-Polish workers in 1885. Thereafter, further changes in agricultural cultivation occurred. The increased demand for workers was initially offset by seasonal workers (:18). Due to the lack of manpower and the rising wage costs, the request was made again at the end of the 1880s to allow foreign Poles to be readmitted to Germany as seasonal workers (:20–21). In 1890, this request was granted under certain conditions in order to prevent the integration of seasonal workers (:22). In total, the number of foreigners in the German Empire rose significantly until 1910 (:25). Over time, the recruitment of foreign Polish workers also spread to the industrial sector that resisted sending the workers back home to Poland in the winter months (contrary to the conditions of employment of foreign workers) and allowed the workers to stay and continue working (:45–46). However, integration of the foreign labourer was not intended and did not happen. There was a great social inequality between foreign and local workers (:54–56). 1914 – 1939 Labour market and forced labour At the beginning of World War I in 1914, the Prussian War Ministry enacted measures to prevent workers from hostile foreign countries from leaving. More than 300,000 Russian-Polish workers were now forced to continue their work in Germany against their will (:86). Furthermore, the Germans took advantage of the 2.5 million prisoners of war and used their manpower to maintain German industry and agriculture during these war years (:88–90). Still there was a lack of workers during the war years, which was why German industry recruited and employed Jews from Eastern Europe (:99). Since all these foreign workers were not sufficient, in 1916 the German Empire passed a law and forcibly deported 61,000 workers from Belgium to work in German industry (:105). The living conditions of the foreign workers, some of whom were forced to work, were precarious. Abuses on the part of employers and authorities were the order of the day (:111–115). At the end of the war, the voluntary and forced foreign workers were to be deported as soon as possible, so that the returning German soldiers could have their jobs which occurred as planned. Of about one million foreigners at the end of the war, only 174,000 were in Germany in 1924. The returning soldiers were not able and/or not willing to work in the agricultural sector in Eastern Germany. This led once more to farmers 22 demanding Polish workers (:118). This time, however, the German labour movement set conditions for the permission of foreign workers. These were decided in 1920 that were binding until 1939: "Employment of foreigners only if no indigenous workers were available; Equal wage conditions for Germans and foreigners; Verification of the admission of foreigners by commissions equally occupied by employers and employees”10 (:120). An important step in the direction of a fairer treatment of foreigners was achieved (:120). From 1933 to 1939, the Nazi regime set two main points in relation to foreign workers. On the one hand, the high demand for workers had to be met, and Hitler agreed with some European States about labour force agreements. On the other hand, the Nazi regime prepared to use prisoners of war in its own economy. The experiences of World War I were evaluated and arrangements were made (:124–127). 1939 – 1945 The Nazi forced labour system At the beginning of the war, German soldiers brought Polish prisoners to Germany with the aim to employ them as workers (:130). However, as the number of prisoners was not sufficient, about 310,000 Poles were forced to work in Germany. The residence of foreigners in Germany did not fit the ideology of the Nazis, which is why they were treated and paid very poorly; and, they were made to live separated from the Germans in camps and had to wear a “P” for Polish on their clothes (:132– 133). As the labour shortage increased the government authorised the use of Russian prisoners of war in 1941 (:137). With the help of various “recruitment” actions, the Germans had by the end of 1942, about 1.7 million Soviet workers working in their industries (:141–142). By the summer of 1944, Germany had about 7.7 million foreign workers and prisoners of war working in their country. At the end of the war these workers returned to their home countries (:193). 1945 – 1973 Foreigners in the “Growing economy” Economic standstill resulted from the war. One of the reasons was attributed to the lack of workers needed to re-activate the economy. By 1950 about 8.3 million German displaced persons and refugees, who 10 Translation by the author. Original: „Beschäftigung von Ausländern nur dann, wenn keine einheimische Arbeiter zur Verfügung standen; gleiche Tarifbedingungen für Deutsche und Ausländer; Überprüfung der Ausländerzulassung durch paritätisch von Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern besetzte Kommissionen.“ 23 had fled during World War II, resettled in Western and Central Germany and the demand for manpower could be filled (:193). Having experienced Nazi dictatorship, when various countries refused asylum to persecuted Jews from Germany, the right of asylum was fixed in the German Constitution in 1949 (Woellert & Klingholz 2014:9). In the 1950s, the influx of workers from the east decreased and finally stopped due to the construction of the Berlin wall between West and East Germany in 1961 (Herbert 2003:200). Although there were still some unemployed people in Germany, the German government signed a contract, “guest-worker agreement”, with the Italian government in 1955, because Germany’s lack of manpower had resulted in too high competitive pressure between employers (:203). Between 1960 and 1968 more agreements were signed between Germany and Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia (Woellert & Klingholz 2014:9). “Guest workers” were selected by the labour management in their country of residence and then hired by German companies. The contract of these workers were to be deliberately short in order for them to return to their homelands (Herbert 2003:203–204). “Guest workers” received less pay and completed the more physically strenuous work for which it was difficult to find German workers (:213). As a result the economic recession in 1966, the xenophobic voices began to get louder (:221). In addition to this pressure, the guest workers stayed longer than planned and were, increasingly, bringing their families to Germany (:225). In 1973 a “recruitment-stop” for workers outside the European Community was issued. As justification, the oil boycott of the Arab oil states was indicated. It is presumed that this was only a preferred reason to cancel the influx from abroad without facing great outcry (:228–229). 1973 – 2000 From foreign labour to immigration policy The “recruitment-stop” did not solve the “guest worker” problem. Of course, a lot of guest workers returned to their countries, but many of them stayed and brought their families to Germany11. In particular, only a few Turks left the Federal Republic of Germany. (Ther 2017:322). This resulted in the situation that there were now more foreign families but not enough single working men. For different reasons, most of the wives remained at home and were thus isolated from German society. In the following time, due to economic structural change, particularly 11 This was still possible according to the immigration law of 1965. 24 the low-skilled foreign workers were dismissed. Unemployment combined with a lack of integration led to socially marginalized areas and parallel societies in which the children of the migrants grew up (Woellert u.a. 2009:13). Then during 1978 onwards, 40.000 Vietnamese refugees, who became known as the Vietnamese “boat people”, were given refuge in Germany as “humanitarian refugees” because they had fled from Vietnam on boats to south East Asia without means to live. The category of “humanitarian refugees” was created especially in this situation (Kleinschmidt 2013:n.p.). In 1981 the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany decided that Germany was not an immigration-country and should not be one (Herbert 2003:247). The “Return Promotion Act” in 1983, with which the federal government tried to motivate foreigners to return to their home countries through financial stimulus, was unsuccessful. In the period from 1988 to 1992, two further events in migration history happened. In one instance, the number of asylum seekers to Germany, from countries torn by civil war (e.g. former Yugoslavia), strongly increased (:263). In another instance, the “fall of the wall” in East Germany and the opening of the Eastern Bloc made it possible for more so-called “Ethnic German resettlers”12 to return to Germany (:265). Between 1992 and 1999, the German and European asylum law was becoming more and more restricted (Woellert & Klingholz 2014:11). For example, the German Basic Law was amended by editing the regulation of “safe third countries”13 in the year 1993 (Meier-Braun 2015:87). At the same time, the number of right-wing extremist violence events was rising (Woellert & Klingholz 2014:11). In 1999/2000, the reform of the citizenship law marked a historic turning point. From now on it was no longer exclusively “Jus sanguinis” (Inheritance of nationality) but “Jus soli” (Acquisition of nationality by birth in the country). Under certain conditions, the acquisition of German nationality by birth in Germany was possible. In addition, the possibility of dual citizenship was allowed until the age of 23 (Herbert 2003:332–333; Bade 2007b:36). Since 2014, dual citizenship can also be retained beyond the age of 23. Herbert has described the epochs until 2000. In the following, the happenings in German migration history from 2000 to 2014 is outlined. 12 For a description about Ethnic German resettlers see 1.9 Clarification of key terms, Migrant/Migration. 13 For a detailed description about “safe third countries” see 2.4.2 Critical review of Germany’s policies and programmes. 25 2000 – 2014 Politics in times of increasing migration From the year 2000, immigration figures were fairly constant but since the economic crisis in 2008-2009, the number of migrants has risen again annually and reached a peak in 2015, due to the “refugee crisis” (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016a:73). Changes in the political field are described as follows: In 2005 the immigration law was introduced. The new formulation included obligations, and offers, that apply to migrants (Woellert & Klingholz 2014:11). It also described integration as a governmental task which was a great change from 1981 when Germany referred to itself as a non-immigration country. Besides that, an integration minister in the federal chancellery was established. In addition, the Federal Office for the recognition of foreign refugees (BAFL) and the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) were constituted (Bade 2007b:36). In 2006 the first integration summit and the first Islam conference were held under the government of Angela Merkel. Both aimed at the participation of migrants. At the same time, the first federal states introduced naturalisation examinations (Woellert & Klingholz 2014:11). In 2007 the topic of integration gained in importance. Another important step towards more significance was the creation of the National Integration Plan, which positively presented integration and cultural openness (Hessisches Ministerium für Soziales und Integration 2015:11). The national integration plan was developed in cooperation with civil society, the federal government, the federal states and local authorities. It includes self-binding measures to promote integration. In 2012 the “Blue Card” was introduced in the EU in order to counteract the shortage of skilled workers. The “Blue Card” is meant to allow highly qualified professionals from non-EU countries to migrate to Germany. In 2014 the number of migrants rose again. At that point the 9th Conference of Integration Ministers of the federal states took place. At the conference the ministers decided to promote cultural openness throughout Germany. In addition, foreigners and reporting authorities were to be transformed into “Welcome Authorities” (Woellert & Klingholz 2014:11). 26 2.3.2 Latest history of migration to Germany As mentioned above, this part focuses on the situation of refugees in Germany since 2014. Gisela Erler and Margit Gottstein have defined five phases in order to summarize the “refugee-crisis” in Germany (Erler & Gottstein 2017). The individual phases are briefly presented below: 1. Pre-Phase: At the end of 2014 the evidence of rising numbers of refugees worldwide increased (:160). 2. Emergency phase: In the summer of 2015, 441,899 asylum applications were submitted: a historical record high. 35.9% of the asylum applications were made by Syrians (BAMF & BMI 2015:119). At the beginning of 2016, the numbers were corrected to 1.1 million asylum applications in 2015 (Hanewinkel 02/2016:1). Starting in the middle of 2015, the registration and accommodation of refugees were carried out in an emergency mode (Erler & Gottstein 2017:160). Quick decisions had to be made which led to flexible transitional structures. As the situation could not be solved by the municipalities, support services had to be requested, for example, from the NGOs and the German armed forces (:160). The housing of the refugees posed great challenges for the authorities, so that some, even in winter, had to be accommodated in tents (Fründt 25.09.2015). 3. Transition phase: At the end of 2015 and in the first quarter of 2016 the focus was still on providing emergency help and on covering the basic needs of refugees (Erler & Gottstein 2017:160). In 2016 the demand for an “upper limit” of refugees was expressed (Hanewinkel 02/2016:1). The first quarter of the year 2016 brought a further tightening of the German asylum laws. Despite all this, the protests of the right-wing Populist Party Alternative for Germany (AfD) became louder as they demanded the use of weapons at German borders (Hanewinkel 03/2016:1). By closing the “Balkan route”14, the number of the refugees who came to Germany was reduced. In March 2016, the EU made the “EU-Turkey deal” (Hanewinkel 04/2016:1–2), which is addressed in detail in the next section (2.4.1). 4. Consolidation phase: As fewer people came to Germany due to the closed routes and the EU-Turkey deal, the transition from the emergency phase to a more stable situation could be initiated. The support 14 The Balkan route passed through Greece, Macedonia and Serbia. 27 for refugees could be incorporated into regular supply and administrative structures (Erler & Gottstein 2017:160). In July 2016 the new Integration law was passed wherein the main focus is that integration is a joint project between migrants and German society (Bundestag 2016). 5. Relaxation Phase: The relaxation phase began approximately in the second half of 2016 and remains ongoing. Relaxation refers to the numbers of refugees coming to Germany. Those responsible in politics looked for short and long-term integration measures (Erler & Gottstein 2017:160). Furthermore, the issue of refugees was an important topic in the Bundestag election campaign in 2017. During this period, the issues of deportation and “safe countries of origin”15 were widely discussed (pro Asyl 2017). Especially deportations to Afghanistan have aroused a lot of public attention (Przybilla & Sprick 2017). A description and critical reflection of the refugee’s legal framework and the life situation in Germany is described under 2.4.2. 2.4 Integration policies and programmes in Germany Overall, the objectives of Germany’s integration policies and programmes serve to deter and not to increase the integration performance of the federal government that can be seen in active politics regarding integration. Part of the policy are European agreements in which Germany is involved. In this section Germany’s integration policies and programmes are described and critically reviewed through the characterisation of two European deals, the legal framework of asylum, the life situation of the refugees and the current coalition agreements of the federal government. 2.4.1 Critical review of European regulations As the German policies have to be seen in the context of the EU, to begin with, I will present and review two European programmes at the beginning because Germany was very involved in these two deals. 15 For a detailed description about “safe counties of origin” see 2.4.2 Critical review of Germany’s policies and programmes. 28 Dublin Agreement The Dublin Agreement was named for the city in which it was primarily signed in 1990; however, it came into force only in 1997. The Dublin Regulation lays down the responsibility for an asylum procedure within the EU. The country that the asylum seeker enters first is responsible for his/her asylum application. The procedure was repeatedly revised and the final version (Dublin III) has been in force since 01 January 2014 (Meier-Braun 2015:89–90). Countries at the border of Europe, such as Greece and Italy, have to bear most of the responsibility, since most asylum seekers enter the EU by sea (:90). In general the European States should share the task of caring for the refugees in Europe. One of the problems lies in the fact that the actual planned redistribution (from September 201516) of the EU has not been put into action which has led to crowded reception camps in Greece and precarious living situations for many refugees (UNO-Flüchtlingshilfe 12.01.2018:n.p.). Since Germany is not a “border-land” in Europe, the Dublin Agreement suitably frees it from obligations. In the meantime (especially since 2015) the Dublin agreement is not being implemented consistently and one consequence is that refugees are using smuggling gangs to reach Germany (Meier-Braun 2015:90). Now Germany is committed to the fact that the refugees should be distributed equitably all over Europe (Hanewinkel 2018:6). EU-Turkey Deal The contract between the EU and Turkey has been active since 20 March 2016. The agreement is that asylum seekers that use Turkey as a transit country to enter the territory of the EU on the Greek islands are deported back to Turkey. A 1:1 mechanism is used: for each Syrian person deported from the Greek islands to Turkey, another Syrian person from Turkey will be relocated in the EU. For this purpose, Turkey receives 6 billion Euros and the promise that vulnerable refugees will be accepted by the EU if the “deportation-deal” works (Cremer 2017a:n.p.). The Refugee and Human rights organisation Pro Asyl criticises the EU-Turkey deal on three points (pro Asyl 2016). Firstly, the deal blocks the ways to the EU and deprives refugees of the right to 16 On 09 September 2015 the EU- Commission proposed to relocate 120,000 refugees from Hungary, Greece and Italy to the other European states (European Commission 2015:1) 29 apply for asylum (:4). Secondly, in the course of this deal, the EU declares Turkey as a “safe third country” (:5–6); and, thirdly, the right of each refugee to an individual case examination is not granted to him/her (:8). It is obvious that the objective of the EU-Turkey Deal is to prevent refugees from entering the EU. From a human rights perspective, the deportation of refugees to Turkey does not qualify as “safe” according to lawyer Hendrik Cremer (Cremer 2017b:n.p.). 2.4.2 Critical review of Germany’s policies and programmes In this section three different areas of policies and programmes are described and critically analysed, since all three areas affect each other. These are: Germany’s legal framework of asylum, the refugee’s life situation and the current coalition agreement of the German Government that was elected in 2017. Legal framework In this section, Germany’s asylum procedures and the legal status of refugees are described and afterwards critically reviewed. Asylum procedures The procedure for asylum proceedings is as follows: 1. Asylum application When a person wishes to submit an application for asylum in Germany, he/she can do so at a German authority. Firstly, the personal details are recorded and the person is usually accommodated in a mass accommodation (Richter 2016:24). It is also decided in which federal state the refugee is to be accommodated (Schott 2016:203). 2. Examination of the application Firstly, it is checked whether Germany is responsible for the asylum seeker or whether he/she has already made an application in another European country. In the latter case, the Dublin III agreement would become effective17 (Richter 2016:24; Meier-Braun 2015:85). 17 For a detailed description about the Dublin II agreement see 2.4.1 Critical review of European Regulations. 30 3. Asylum procedure by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) If the Dublin III agreement does not apply or cannot be executed, an examination of the right of asylum by the BAMF is initiated. For this, a personal “interview” is conducted with the refugee. Depending on the personal situation of the refugee and the situation in his/her country of origin, relevant recognitions and residence permits may apply18. 4. Asylum procedure by the Immigration authority When the decision has been made at the BAMF, the immigration authority has the task of issuing the residence permit. This depends on the status that the BAMF has assigned to the refugee (Schott 2016:206). The status also determines whether and when close family members get permission to migrate to Germany as well (Grote 2017:6,24). A positive decision may be extended or lead to a residence permit. A negative decision can lead to a “Duldung”19 (Schott 2016:206–208). Legal status of refugees The following recognitions and residence permits are possible in the German legal system: Asylum by the German Constitution The unique aspect about the German asylum law is that, since 1949, the right of asylum for politically persecuted people is a fundamental part of the German Constitution but it was limited in 1992 due to increasing asylum applications. Since the so-called “asylum compromise”, only those refugees who do enter Germany without travelling through an EU country or a “safe third country” can apply for asylum in Germany (Meier-Braun 2015:84). A “safe third country” is a state in which the Geneva Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights apply. Germany does not have to accept refugees who travel through such a “safe third country” on their way to Germany (:87). There is another limitation in the law. This occurs when a refugee comes from a country that Germany declared as “safe country of origin”. The German law (German constitution, Article 16 Section 3) declares a country of origin as safe “[…] if it is possible to prove on the 18 For a detailed description of possible recognitions and residence permits, see later in this section under “Legal status of refugees”. 19 For a detailed description of the toleration, see later in this section under “Legal status of refugees”. 31 basis of the democratic system and of the general political situation that no state persecution is to be feared there as a rule, and that the State in question can provide protection against non-state persecution as a matter of principle” (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2016b:n.p.). If a person from a “safe country of origin” asks for asylum in Germany, he/she must prove that he/she was persecuted in his/her country of origin despite the assertion of the German government that there is no persecution in his/her home country (Meier-Braun 2015:87) Asylum by the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees Refugees to whom the Geneva Convention20 applies get asylum granted in Germany. This covers the group of people who are being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. At the same time, the same restrictions as those described in “Asylum by the German Constitution” are applied. Subsidiary protection The Subsidiary protection21 becomes effective if the right of asylum does not apply, but nevertheless dangers to freedom, limb and life, such as torture or death penalty, threaten the refugee in his home country. The subsidary protection is only a deportation ban on time and not on residence permit (:89). Suspension of deportation Persons who are not or are no longer in the asylum proceedings, or whose applications have been turned down but whose deportation has been suspended, receive from the immigration authority a "certificate of suspension of deportation", the so-called Duldung” (BAMF n.d.). Refusal of Asylum A possible result could be that the application for asylum is rejected. In theory, it is possible to apply for asylum in Germany if the refugee has not travelled through a “safe third country” on his/her way to Germany or his/her home country is declared as “safe country of origin”. 20 For a detailed description about the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees see 1.9 Clarification of key terms. 21 For a detailed description about Subsidiary protection see 1.9 Clarification of key terms. 32 Since Germany is surrounded by “safe third countries” and it is difficult for refugees from “safe countries of origin” to prove that they are under threat, it has become very difficult to put an application for asylum in Germany (Meier-Braun 2015:84). Life situation of the refugees Germany’s policies and programmes have consequences on the life situation and the integration of the refugees. This is briefly illustrated and critically reflected in the examples of accommodation and employment. Accommodation Where and how refugees live in Germany is, at least primarily shaped by the legal policies. Asylum seekers are required to initially live in a mass accommodation. Officially the stay takes up to six weeks, but not more than six months, or at most until they have been granted protection status (§ 47 para 1 AsylG and § 53 para 2 AsylG). As soon as the accommodation period (six weeks up to six month) has expired or the protection status has been recognised, the refugees are allocated to the municipalities. Here, too, accommodation is initially in a mass accommodation. Decentralised accommodation can be sought when living in the second mass accommodation in the municipalities (Baier & Siegert 2018:3). Due to the high level of asylum seekers in recent years, these deadlines cannot be met and the tendency is for refugees to be accommodated longer in mass accommodation (Aumüller, Daphi & Biesenkamp 2015:40). The Integration law, of 06 August 2016, established a residence assignment for asylum-seekers, recognised refugees, and refugees with the status of subsidiary protection (Bundesregierung Deutschland 2016b:1942–1943). The first three years of their stay they have to live in the federal State that is responsible for their asylum or admission procedure (§ 12a AufenthG). In addition, the authorities can allocate refugees to a certain place of residence within six months after the recognition or grant of the residence permit (§ 12a para. 2 and 3 AufenthG). Refugees who are employed, study or do vocational training are exempt from the residence requirement (Baier & Siegert 2018:3). Refugees that are still in the asylum procedure and refugees with the status of subsidiary protection have no say in the choice of place of residence (Aumüller, Daphi & Biesenkamp 2015:21). One criticism of these German policies is that the accommodation of refugees in mass accommodation prevents integration. A study by the Robert Bosch Foundation has interviewed local decision-makers in the 33 municipalities about their experiences regarding the accommodation of refugees. Two of the results are that decentralised housing of refugees promotes integration and helps to increase the acceptance of refugees in society (:61-62, 69). The opposite is when in 2013 the average time that refugees stayed in mass accommodation in the municipalities was already 4.2 years (:70). Since more refugees have come to Germany in recent years and no more housing is available, the tendency to place refugees in mass accommodation is increasing. Furthermore, the coalition agreement of the new German Government is planning to accommodate all refugees in so-called Reception, Decision-making and Repatriation facilities (AnKER centres) (CDU, CSU & SPD 2018:107), which are also mass accommodations that will be discussed in the next section. Another study by the Bertelsmann Foundation shows that the housing situation also has an influence on the work integration of the refugees. The living circumstances in a mass accommodation is depriving refugees of the power to concentrate on training and language studies (Aumüller 2016:17). Employment The Labour law situation for the employment of refugees is complex and difficult for non-experts to understand. The following is a rough excerpt: Recognised refugees are not allowed to work for the first three months of their stay in Germany. This regulation used to be nine months. Even, however, if a work permit has been granted in the first 15 months, recognised refugees are only allowed to start working in a job when no German worker, EU foreigner or foreigner with a residence permit is available to do it. (:13; Richter 2016:31). As a result, it is difficult for refugees to find a job and the first 15 months can hardly be used for integration. Another hindrance for the integration of refugees in the labour market is the revocation examination of asylum. Within three years after the recognition of asylum the Asylum Law provides for a reexamination of the legal status to check whether the refugee is still entitled to have the asylum status he/she has. After the revocation the recognition or granting of subsidiary protection may be revoked if the situation in the country of origin has changed. This leads to uncertainty and employers would tend to hesitate employing refugees (Aumüller 2016:13–14). 34 Coalition agreement of the German Government The agreements of the coalition partners can roughly be divided into three thematic areas. The first thematic area is that of labour migration. This means that the Federal Republic of Germany wants to make it easier for the well-educated foreigners to migrate into Germany. The second thematic area includes the measures to limit the migration of refugees. The third point of the migration and integration policy of the new federal government concerns the integration of migrants (Hanewinkel 2018:4–8). In the following two of the coalition agreements of the German Government are critically reviewed: Declaring “countries of safe origin” It is described under how the German law defines a “country of safe origin”. At the moment Ghana, Senegal and the six Western Balkan countries Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are declared as “safe countries of origin” (Meier- Braun 2015:87). In the coalition plan the new federal government decided to declare Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as “safe countries of origin” (Hanewinkel 2018:6), even though the BAMF’s (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) internal documents do point out that people in these countries might be persecuted (Augustin, Biermann & Faigle 2016). The classification as “safe countries of origin” for Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia would make it more difficult for the individual asylum seekers to be granted the application; and thus, he/she can be easily deported, which would reduce the number of refugees in Germany. Reception, Decision-making and Repatriation facilities 22 In order to enable a more efficient asylum procedure, the federal government intends to place all asylum seekers on arrival in an AnKER facility. The purpose of this facility is to verify the identity of the asylum seekers and to decide on reception, allocation in community or repatriation. Minors travelling alone are excluded from admission to these centres23. The stay is planned to be no longer than 6 months for families 22 In the following text these facilities are referred to as AnKER facilities since this is the German abbreviation for Aufnahme-, Entscheidungs-, und Rückführungseinrichtungen. 23 Unaccompanied minors who enter Germany are taken into care by the youth welfare office that has local responsibility. This provisional taking into care ensures 35 and no longer than 18 months for single travellers. Only the refugees, who have a positive prognosis for their stay, should be distributed to the municipalities. All others should, in reasonable time when possible, be deported directly from these facilities to their home countries (CDU, CSU & SPD 2018:107). There are many concerns about the implementation of these plans. Since this study deals with the integration of refugees, only the consequences of the AnKER facilities for integration are considered. Firstly, it should be considered what consequences the isolation of such centres will have on people. Being isolated from the community for 6 to 18 months hinders the integration of those refugees who will remain in Germany. Secondly, the Refugee and Human rights organisation Pro Asyl points out that large shelters for refugees are stigmatizing signs of exclusion. In addition, mass accommodation for refugees can become the subject of hate campaigns (pro Asyl 10.04.2018:n.p.). As can be seen in the coalition agreement, the AnKER facilities do not have integration as a goal. Considering the arguments mentioned here, it might happen that integration may be delayed or even prevented. Finally, it can be concluded that the legal framework of asylum, the life situation of the refugees and the current coalition agreements of the federal government show that somehow integration is important to the federal government, but the deterrence of refugees and the reduction of the number of refugees is more important. This view is also shared by the press and science (Lobenstein 08.02.2018; Prantl 16.01.2018; Schmitt & Wienforth 18. April 2018). 2.5 Conclusion In this chapter the long history and complexity of world-wide migration, the political, legal and life situation of refugees in Germany have been presented. It has been made clear that the attempt of this study, to develop an integration theory with the focus on the capabilities of the refugees, is set in a very complex international situation at a time when that these children and juveniles aged under 18 are accommodated with a suitable person or in a suitable facility (BAMF 2016:n.p.). 36 the opinions about integration are dichotomous in Germany. This represents the historical and political framework. In the next chapter the theoretical framework is explained.

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This book is a reaction to the “refugee-crisis” in 2015 and the ensuing demand of science and practice for a stronger focus on the potentials and abilities of refugees in the integration process. To direct the focus of integration theories away from the weaknesses and towards the capabilities of the refugees, Heckmann’s Integration Theory – based on a comparative analysis – is related to Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach via interlinking both theories. The results show that an integration theory with the focus on the capabilities of the refugees empowers the individual immigrant to become a valued and active participant in the integration process. This study was researched using the situation in Germany as an example, but the results are transferable to social integration contexts in other countries as well and may give non-governmental organisations, social workers and government agencies an orientation for their future aid programming.