4. Results in:

Andreas Schwenk

Finding a Cue through "Q", page 39 - 54

Applying Q-Methodology to Compare German and U.S. Diplomats' Attitudes towards U.N. Security Council Reform

1. Edition 2019, ISBN print: 978-3-8288-4306-6, ISBN online: 978-3-8288-7239-4, https://doi.org/10.5771/9783828872394-39

Series: Wissenschaftliche Beiträge aus dem Tectum Verlag: Politikwissenschaften, vol. 81

Tectum, Baden-Baden
Bibliographic information
Results Analysis of Interviews23 For this master thesis, various interviews were conducted with diplomats from Germany and the United States. Four of the various interviews were conducted with retired diplomats. Two of the interviewees are former US diplomats, while the other two are former German diplomats. On the American side, Ambassador (Ret.) Richard A. Boucher and Ambassador (Ret.) William Braucher Wood agreed to interviews. On the German side Ambassador (Ret.) Doris Hertrampf and Ambassador (Ret.) Dr. Gunter Pleuger agreed to interviews. While conversations with active diplomats from both sides were held during the preparations for this thesis, it is noteworthy to say that on neither side, any active diplomats agreed to be quoted or referred to in this thesis. A comparison of the four interviews held with retired diplomats showed that prior official policies from UN documents and discussions in journals or magazines were echoed. The diplomats did not seem to have any radically new approaches to the issue of UN Security Council reform, and both sides seemed to be rather pessimistic. US Ambassador (Ret.) Boucher stated that reform efforts have gone nowhere and that reform might even be farther away than ten years ago. German Ambassador (Ret.) Hertrampf even said that she does not expect any change to the status-quo by 2030. While both American and German diplomats were pessimistic on the future success of any reform, reasons for the current gridlock differed between the two sides. Ms. Hertrampf was of the opinion that the United States was not interested in reform, because it feared a loss of power. Therefore, the US was follow- 4. 4.1. 23 The statements made by the retired diplomats in the interviews conducted for this master thesis do solely reflect the personal opinions held by the interviewees. In no way are they reflective of, or to be associated with, the official policies of the two countries in this study. 39 ing an avoiding strategy by intentionally provoking a never-ending debate. Boucher instead raised concern over the disagreement between aspirant countries making reform impossible. Germany wants an honest discussion, according to Hertrampf, but according to Boucher, every country had its own reasons for why it should be on the council, and yet nobody could agree on whether those were the right reasons. US Ambassador (Ret.) William Wood stated that reform was just not operational, as there is too much disagreement before even getting to the P-5 states. In terms of the veto right, there was expected disagreement between the two sides as well. While both Hertrampf and Pleuger agreed that an enlargement of the Security Council would only be possible with new veto powers, Boucher and Wood said that any new vetoes would be a non-issue. Boucher commented that ideally he preferred a “5+5+5” solution24, in which there would the the current P-5 together with five permanent members from the G-4 proposal without a veto, plus five non-permanent members. Pleuger however stated that with every further year of the status-quo, the veto power would be delegitimated. Another interesting aspect was the difference in the two sides' interpretation on the council's legitimacy. Wood saw its legitimacy coming from the authority enshrined in it by the UN Charter. The P-5's capability to ensure world security and peace plays an important role here. Boucher questioned whether Germany's military would have the capability to fulfill this role. Pleuger on the other side saw legitimacy coming from the representativeness of the council. The question of the German military becoming more powerful again was described as a dilemma for the country, according to Hertrampf. Thus, for Wood there is no lack of legitimacy for the Security Council, while for Pleuger the lack of representativeness causes a lack of legitimacy. The greatest future concern that was raised from the German side was that with the status quo continuing, the UN might become irrelevant. As more countries deem the set-up of the Security Council to be unreflective of the 21st century, more solutions to world problems might be looked for in different settings. While the German side seemed to bemoan such a potential development, Wood said that he 24 [China, France, Russia, UK, US] permanent with veto + [African State, Brazil, Germany, India, Japan] permanent without veto + [Five regionally selected states] nonpermanent without veto 4. Results 40 would welcome solutions from all settings, also from outside the UN. The greatest future concern on the US side was that a potential reform might undermine the council's effectiveness. According to Wood a reform that would make the council parliamentary would be a bad idea. A 25-member council should be the absolute limit. A potential step forward to making the UN Security Council more reflective of the 21st century was given by the two US diplomats in the form of the EU sharing its two permanent seats. However, a sharing between France and Germany was preferred to the UK joining such an agreement. For all Europeans this seems to be out of the question. Another idea might be a permanent seat for the European Union, for which the UN Charter would have to be amended. While the German diplomats continued to argue for institutional reform, to make it more legitimate, their US counterparts suggested Germany should concentrate its efforts on other issues not in gridlock. According to Wood, Germany is part of the solution for world problems, not part of the problem. Germany's voice is loud and clear, and the country should continue to use its influence to make positive changes. UN Security Council reform however, remains unlikely. Two Typologies Through a close study and interpretation of the factor correlations and Q-analysis used in this study, one “unipolar” and one “bipolar” (Webler, et al., 2009) factor can be identified. Each of the two factors are resembled by an idealized, theoretical Q-sort which was calculated. The two idealized Q-sorts are referred to as factors A and B [see table 3]. They represent the two possibilities to which the loading factors of the study participants can be likened the most, and therefore constitute the two dominating discourses on the subject matter at hand. The subject factor loadings of the study participants represent the factor loadings of each diplomat in this study in relation to the two idealized factors. Each of the two factors will be named in the following part of this section and a social perspective narrative will be created for it. It is important to note that this creation of a social perspective narrative arises out of the order of the statements given to them by the study partici- 4.2. 4.2. Two Typologies 41 pants, and therefore reflects the relative importance given to the statements in relation to each other. Furthermore, the results of the interview rounds with the diplomats are taken into account for the creation of the social perspective narratives as well. Table 3 Statement Scores on Each Factor No. Factor A B 1 The United States is not open to an enlargement of the Security Council by a Charter amendment that changes the current veto structure. 1 4 2 Unlike Japan and Germany, which are most closely aligned with U.S. preferences, Brazil, India, and South Africa frequently vote contrary to U.S. preferences, showing that close bilateral relations do not always translate into cooperation in multilateral settings. 0 2 3 The United States supports expansion of the Security Council. Such expansion, however, should neither diminish the Council’s effectiveness nor its efficiency. 1 2 4 The [German] Federal Government is also ready to shoulder the responsibility that comes along with a permanent membership on the security council. 3 -2 5 Every modification of the veto right will meet substantial resistance from the side of the five permanent members. 3 3 6 For Washington, an ideal enlargement scenario might be simply adding the G4 powers as permanent (or long-term) members without veto power. -1 2 7 Given that U.S. interests in enlargement are riding on the future behavior of aspirant countries, the United States would do well to pursue a disciplined, criteria-based approach to enlargement. 2 0 8 Alongside the call for a geographically balanced distribution of seats, […] countries that make considerable contributions to the UN should be members of the Security Council. 4 1 9 When the Security Council legislates, it sets rules for the United Nations membership as a whole. 1 -1 10 The UN may be a multilateral organisation, but it has to deal with an increasingly unipolar world in which the US rules, and rules supremely. -3 -1 11 The United States is open in principle to a limited expansion of both permanent and non-permanent members. 0 1 12 The present institutional setting is able neither to appease existing conflicts nor to prevent those in preparation. 1 -1 13 The council's capability to act increases when preferably highly contributing states like Japan and Germany receive permanent seats on the council. 2 0 14 The heated debate in the general assembly has caused a sort of competition in multilateralism […]. -2 1 15 The membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to twenty-five by adding six permanent and four non-permanent members. 0 -2 4. Results 42 No. Factor A B 16 The one who possesses considerable financial and other resources and puts them into the service of the UN, should also have the appropriate influence. 2 -1 17 There should be no changes to the current veto structure. -4 3 18 The debate over the expansion of the Security Council is a geopolitical contest for power and influence, but it is also about sharing the cost of international security. 0 2 19 Germany has in all its decisions on the security council always taken into account EU interests […]. 0 0 20 The major advantage of the G4 candidates’ case rests on its trajectory towards a fairer representation of regional interests. 0 -1 21 40 years after the establishment of the United Nations, it is not only desirable today but entirely feasible to give serious thought to the reform of the United Nations and its system of organizations. -1 1 22 This [institution of the veto] has merely widened the gap in the situation between the inhabitants of developed and developing countries dramatically: lack of security and war have been reserved for the most underprivileged peoples. -1 -2 23 Vetoing U.N. action against a state that is clearly in violation of international law and practice because that state is an ally should not be acceptable. 2 -4 24 In order to keep the UN under its authority, the US is still in arrears for the payment of its contribution […]. -2 0 25 There is too much to lose if U.S. allows the enlargement debate to turn into a ruthless realpolitik chess game. -3 0 26 […] the idea of a possible enlargement of the Security Council progressed and received support from the US, in order to permit the entrance of Japan and Germany as permanent members. -1 0 27 The global North […] finds itself in a permanent minority, outvoted on issue after issue by nations of the global South […]. -1 1 28 The word “permanent” does not belong in any constitution or charter, for the simple reason that no human creation is truly permanent. -2 -3 29 It is hardly surprising […] that there is now wide sentiment that the time has come to enlarge the Council yet again, by anywhere from two to ten new members. 0 0 30 The reference to the status of Germany as the third largest contributor is a classical argument of Machtpolitik. -2 0 31 Membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to twenty-four by adding five permanent and four non-permanent members. 1 -2 32 The four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from African States; (ii) One from Asian States; (iii) One from Eastern European States; (iv) One from Latin American and Caribbean States. 0 -3 Own calculations. 4.2. Two Typologies 43 Convinced Institutionalism (Factor A)25 The most important aspect of United Nations Security Council membership is that it takes into account both geography and contributions. The UN Security Council should therefore be updated, based on a fair distribution of members. Such a distribution should take into account the geographical diversity of the membership, as well as the amount of contributions by United Nations member states (8). The legitimacy of the council depends on such a fair distribution, so that all members feel directly or indirectly represented and involved. Such contributions may be military, financial or diplomatic. Any reform must include a change to the current veto structure to include the newly selected permanent member states. Any reform without an expansion of veto powers would not be reflective of the 21st century (17). It is crucial that any permanent member state of the council has the capabilities to fulfill its role and is ready to shoulder the burden that comes with it. Germany would be one of those countries ready to do so, after having arisen from its past of a divided state during the years of the Cold War (4). It should be allowed to play its role for peace, security and stability in the world. Since the United Nations is a truly multilateral organization, all permanent members should be seen as equals, and no country should attempt to undermine this through playing anachronistic games of Machtpolitik (10). Since the institutional structures of the UN Security Council include veto rights for the current P-5 members however, it is unlikely that a reform will happen, as the current veto powers are not interested in any change (5). Even though geopolitical realities have changed drastically since the end of World War II and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the P-5 members fear a loss of power, and will therefore attempt to block any reform effort. Nevertheless, the P-5, and especially the United States would do well in working towards an honest reform to make the United Nations fit for the 21st century, since otherwise there is a real danger that the UN Security Council loses its legitimacy in the eyes of the world. There is simply too much to lose if the reform debate becomes a ruthless adaptation of Realpolitik (25). As the only remaining superpower, the United States would do well in us- 4.2.1. 25 Numbers in brackets indicate the corresponding statements in table 3. 4. Results 44 ing a criteria-based approach to evaluate which aspirant countries it wants to support. After all, the future behavior of new permanent members on the Security Council will have a huge effect on its future actions (7). In any potential reform scenario, it should be recognized that the council's capability to act increases when member states with high contributions are made permanent. This way, their willingness to further intensify their contributions is increased (13). Therefore, it would be beneficial for a future Security Council to make states like Germany and Japan permanent members. This is not only a question of effectiveness and efficiency, but also of justice. Higher-contributing members should simultaneously yield greater influence in the organization for which they pay a higher membership fee than others (16). The debate about reform has not evolved into a hypocritical competition of multilateralism, but is driven by an honest will for a just reform (14). Even though, the United States does not seem to be keen on reform, it recognizes the dedicated proposals of aspirant states and continues to support the United Nations as an institution (24). It is obvious that potential permanent seats for aspirant states should reflect their contributions, thereby entrusting them with its full privileges to recognize the work of the most influential and trustworthy countries (28). This has absolutely nothing to do with Machtpolitik, but much rather shows a willingness to shape the world in a peaceful and stable manner (30). In a future UN Security Council it should be prohibited to veto any action of the council that goes against a state in violation of international law, as peace and stability in the world can only be guaranteed on a legally binding international consensus (23). Cautious Institutionalism (Factor B)26 Any change to the current veto structure of the United Nations Security Council would constitute a risky, if not dangerous, gamble with world peace and security. Therefore, the United States should not be open to any amendment to the UN Charter that would change the status-quo of the veto (1). The broad consensus among the P-5 members 4.2.2. 26 Numbers in brackets indicate the corresponding statements in table 3. 4.2. Two Typologies 45 of the council to prevent this from happening, shows that a change to the veto structure would be extremely risky. After all, those five states are still the guarantors of security and stability in the world (5). Permanent membership with a veto right in the UN Security Council should be see as a pillar of stability, counter-weighing the UN General Assembly (28). The legitimacy of the council arises out of its effectiveness to keep the world secure and stable, further supporting the current veto structure. Therefore, permanent membership with veto rights is an essential aspect of the Security Council. The veto powers of the Security Council should remain free in their use of the veto right, in accordance with the UN Charter. This may also include vetoing action against a state in violation of international regulations that have been signed by some, but not by all (23). Again, only what is specified in the UN Charter is legally binding. A change of the veto would most likely create more chaos and should not even be debated (17). As changes to the veto structure would surely include an expansion of veto rights to more countries, it is uncertain to what extent a future UN Security Council would still be able to act and to ensure peace. The United Nations voting record of other countries has shown that close bilateral ties do not always mean agreement in multilateral settings such as the Security Council. This can be backed up by the differing voting record of, for example, Germany and Japan on the one side, Brazil and India on the other side. While the first two can be seen as close U.S. allies, the latter two often align themselves with other blocs within the United Nations (2). Following this logic, one should attempt to get one's allies on board, while attempting to keep one's adversaries out. As no such one-sided reform effort would reach a majority in the United Nations General Assembly, no reform is preferable to bad reform. This applies to all P-5 powers alike. More member states on the council would make it more difficult to act. Therefore, an enlargement to both twenty-four or twenty-five members would be the absolute limit, if not already too much (15, 31). The various reform proposals over the last twenty years have only confused the UN membership, but have not improved the situation at all (32). The ideal enlargement would simply be adding the “G-4 powers”. A really important criteria for Security Council membership is whether a country is ready and willing to fulfill its role. Emerging, powerful aspirant countries like Germany do not 4. Results 46 yet seem ready to do so, as it lacks crucial military capacities to deploy its forces at any time around the world to respond to threats against international peace and security (4). Furthermore, it is extremely important to keep the Security Council's ability to act in place. A too great expansion with too many differing interests would further undermine the council's effectiveness and efficiency in an already difficult setting (3). Again, the perfect solution would be to add the so-called “G-4 powers” of Brazil, Germany, India and Japan to only have emerging powerful countries on board. This would increase the council's capabilities due to those states' resources and contributions to the United Nations. At the same time this would reflect a good geographical distribution, balancing out differing interests on the council (6). While it would be really lamentable to ignore Africa in this, there does not seem to be a single country on the African continent capable of doing the same job as the “G-4 powers” would be capable of doing. It is obvious that, due to the importance of the UN Security Council, the reform debate is a geopolitical contest for power and influence. At the same time however, it is a question of justly sharing the cost for international security among the countries of the world (18). The institution of the veto does not constitute a dividing factor among different regional, geographical or political blocs within the United Nations, but ensures stability in the United Nations and the world from which all countries benefit (22). Diplomats’ Alignment to the two Discourses (Factor Loadings) The factor loadings analysis of this thesis describes the individual factor loadings of the ten diplomats being studied [see table 4]. The loadings show how each of the diplomats correlates with the two factors found. One especially noteworthy factor between the ten diplomats that participated in this study is that the Germans and Americans overwhelmingly sided with opposing factors. Four out of the five German diplomats had a high positive correlation with Convinced Institutionalism. All of them had worked for their country in relations with the United Nations. Three out of five Americans had a high positive correlation with Cautious Institutionalism. Two from those had 4.2.3. 4.2. Two Typologies 47 worked for their country in relations with the United Nations, while one had not. One German diplomat did not have a statistically significant correlation with Convinced Institutionalism, but solely a high negative correlation with Cautious Institutionalism. This diplomat had not worked in relations with the United Nations. One American diplomat did not have a statistically significant correlation with Cautious Institutionalism, but a high positive correlation with Convinced Institutionalism. This diplomat had also not worked in relations with the United Nations. Another American diplomat, who had not worked in relations with the United Nations, did not have statistically significant correlations with either one of the two factors. Thus, an overall of five [four Germans; one American] diplomats fell on factor A, while three [all Americans] fell on factor B. One German diplomat only showed statistical significance in his opposition to factor B. Following this, German diplomats showed greater consistency in their preference for factor A than American diplomats showed for factor B. Another interesting result is that on both sides, female diplomats were congruent with their national peers' dominating preference, while some male diplomats varied from it. Table 4 Subjects Factor Loadings Factor Subjects A B 1 Diplomat (UN experience) GER - (female) 0.66 * -0.06 2 Diplomat (UN experience) GER - (male) 0.76 * -0.03 3 Diplomat (UN experience) GER - (female) 0.72 * -0.19 4 Diplomat (UN experience) GER - (male) 0.61 * 0.14 5 Diplomat (no UN experience) GER - (male) 0.40 -0.77 * 6 Diplomat (no UN experience) USA - (female) -0.01 0.32 7 Diplomat (UN experience) USA - (male) 0.38 0.68 * 8 Diplomat (UN experience) USA - (male) -0.33 0.53 * 9 Diplomat (no UN experience) USA - (male) 0.39 0.73 * 10 Diplomat (no UN experience) USA - (male) 0.70 * 0.07 *p <_ 0.01. – Own calculations. 4. Results 48 A statistical factor correlations analysis was attempted with three rotating factors, but did not show sufficient statistical significance to justify the creation of a third factor. In this potential third factor, all German diplomats and three American diplomats did not have any correlation with the potential third discourse, while two Americans diplomats had a high positive and high negative correlation respectively. Assessment of Typologies The creation of the two social perspective narratives under consideration of the factor analysis and the interviews has given way to two different discourse typologies in a cross-national comparison of German and American diplomats: 1. Convinced Institutionalism & 2. Cautious Institutionalism [see table 5]. Table 5 Analysis of Two Discourses of UN Security Council Reform Discourse Elements Discourse Ontology Agency Ascribed Motivation Relationships seen as natural Convinced Institutionalism UN Member States, UN Security Council Governments, UN Secretariat Fair Distribution, Legitimacy Capability to Contribute Cautious Institutionalism UN Member States, UN Security Council Governments, UN Secretariat Security & Stability, Effectiveness & Efficiency, Legitimacy Capability to Act Both of these discourses are similar to each other in some aspects and differ from each other in others. The similarities between them lie in their assessments of ontology and agency. Both discourses agree that the entities involved in the issue at hand are the UN member states and the UN Security Council. It is precisely the UN Security Council 4.3. 4.3. Assessment of Typologies 49 whose reform is at stake, and this organ is similarly recognized as the most important decision-making institution in this process. The second entity recognized is the member states of the United Nations which will ultimately have to decide upon any reform solution. Furthermore, the two discourses are in agreement over the agencies involved in the reform process, identifying them as national governments and the UN Secretariat. Thus, reform negotiations are an interplay between the involved member states' governments, and the United Nations as an institution. Differences can be identified in the ascribed motivations of the two discourses. Convinced Institutionalism acts on the motivations of reaching a fair distribution of member states on the Security Council, based on geographical diversity and contribution size to the UN. In addition, legitimacy is seen as arising out of exactly this fair distribution. Contributing countries should have proportional power in the UN system. The status-quo of the Security Council set-up is thus identified as lacking legitimacy. Cautious Institutionalism on the other side acts on the motivations of seeking security and stability for the world, seeing this best guaranteed with a continued status-quo of the remaining big military powers. Furthermore, effectiveness and efficiency serve as another motivation for this discourse, as the council should be kept capable to act swift and decisively. Any enlargement would complicate this heavily. Legitimacy is seen as arising out of the effectiveness and efficiency of the council, as well as out of a legally positivistic view of the status of the UN Charter being as it is. The relationship seen as natural constitutes a hierarchy that is assumed by the two discourses. While Convinced Institutionalism sees that hierarchy as being the capability of a UN member state to contribute to the institution, Cautious Institutionalism sees it as the capability of a member state to act in lieu of the institution. When looking at the factors loadings [see table 4], it is especially striking that almost all German and American diplomats sided with opposing factors. Only one German and one American diplomat differed from their peers, with the German diplomat having no correlation on factor A (& a negative correlation on factor B) and the American diplomat having a positive correlation on factor A (& no correlation on factor B). A reason for this divergence might be a difference in past experience throughout the diplomatic career. While all diplomats from both sides 4. Results 50 who had worked in relations with the United Nations stuck with their peers, the two diplomats that did not, had no past posting to the United Nations. Other diplomats without past posting to the United Nations however, did not differ from their peers. Overall, the German diplomats are slightly more consistent than the American diplomats on their respective factor. Broadly speaking, the two discourses identified in this study can be accredited to two theories of international relations. While Convinced Institutionalism fits into the realm of liberal institutionalism, Cautious Institutionalism fits into the realm of liberal realism. Convinced Institutionalism reflects a conviction of the sanctity of international organizations such as the United Nations. It sees benefits in cooperation through the UN framework and in the building of a legally binding, international behavioral rulebook. This must be established through the incorporation of all member states on just terms, resembling the current situation within the international system. It is important to note that there is no idealistic dream driving this, but the rational assessment of the anarchic system being tameable through international institutions to create prosperity and peace. Broadly speaking, Convinced Institutionalism therefore can be related to the international relations theory of liberalism as outlined by prominent scholars and thinkers Adam Smith (1776), Immanuel Kant (1795), Michael Doyle (1983; 1986) John Ikenberry (2001) and Robert Keohane (1984; 1993). Liberalism holds that with growing international exchange, interdependence and laws, armed conflict between states can be reduced. Cautious Institutionalism reflects a more hesitant approach towards international organizations, for this study, specifically the United Nations. While it sees benefits in cooperating on the UN Security Council and shaping the world through common, international agreements, it simultaneously holds deep mistrust for the actions of other member states. It recognizes that within the UN system, some members states are more equal than others, and thus, preparations have to be taken. A state should therefore only cooperate within a UN framework as far as it is in its own rational interests, but always be ready to act outside of it where ever seen necessary. This discourse broadly can be related to the theoretical school of realism in international relations as outlined by prominent scholars Hans Morgenthau (1948), Kenneth Waltz (1959), 4.3. Assessment of Typologies 51 John Mearsheimer (1983; 2001), Stephen Walt (1987) or Robert Gilpin (1981; 1987). More precisely however, Cautious Institutionalism fits into the English school of the so-called liberal realism, as outlined by scholars Hedley Bull (1977; 1984), Martin Wight (1977; 1996; 2002) or Barry Buzan (2014). Liberal Realism assumes the international system to be anarchic, just as classical realism does. However, instead of pitting states against one another in an ever-constant struggle for power and a continuing mistrust of the others' intentions, liberal realism assumes there to be a society of states notwithstanding the omnipresent anarchy. This society of states arises out of the existence of common interests and norms between certain states, thus leading to the formulation of common rules of procedure when dealing with each other. The United Nations can be seen as the product of those common interests and norms, whose authority nevertheless solely reaches to said communalities. Both Convinced Institutionalism and Cautious Institutionalism can thus be broadly related to already existing theories within international politics. It is important to note that both theories assume rational actor behavior and stem from functionalistic goals. Both agree on the merit of the existence of international institutions, but disagree on the scope one's own interests should be put behind the institution's goals. Following the development of the two theories of international politics, one can say that the Grotian English School of realism is already a middle ground between the Hobbesian classical realism and the Kantian liberal institutionalism. The Hobbesian classical liberalism sees states pitted against each other in a constant struggle for power and domination. The Kantian liberal institutionalism envisions a cosmopolitan society in which states cooperate through international institutions. The Grotian tradition of the English School accepts states as the principal actor in the system, but does not necessarily see everything as a zero-sum game. While the political discourse found for the United States falls in the Grotian tradition, the political discourse found for Germany falls in the Kantian tradition. Similar to the verbal battle between realism and liberalism in academia, one can expect that no immediate bridge will be found between the two identified political discourses either. Germany and the United States seem to be victims of the UN Security Council's structure, victims of the rules of the game. 4. Results 52 After the interviews held with the four diplomats, it appears that the goal of their countries' actions is the accumulation of greater power in relation to others by introducing the arguments of distribution/legitimacy and security/stability respectively, thereby behaving as a rational actor in game theory. It is to be doubted that in switched situations, the two countries would act fundamentally differently than what game theory suggests. Therefore, domestic politics, historical backgrounds, cultural prevelance, etc. do not seem to have a great influence in institutionalized negotiation situations like the one at hand. 4.3. Assessment of Typologies 53

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Abstract

United Nations Security Council reform has been hotly debated since the end of the Cold War, which unleashed a global geopolitical realignment. But since 2007, the push to update the Security Council to reflect the power-sharing realities of our modern age – giving for example Germany a seat on the coveted panel – has largely stalled. Finding a Cue through “Q” chronicles the history, key initiatives and major players in this important discussion, while focusing on U.S. and German involvement on the council, and reboots the debate through political discourse analysis and intensive Q-methodology. Diplomats from Germany and the United States were asked to rank their agreement with statements made by stakeholders from government, business, academia and media in both countries. Instead of presenting a priori categories and foregone conclusions, this method describes the parameters of the debate through typologies derived from fresh diplomatic assessments. Social perspective narratives were created from the results, leading to the surfacing of two dominant discourses: Convinced Institutionalism and Cautious Institutionalism. Andreas Schwenk’s innovative approach provides new insight into the thinking of German and U.S. diplomats, and offers a valuable contribution to overcoming the stalemate. “Considering the growing number of attacks on multilateralism, Mr. Schwenk’s meticulous study clearly illustrates the need for reform of what is designed to be the world’s pivotal multilateral organization. A lack of reform of the U.N. Security Council might lead to future challenges to its primacy. It was my great pleasure to contribute to this fascinating book.” Doris Hertrampf, German Ambassador (Ret.) “I enjoyed participating in Mr. Schwenk‘s rigorous and systematic study of the vexed issue of U.N. Security Council reform. His analysis demonstrates broad commitment to keeping the Security Council effective, while the diversity of views confirms that changes to the number, regional distribution, or powers of its members will continue to be difficult.” William B. Wood, U.S. Ambassador (Ret.)