Chapter VIII Conclusion: The Waning and Revival of Political Ideology in:

Ridho Al-Hamdi

Indonesian Political Ideology, page 243 - 256

Political Parties and Local Governance in Yogyakarta Municipality 1998-2015

1. Edition 2017, ISBN print: 978-3-8288-4058-4, ISBN online: 978-3-8288-6884-7,

Tectum, Baden-Baden
Bibliographic information
Chapter VIII Conclusion: The Waning and Revival of Political Ideology Examining political ideologies and political parties in Indonesia are appealing subjects to examine further. Indonesia is not merely the third largest democratic state of the globe but also the largest predominantly Muslim country with variation among Muslim beliefs and practices and its positive development in economic affairs as well. After roughly four decades, the political ideology has been muted since the end of the s and the breakdown of the New Order regime in provided a chance for the emergence of political ideologies in Indonesia through party politics. Hundreds of political parties were established in post– . Nonetheless, merely parties were allowed to participate in the election, parties in , parties in and parties in . Most of them were founded and their policies and agendas were based on ideological considerations which were designed and stood between two opposing spectrums: secular and religious. At the same time, despite having positive developments, the democratisation wave in Indonesia, by and large, has run at a slow pace towards an embedded democracy. The democracy in Indonesia today falls into the scenario of stability (Merkel & Croissant, ), with neither optimism towards a consolidated democracy nor a regression in the near future. In order to encourage the democratic system, the separation of power between the central and regional governments known as “decentralisation” has been applied as an integrated system where the regional government, mainly the district and municipal levels have high authority to govern their own local resources. By applying the decentralised system, the local governance can realise the state and people’s welfare. 243 Numerous studies have described political parties in Indonesia’s post-New Order regime, whether analysing a sole party or a comparative study. Nonetheless, scrutinising parties in the context of local governance by selecting more than two parties based on ideological considerations and with a long time frame is still rare. Therefore, this study examined the existence of political ideology in contemporary Indonesia, from to . In doing so, selecting a particular district/ municipality with well-implemented local governance was applied in this study. Yogyakarta Municipality was selected. Moreover, three political parties were chosen as being representative; PDIP symbolises the abangan group (nationalist-secular), PAN characterises the old-santri group (nationalist-Muslim) and PKS can be classified as the new-santri group (nationalist-Islamist). Utilising a qualitative research method with in-depth interview and the documentary analysis as the data-gathering techniques, this study answered three interrelated questions: How do the policy and agenda of political parties cope with education and health issues? Do their policies and agendas work effectively? What are their strategies in interacting and communicating with four main actors in the governance arena: executive, legislature, civil society and economic society? The answer to these three questions answered the central question of this study: To what extent does political ideology influence political parties in addressing local governance issues in Yogyakarta Municipality? Towards a Symbiotic Ideology: Welfarism It can be postulated here that contemporary Indonesian parties are characterised by the fact that they are gradually moving towards a symbiotic ideology. The word “symbiotic” is an adjective from “symbiosis” which, according to the Cambridge Dictionary ( ), signifies a reciprocal relationship between two or more types of similar things in which each provides for the other the required conditions for its existence. In this context, symbiotic ideology can be understood as joining distinctive ideologies together into a particular ideology so that each party has an ability to continue its survival. The existence of ideologies in Indonesia today which are situated in the secular-religious 1. Chapter VIII 244 cleavage, is towards into a similar trajectory when parties address issues related mainly to public policies: as the fighter of welfare, primarily for lower-class people. Thus, Welfarism, convinced that a state has some responsibilities in securing the well-being of its people, is the symbiotic ideology adopted by Indonesian political parties in coping with public services. To verify this thesis, the policy of PDIP, PAN and PKS in addressing two main public services, education and health, follows a common pattern. In education issues, they together envision a threefold vision: ) free education, ) the realisation of years of compulsory education, and ) the improvement of school facilities, teacher quality and student scholarship not merely in public schools but also in private institutions. Concerning health issues, they concur to strive for a threefold target: ) free healthcare, ) the increase of the health centres’ facilities and work quality and ) the need to establish “a hospital without classes” prioritised for a poor-class society. Thus, these three parties agree that education and health are basic needs for human life which should be subsidised entirely by the municipal budget. In producing a policy or a set of policies, three main determining factors can influence those parties: the party regulation, internal stimuli and external stimuli. The party regulation will be found mainly in the party’s vision and missions, the party’s statute, the congressional decisions, the instructions made by the central board of the party and the official meeting decisions. In terms of internal stimuli, PDIP has two factors: ) the three pillar meetings consisting of structural, legislative and executive; ) the reports of three centres of the service: the DPC PDIP office, the PDIP Fraction in the DPRD and the PAC PDIP and DPRt PDIP offices. Meanwhile, PAN and PKS have one factor respectively. The reports coming from the DPC and DPRt are owned by PAN and the web of cadre aspirations belongs to PKS. Regarding external stimuli, there are five driving factors: MUSRENBANG, reses, public opinions, public hearings and society reports. Moreover, regarding the main policy makers of the party, although these three parties apply the collective-collegial mechanism and the deliberative system as its embodiment, in fact, the chairperson and the daily board of the party have dominant authorities rather than other positions in formulating and deciding a set of policies in the party. 1. Towards a Symbiotic Ideology: Welfarism 245 Furthermore, concerning the parties’ agenda in coping with two public services, it could be found in two distinctive ways. First are structural ways. It can be seen with the parties’ involvement in the DPRD’s tool fittings. Due to having many parliamentary seats and holding vital positions, PDIP, PAN and PKS have already demonstrated their significant contributions structurally in five distinctive tool fittings: the DPRD board, the commission of social welfare, the legislation body, the budgeting body and the special committee. More specifically, PDIP has already held the head of the DPRD three times, the chairperson of the commission of social welfare twice, the chairperson of the legislation body once, the chairperson of the budgeting body twice and the chairperson of the special committee once. PAN held the head of the DPRD once, twice as the chairperson of the commission of social welfare, once as the chairperson of the legislation body, once as the chairperson of the budgeting body and once as the chairperson of the special committee. In the meantime, PKS once held the deputy head of the DPRD, once as the vice chairperson of the commission of social welfare, once as the vice chairperson of the legislation body, once as the vice chairperson of the budgeting body and once as the chairperson of the special committee. PDIP, PAN and PKS usually have their representatives in those five kinds of the tool fittings so that they have contributed structurally either as the board or as an ordinary member in dealing with education and health issues. Second are functional ways as seen from the parties’ attitudes towards local regulation drafts (raperda) related to education and health issues. In doing so, PDIP, PAN and PKS have their own positions in addressing four sorts of raperda: the education system, the retribution of health services, health insurance and exclusive breastfeeding. The attitudes can be found through fractional views (pemandangan umum) delivered in the DPRD plenary sessions or through personal opinions of their delegates in the special committee. Despite having different expressions and points of view, the views of the three parties generally are encouraging and strengthening one another. With these two approaches played by these three parties, the positive growth of education and health issues in Yogyakarta Municipality is clear. All local regulations (perda) related to public services are usually discussed and issued officially by the DPRD, and all tool fittings Chapter VIII 246 are encouraging each other. Moreover, the municipal budget related to these two issues has been experiencing spectacular improvement from year to year. In , the budget for education sectors was still under five percent. It then rose to . percent in and improved drastically to . percent in . Likewise, the budget for health sectors in was . percent. It increased to percent in and . percent in . Hence, the budget for education in is the biggest of all sectors, followed by the budget for regional autonomy and health in the second and third ranks respectively. The budget for two sectors, education and health, in was more than half of the total annual budget of the municipality. That is why Yogyakarta Municipality could be considered Indonesia’s city of education. It is evident that with all the progress party agendas have done, all of them work effectively and successfully. Blunt in the Power Arena, Sharp to the Grassroots The strategy of the three parties in interacting and communicating with governance actors can be classified into two clusters. First is the relationship between parties and the state actors consisting of the government and the legislature. Second is the relationship between parties and the society groups comprising civil society and economic society. This study hypothesises that the political ideology is blunt in “the power arena” while it is sharp when it copes with “the grassroots”. In other words, the ideology is waning if it appears in the power arena, but conversely will revive if it addresses the grassroots. Waning Ideology: A Contest in the Power Arena The relationship between parties and the executive actors starts with the creation of a coalition in the mayoral election and ends at the end of the regime. The new coalition will begin again in the following mayoral election and so on. Broadly speaking, changeable politics is an embedded feature of the dynamics of local politics in Yogyakarta Municipality for three periods of the administration since until . 2. 2.1. 2. Blunt in the Power Arena, Sharp to the Grassroots 247 This study put forward three models of political cleavage found in the relationship between parties and the executive actors. First is the ideological approach from to . It denotes the relationship which took place between the abangan group (FPDIP and FKDK) and the santri group (FPAN and FPI). The pattern of coalition and clash during the mayoral election were tangible evidence. This clash was supported by some cases related to the relocation of street-based vendors and the closing of so-called “social illness spots” such as nightclubs, discotheques, casinos, drug trade and prostitution. Second is the pragmatic approach from to . This relationship indicates that political competition is rooted in a pragmatic orientation. The cleavage is based on the likes and dislikes amongst of them and preferring to avoid ideological considerations. It could be seen with the existence of the KRJ-Coalition (PAN and Golkar) vis-avis the KMP-Coalition (PDIP, PPP and PKS). Nevertheless, since the successful leadership by Herry Zudianto as the city mayor, the conflict tended to subside. The participation in governing the municipality not merely involves the governing parties but also all interrelated political parties. This is in line with the outstanding growth of the municipality. Third is the pragmatic-opportunist approach from to . It signifies that each of these three parties has the ambition to take a chance and a position in gaining the control of the municipal government through the mayoral election (pilwalkot). Therefore, PDIP, PAN and PKS had their own candidate in the mayoral election. Although PKS did not triumph, some of its elites had special ties with the elected pair of mayor and vice mayor. PAN was seemingly the sole party which always criticised the regime. In the meantime, an internal conflict occurred between the city mayor and its vice mayor, primarily at the end of the period. Each of them attempted to consolidate themselves for the candidacy in the mayoral election. Regarding the relationship between parties and the municipal agencies, the given data imply that PDIP prefers to struggle for individual interests while PAN and PKS tend to strive for institutional interests. PDIP has no special relation to particular institutions related to education and health issues. In the meantime, PAN usually keeps a close bond with Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah while PKS with the Chapter VIII 248 JSIT network. Each party will struggle for their own group or alliance interests. Meanwhile, the relationship between parties and the legislative actors begins after the elected legislators are decided officially by the KPUD and will discontinue until the end of the legislative period. In terms of the relationship of parties and their fraction in the parliament, it, in general, seemed solid in spite of a tiny clash, primarily suffered by PDIP and PAN in – . In the meantime, there was no crucial conflict found in PKS. Regarding the relationship amongst fractions within the parliament, it depends on the issue. If they discuss issues related to public policies and parliamentary affairs such as wages and the tool fittings, the situation will liquefy. On the other hand, if they address issues linked to religion and ethnicity, the circumstances will become extreme clashes. The three models of political cleavage in the executive arena and the relationship pattern depends on the issue or interest in the legislative arena indicating that the political ideology in the power arena is inactive or blunt. In other words, waning of ideology is detected when parties compete for one another in the power arena. In particular, “the symbiotic politics” were found in some contexts. The symbiotic politics signifies the fact that parties direct their different ideologies into a particular goal with a certain interest. In the executive arena, the unification of different ideologies was found, mainly in the municipal election when secular and Islamist parties (PDIP, PPP and PKS) were situated in one coalition and nominated an agreed pair of candidates. This continued during the – municipal administration in another form where all parties seemingly were controlled and tamed by the central figure of Herry Zudianto. Each party together positioned itself as the fighter of people’s interests when it interacted and communicated with the municipal agencies. The symbiotic politics also took place in the legislative arena when parties discussed and addressed welfare issues, either related to people’s or legislators’ interests. Thus, five fractions became one fraction if they dealt with welfare issues, but, one fraction ruptured into two or more fractions when they coped with electoral or religious/ ethnic issues. This phenomenon signifies that when political ideology 2. Blunt in the Power Arena, Sharp to the Grassroots 249 is waning, the more the local governance and even embedded democracy can be achieved. The Revival of Ideology: Approaching the Grassroots Whilst the political ideology is submerged in the power arena, it will revive if political parties interact and communicate with the society groups: civil society and economic society. In doing so, the revival of ideology can be formulated with “the creation of political forces” (see Figure . ). It is commenced, first and foremost, with the way parties recruit cadres from the existing networks and affiliations. After parties select the cadres, these elected cadres will be the key actors who mobilise societal power and attract popular votes. People will vote for the party based on their own preferences. The involvement in certain organisations, primarily religious-based organisations, will influence the way someone thinks. These organisations teach particular doctrines or religious perspectives. The way someone thinks will affect the way he/she votes for a certain party having a similar platform with his/her own social background. Consequently, he/she voluntarily will promote the organisation and the political party among family members, relatives, colleagues and so on. Based on this framework, each party will cultivate close ties with what Poguntke ( ) called a “collateral organisation”. Demonstrably, PDIP attempts to strengthen the web of Marhaenism devotees, PAN will rely on the network of Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah while PKS will maximise the role of the liqo’ linkages originating from the Jemaah Tarbiyah circle. To build their internal force, each of these parties has their own strategy to recruit cadres. PDIP prefers to recruit cadres from Marhaenism-based organisations characterised by multi-religions and multi-ethnics. Moreover, PAN tends to recruit cadres from mainly Muhammadiyah and ‘Aisyiyah and a small number from HMI and PII. In the meantime, most cadres of PKS originate from LDK and KAMMI. In the meantime, parties have distinctive bonds with economic society. Although PDIP is well-known with the slogan of struggling for the wong cilik, it does not truly prove such a slogan in its behaviour. 2.2. Chapter VIII 250 The closing of some leisure industries portrays the ambiguity of the PDIP position, whether striving for conglomerates or for labourers. In addition, the relocation of street-based vendors and traditional markets are evidence that PDIP can be a moderate party if it is involved in the process of decision making. Furthermore, PAN prefers to build reciprocal cooperation with business clusters in the proportional framework, although many of its cadres are leading entrepreneurs locally and nationally. Meanwhile, PKS has little concern with this issue for two reasons: the social background of the party’s elites and the fact that PKS has never been part of the main regime party. Regarding the relationship between parties and society actors, it is important to explain here that although Yogyakarta Municipality is the root of Marhaen communities, it is also the basis for kampung santri for pious Muslim activities. They are centred in Kauman, Karangkajen, Kotagede, Suronatan, Warungboto and Nitikan. These six locations could be abbreviated into one term: “TRIKASWANI”. These locations were selected for three reasons: a historical reason, a socio-religious reason and a political reason. Theoretical and Practical Implications From a theoretical standpoint, the findings call into question the hypothesis of Budge ( ) and Freeden ( ) which posits that the political ideology can frequently be reflected in the official programmes (policies and agendas) of the parties; this is frankly not quite accurate in contemporary Indonesia. Parties represented by PDIP, PAN and PKS join together as the fighters of people’s welfare and strive for the poor-class society’s interests. This signifies that the ideological contestation is waning and submerged, as there are no salient differences among platforms of those parties. The waning of ideology is strengthened by tangible evidence that the parties’ performance in the power arena indicates the feature of changeable politics, from ideological features into pragmatic features and again into pragmatic-opportunist features. Hence, the ideology is not applicable when parties address issues related to public policies and parliamentary affairs such as wages 3. 3. Theoretical and Practical Implications 251 and tool fittings. Instead, the ideology is revived when parties cope with issues related to religion and ethnicity. Furthermore, the theory developed by Jackson and Kingdon ( ) and Freeden ( ) that party ideology has a robust relationship with voting patterns is in line with this study. Each party with their own ideologies has a special relationship with societal organisations and alliances. This is supported by empirical findings which demonstrated that PDIP will cultivate its closeness with Marhaenismbased organisations, PAN prefers Muhammadiyah networks while PKS keeps its proximity with LDK and KAMMI communities. Hence, when Liddle ( ) hypothesised that the religious orientation has a weak influence on voting behaviour, it does not indicate that the relationship between parties and society is also feeble. Rather, the study’s findings strengthen the theories by Neumann ( ), Eldersveld ( ), Sartori ( ), Mainwaring ( ), Diamond ( ), Hofferbert ( ), Puhle ( ), Poguntke ( ), Randall ( ) and Mietzner ( ) who posit that parties are definitely associated with collateral-mass organisations and movements. Therefore, Ufen ( ) presumed that parties no longer have a tight network with any mass organisation including religious groups, which is not correct at all. The politics of aliran are not completely feeble as assumed by Ufen ( ). In addition, this study also supports Mietzner’s ( : p. ) argument that compared with other new democracies, Indonesia’s parties have a more solid historical and ideological foundation, cultivate closer ties to societal organisations and movements, have avoided confrontational competition patterns and indeed have contributed to the general stability of the post-authoritarian regime of . The survival of some political ideologies in contemporary Indonesia such as Pancasila, Islamism, secularism and communism-Marxism is encouraging Bajpai and Bonura’s ( ) theory that put forward some leading ideologies in South and Southeast Asia: liberalism, communism, nationalism, religious ideologies and ideologies of race, indignity and caste. The role of European colonialism in the Southeast Asia region has influential contributions in shaping those kinds of ideology. Nevertheless, the political cleavage between abangan and santri is occasionally inactive and alive. The cleavage is waning when it addresses issues related to public services and when it is situated in the Chapter VIII 252 power arena. In contrast, it will revive when it deals with religious and ethnic issues as well as the grassroots. Thus, the dichotomy of abangansantri which was classified by Geertz ( ) in a particular context is hazy and even disappearing. The disappearance of this dichotomy could be detected in some contexts such as in executive and legislative elections and in the discussions related to parliamentary tool fittings and legislators’ wages. Nevertheless, this study supports the theories of Randall ( ) and Mainwaring ( ) that studying political parties in developing countries is associated with the issues of democratisation, ideology, the party system and institutionalism. In addition, this study supports the theories postulated by Strom ( ), Downs ( ) and Harmel and Janda ( ) that each political party pursues four goals: winning the elections, gaining the executive office, advocating for interests or issues and implementing intra-party democracy. Indeed, PDIP, PAN and PKS have a desire to chase and obtain all four goals. It is important to highlight that there are three determining factors which influence a party in deciding on a set of policies namely the party regulation, the internal stimuli and the external stimuli reinforcing the theories of Pal ( ) and Harmel and Janda ( ). In the meantime, the existence of the chairperson and the daily board of the party as the main policy-makers of the party also strengthens Harmel and Janda’s ( ) hypothesis on five structural hierarchies of the authority: top leaders, middle-level leaders, activists, members and supporters. Particularly, this study also attempts to revise the preceding classification of political parties. Most previous scholars have distinctive classifications for PAN. Baswedan ( ) categorised it as the Islaminclusive party and Ufen ( ) grouped it into the moderate Islamic party. This study classified PAN as the nationalist-Muslim party. Moreover, Baswedan ( ), Webber ( ), Abuza ( ) Permata ( ) Mecham and Hwang ( ) categorised PKS as “the Islamist party”, Barton ( ) grouped it as “the formalist Islamic party” and Hosen ( ) catalogued it as “the formal sharia group party”. Nonetheless, this study grouped PKS into the category of “the nationalist-Islamist party”. For PDIP, this study applied Baswedan’s ( ) and Ufen’s ( ) concept: the nationalist-secular party. 3. Theoretical and Practical Implications 253 For practical implications, the formation of the symbiotic ideology among Indonesia’s parties in the context of struggling for social welfare is a positive sign in consolidating and stabilising local democracy. It indicates that all parties perform and work for people’s interests, not for personal ambitions or certain groups. It also denotes the fact that the parties’ platform is applicable with the fifth principle of Pancasila, keadilan sosial bagi seluruh rakyat Indonesia (social justice for all Indonesian people), and no party would endanger the unity of Indonesia as a state or a nation. In the other hand, the symbiotic ideology eventually will obscure the party platform so that it is difficult for any society to differentiate between secular and Islamist parties. Hence, it is a dilemma for ideology-based parties, between struggling for people’s welfare to attract popular votes and losing the party identity. The best but easy choice is indeed striving for people’s welfare without losing the party identity. In the same vein, the waning ideology in the power arena reveals that the politics of aliran is feeble and, in turn, it has some effects. First is the hazy identity which would be suffered by parties so that the party platform is not fundamental anymore. Second is that parties no longer have an obvious guideline in directing their policy, agendas and strategies due to the poor ideology. Third is the increase of authoritarianism, personalism and presidentialised parties as postulated by Samuels ( ), Poguntke and Webb ( ), Ufen ( a) and Kawamura ( ) which will threaten the party’s institutionalisation. In the meantime, the resurgence of ideology in the grassroots is tangible evidence that Indonesia’s parties indeed have a robust ideology and rooted ties to society so that parties could be a real channel for society to convey their aspirations to the state. The waning and resurgence of political ideology could be called “two sides of the same coin” which demonstrates that the more a party has a vigorous ideology and rooted bonds to society the more it has a chance to realise the party’s agendas and goals. The electoral performance of PDIP in and and PKS in and could be appropriate instances. Conversely, the less a party has a vigorous ideology there is more risk for the party to be inactive and lost. The electoral performance of PKB in and and the Democrat Party in are precise cases. Nevertheless, the waning or resurgence of ideol- Chapter VIII 254 ogy seemingly is not too significant for society. The fulfilment of basic needs and the achievement of pleasant life are indeed their real desire. Therefore, the most important thing is how parties capitalise and interpret such desires into a platform and strategies which differentiate themselves from others to earn popular votes and public sympathy. Proposal for Further Research Due to the limitations of this study, it is important to examine further three categories of research. First is conducting qualitative research regarding the policy and agenda of three parties, PDIP, PAN and PKS in dealing with the issues related to religion and ethnicity. Investigating the cases of making sharia regulations or anti-alcohol laws, the establishment of sharia-based Islamic banks, the foundation of sharia-based hotels or the allocation of financial aids for worship places are relevant instances to elaborate in in-depth research. Such research will depict to what extent political ideology is used. Second is carrying out empirical research on the relationship between the three parties and society groups in other districts and municipalities outside Yogyakarta Municipality. Are PDIP, PAN and PKS still relying on collateral-mass organisations and alliances in mobilising societal forces and attracting popular votes? Or, rather, is the organisational machine of the party feeble and inactive? This eventually will confirm the preceding hypothesis, either supporting or rejecting the thesis that political parties have a tight bond with collateral organisations including the determining factors. Third is sociological research on the existence of six kampung santris known as “TRIKASWANI” as elaborated in Chapter VII. First, research should explore the recent development of one of the TRIKASWANIs or a comparative study of two or more kampungs related to their contributions in activating the santri’s activities among the Marhaenist society. Second, research can explore the role of society (it can be specific to an organisation such as Muhammadiyah) in Islam-based parties winning the legislative election, mainly in four kelurahans: Purbayan, Prenggan, Brontokusuman and Notoprajan. 4. 4. Proposal for Further Research 255 Such research will portray the current influence of devout Muslims in Marhenist communities. Chapter VIII 256

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This book examines the influence of political ideology in Indonesia’s political parties to address governance issues during the democratic era, 1998–2015. Further, it investigates the policy, agenda and strategies of three ideological parties in Yogyakarta Municipality in coping with public service issues. The three parties are the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS).