2. Literature Review in:

Andreas Schwenk

Finding a Cue through "Q", page 5 - 32

Applying Q-Methodology to Compare German and U.S. Diplomats' Attitudes towards U.N. Security Council Reform

1. Edition 2019, ISBN print: 978-3-8288-4306-6, ISBN online: 978-3-8288-7239-4, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828872394-5

Series: Wissenschaftliche Beiträge aus dem Tectum Verlag: Politikwissenschaften, vol. 81

Tectum, Baden-Baden
Bibliographic information
Literature Review Two Countries in the United Nations Security Council The Federal Republic of Germany After World War II had left Germany in ruins, immediate popular attention was not given to foreign policy or the United Nations, but much rather to more elementary tasks of reconstruction and livelihood. Germany's preliminary legal status had only been enshrined in 1949 with the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany [West Germany] and the German Democratic Republic [East Germany]. The so-called “enemy-states articles” of the United Nations Charter (UN Charter, Ch. VIII, Art. 53; UN Charter, Ch. XII, Art. 77; UN Charter, Ch. XVII, Art. 107) provided that any potential action taken against Germany would not be subjected to its otherwise binding rules. As these articles prevented Germany from becoming a full member of the United Nations, it resorted to an observer status without any voting rights, similar to what the Holy See and Palestine hold today. The Hallstein Doctrine (1955)5 made sure that East Germany did not become an observer state until the 1970s, as West Germany effectively was able to block the United Nations from recognizing the East. The enforcement of this doctrine ended with the introduction of Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, eventually leading to full UN membership for both German states in 1973. The enemy-states articles were declared obsolete by the United Nations General Assembly in 1995, but remain in the charter. 2. 2.1. 2.1.1. 5 The Hallstein Doctrine declared the official recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations by third-party states (except the Soviet Union) with the German Democratic Republic as an “unfriendly act”. As it was in the interest of other western states to isolate the East, an official UN membership application by East Germany was prevented. Similar circumstances in diplomacy can still be found today in the People's Republic of China's “One-China Policy” with regards to Taiwan. 5 Germany has been elected to an overall five times to a two-year non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The first time came only four years after its admittance to the organization for the period of 1977–1978 as West Germany, during which the country played an active role in Namibia's independence preparations. East Germany served as a member once during the period of 1980–1981. West Germany's second term came for the period of 1987–1988, which was also supported by the East. After reunification in 1990, West Germany took over the dissolved East, now having one seat for the reunified country. The next Security Council term followed for the period of 1995–1996 with an increased role and status in the international arena. The 21st century has seen two terms so far during the periods of 2003– 2004 and 2011–2012, being overshadowed by disagreements in the council on the Iraq War and the Libya no-fly zone respectively (DGVN, 2016). During the most recent period, Germany was especially active, creating multiple draft resolutions on the situation in Syria and the Arab Spring, which failed due to the resistance of veto powers Russia and China (Auswärtiges Amt, 2014). In 2016, Germany announced that it will campaign for another two-year non-permanent term for the period of 2019–2020 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2016). The German quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council can be followed in a progressive matter from 1990 onwards, becoming ever more pressing. In the first years after reunification, calls for a permanent German seat on the UN Security Council were not present, as the struggles of the reunification process and the dawning first Gulf War were too dominant (Hellmann, 2007). Furthermore according to a speech by former German Foreign Minister Genscher (1990), German foreign policy should, out of responsibility for the European continent, follow a multilateral European approach without pure national Machtpolitik. After two world wars having been initiated by Germany, the concern over any German claims for its own seat was still too great. In addition, Germany did not want to prove British and French doubts over the consequences of German reunification right. The strongest claim was a suggestion by former Chancellor Brandt (1990) that Germany should share the two permanent European seats with France and the United Kingdom. When Klaus Kinkel became the new foreign minister in the early 1990s, he still relatively 2. Literature Review 6 shyly formulated a wish for a German seat, but made clear that no unilateral initiative would be taken (Kinkel, 1992). In a statement by the German Federal Government on the issue the following year, the term “natural candidate” was coined for the first time (Bundesregierung, 1993). According to Hellmann, et al. (2007) the position showed that Germany saw itself as a natural candidate based on its economic power, but instead of claiming its own right to a seat, was pressed for it by others due to its increased importance. Any reference to a sharing agreement of permanent seats with France and the United Kingdom had disappeared. In the coalition contract of the new German Red-Green government in 1998, a claim for an own seat was reiterated, if the quest for a European seat fails (Coalition Contract, 1998). In a speech by foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (2004) before the Bundestag, the word “if ” suddenly became the word “because”. Germany had apparently come to the conclusion that a failure of a European seat was clear and it should therefore pursue solely its own seat. What followed in 2005, was a draft resolution (United Nations, 2004) put forward by the socalled Group of Four, consisting of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan on a concrete reform proposal. Since German reunification, the country has seen a progression on its position for an own UN Security Council seat from a wish to a claim. This claim is supported by five factors: economic strength, international expectations and responsibility, German national interest, legitimacy, and multilateralism (Hellmann, 2007). Germany's relatively large economic output as the world's fourth biggest economy (International Monetary Fund, 2016) and large contribution to the United Nations as the third biggest contributor after the United States and Japan with 7.141% of the budget, (United Nations, 2015) builds a strong case for a permanent seat. Former German Permanent Representative to the United Nations Gunter Pleuger (2003) stated that the expectations of the international community have grown especially since German reunification. As a now post-Cold War, reunified and extremely wealthy developed state, Germany should take more responsibility for and in the world than it has done before as a political dwarf. In terms of national interest, a raised profile with more influence would yield greater possibilities for Germany to shape the world according to its wishes. To do so in the UN Security Council would constitute princi- 2.1. Two Countries in the United Nations Security Council 7 pal capabilities in one of the most important organizations of the world. The German expectation should be to “take responsibility within the process of globalization” and to incorporate a “role” that gives the possibility for “encompassing contributions” (Pleuger, 2003, 688). For the fourth factor of legitimacy, it is to be said that an inclusion of more broadly geographically distributed member states as permanent members of the UN Security Council, as well as the inclusion of the biggest contributors to the UN budget would raise the legitimacy of the council. For the last factor of multilateralism, Pleuger (2003) states that part of the international demands for Germany to take up more responsibility in the world is the conviction that it is a trustworthy multilateralist. In an interview for this master thesis, former German ambassador Doris Hertrampf called Germany a “Zivilmacht” (civil power), taking reference to precisely this assumption. In an analysis of Germany's last term on the UN Security Council, Gowan (2013) introduces two myths about German foreign policy: the myth of German strength and the myth of German weakness. These two myths present two opposing interpretations of Germany's foreign policy behavior during the 2011–2012 term, marked by the country's abstention on the Libya no-fly zone issue. While on some occasions such as in Afghanistan or at the Horn of Africa, Germany remains aligned with its western allies, on other issues such as the Libya abstention it sided with the BRIC-countries. The myth of German strength interprets the abstention as an assertion of Germany's new power on the international stage and a realignment of its foreign policy towards a more independent position, sometimes siding with western countries and sometimes with non-western countries. This realignment stems from a new confidence among Germany's political elite in terms of being able to independently steer its own foreign policy. The myth of German weakness on the other side interprets the reaction to the abstention as a sign of a failed attempt to steer Berlin's foreign policy independently and thus sees a retreat back to the traditional western allies. Whichever one of these two myths might be or might not be reality, Germany's candidacy for its sixth non-permanent term for the period of 2019–2020 shows a continued willingness to fulfill its role in the world through the UN Security Council. Besides Germany's willing- 2. Literature Review 8 ness to contribute and to shape, the country's continued commitment to Security Council reform stays an official part of its policy towards the United Nations. Former German ambassador Doris Hertrampf assured that her country seeks an honest discussion on a feasible and just reform. Germany has distinguished itself as a cooperative leader in the world since reunification. German foreign policy is based on arguments and convincing strategies, rather than on coercion or force. This is a key in organizations such as the United Nations. In another interview for this master thesis, former German Permanent Representative at the United Nations Dr. Gunter Pleuger agreed with this assessment, stating that Germany indeed does not even have any Machtpolitik anymore. The United States of America The United States of America is a founding member of the United Nations having emerged as one of the victorious states out of World War II. Inspired by its predecessor, the League of Nations, the United Nations was founded at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945 by 50 participating countries. Since then, the United States has held its permanent seat enshrined in the UN Charter, thereby being one of the permanent five (P-5) members of the UN Security Council. Due to the veto status of both the United States and the USSR, the Security Council found itself in a deadlock on any issue directly or indirectly related to Cold War policy between the two opposing sides. This situation remained the case until the formation of the post-Cold War order in the beginning of the 1990s. The first sign of the newly found decisiveness in the Security Council were Security Council Resolutions 687 and 688 (1991) requiring Iraq to abandon its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction and establishing a no-fly zone over Iraq respectively. The United States led a coalition of countries to respond to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. After a short period of decisiveness, described by then UN Undersecretary-General Brian Urquhart as a “false renaissance” (Meisler, 1995), a backlash occurred with multiple crises during the 1990s to which the Security Council was unable to find solutions. During the 2.1.2. 2.1. Two Countries in the United Nations Security Council 9 years of the Clinton Administration, the UN Missions to Somalia, to Bosnia and to Rwanda were viewed as failed, since all were unable to prevent widespread killings or even genocide. The NATO-led intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 was not approved by the Security Council. Neither was the 2003 intervention in Iraq during the Bush Administration prior to which then US Secretary of State Colin Powell attempted to convince council members of the presence of weapons of mass destruction. Nevertheless, two years earlier in 2001, Security Council Resolution 1386 (2001) established the International Security Assistance Force [ISAF] in Afghanistan as a response to the terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City of the same year. While since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council has continued to enjoy authority and legitimacy in US foreign policy, the world's only superpower seems to reserve the right for itself to act without the body's approval, where deemed necessary. In terms of the positions of the United States on the reform of the UN Security Council, no concrete proposal has ever been outlined. Instead, the United States concentrates on responding to proposals brought forward by aspirant countries, and setting a lose set of criteria for membership. Support for certain aspirant countries over others has changed over time. In a paper by the US Department of State (1999), “the United States supports a strengthened and expanded Security Council, including permanent seats for Germany and Japan”, while “there should be no change in the status or privileges of the existing permanent members” (US Department of State, 1999, 52). In 2003, the State Department introduced seven principles for UN reform, including “responsibility, accountability, effectiveness, stewardship of financial resources, modernization, credibility, and freedom”. Furthermore, the United States “stressed that any Security Council reform must focus on practical, achievable reforms to enhance its ability to effectively implement its original mandate” (US Department of State, 2003, 136– 137). In 2004, US policy on Security Council reform included that it must “be supported by a broad consensus” (US Department of State, 2004, 124) of member states. The themes of effectiveness and efficiency in any reform of the United Nations seem to be of particular relevance to the United States. Especially in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion, the effectiveness and efficiency of the United Nations was widely 2. Literature Review 10 doubted. Thus, in 2005 the US Congress created a task force jointly chaired by former Speaker of the US House of Representatives Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell. This report published through the United States Institute of Peace came to roughly the same conclusion as the prior mentioned US State Department papers, stating that any potential expansion of the council must “enhance its effectiveness and should not “detract from the Councils efficiency and ability to act in accordance with the UN Charter.” (US Institute of Peace, 2005, 7). Following the task force's criticism on the overall mismanagement of the United Nations, the United Nations Reform Act (2005) passed by the US House of Representatives demanded that the US contributions to the UN budget should be reduced by 50% if no improvements would be made by 2008. The 2010 US National Security Strategy of the Obama Administration comes to yet again a familiar conclusion of UN Security Council reform, stating that any potential reform should be one that “enhances the UN's overall performance, credibility, and legitimacy” (The White House, 2010, 46). In a report for the Council on Foreign Relations, McDonald and Patrick (2010) summarized the situation at hand and gave recommendations for future U.S. policy in the area. Responding to criticisms on the lack of legitimacy of the UN Security Council, the two authors take a legal perspective stating that the sole legitimacy of the council comes from the UN charter created in 1945. They choose to refer to article 23 (1) of the UN Charter, arguing that the council does not have a legitimacy problem. Since geographical distribution of the membership is mentioned as a secondary factor, the ability to contribute to enduring peace and security is the primary one. Equal distribution among the UN's regional groups therefore is of lesser importance for council membership than the power to be a guarantor of world peace. This power may be of military, economic, diplomatic or technological nature. Furthermore, the continuous involvement of the UN Security Council in kinds of matters of international conflict shows the authority and legitimacy it has in the eyes of the member states. Nevertheless, the two authors argue that council reform is in the “enlightened self- 2.1. Two Countries in the United Nations Security Council 11 interest”6 (McDonald & Patrick, 2010, 10) of the United States. By taking a pro-active role in shaping the reform debate, the United States could construct any potential reform in its favor. The two authors recommend a combination of a criteria-based approach and a long-term approach. The criteria-based approach would include a “history of political stability”, a “globally or regionally deployable military”, “financial contributions to the UN regular budget”, “financial contributions to UN peace-keeping operations”, and a “demonstrated willingness to use, when appropriate […] sanctions, force, international intervention” (McDonald and Patrick, 2010, 21). The long-term approach recommended by the two authors would include a proposal for an interim permanent seat on the UN Security Council, as well as the increased importance of aspirant states in other international organizations to prove their willingness and capability to shoulder the burden. Taking a different approach on the question of legitimacy Lyman (2000) sees an immense lack of legitimacy of the UN Security Council, as “for much of the world, the Security Council is seen as unrepresentative, biased, and increasingly ineffective”. In addition, many members accuse it of applying a “double-standard” when selecting where to send peace-keeping troops or humanitarian aid, as well as especially the United States for its policy position on the International Criminal Court7 (Lyman, 2000, 2). Lyman (2000) suggests reforming the UN Security Council in a way that 75% percent of the world's GDP and between 57% and 63% of the world's population would be directly represented. 6 McDonald and Patrick take reference to a term created by John Ikenberry (2001) in his book “After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars”. Ikenberry describes that victorious powers tend to create strong institutional frames in their favor to lock other states in. Examples of this would be the Peace of Westphalia (1648) ending the 30 Years War, the Concert of Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815), the League of Nations after World War I (1920), and the United Nations after World War II (1945). 7 The United States signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, but the US Congress has never ratified it. Therefore, the United States is a party to the statute, but not obliged to enforce it. Practically, this means that the United States can support and/or encourage cases over war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide against individuals of other states, but US individuals would not be subjected to this. 2. Literature Review 12 The overall US position on UN Security reform has not dramatically changed since the beginning of the post-Cold War period. One shift in 2003 was to remove its support of Germany as a candidate. The US's main interests are to keep the council effective and efficient, while at the same time maintaining its power share. The first interest would mean that a heavy enlargement of the council is not in the interest of the United States, as more members would make consensus more difficult. The second interest would mean keeping the status in terms of the veto, while including as many allies as possible in any potential enlargement. Bosco (2015) argues that while the status-quo is possibly the best option for the United States, a limited reform should nevertheless be in its interest to appease the emotions around Turtle Bay. He proposes adding six new semi-permanent seats to the council without veto rights. Semi-permanent according to him would be a four- or five-year term with the possibility of a re-election. He claims that the great part of this plan is that nobody would be completely satisfied, but everybody could live with it. In an interview for this master thesis, former US Ambassador Richard Boucher stated that the optimal outcome for the US would be simply adding the Group of Four [Brazil, Germany, India, Japan] plus one African country to the council, making them permanent without a veto right. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions When the topic of UN Security Council reform was put on the agenda again in 1992 after the last reform in the 1960s, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/47/62 (1992) was a first milestone taken on the road to a new Security Council reflecting the realities of the post-Cold War world. The resolution invited all members to bring forward suggestions on how the Security Council should be reformed. The following year, a report drafted by the then UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- Ghali summarized the results of the member states proposals, leading to General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/26 (1993). This resolution established the so-called “Open-Ended Working Group”, whose task it was to lay out a detailed report on realistic reform scenarios for the future of the Security Council. Four years later in 1997, the so-called 2.2. 2.2. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions 13 Razali Paper (1997)8 named after the Open-Ended Working Group's Chairman Ismail Razali was submitted to the General Assembly. Resistance came in 1998 with General Assembly Resolution A/RES/53/30 (1998), reminding member states of the necessity for a two-third majority for any change to the Security Council structure. After Security Council reform was also a topic in the United Nations Millennium Summit in the year 2000, the UN High-level Panel Report (2004)9 gave further detailed recommendations on Security Council reform. Building on and interpreting this report, four different draft resolutions were distributed in the UN General Assembly: draft resolution A/59/ L.67 (2005) by the African Union, draft resolution A/59/L.64 (2005) by the Group of Four, draft resolution A/59/L.68 (2005) by the group Uniting for Consensus and draft resolution A/60/L.49 (2006) by the group Small Five. These four draft resolutions together with the Highlevel panel report form the basis of reform proposals until today. After more than a decade of stalling negotiations within the setting of the Open-Ended Working Group, member states decided to move to a different forum in 2007. With General Assembly Decision 62/557 (2008) member states moved to a forum of intergovernmental negotiations between single states and the groups that had already been formed in the prior process. This new setting is called the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN). Decision 62/557 (2008) sets the most pressing issues of Security Council reform out as: (A) the different categories of membership, (B) the veto, (C) regional representation, (D) enlargement of the council and working methods, (E) cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly. In the following years, negotiations have centered around different set-ups and term arrangements. Some of these are recommendations on being more flexible with terms for seats on the Security Council. Longer terms for some seats, short terms with the possibility of a re-election or longer non-permanent terms that evolve into permanent seats are some examples. However, no new breakthroughs have been reached and the negotiations have 8 Paper by the Chairman of the Open-Ended Working Group On The Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. 9 A more secure world: our shared responsibility – Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 2. Literature Review 14 stalled. The most current effort to reinvigorate the debate came with Populated Framework Document (2015) in which 120 member states expressed their views on reform prospective once again. The “Razali Reform Paper” After UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/26 (1993) had established the Open-Ended Working Group, requesting an assessment of reform outlooks and a written report, the group began its work under the chairmanship of Malaysian diplomat Ismail Razali. The “Razali Reform Paper” was the result of the group's assessment, culminating in a working paper. This working paper was the first serious new reform proposal since its first reform in 1965. As requested, the paper outlined the group member's consensus on potential reform scenarios of the UN Security Council. The “Razali Reform Paper”10 (1997) was distributed in the General Assembly on December 3rd, 1997, after four years of deliberations on the subject matter. It suggested increasing the size from fifteen to twenty-four members, adding five permanent seats and four non-permanent seats. The distribution of permanent seats was envisioned to be in the following pattern: developing states of Africa (1), developing states of Asia (1), developing states of Latin America and Caribbean (1), industrialized states (2). The seat distribution of non-permanent seats was supposed to be: African States (1), Asian States (1), Eastern European States (1), Latin American and Caribbean States (1). Noteworthy in this reform proposal is that for the new permanent seats, the countries are not divided along the lines of the UN's regional groups, but along the lines of developing and developed states. Only in the category of non-permanent seats, there is a return to the regional group division. On the issue of the veto power, the “Razali Reform Paper” discourages its use, limiting it solely to matters covered by Chapter VII11 of the UN Charter. Simultaneously, it de- 2.2.1. 10 Paper by the Chairman of the Open-Ended Working Group On The Question of Equitable Representation and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council. 11 Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression. 2.2. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions 15 cides that the new permanent members of the Security Council shall have no veto rights. The affirmative vote on the new 24-member council shall be at fifteen, requiring amendments to article 27 (2) and (3) of the UN Charter. The report also decides to amend article 53 of the charter, by deleting any reference to former enemy states12 and to eliminate article 10713 accordingly. Furthermore, the paper calls for transparency enhancing measures, such as an increase in regular meetings with non-members of the council, monthly consultations with the General Assembly and regular briefings on the council's progress to non-members. The High-Level Panel Report When at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September of 2000 leaders of member states came together to what was the then “largest gathering of world leaders in history” (BBC News, 2000), deliberations on the role of the UN in the 21st century were on the agenda. What came out of this gathering was the United Nations Millennium Declaration with the Millennium Development Goals14. All leaders back then agreed to help the populations of the poorest parts of the world to feel a real improvement in their every-day lives by the year of 2015. The UN Millennium Declaration was divided into the points (1) Values and Principles, (2) Development and Poverty Eradication, (3) Protecting our Common Environment, (4) Human Rights, Democracy and Good Governance, (5) Meeting the Special Needs of Africa, (6) Strengthening the United Nations (United Nations, 2000). The issue of Security Council reform was briefly touched upon in the last aspect [Strengthening the United Nations] as “to intensify our efforts to 2.2.2. 12 “The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.” (Article 53 [2], UN Charter) 13 “Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.” (Article 107, UN Charter) 14 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ 2. Literature Review 16 achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects” (United Nations, 2000). Four years after the dissemination of the UN Millennium Declaration, a report by the so-called “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” was distributed as a follow up to the declaration together with UN General Assembly Presidential Note A/59/565 (2004). The High-level report (2004) was attached under the title “a more secure world: our shared responsibility”. The at that time UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan entrusted former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun with the chairmanship of the panel. The panel's task was to “assess current threats to international peace and security; to evaluate how our existing policies and institutions have done in addressing those threats; and to make recommendations for strengthening the United Nations so that it can provide collective security for all in the twenty-first century” (United Nations, 2004, 1). Threats identified by the report were (1) poverty, (2) infectious disease, (3) environmental degradation, (4) inter-state war, (5) civil war, (6) genocide, (7) other atrocities, (8) weapons of mass destruction, (9) terrorism and (10) transnational organized crime. Part of this report was a proposal on a reform of the UN Security Council. The report says that a future council should not simply be made representative covering all the regional groups equally, but should be kept as a “responsible body able to take decisive action” (United Nations, 2004, 79). Expansion should not solely be based on “geographical balance but also on contributions to maintaining peace and security” (United Nations, 2004, 80). Any reform, according to the report, should increase the effectiveness and credibility of the council without undermining its readiness to act. It should also make it more democratic and accountable, broadening its membership especially to the developing world. The member states contributing the most to the UN budget should be given preference when being elected for council seats. Contributions can be of financial, military or diplomatic nature to the objectives and mandates of the United Nations. The report does not give a specific reform recommendation, but presents two models for member states to consider. The first reform present in both models is a reorganization of the current regional groups. The group “Western European and Others” would be split up. Western Europe would be 2.2. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions 17 merged with the Eastern European group to make it one “European Group”. The remaining “others” would also be merged with different groups. The United States and Canada would join the group “Latin American and Caribbean”, making it the “Americas”. Australia and New Zealand join the Asian group, making it “Asia-Pacific”. Thus, the group number would be reduced from five to four with the new regional groups being (1) Africa, (2) Americas (3) Asia-Pacific, (4) Europe. Therefore at the status-quo, Africa would have no permanent seats, the Americas would have one, Asia-Pacific one and Europe three. According to the report, the Security Council is to be enlarged to twentyfour members with each of the four new regional groups having six seats. Distribution Model A introduces six new permanent seats without the right of a veto and three new non-permanent seats for twoyear terms. Africa and Asia-Pacific would receive two permanent seats respectively, Europe and the Americas would receive one seat respectively. This would bring the total count of permanent seats up to eleven with only the original five having veto powers. Africa would have two permanent seats without veto powers, Asia-Pacific would have three permanent seats [one with veto power & two without veto power], the Americas would receive two permanent seats [one with veto power & one without veto power] and Europe would have four permanent seats [three with veto power & one without veto power]. Furthermore, Africa would receive four spots for non-permanent seats, Asia-Pacific would receive three such spots, the Americas would receive four and Europe would receive two. This would divide the council into an eleven permanent seats [five with veto power & six without veto power] and thirteen non-permanent seats to an overall of twenty-four. Distribution Model B introduces no new permanent seats at all, instead creating a new category of non-permanent seats. The new category would be a renewable four-term for which all regional groups would receive two spots. In addition in the two-year non-renewable category for non-permanent seats, Model B proposes awarding four new seats to Africa, three new seats to Asia-Pacific, three new seats to the Americas and one new seat to Europe. This would bring the seat distribution to five permanent seats with veto power, eight new renewable fouryear term non-permanent seats equally distributed among the regional groups and eleven non-renewable non-permanent seats. Model B 2. Literature Review 18 would also have an overall of twenty-four seats on the Security Council. Both models are designed to encourage member states to contribute more resources to the UN budget by potentially rewarding them with longer or renewable seats. The report furthermore states that this should not be the last reform, as with ever-changing times, the need for another reform may arise in the future. It accentuates that in neither model, a new veto power would be created, as the authors see “no practical way of changing the existing members' veto powers” nevertheless calling the institution as such “anachronistic” (United Nations, 2004, 82). 2.2. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions 19 The Group of Four The Group of Four is a group of countries made up of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan. The four countries cooperate within the field of UN Security Council reform by publicly supporting each other's bids for a permanent membership. They base their aspirations for this membership on the strength of their economies as well as on the growing political weight of their voices in a world in which the balance of power is shifting away from US-dominated unipolarity to an increasingly diversified power share. Furthermore, the relatively high financial contribution to the UN Budget is raised as another argument in favor (Auswärtiges Amt, 2016). Economically speaking, it is especially Germany and Japan that have come out of the Cold War as winners and 25 years onwards continue to be in relative good economic shape. Germany is Europe's de-facto economic leader, while Japan remains Asia's second biggest economy after China. Both countries currently rank 3rd and 4th according to the nominal gross domestic products figures of the International Monetary Fund (2016). In a New York Times (1990) opinion piece, John Ullmann, a professor of management at Hofstra University, called the two countries the actual winners of the Cold War, because they have not wasted their resources on an arms race, but followed more wise and long-term oriented policy approaches. India and Brazil being the other two members of the Group of Four, are two more additions to the world's more diversified power share. As the world's largest democracy in terms of population size, India has consistently grown its economy and developed into a regional power in the possession of nuclear weapons. Brazil, even though experiencing some recent economic trouble fueled by corruption scandals in the government of Dilma Rousseff and wide scale administrative mismanagement (The Economist, 2016), has positioned itself to be a leader in South America. The four countries of this group make up the most likely choices for UN Security Council expansion, as they in addition to the economic strength and political weight, have been voted to the council as non-permanent members for 64 years cumulatively since the UN's founding. This length shows an overall trust in the countries by the rest of the UN's member body. 2.2.3. 2. Literature Review 20 On July 6th, 2005, a draft resolution was brought forward in the UN General Assembly by a group of countries centered around the Group of Four, calling for a reform of the council by enlarging it and by extending the veto right to a greater number of member states. Draft Resolution A/59/L.64 envisions an expansion of the UN Security Council from 15 to 25 members with four non-permanent ones and six permanent ones being added. The four non-permanent members shall be one African state, one Asian state, one Eastern European state and one Latin American and Caribbean state. The six permanent members shall be made up of two African states, two Asian states, one Latin American and Caribbean state and one Western European and Others state. It is obvious that the states being considered are the members of the Group of Four plus two African states of which the contenders are Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. In the argument of the initiators, this draft resolution constitutes a fair consideration of the regional distribution of new members, increasing the council's legitimacy in the eyes' of member states. Furthermore, effectiveness and credibility would be increased through a more representative council, reflecting current world realities. In addition, the draft resolution aims at greater transparency of the council's working methods through regular briefings of non-members from the General Assembly. On the issue of the veto, the draft resolution states that the six new permanent members shall not exercise their right until a review of the new situation created by the draft resolution has been undertaken fifteen years after. On September 29, 2015, the four members of the Group of Four reiterated their aspirations in their latest joint press release on the topic, stating that a “more representative, legitimate and effective Security Council is needed more than ever to address the global conflicts and crises, which had spiralled in recent years.” (Bundesregierung, 2015). The Group “Uniting for Consensus” The group “Uniting for Consensus” [nicknamed “Coffee Club”] was formed in 1995 under the leadership of Italy as a response to the aspirations of the G-4. As can be deducted from the group's name, its aim is to reach a consensus among UN member states prior to making any 2.2.4. 2.2. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions 21 decision on an actual reform effort. The group opposes any expansion of permanent seats, but instead advocates for an overall enlargement of non-permanent seats from ten to twenty (Ariyoruk, 2005). It was especially former Italian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Franscesco Paolo Fulci, who even after his official assignment ended, stayed longer in New York City for other UN functions to continue advocating privately. Notably so, it can be said that among the group members of the “Coffee Club” one can find expected regional competition from the regions of the G-4. Italy here would serve as the counterpart to Germany, Colombia and Argentina as counterparts to Brazil, as well as Pakistan and South Korea as counterparts to India and Japan. One draft resolution from 2005 and one further proposal from 2009 have been brought forward by the group “Uniting for Consensus”, where the proposal serves as a supplement to the initial draft resolution. Draft Resolution A/59/L.68 (2005) includes an increase of the seats for non-permanent members from 10 to 20, making the council one of 25 members overall. The draft resolution does not call for any expansion of the permanent membership, but aims at further visualizing the divide between veto powers and non-veto powers by simply increasing the latter. Furthermore, greater space for regional rotation for members from the five regional groups would be enabled, creating a more equitable geographical distribution. The twenty non-permanent members are to be elected to the pattern of African States (6), Asian States (5), Latin American and Caribbean States (4), Western European and Others States (3), and Eastern European States (2). Whether a direct re-election after a fulfilled two-year term is possible shall be decided upon by each of the five regional groups for their own members. An affirmative voting majority shall be reached at fifteen out of twenty five votes with no veto-power objecting. The draft resolution also calls for improved consultation between the Security Council and the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. To make these changes possible, article 23 (1) and (2), article 27 (2) and (3), as well as article 109 (1) will have to be amended. The major differences to prior efforts in the most recent proposal from 2009 (Global Policy Forum, 2009) is the creation of a completely new category of seats on the Security Council. In addition to the traditional 2-year non-permanent seats, two new alternative categories are 2. Literature Review 22 put forward. Either an additional 2-year category shall be created, whose members would be re-electable or a completely new category of 3- to 5-year terms shall be created. A further difference between these two categories is that members in a 2-year term will have the possibility of a re-election, while the 3- to 5-year seat does not hold this possibility. The longer term seats will also be allocated to regional groups on a partly rotational basis as follows: African States (1), Asian States (1), African/Asian States (1 – rotational basis), Latin American and Caribbean States (1), Western European and Others States/Eastern European States (1 – rotational basis). The original 2-year non-permanent terms without the possibility of a re-election would be upheld with the following allocation: Small States15 (1), Medium-Sized States16 (1), African States (1), Asian States (1), Latin American and Caribbean States (1), Eastern European States (1). The majority required for passing resolutions on the Security Council is set at 15 out of 25 member states. For the veto right, two options are given: either a complete abolition or a limitation to the usage of the veto to an inter-alia application limited to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter: “action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression”. Lastly, the proposal calls for a review of the mechanism after a period of either 10 to 12 years or 15 to 16 years, taking into consideration the terms of the seats and a comprehensive reassessment of the working methods and composition. The African Union After having been largely ignored in the power struggles and negotiation rounds of the UN Security Council during much of the second half of the 20th century, African countries have started an attempt to increase their chances at their own permanent seats in the early 21st century as well. In the Ezulwini Consensus (2005)17, a common African position on the proposed reform of the United Nations focus- 2.2.5. 15 Member states with a population of less than 1 million. 16 Member states with a population of between 1 million and 10 million. 17 The Common African Position On The Proposed Reform Of The United Nations – “The Ezulwini Consensus” 2.2. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions 23 ing on international peace and security matters, was formed. The Ezulwini Consensus covers various topics ranging from famines, poverty and debt management, international trade, environment concerns, inter- and intra-state armed conflict, the elimination of nuclear weapons, UN sanctions enforcement, peace-keeping missions, nation building, and the institutional reform of the United Nations itself. All of these issues are combined and framed as collective security problems for the African continent. Considering the aspect of United Nations Security Council reform, the Ezulwini Consensus demands at least two permanent African seats and five further non-permanent seats. The consensus was adopted by the African Union in March 2005. Facing significant opposition to the number of demanded seats in the UN General Assembly, the Sirte Declaration (2005) was adopted by the African Union in July of the same year. The Sirte Declaration scales down Africa's demands from five non-permanent seats on the council to two non-permanent seats. Both the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration form the basis on which the African attempt for Security Council reform is based. On July 18th, 2005, the African Union countries distributed their own draft resolution for Security Council reform in the UN General Assembly. Draft Resolution A/59/L.67 calls for expansion of the council size from the current fifteen to an overall of twenty-six members, creating eleven new seats. The seat distribution for new permanent seats in the African proposal would be as follows: African States (2), Asian States (2), Eastern European States (0), Latin American and Caribbean States (1), Western European and Others States (1). The seat distribution for new non-permanent seats in the African proposal would be as follows: African States (2), Asian States (1), Eastern European States (1), Latin American and Caribbean States (1), Western European and Others States (0). An important factor distinguishing the African resolution is that it demands the same derogatives and privileges for the new permanent members, including the veto right without any reassessment after a certain time period. With three non-permanent seats for Africa at the current set-up of the UN Security Council, but no permanent seats, Africa has a lot to gain in any potential reform scenario. While the African Union is currently demanding two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats, 2. Literature Review 24 it is questionable whether an argument for more than one permanent seat will be accepted by non-African countries. On the African continent itself, there are three potential candidates for the permanent seats. These potential candidates are Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa. Therefore, Africa is in a competition for two (most likely one) seats with three aspirant countries. While the first candidate has been politically extremely unstable in recent years following the resignation of former President Hosni Mubarak during Arab Spring and the events on Tahrir Square against military rule and Mohamed Morsi, the other candidates don't look that much better. Nigeria is in the midst of the fight against Boko Haram. Furthermore, to quote former British Prime Minister David Cameron, it is “possibly one of the most corrupt countries in the world”18 (The Guardian, 2016). South Africa is riddled in its own domestic governance problems under President Jacob Zuma and still suffering from the effects of an unfinished societal process after the Apartheid regime ended in 1994. The “Small Five” Another reform initiative for the United Nations Security Council was brought forward by a group that formed in 2005. The group is called the “Small Five” and consists of Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland with the latter being the unofficial leader. The group's name is supposed to work as a metaphor for being the exact opposite of the “Big Five” (permanent member of the Security Council with a veto power). In an effort to increase the inclusiveness and transparency of the council's working methods, this group calls exclusively for a greater incorporation of small member states into the council's work. A statement by the former Swiss Permanent Representative to the United Nations Mr. Peter Maurer backs this by stating that only a few member states will benefit from an enlargement of the council, but 2.2.6. 18 Former UK Prime Minister David Cameron called Afghanistan and Nigeria “fantastically corrupt” and “possibly two of the most corrupt countries in the world”. He made those remarks in a verbal conversation at the 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit with the Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby, the Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow and Queen Elizabeth II of England. 2.2. Main Initiatives and Draft Resolutions 25 the great majority would only benefit from improved working methods. All UN-member states that contribute to peace-keeping missions should receive a greater overview of the Security Council's plans, as they are expected to share the burden of the enforcements of United Nations missions (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 2009). In draft resolution A/60/L.49 (2006), the group suggests interactive and informal discussions between the Security Council and the General Assembly. Furthermore, special subject-oriented reports by the Security Council to the General Assembly on issues of international concern such as peace-keeping missions or sanction enforcement shall be drafted. In addition, more substantive exchanges of views between the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council shall be held. Regular and timely consultations between members and non-members of the council shall be held as well. On the use of the veto right in the Security Council, the group “Small Five” suggests that all members making use of this right should have the obligation to explain themselves in a written document issued to all council members. The veto shall not be used in the event of genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violation against international humanitarian law. While the draft resolution was never officially put up for a vote, some suggestions on consultations and transparency have later been taken up in a Presidential Note issued by the Security Council (S/ 2006./507, 2009). In an interview given to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC News, 2012), Mr. Peter Maurer called this “a significant achievement” and “a step in the right direction” (Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, 2009). Up until today, the suggestions of the group “Small Five” have however not become part of the council's standard procedures. An Academic Approach: The “Schwartzberg Reform Proposal” A completely different approach to United Nations Security Council reform comes from the academic world. Professor Joseph E. Schwartzberg is a professor emeritus in geography at the University of Minnesota, who came up with a totally different and very parliamentary solution to the problem. Being a member of the World Federalist 2.3. 2. Literature Review 26 Movement19, Professor Schwartzberg favors a model for the United Nations that reflects the relative position of one member state compared to all others. In his academic proposal and analysis “Revitalizing the United Nations: Reform through Weighted Voting” (Schwartzberg, 2004) he developed a system of weighted voting in which every UN member state will have a voting weight according to its international position in relation to the rest. Schwartzberg's main point of critique of the current voting system of the United Nations is that each country has one vote with the exact equal weight. The system of “one state – one vote” does not reflect the realities of the balance of power in the world, which should be taken into account at UN votes as well. In the current system, Micronesia's vote in the General Assembly has the same weight as the one of the United States. As one can imagine, this has been a point of critique by the more powerful member states since the UN's founding and was only acceptable to them through the introduction of the veto right in the UN Security Council (Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). Professor Schwartzberg (2004) wants to reform the current system of “one state – one vote” by replacing it with a method of weighted voting. He developed a specific formula for this weighted vote: “(P+C+M)/3”. In his formula, “P” stands for the percentage of the member state's population among the UN membership, “C” stands for the percentage of the member states' financial contributions to the UN budget or alternatively the member state's gross national product's percentage compared to all others, and “M” stands for the member state's unit share among the UN's membership. Then, the result is divided by three to get the average of the three prior factors. Schwartzberg (2004) wants to apply this system to the UN General Assembly primarily. In the setting where each vote counts the same, now the countries' votes would carry a certain percentage weight. According to his formula, the five UN member states with highest weighted vote in the General Assembly would be: (1) United States [9.064% in contributions OR 11.716% in GNP], (2) China [7.672% in contributions OR 8.462% in GNP], (3 OR 4) India [5.960% in contributions OR 6.3455 in GNP], (3 OR 4) Japan [7.282% in contributions OR 5.423% in GNP], and (5) Germany [3.835% in contributions OR 19 World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy. http://www.wfm-igp.org/ 2.3. An Academic Approach: The “Schwartzberg Reform Proposal” 27 2.987% in GNP]. For the UN Security Council, Professor Schwartzberg (2004) envisions an expansion of the council from fifteen seats to a maximum of eighteen seats with the veto right having been eliminated. This number is based on calculations he has made in his work. All member states with a contribution or GNP percentage of at least 4% would be guaranteed a permanent seat. According to his formula, this would only apply to the four highest ranked countries of the United States, China, India and Japan. Simultaneously, he would dissolve the current UN regional groups that are entrusted with selecting candidates for non-permanent seats. Instead, he would allow all member states to freely choose their group affiliations and also allow groups to change. As one will only be able to have a seat on the UN Security Council with a contribution or GNP percentage of at least 4% and most members will want to have a seat, Schwartzberg (2004) expects member states to start sharing seats in newly formed, like-minded groups. The new groups could then be formed according to economic, security, cultural, linguistic, religious, etc. connections among member states. In all of these circumstances, a maximum of eighteen different regional groups would emerge. These groups of like-minded could then choose their representatives, acting as groups on the council. Schwartzberg (2004) predicts that this move would eliminate the fierce competition among members of the same regional groups, as now only like-minded countries would come together. Some of his group suggestions include the (1) Arab League; (2) Central Europe; (3) Central, Easter and Southern Africa; (4) China; (5) Eastern Europe; (6) India; (7) Japan; (8) Meso-America; (9) Non-Arab Islamic States of Central and Southwest Asia; (10) North Atlantic Bloc; (11) Northern Europe; (12) South America; (13) Southern Europe; (14) Southeast Asia; (15) United States; (16) Western Africa; (17) Western Europe. Assessment of Main Initiatives The mentioned literature has shown a great depth of reform suggestions for the UN Security Council coming from both official policy proposals and UN documents, as well as from the academic world. From the Razali Paper and the UN-High Panel Report to the reform 2.4. 2. Literature Review 28 proposals of the Group of Four, the group “Uniting for Consensus”, the African Union, the group “Small Five” or the Schwartzberg reform proposals, suggestions for institutional reform are plenty. The remaining question however is, whether some of those are practical and feasible. The classical interpretation of the situation found on the UN Security Council is reflected by game theory, as each negotiating player must fear to suffer consequential losses. The losses to be suffered in the debate on council reform would be to either not be included in the way aspired or to not be included at all. For a P-5 veto power such as the United States, an abolition of the veto would constitute a catastrophic reduction of the bargaining power on the council, while an extension of veto powers to further states would constitute a relative reduction. Aspirant states such as Germany would be able to increase their bargaining powers with either an acquired veto power or an enlargement of the member size of the council. However, aspirant states are also put against each other, as further aspirant countries such as Italy might not be considered in the veto discussion. The crux of the matter remains a lack of trust or assurances within the international system that one state will in fact live up to its promises. Might Germany remain a strong partner for the United States within the western alliance if it acquires a veto? Might Germany remain a proponent of pan-EU ideas, also taking into consideration Italian interests once it has a veto? Can the United States rest assured that an extension of the veto and enlargement of the council will not detract from the Security Council's effectiveness? None of these questions can be answered prior to a reallife simulation. The problem is that the post-simulation status cannot be reversed once it has been instated. In terms of bargaining power on the UN Security Council, Winter (1996) has shown that a crucial part is time. According to him, bargaining power of the non-veto states on the council is basically zero, as any decision can be stopped at any time by the veto powers. An attempt was made with the first reform of the UN Security Council in 1965 to undermine the P-5's bargaining power enlarging the council from eleven to fifteen, but this would have only been successful without the veto. With the veto as it stands, the first reform had no effect. Neither would a second reform with no change to the veto have any effect to the said bargaining power of the P-5. A 2.4. Assessment of Main Initiatives 29 mere enlargement to 25 members would not change anything. An extension of the veto to other states would give more states the same absolute bargaining power, but discrepancy to non-veto states would remain unchanged. Winter (1996) therefore argues that the only reform aspect to relativize the absolute bargaining power of the veto states, would be to put a time limit on the decision-making process. However, the limit would have to have the consequence of a loss for everybody. If a situation arises out of whose continuation all veto powers would suffer harm, the bargaining power of the veto is diminished. Should environmental policy and climate change policy ever be framed in terms of security, this might become interesting in council negotiations. As climate change affects everybody equally, negotiation delay through the veto power would become nonsensical. Therefore, the bargaining power of non-veto states would be increased. On the other side, without the time limit, the P-5 continue to have absolute bargaining power. This serves as yet another proof for George Tsebelis's (2002) veto player theory, arguing that the outcome of policy in any legislative body is dependent on veto players within it. Using rational-choice institutionalism, this theory claims that the outcome of policy depends on “(1) the number of veto players, (2) the distance between these players' policy ideal points, and (3) the players internal cohesion” (Wirkola, 2010, 3). Tsebelis (2002) explains that the existence of an area between the veto players' ideal policy preferences preserves the status-quo on a policy. He calls this the “unanimity core”. In the case of the United Nations Security Council, a further core is the “qualified majority core”, which is needed as resolutions are passed with a 9/15 majority. The case of the P-5's absolute bargaining power therefore remains for reform negotiations of the council, as can be see in the accusation of a “delaying strategy” by German Ambassador Hertrampf (Ret.). Hosli et al. (2011) continue with the deliberation on bargaining power by adding the potential for winning coalitions to the conversation. Analyzing the effectiveness of the decision-making process and the weighted-voting power of member states, they use the Coleman Index of the power of a collectivity to act. In the first structural period of the UN Security Council (1945–1965), the collective weight of the veto powers' voting power stood at 90.48% and in the second structural period (1965–present) at 83.46%. The Coleman Index for decision probability stood at 2.78 and 2. Literature Review 30 2.59 respectively. In the event of an enlargement following the proposal of the Group of Four (of which Germany is a member), the collective voting power of the then ten veto powers in an enlarged 25-member council would be 62.53% with a Coleman Index for decision probability of 1.84. This means that while the overall weighted-voting power of the member states with a veto power would decrease, winning coalitions would also become more difficult to find. Thus, one can expect the use of the veto in the UN Security Council to become more frequent under any enlargement scenario, supporting US Ambassadors (Ret.) Wood and Boucher's concern for council ineffectiveness. With reform negotiations having stalled however, the UN Security Council remains a structured institution whose equilibrium is the rules of the status-quo (Shepsle, 2005). 2.4. Assessment of Main Initiatives 31

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United Nations Security Council reform has been hotly debated since the end of the Cold War, which unleashed a global geopolitical realignment. But since 2007, the push to update the Security Council to reflect the power-sharing realities of our modern age – giving for example Germany a seat on the coveted panel – has largely stalled. Finding a Cue through “Q” chronicles the history, key initiatives and major players in this important discussion, while focusing on U.S. and German involvement on the council, and reboots the debate through political discourse analysis and intensive Q-methodology. Diplomats from Germany and the United States were asked to rank their agreement with statements made by stakeholders from government, business, academia and media in both countries. Instead of presenting a priori categories and foregone conclusions, this method describes the parameters of the debate through typologies derived from fresh diplomatic assessments. Social perspective narratives were created from the results, leading to the surfacing of two dominant discourses: Convinced Institutionalism and Cautious Institutionalism. Andreas Schwenk’s innovative approach provides new insight into the thinking of German and U.S. diplomats, and offers a valuable contribution to overcoming the stalemate. “Considering the growing number of attacks on multilateralism, Mr. Schwenk’s meticulous study clearly illustrates the need for reform of what is designed to be the world’s pivotal multilateral organization. A lack of reform of the U.N. Security Council might lead to future challenges to its primacy. It was my great pleasure to contribute to this fascinating book.” Doris Hertrampf, German Ambassador (Ret.) “I enjoyed participating in Mr. Schwenk‘s rigorous and systematic study of the vexed issue of U.N. Security Council reform. His analysis demonstrates broad commitment to keeping the Security Council effective, while the diversity of views confirms that changes to the number, regional distribution, or powers of its members will continue to be difficult.” William B. Wood, U.S. Ambassador (Ret.)